Our impetus to produce this book arose out of our undergraduate and postgraduate teaching in information technology law. Although the number of texts in the area is now increasing, on being asked by students to recommend a casebook we were unable to do so. We have also found that one of the difficulties with a relatively new subject is that materials are not always readily accessible to students. Our aim was to include a range of materials sufficient to aid and enhance the student’s study of this topic. In addition, in such a developing area, we felt it helpful to include a substantial element of our own texts, where the context required it.

The book is primarily aimed at undergraduate and postgraduate law students. Against that background, we hope that it will provide reassurance that a detailed knowledge of the technology is unnecessary to understand the legal issues. Where some rudimentary understanding is helpful, minimum technical explanations have been included. We think the book may also prove both useful and of interest to computer scientists, who increasingly have to consider the wider implications of their discipline. They, of course, can skip the brief explanations of the technology!

We think that information technology provides exciting challenges and opportunities for the law and lawyers. We hope we have communicated something of this to the reader.

We have attempted to state the law as at 1 July 2000, but, where possible, developments since that date have been taken into account.

*Diane Rowland*
*Elizabeth Macdonald*
*November 2000*
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1 INTRODUCTION

PART I
THE CHALLENGES OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE

2 PROTECTING AND EXPLOITING RIGHTS IN SOFTWARE—INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

INTRODUCTION

THE SCOPE OF PROTECTION

The situation in the US

The situation in the UK

REVERSE ENGINEERING AND DECOMPILATION

THE ‘SOFTWARE DIRECTIVE’

UK implementation of the Software Directive

Sui generis rights revisited

PATENTS AND COMPUTER PROGRAMS

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN DATABASES

THE DATABASE DIRECTIVE

CONCLUDING REMARKS

3 PROTECTING AND EXPLOITING RIGHTS IN SOFTWARE—CONTRACT

INTRODUCTION

Types of contract

Bespoke and standard software

The software licence

Goods or services or something else?

Scope of the chapter

SUITABILITY/QUALITY OF SOFTWARE

Pre-contractual statements

TERMS
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SALE BY DESCRIPTION—s 13</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘By description’</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What constitutes a ‘description’ for the purposes of s 13?</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SATISFACTORY QUALITY</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPLICATION OF THE TERM</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sale ‘in the course of a business’</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Goods supplied under the contract’</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exceptions</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHAT CONSTITUTES SATISFACTORY QUALITY?</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FITNESS FOR THE BUYER’S PARTIAL PURPOSE—s 14(3)</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Particular purpose</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALE BY SAMPLE</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELEVANCE OF THE IMPLIED TERMS</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 DEFECTIVE SOFTWARE—PRODUCT LIABILITY AND TORT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The CPA 1987</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negligence</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART II</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE CHALLENGES OF COMPUTER NETWORKS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 E-COMMERCE</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global nature</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronic data interchange (EDI)</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope of the chapter</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JURISDICTION AND THE GOVERNING LAW</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JURISDICTION</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventions and common law</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Brussels Convention</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The common law rules</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE GOVERNING LAW</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC DIRECTIVE ON E-COMMERCE—BASIC ISSUES AND PARTICULAR PROBLEMS</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Contents

**8 POLICING ‘CYBERSPACE’**
- INTRODUCTION 447
- COMPUTER FRAUD 449
- THE OPERATION OF THE ACT 474
- REGULATION OF CONTENT ON COMPUTER NETWORKS 479
- EUROPEAN INITIATIVES 498

**9 ASPECTS OF THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS ON THE INTERNET**
- INTRODUCTION 503
- COPYRIGHT 503
- ISSUES RAISED BY LINKING ON THE WORLD WIDE WEB 511
- DOMAIN NAMES 520
- SUMMARY 532

**Index** 535
TABLE OF CASES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACLU v Reno I US DC Penn (1996)</td>
<td></td>
<td>479, 484, 486, 488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACLU v Reno II US Ct App (3rd Cir 2000)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.epic.org/free_speech/copa/pi_decision.html">www.epic.org/free_speech/copa/pi_decision.html</a></td>
<td>484, 491, 492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMI Systems Corp v Peak Computers Inc</td>
<td>991 F 2d 511 (9th Cir 1993)</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adams v Lindsell (1818) 1 B &amp; Ald 681</td>
<td></td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advent Systems Ltd v Unisys Corp 925 F 2d 670 (1991)</td>
<td></td>
<td>180, 184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AG v Jonathan Cape [1975] 3 All ER 484</td>
<td></td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AG’s Reference (No 1 of 1991) [1992] WLR 432, CA</td>
<td></td>
<td>469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ailsa Craig Fishing Co Ltd v Malvern Fishing Co Ltd 1983] WLR 964</td>
<td></td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alderslade v Hendon Laundry Ltd [1945] 1 KB 189</td>
<td></td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander v Rly Executive [1951] 2 KB 882</td>
<td></td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allapat, In re (1997) 28 IIC 868</td>
<td></td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alphacell Ltd v Woodward [1972] AC 824</td>
<td></td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglia TV v Reed [1971] 3 All ER 690</td>
<td></td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apple Computer Inc v Microsoft Corp 35 F 3d 1435 (9th Cir 1994)</td>
<td></td>
<td>41, 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arcos Ltd v EA Ronasen &amp; Son [1933] AC 470</td>
<td></td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aswan Engineering v Lupdine [1987] 1 All ER 135</td>
<td></td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atari Games Corp v Nintendo of America Inc 975 F 2d 832 (Fed Cir 1992)</td>
<td></td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlas Express v Kafco (Importers and Distributors) Ltd [1989] 1 All ER 641</td>
<td></td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avnet Inc v Isoact Ltd [1998] FSR 16, HC</td>
<td></td>
<td>517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aztech Systems Pty Ltd v Creative Technology Ltd [1996] FSR 54</td>
<td></td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

xvii
B & S Contracts and Designs Ltd
   v Victor Green Publications Ltd [1984] ICR 419  114
Baker v Selden 101 US 99 (1879)  11, 32, 35
Bannerman v White (1861) 10 CBNS 844  96
Bartlett v Sydney Marcus Ltd [1965] 2 All ER 753  203, 208
Barton v Armstrong [1976] AC 104  113
Beale v Taylor [1967] 1 WLR 1193  193, 195
Beecham v Francis Howard [1921] VLR 428  211
Bell v Alfred Franks & Bartlett Co Ltd [1980] 1 All ER 356  400, 401
Bernstein v Pamson Motors (Golders Green) Ltd
   [1987] 2 All ER 220  203, 210
Beta Computers (Europe) Ltd v Adobe Systems (Europe) Ltd
Bevan Investments v Blackball and Struthers (No 2)
   [1973] 2NZLR 45  243
Birch v Paramount Estates Ltd (1956) 16 EG 396  97
Bissett v Wilkinson [1927] AC 177  99
Blumenthal and Blumenthal v Drudge and America Online Inc
   US DC (Colum) 22 April 1998
   www.techlawjournal.com/courts/drudge/80423opin.htm  437
Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46  175
Bolam v FriernHMC [1957] 1 WLR 582  242, 243
 Boughton v Knight (1873) LR 3 PD 64  401
 Brinkibon Ltd v Stahag Stahl und
   Stahlwarenhandelgesellschaft mbH [1982] 1 All ER 293  302, 304, 306
British Fermentation Products Ltd v Compair Reavell Ltd
   [1999] 2 All ER (Comm) 389  144
British Gas Trading Ltd v Data Protection Registrar
   (1998) unreported  347, 400
British Leyland Motor Corp Ltd v Armstrong Patents Co Ltd
   [1986] AC 577  122
British Telecommunications plc and Another
   v One in a Million Ltd and Others [1998] 4 All ER 476  526, 528
British Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co Ltd
   v Underground Electric Rlys Co of London [1912] AC 673  132
Brogden v Metropolitan Rly Co (1877) 2 App Cas 666  127
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Details</th>
<th>Page Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brookfield Communications Inc v West Coast</td>
<td>518, 519, 522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brower v Gateway 2000 Inc 676 NSY 2d 569 (NYAD 1998)</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown v Craiks [1970] 1 All ER 823</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown v Raphael [1959] 1 Ch 636</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown Bag Software v Symantec Corp 960 F 2d 1465 (9th Cir 1992)</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Applications v Nationwide Credit Corp [1988] RTR 332</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byrne v Dean [1937] 1 KB 818</td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C &amp; P Haulage v Middleton [1983] 3 All ER 94</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCC Films (London) Ltd v Impact Quadrant Ltd</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[1984] 3 All ER 298</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCN Systems Ltd and CCN Credit Systems Ltd v Data</td>
<td>395, 396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection Registrar Case DA/90 25/49/9, unreported</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTN Cash and Carry v Gallaher [1994] 4 All ER 714</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cammell Laird &amp; Co Ltd v Manganese Bronze and Brass Co Ltd [1934] 402</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada Steamship Lines Ltd v R [1952] AC 192</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caparo Industries plc v Dickman and Others [1990] 2 AC 605</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cardozo v True 342 So 2d 1053 (1977)</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cardservice International v McGee 950 F Supp 737 (ED Va 1997)</td>
<td>529, 530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co [1893] 1 QB 256</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caughey, ex p Fordey, Re (1876) 1 Ch D 521</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavanagh v Ulster Weaving Ltd [1960] AC 145</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapelton v Barry UDC [1940] 1 KB 532</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chappell &amp; Co v Nestle Co [1960] AC 87</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chester Grosvenor Hotel Co Ltd v Alfred McAlpine Management Ltd [1992] 56 Build LR 115</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collins v Godefroy (1831) 1 B&amp; Ald 950</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission v UK Case C-300/95 [1997] ECR I-2649</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Charge Registration Office of Rhondda BC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v Data Protection Registrar Case DA/90 25/49/2, unreported</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Charge Registration Officers of Runnymede BC, South Northamptonshire DC and Harrow BC v Data Protection Registrar Cases DA/90 24/49/3, 4 and 5, unreported</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Computer Aided Design v Bolwell
(1989) unreported, 23 August 45, 48

(1992) 106 Harv L Rev 510 13, 30, 36, 37, 40–44,
47–51, 54, 55

Computer Edge Pty Ltd v Apple Computer Inc
(1986) 161 CLR 171 22–25

Conegate v HM Customs and Excise [1986] ECR 1007 499, 500
Conopco Inc v McCreadie 826 F Supp 855 (1991) 180
Couchman v Hill [1947] 1 All ER 103 97, 280
Cox v Riley [1986] CLR 460 176, 457, 458, 470–72, 497

Cubby Inc v CompuServe Inc
776 F Supp 135 (SDNY 1991) 432, 433, 436, 437
Currie v Misa (1875) LR 10 Exch 153 108
Curtis v Chemical Cleaning and Dyeing Co
[1951] 1 KB 805 101

DP Anderson & Co v Lieber Code Co [1917] 2 KB 469 21
Darlington Futures Ltd v Delco Australia Pty
(1986) 68 ALR 385 134

Data Access Corp v Powerflex Services Pty Ltd
[1999] HCA 49, HC (Aus) 54, 55, 58, 70

Data Protection Registrar v Amnesty International
(British Section) (1994) The Times, 23 November 415
Davies v Sumner [1984] 1 All ER 831 146–48, 205
Denco v Joinson [1992] 1 All ER 463 475
Devlin v Hall [1990] RTR 320 148, 205

Dick Bentley Productions Ltd v Harold Smith
(Motors) Ltd [1965] 2 All ER 65 96, 98

Dimskal Shipping Co SA v International Transport Workers’
Federation (The Evia Luck) [1991] 4 All ER 871 114

DPP v Bignell [1998] Crim LR 53 468
Dodd v Wilson [1946] 2 All ER 691 186, 187

Doe v AOL 1997 WL 374223 (Fla Cir) June 26 1997
www.techlawjournal.com/courts/zeran/81014.htm 437

xx
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donaghue v Allied Newspapers Ltd [1938] Ch 106</td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562; [1932] 1 All ER 1</td>
<td></td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drummond v Van Ingen (1887) 12 App Cas 284</td>
<td></td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dulles’ Settlement (No 2), Re [1951] Ch 842</td>
<td></td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co v Selfridge &amp; Co [1915] AC 79</td>
<td></td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edgington v Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch D 459</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edwards v NCB [1949] 1 QB 704</td>
<td></td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emmens v Pottle (1885) 16QBd 354</td>
<td></td>
<td>431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enimont Overseas v Rojugeotanker Zadar (The Olib) [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 108</td>
<td></td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entores Ltd v Miles Far Eastern Corp [1955] 2 QB 325</td>
<td></td>
<td>300, 301, 303, 304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erven Warnink BV v J Townend and Sons (Hull) Ltd [1979] 2 All ER 927</td>
<td></td>
<td>526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Mardon [1976] QB 801</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feist Publications Inc v Rural Telephone Service Co</td>
<td>113 L Ed 2d 358 (1991)</td>
<td>42, 85, 86, 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisher v Bell [1961] 1 QB 394</td>
<td></td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flamar Interocoean Ltd v Denmac Ltd [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 434</td>
<td></td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraser v Evans [1969] 1 QB 349</td>
<td></td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frost v Aylesbury Dairy Co [1905] 1 KB 685</td>
<td></td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fujitsu Ltd’s Application [1996] RPC 511</td>
<td></td>
<td>74, 81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Futuredontics Inc v Applied Anagramics Inc 45 USPQ 2d (BNA) 2005 (1998); affirmed US Ct App (9th Cir) (1998)</td>
<td></td>
<td>514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gale’s Application, Re [1991] RPC 305, CA</td>
<td></td>
<td>80, 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galloway v Galloway (1914) 30 TLR 531</td>
<td></td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geddling v Marsh [1920] 1 KB 668</td>
<td></td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geier v Kujawa, Weston and Warne Bros (Transport) [1970] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 364</td>
<td></td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd [1983] 2 AC 803</td>
<td></td>
<td>134, 149, 153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gibson v Manchester CC [1979] 1 WLR 294</td>
<td></td>
<td>124, 296, 297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Citation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glaxo plc v Glaxowellcome Ltd</td>
<td>[1996]</td>
<td>FSR 388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Godfrey v Demon Internet</td>
<td>[1999]</td>
<td>4 All ER 342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodman v J Eban Ltd</td>
<td>[1954]</td>
<td>1 QB 550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gottschalk v Benson</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>US 63 (1972)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grainger &amp; Son v Gough</td>
<td>[1896]</td>
<td>AC 325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant v Australian Knitting Mills</td>
<td>[1936]</td>
<td>AC 85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greaves &amp; Co (Contractors) v Beynham Meikle and Partners</td>
<td>[1974]</td>
<td>1 WLR 1261; [1975] 3 All ER 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green (RW) Ltd v Cade Bros Farms</td>
<td>[1978]</td>
<td>1 Lloyd’s Rep 602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Griffiths v Peter Conway Ltd</td>
<td>[1939]</td>
<td>1 All ER 685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadley v Baxendale</td>
<td>(1854)</td>
<td>9 Ex 341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harling v Eddy</td>
<td>[1951]</td>
<td>2 All ER 212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harlingdon &amp; Leinster Enterprises v Christopher Hull Fine Art</td>
<td>[1991]</td>
<td>1 QB 564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harris v Watson</td>
<td>(1791)</td>
<td>Peake 102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harrison, T &amp; J v Knowles and Foster</td>
<td>[1918]</td>
<td>1 KB 608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harrods plc v UK Network Services Ltd</td>
<td>[1996]</td>
<td>unreported, Ch D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hartley v Ponsonby</td>
<td>(1857)</td>
<td>7 E &amp; B 872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Havering LBC v Stevenson</td>
<td>[1970]</td>
<td>3 All ER 609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawkes &amp; Son (London) Ltd v Paramount Film Services Ltd</td>
<td>[1934]</td>
<td>Ch 593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedley Byrne &amp; Co Ltd v Heller &amp; Partners Ltd</td>
<td>[1964]</td>
<td>AC 465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heilbut, Symons &amp; Co v Buckleton</td>
<td>[1913]</td>
<td>AC 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hill v Gateway 2000 Inc</td>
<td>105 F 3d</td>
<td>1147 (7th Cir 1997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hird v Wood</td>
<td>(1894)</td>
<td>38 SJ 235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hitachi’s Application</td>
<td>[1991]</td>
<td>RPC 415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hollier v Rambler Motors Ltd</td>
<td>[1972]</td>
<td>2QB 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hollinrake v Truswell</td>
<td>[1894]</td>
<td>3Ch 420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holwell Securities v Hughes</td>
<td>[1974]</td>
<td>1 All ER 161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha</td>
<td>[1962]</td>
<td>2 QB 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hood v Anchor Line</td>
<td>[1918]</td>
<td>AC 837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houghton v Trafalgar Insurance Co</td>
<td>[1954]</td>
<td>1 QB 247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Fire Insurance v Grant</td>
<td>(1879)</td>
<td>4 Ex D 216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howard Marine &amp; Dredging Co Ltd v A Ogden &amp; Sons (Excavations) Ltd</td>
<td>[1978]</td>
<td>QB 574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case</td>
<td>Page Numbers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBA v EMI and BICC (1980)</td>
<td>14 BLR 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibcos Computers Ltd v Barclays Mercantile Highland Finance Ltd</td>
<td>238, 243, 245</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBM/Computer-related invention T115/85 [1990] EPOR 107</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBM Corp, In re T1173/97 (1997)</td>
<td>76, 82, 83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBM/Data Processor Network T06/83 [1990] EPOR 91</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBM/Semantically related expressions T52/85 [1989] EPOR 454</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBM/Text processing T65/86 [1990] EPOR 181</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infolink Ltd v Data Protection Registrar Case DA/90 25/49/9, unreported</td>
<td>396</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovations (Mail Order) Ltd v Data Protection Registrar Case DA/92 31/49/1, unreported</td>
<td>393</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interfotol Picture Library v Stiletto Visual Programmes [1988] 1 All ER 348</td>
<td>125</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacobs v Batavia and General Plantations Trust [1924] 1 Ch 287</td>
<td>99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnstone v Bloomsbury HA [1991] 2 All ER 293</td>
<td>102, 128</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jones v Daniel [1894] 2 Ch 332</td>
<td>124</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenrick and Co v Lawrence &amp; Co (1890) 25 QBD 99</td>
<td>50, 52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koufos v Czarnikow Ltd [1969] 1 AC 350</td>
<td>131</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football) Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 273</td>
<td>24, 28, 46–50, 54, 85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lady Gwendolen, The [1965] P 294</td>
<td>237</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lang (1975) 62 Cr App R 50</td>
<td>401</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lee v Griffin (1861) 1 B &amp; S 272</td>
<td>188–90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
L’Estrange v F Grauco Ltd [1934] 2 KB 394 101, 323
Lewis v Clay (1897) 67 LJQB 224 401
Linguaphone Institute Ltd v Data Protection Registrar Case DA/94 31/49/1, unreported 394
Liverpool CC v Irwin [1976] 2 All ER 39 102
London and Globe Finance Corp Ltd, Re [1903] 1 Ch 732 453
Lotus v Borland Copyright and Computer Programs (1996) Tul LR 2397 12
Lunney v Prodigy Services Co NY State Ct App, 2 December 1999 www.nycourts.com 427, 438, 439, 508

MA Mortenson Co Inc v Timberline Software Corp 970 P 2d 803 (Wash App 1999) 130
MS Associates v Power [1987] FSR 242 29
MTV Networks Inc v Curry 867F Supp 202 (SDNY 1994) 529
McGhee v NCB [1973] 1 WLR 1 241
Macgregor v Procurator Fiscal of Kilmarnock (1993) unreported, 22 June 402
Macmillan & Co Ltd v Cooper (1924) 40 TLR 186 85
Macquarie Bank v Berg [1999] NSWSC 526 429
Maharanee of Baroda v Wildenstein [1972] 2 All ER 689 268
Manchester Liners Ltd v Rea Ltd [1922] AC 74 214, 215
Marcel v Metropolitan Police Comr [1992] Ch 225 338
Marcel, J (Furriers) Ltd v Tapper [1953] 1 WLR 49 190
Marks & Spencer plc v One in a Million Ltd [1998] FSR 265 525, 528
Mars UK Ltd v Teknowledge Ltd [2000] FSR 138 90
Maskell v Horner [1915] 3 KB 106 113
Micklefield v SAC Technology Ltd [1990] 1 WLR 1002 142
Micron Computer Systems Ltd v Wang (1990) unreported, 9 May 95, 103, 210, 213
Miller v California 413 US 15 (1973) 488
Ministry of Housing and Local Government v Sharp [1970] 2 QB 223 1, 236
Mondial Shipping and Chartering BV v Astarte Shipping Ltd [1995] CLC 1011 304
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Volume/Year</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monson v Tussauds Ltd [1894]</td>
<td>1 QB 671</td>
<td>425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moorcock, The (1889)</td>
<td>14 PD 64</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moore &amp; Co and Landauer &amp; Co, Re [1921]</td>
<td>2 KB 519</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand Post v Leng [1999]</td>
<td>3 NZLR 219</td>
<td>527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niblett Ltd v Confectioner’s Materials Co Ltd [1921]</td>
<td>3 KB 387</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nichols v Universal Pictures Corp 45 F 2d 119 (2nd Cir 1930)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norman v Bennett [1974]</td>
<td>1 WLR 1229</td>
<td>394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Ocean Shipping v Hyundai Construction Co Ltd (The Atlantic Baron)</td>
<td>3 All ER 1170</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oggi Advertising Ltd v McKenzie [1999]</td>
<td>1 NZLR 631</td>
<td>527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olley v Marlborough Court Hotel [1949]</td>
<td>1 KB 532</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams [1957]</td>
<td>1 All ER 325</td>
<td>96, 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxford v Moss [1978]</td>
<td>68 Cr App R 183</td>
<td>175, 177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panavision International LP v Toeppen and Network Solutions Inc 143 F 3d 1316 US Ct App (9th Cir 1998)</td>
<td>520, 528, 529</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pardo, In re 684 F 2d 912 (1982)</td>
<td></td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parker v South Eastern Rly Co Ltd (1877)</td>
<td>2 CPD 416</td>
<td>101, 125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parmiter v Coupland (1840)</td>
<td>6 M &amp; W 105</td>
<td>426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parsons (H) (Livestock) v Uttley Ingham &amp; Co Ltd [1978]</td>
<td>1 All ER 525</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partridge v Crittenden [1968]</td>
<td>2 All ER 421</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Boots Cash Chemists [1953]</td>
<td>1 QB 401</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phillips Products Ltd v Hyland [1987]</td>
<td>2 All ER 620</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photo Production Ltd v Securicor [1980]</td>
<td>AC 827</td>
<td>134, 152, 153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pitman Training Ltd v Nominet UK [1997]</td>
<td>FSR 797</td>
<td>520, 523, 524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Playboy Enterprises Inc v AsiaFocus International Inc No Civ A 97–734–A (US DC Va) 10 April 1988 cyber.law.harvard.edu/property/domain/playboy.html</td>
<td>515, 516</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Playboy Enterprises Inc v Calvin Designer Label 985 Supp 1220 (US DC Cal 1999)</td>
<td>516, 517</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

xxv
Playboy Enterprises v Chuckleberry Publishing
939 F Supp 1032 (SDNY 1996)

Playboy Enterprises Inc v Frena
839 F Supp 1552 (US DC Flo 1993)

Playboy Enterprises v Giannattasio (1999)
www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/guidelines/precedents.html

Playboy Enterprises v Netscape Communications Corp;
Same v Excite Inc 55 F Supp 2d 1070 (US DC Cal 1999)

Playboy Enterprises v Universal Tel-a-Talk Inc

Playboy Enterprises v Welles 7 F Supp 2d 1098 (SD Ca 1998)

Preist v Last [1903] 2 KB 148

Prince plc v Prince Sportswear Group Inc [1998] FSR 21

Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 1 Mac & G 25

ProCD Inc v Mathew Zeidenberg and Silken Mountain Web Services Inc No 96–1139 US Ct App (7th Cir)
unreported, 20 June 1996

R & B Customs Brokers v United Dominion Trust
[1988] 1 All ER 847

R v Bedworth (1993) unreported

R v Brown [1996] 2 WLR 203

R v Burdett (1820) 4 B & Ald 95

R v Caldwell [1982] AC 341

R v Cropp (1991) unreported

R v Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396

R v Department of Health ex p Source Informatics
[2000] 1 All ER 786

R v Fellows and Arnold [1997] 2 All ER 548

R v Fisher (1865) LR 1 CCR 7

[1988] Crim LR 437, HL

R v Governor of Brixton Prison ex p Levin [1997] 1 Cr App R 355

R v Griffiths ex p AG [1957] 2 All ER 379

R v Henderson and Battley (1984) unreported, ICA

R v Henn and Darby [1979] ECR 3795

R v Kopsch [1925] 19 Cr App R 50
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Page Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R v Lawrence [1982] AC 510</td>
<td>414, 415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R v Lawrence [1989] Crim LR 309</td>
<td>477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R v Munden (1996) unreported</td>
<td>453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R v Pile (1995) unreported</td>
<td>473, 478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R v Ponting [1985] Crim LR 318</td>
<td>476, 477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R v Poplar Coroner ex p Thomas [1993] 2 WLR 547</td>
<td>240, 241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R v Preddy [1996] AC 815</td>
<td>455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R v R [1991] 3 WLR 767</td>
<td>389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R v Reid [1992] 3 All ER 673</td>
<td>414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R v Thompson [1984] 1 WLR 962</td>
<td>450–52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1991) The Times, 6 February</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reardon Smith Line v Hansen Tangen [1976] 1 WLR 989</td>
<td>196, 199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rees Hough Ltd v Redland Reinforced Plastics Ltd</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[1985] 2 Con LR 109</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richardson, Spence &amp; Co v Rowntree [1894] AC 217</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mark.law.auckland.ac.nz/cases/Rindos.html</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robinson v Graves [1935] 1 KB 579</td>
<td>188–91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robinson v Harman (1880) 5 App Cas 25</td>
<td>100, 131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roe v Naylor [1971] 1 KB 712</td>
<td>394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rogers v Parish Ltd [1987] 1 QB 933</td>
<td>203, 208, 210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routledge v Mackay [1954] 1 All ER 855</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rowland Divall [1923] 2 KB 500</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royscott Trust Ltd v Rogerson [1991] 3 All ER 294</td>
<td>100, 101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Albans City and DC v ICL [1996] 4 All ER 481;</td>
<td>12, 104, 144, 153, 154, 172, 176, 178, 181, 183, 185–88, 191, 209, 218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[1995] FSR 686</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salooomey v Jeppesen 707 F 2d 671 (1983)</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvage Association v CAP Financial Services Ltd</td>
<td>132, 142, 144, 153, 154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[1995] FSR 654</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scotson v Pegg (1861) 6 H & N 295 108

Seaconsfar Far East Ltd v Bank Markhazi Jomhouri Islami Iran [1994] 1 AC 438 269

Sega Enterprises Ltd v Accolade Inc 977 F 2d 1510 (1992) 13, 48, 57

Sega Enterprises Ltd v Richards [1983] FSR 73 22

Selectmove, Re [1995] 2 All ER 531 108


Shevill v Presse Alliance SA Case C–68/93 [1995] All ER (EC) 289 443, 444

Shirlaw v Southern Foundries Ltd [1939] 2 KB 206 102

Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237 426

Singer Co (UK) Ltd v Tees and Hartlepool Port Authority [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 164 152

Slater v Finning [1996] 3 All ER 398 213

Smedley v Breed [1974] AC 839 235

Smith v Chadwick (1884) 9 App Cas 187 99

Smith v Eric S Bush (A Firm) [1990] 1 AC 831 149, 150, 152–54

Smith v Land & House Pty Corp (1884) 28 Ch D 7 100

South Central Bell Telephone Co v Barthelemy 643 So 2d 1240 (La 1994) 176, 177


Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] 1 WLR 461 125

Stag Line Ltd v Tyne Ship Repair Group Ltd (The Zinnia) [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 211 152

Step-Saver Data Systems Inc v Wyse Technology and Software Link Inc 939 F 2d 91 (3rd Cir 1991) 130

Stevenson v Rogers [1997] 1 All ER 613 148, 204, 205

Stewart Gill Ltd v Horatio Myer & Co Ltd [1992] 2 All ER 257 149

Stilk v Myrick (1809) 2 Camp 317 109–11
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Title</th>
<th>Court</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stratton Oakmont Inc v PRODIGY Services Co</td>
<td>NY Sup Ct Nassau Co</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>32, 33, 36, 37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar v LM &amp; S Railway</td>
<td>1 All ER</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tehran Europe v ST Belton</td>
<td>2 QB</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thake v Maurice</td>
<td>1 All ER</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas v Thomas</td>
<td>2 QB</td>
<td>1842</td>
<td>851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thompson v LM &amp; S Railway</td>
<td>1 KB</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thornett and Fehr v Beer &amp; Son</td>
<td>1 KB</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking</td>
<td>2 QB</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ticketmaster Corp v Microsoft Corp</td>
<td></td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toby Constructions Products Pty Ltd v Computa Bar (Sales) Pty Ltd</td>
<td>NSWLR</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Information Processing Systems Ltd v Daman Ltd</td>
<td>FSR</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States v Thomas</td>
<td>3d</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universe Tankships Inc of Monrovia v International Transport Workers’ Federation</td>
<td>1 AC</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of London Press v University Tutorial Press Ltd</td>
<td>2 Ch</td>
<td>1916</td>
<td>601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacwell Engineering Co Ltd v BDH Chemicals Ltd</td>
<td>1 QB</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Varley v Whipp</td>
<td>1 QB</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicom/Computer-related invention T208/84</td>
<td>EPOR</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>74–76, 79–83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd v Newman Industries Coulson &amp; Co Ltd</td>
<td>2 KB</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Laboratories Inc’s Application</td>
<td>RPC</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward v Byham</td>
<td>2 All ER</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Whelan Associates v Jaslow Dental Laboratory Inc
797 F 2d 1222 (1987)
31, 35–37, 40, 42, 43, 45, 46, 48, 50, 53

White v Bluett (1853) 23 LJ Ex 36
108

White v John Warwick & Co Ltd [1953] 2 All ER 1021
133

Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd
[1991] 1 QB 1
108, 109, 112

Williams and Glyn’s Bank v Astro Dynamico Cia Naviera SA
[1984] 1 All ER 760
269

Willis v FMC Machinery and Chemicals Ltd
(1976) 68 DLR (3d) 127
182

Wilson v Rickett, Cockerell & Co Ltd [1954] 1 QB 598
206

Wimpey Construction v Poole [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 499
247

Winter v GP Puttnam & Sons 938 F 2d 1033 (9th Cir 1991)
178

Woodman v Photrade Processing Ltd (1981) unreported
152

Wormell v RHM Agriculture Ltd [1986] 1 All ER 769
181–83

Zeran v America Online US Ct App 4th Cir, 12 November 1997
www.techlawjournal.com/courts/zeran/71112opn.htm
435–37, 441
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislation</th>
<th>Section(s)</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Broadcasting Act 1990—</td>
<td>166(1)</td>
<td>426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child On-line Protection Act 1998 (US)</td>
<td>231(e)(2)(A), (2)(B)</td>
<td>490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>231(e)(6)</td>
<td>491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>231(1)</td>
<td>490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children and Young Persons (Harmful Publications) Act 1955</td>
<td></td>
<td>496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41(6)</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
<td>266–68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>43(1)(b), (c)</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>49</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1991</td>
<td></td>
<td>443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications Act 1934</td>
<td></td>
<td>433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications Decency Act 1996 (US)</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>230(e)(3)</td>
<td>486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>509</td>
<td>486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Companies Act 1985</td>
<td></td>
<td>268, 309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer Misuse Act 1990</td>
<td>177, 455, 460, 465, 468, 469, 473–76, 478, 479</td>
<td>139, 158, 395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>465, 466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1(1)</td>
<td>468, 469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22(i)</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31(1)(a)</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31(1)(a)(vii)</td>
<td>25, 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>101(1)</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>102(b)</td>
<td>30, 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>107</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>117</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copyright (Computer Software) Amendment Act 1985</td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1(2)</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Related Act</td>
<td>Sections/Provisions</td>
<td>Reference Numbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988</td>
<td>s 1, 3, s 3(1), s 3A, s 17, s 16(3), ss 10–12, s 17(1), s 17(2), s 17(6), s 20, ss 10–12</td>
<td>405–09, 411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>s 21(3)(ab), s 21(4)</td>
<td>391–93, 406, 407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>s 29</td>
<td>347, 348, 385, 395, 400, 402, 403, 406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>s 29(1), s 50, s 50A, s 50A(2), s 50B, s 50C, ss 7–9, ss 10–14, s 21, ss 28–36, ss 37, 41, s 56</td>
<td>392, 395, 396, 403, 396, 407, 409–11, 416, 367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>s 296A, s 296B</td>
<td>466, 468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Damage Act 1971</td>
<td>s 1(1), s 2, ss 7–9, ss 10–14, s 21, ss 28–36, ss 47, 55, Sched 1</td>
<td>387, 407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>s 296A(1), s 296B, Sched 1</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sched 2, Sched 3</td>
<td>387, 397, 399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>s 1(1), s 2, ss 7–9, ss 10–14, s 21, ss 28–36</td>
<td>438–494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs Consolidation Act 1876</td>
<td>s 7, s 7(1)–(3), ss 6–10, ss 11, ss 12–16, ss 21, ss 28–36</td>
<td>320, 322, 324, 325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>s 46, s 56</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>s 47, s 50A(2), (3), ss 7–9, ss 10–14, s 21, ss 28–36</td>
<td>311, 313–16, 318–20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sched 1</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>s 296A(1), s 296B, Sched 1</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sched 2, Sched 3</td>
<td>387, 397, 399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defamation Act 1996, s 1(1), s 2, ss 7–9, ss 10–14, s 21, ss 28–36</td>
<td>438–494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>s 10(1), Sched 1</td>
<td>438–40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>s 296A(1), s 296B, Sched 1</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sched 2, Sched 3</td>
<td>387, 397, 399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defamation Act 1996, s 1(1), s 2, ss 7–9, ss 10–14, s 21, ss 28–36</td>
<td>438–494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>s 10(1), Sched 1</td>
<td>438–40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>s 296A(1), s 296B, Sched 1</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sched 2, Sched 3</td>
<td>387, 397, 399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Defamation Act 1996, s 1(1), s 2, ss 7–9, ss 10–14, s 21, ss 28–36</td>
<td>438–494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>s 10(1), Sched 1</td>
<td>438–40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>s 296A(1), s 296B, Sched 1</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sched 2, Sched 3</td>
<td>387, 397, 399</td>
</tr>
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<td>Defamation Act 1996, s 1(1), s 2, ss 7–9, ss 10–14, s 21, ss 28–36</td>
<td>438–494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>s 10(1), Sched 1</td>
<td>438–40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>s 296A(1), s 296B, Sched 1</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sched 2, Sched 3</td>
<td>387, 397, 399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defamation Act 1996, s 1(1), s 2, ss 7–9, ss 10–14, s 21, ss 28–36</td>
<td>438–494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>s 10(1), Sched 1</td>
<td>438–40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>s 296A(1), s 296B, Sched 1</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sched 2, Sched 3</td>
<td>387, 397, 399</td>
</tr>
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<td>Defamation Act 1996, s 1(1), s 2, ss 7–9, ss 10–14, s 21, ss 28–36</td>
<td>438–494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>s 10(1), Sched 1</td>
<td>438–40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>s 296A(1), s 296B, Sched 1</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sched 2, Sched 3</td>
<td>387, 397, 399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Defamation Act 1996, s 1(1), s 2, ss 7–9, ss 10–14, s 21, ss 28–36</td>
<td>438–494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>s 10(1), Sched 1</td>
<td>438–40</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>s 296A(1), s 296B, Sched 1</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sched 2, Sched 3</td>
<td>387, 397, 399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Defamation Act 1996, s 1(1), s 2, ss 7–9, ss 10–14, s 21, ss 28–36</td>
<td>438–494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>s 10(1), Sched 1</td>
<td>438–40</td>
</tr>
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<td>s 296A(1), s 296B, Sched 1</td>
<td>413</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sched 2, Sched 3</td>
<td>387, 397, 399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Defamation Act 1996, s 1(1), s 2, ss 7–9, ss 10–14, s 21, ss 28–36</td>
<td>438–494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>s 10(1), Sched 1</td>
<td>438–40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>s 296A(1), s 296B, Sched 1</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sched 2, Sched 3</td>
<td>387, 397, 399</td>
</tr>
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<td>Defamation Act 1996, s 1(1), s 2, ss 7–9, ss 10–14, s 21, ss 28–36</td>
<td>438–494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>s 10(1), Sched 1</td>
<td>438–40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>s 296A(1), s 296B, Sched 1</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sched 2, Sched 3</td>
<td>387, 397, 399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defamation Act 1996, s 1(1), s 2, ss 7–9, ss 10–14, s 21, ss 28–36</td>
<td>438–494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>s 10(1), Sched 1</td>
<td>438–40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>s 296A(1), s 296B, Sched 1</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sched 2, Sched 3</td>
<td>387, 397, 399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defamation Act 1996, s 1(1), s 2, ss 7–9, ss 10–14, s 21, ss 28–36</td>
<td>438–494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>s 10(1), Sched 1</td>
<td>438–40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>s 296A(1), s 296B, Sched 1</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sched 2, Sched 3</td>
<td>387, 397, 399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defamation Act 1996, s 1(1), s 2, ss 7–9, ss 10–14, s 21, ss 28–36</td>
<td>438–494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>s 10(1), Sched 1</td>
<td>438–40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act/Statute</td>
<td>Section(s)</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Aus)</td>
<td>s 1(1)</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enduring Power of Attorneys Act 1987</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair Trading Act 1986 (NZ)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Law Reform Act 1969—s 1(1), 8(1)</td>
<td>s 1, 8</td>
<td>1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Trademark Dilution Act (US)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and Safety at Work Act 1974</td>
<td>s 1, 6</td>
<td>1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpretation Act 1978</td>
<td></td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlord and Tenant Act 1954</td>
<td>s 1, 6</td>
<td>1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malicious Communications Act 1988</td>
<td></td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malicious Damage Act 1861</td>
<td>s 2(1)</td>
<td>1861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misrepresentation Act 1967—s 2(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misrepresentations Act s 14(1)</td>
<td>s 14(1)</td>
<td>1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obscene Publications Act 1959</td>
<td></td>
<td>1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official Secrets Act</td>
<td>s 1(1)</td>
<td>1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penal Code (Germany)—s 184</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Act 1997</td>
<td>s 1</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of Children Act 1978</td>
<td>s 1(1)(a)–(d)</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of Children Act 1999</td>
<td></td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1893</td>
<td></td>
<td>1893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sale of Goods</td>
<td>s 13</td>
<td>1893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s 10(3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s 1125(c)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s 12(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s 12(2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s 13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>References</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s 1(1)</td>
<td>197</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s 2(1)</td>
<td>180</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ss 8, 9</td>
<td>184</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ss 11(1)(b)</td>
<td>196</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ss 12–15</td>
<td>145</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s 13</td>
<td>193–95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ss 13–15</td>
<td>102, 136, 145, 191, 192</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s 14</td>
<td>204, 206</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s 14(2)</td>
<td>171, 186, 187, 202, 204, 205, 212, 217</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s 14(3)</td>
<td>204, 211, 213, 215–17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ss 14–20B</td>
<td>184</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s 20</td>
<td>182, 204</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ss 27–34</td>
<td>184</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sale of Goods Act 1979**
- s 1(1) 197
- s 2(1) 180
- ss 8, 9 184
- s 11(1)(b) 196
- ss 12–15 145
- s 13 193–95
- s 13(1) 193–95
- ss 13–15 102, 136, 145, 191, 192
- s 14 204, 206
- ss 14–20B 184
- s 20 182, 204
- ss 27–34 184

**Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973**
- ss 8–11 136
- s 13 171
- s 14 173

**Telecommunications Act 1996 (US)**
- s 230 433–37

**Theft Act 1968**
- s 4 426
- s 15 450, 452

**Theft (Amendment) Act 1996**
- s 1(1) (2) 451

**Trademarks Act 1994**
- s 21 524
### Table of Legislation

**Trade Descriptions**
- Act 1968
  - s 1(1) 146, 147
- 134, 136, 138–41, 144, 145, 150, 191, 201

**Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992** 397
- s 6(2) 145

**Trading Stamps Act 1964** 137
- s 10 137, 138

**Trading Stamps Act (Northern Ireland) 1965** 137
- s 11(1) 149

**Unfair Contract Terms**
- Act 1977
  - s 1 134, 142
  - s 1(1) 139, 143
  - s 1(3) 137
  - ss 2–7 277

**Uniform Commercial Code (US)—**
- Art 2 180, 184
**TABLE OF STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statutory Instrument</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations 1997 (SI 1997/3032)</td>
<td>89, 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copyright (Computer Programs) Regulations 1992 (SI 1992/3233)</td>
<td>27, 63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regs 13, 23</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design Right (Semiconductor Topographies) Regulations 1989 (SI 1989/1100)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules of the Supreme Court— Ord 11 r 1(1)</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regs 1–3</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reg 3</td>
<td>160, 168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regs 4, 5</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reg 5(1), (2)</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reg 5(5)</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regs 6–9</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reg 6(1)</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reg 6(2)</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reg 8(1)</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reg 9</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regs 10, 11</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reg 12</td>
<td>156, 157, 159, 169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reg 13</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regs 14, 15</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sched 1</td>
<td>155, 157, 158, 160, 169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sched 2</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directive</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts 1, 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 7(e)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87/ 54/EEC</td>
<td>Legal Protection of Topographies of Semiconductor Products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 1</td>
<td>60, 65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts 2, 4–6</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 4(a), (b)</td>
<td>61, 118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 5</td>
<td>121, 128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 5(1)</td>
<td>117, 118, 127, 128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 5(2)</td>
<td>61, 119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 5(3)</td>
<td>61, 62, 65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 6</td>
<td>59, 61, 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 9(1)</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93/ 13/EC</td>
<td>Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts 1, 2</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 3</td>
<td>163, 164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 3(3)</td>
<td>166–68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts 4–6</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts 7–11</td>
<td>164, 165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95/ 46/EC</td>
<td>Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 1</td>
<td>365, 377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 1(1)</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 2</td>
<td>366–68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 2(h)</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 3</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 3(2)</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 6</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article</td>
<td>Pages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 6(1)(e)</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 7</td>
<td>368, 370, 378, 399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 7(e), (f)</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 8</td>
<td>369, 370, 378, 399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 8(5)</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 9</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 10</td>
<td>371, 392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 11</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 12</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 13</td>
<td>375, 376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 14</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 14(a), (b)</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 15</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 15(1)</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 18</td>
<td>373, 374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts 19, 20</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 25</td>
<td>377, 378, 380, 408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 25(4)–(6)</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 26</td>
<td>377, 378, 380, 408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 29</td>
<td>339, 340, 379, 418–21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 30</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 30(1)(b), (4), (5)</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 31</td>
<td>379, 380, 382, 384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 32(2)</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

96/9/EC Legal Protection of Databases (Database Directive) 84, 86, 87, 89–91
- Art 3 | 86 |
- Art 3(1) | 88 |
- Arts 5, 6 | 87 |
- Art 6(2)(d) | 91 |
- Arts 7–10 | 87 |

97/7/EC Protection of Consumers in respect of Distance Contracts (Distance Selling Directive) 255, 286, 294, 327, 328, 334
- Arts 1–3 | 328 |
- Art 2(1) | 327 |
- Art 3 | 335 |
- Arts 4–7 | 329 |
- Art 4 | 334, 335 |
- Art 4(1)(a)–(f) | 330 |
- Art 5 | 330, 335 |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislation</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Art 6</td>
<td>330, 331, 335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 6(3)</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 7</td>
<td>331, 332, 336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts 8–10</td>
<td>332, 336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts 11, 12</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 12(2)</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts 13, 14</td>
<td>334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97/66/EC</td>
<td>282, 286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98/34/EC—</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98/48/EC</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99/44/EC Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99/93/EC Community Framework for Electronic Signatures</td>
<td>320, 325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts 1, 2, 5</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000/31/EC Certain Legal Aspects of Electronic Commerce in the Internal Market (E-Commerce Directive)</td>
<td>281, 282, 290–92, 299, 320, 422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 1</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art</td>
<td>2282, 290, 291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 2(f)</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 3</td>
<td>281, 283, 292, 294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 4</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 5</td>
<td>285, 292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 5(1)(a)–(c), (e)</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts 6–8</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 7</td>
<td>281, 293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 6</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 7(2)</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts 9–11</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 9</td>
<td>287, 318, 319, 322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 10</td>
<td>287, 293, 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 11</td>
<td>288, 299, 306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts 12–15</td>
<td>281, 294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 12</td>
<td>288, 290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts 13, 14</td>
<td>289, 290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 15</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 17</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 17(1)</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 18</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Decisions

276/1999/EC Decision Adopting a Multiannual Community Action Plan on Promoting Safer Use of the Internet by Combating Illegal and Harmful Content on Global Networks 500
Art 2 500, 501
Art 3 501

Treaties and Conventions

Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886 59–61, 66, 504
Arts 1, 2 257, 262
Arts 3–5 258
Art 3 262
Art 4 259, 262
Arts 5–18 262
Art 5 259, 263, 265
Art 5(1) 261
Art 5(3) 443, 444
Art 6 259, 264
Arts 13–15 264
Art 13 259
Art 14 260
Art 15 260, 265
Art 16 258, 260, 262
Art 17 261, 269
Art 18 262, 263, 269
Arts 21–24 262
Arts 21, 22 265
Art 42 266
Art 52 268
Art 53 267, 268
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Convention/Agreement/Convention</th>
<th>Articles/Sections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Council of Europe Convention for the Protection on Individuals</td>
<td>347, 355, 363, 375, 377, 381, 382, 385, 396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with regard to the Automatic Processing of Personal Data 1981</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 4(1)</td>
<td>355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 5</td>
<td>355, 356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts 6–8</td>
<td>356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC Treaty—</td>
<td>499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts 30, 36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 100A</td>
<td>160, 168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 205(2)</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 251</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEA Agreement (Oporto) 1992</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundamental Freedoms 1950—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts 10, 12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 52</td>
<td>67, 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 52(1)</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 52(1)(c)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 52(2)</td>
<td>73, 74, 77, 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 52(3)</td>
<td>74, 77, 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 56</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in</td>
<td>256, 266, 267, 443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil and Commercial Matters 1988</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 1</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 1(2)(h)</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts 3–6</td>
<td>273, 274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 3</td>
<td>271, 272, 275, 278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 3 (3)</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 3(4)</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 4</td>
<td>271, 272, 275, 278, 308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 4(5)</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 5</td>
<td>272, 273, 275, 278–80, 327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art/Section</td>
<td>Page(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts 6–10</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 6</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 7</td>
<td>275, 276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 8</td>
<td>271, 280, 307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 9</td>
<td>271, 280, 326, 327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 10</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 11</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 12</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 16</td>
<td>274, 278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single European Act 1986</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strasbourg Convention on Products Liability in Relation to Physical Injury and Death</td>
<td>227, 231, 235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty of Amsterdam 1998</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty on European Union 1993</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRIPS Agreement</td>
<td>75–77, 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 27(1)</td>
<td>75, 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 27(2), (3)</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1980 (Vienna Convention)</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce</td>
<td>309, 314, 316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 6</td>
<td>316, 317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 6(1)</td>
<td>310, 314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 8</td>
<td>316–18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 15(4)</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vienna Convention on Treaties—</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 31(1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Intellectual Property Organisation Copyright Treaty 1996</td>
<td>87, 509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art 7</td>
<td>507</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South East Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBO</td>
<td>Bulletin board operator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C &amp; L</td>
<td>Computers and Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCRO</td>
<td>Community Charge Registration Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Communications Decency Act 1996 (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDPA</td>
<td>Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL</td>
<td>Computer Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL &amp; P</td>
<td>Computer Law and Practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLR</td>
<td>Commonwealth Law Reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comm L</td>
<td>Communications Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPA</td>
<td>Child On-line Protection Act 1998 (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Consumer Protection Act 1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECR</td>
<td>European Court Reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDI</td>
<td>Electronic data interchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFTA</td>
<td>European Free Trade Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIPR</td>
<td>European Intellectual Property Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Patent Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPIC</td>
<td>Electronic Privacy Information Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPO</td>
<td>European Patent Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSR</td>
<td>Fleet Street Reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTC</td>
<td>Federal Trade Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HTML</td>
<td>Hypertext mark-up language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICANN</td>
<td>Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICP</td>
<td>Internet content provider</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Int JLIT</td>
<td>International Journal of Information Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISP</td>
<td>Internet service provider</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JANET</td>
<td>Joint Academic Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JBL</td>
<td>Journal of Business Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North Atlantic Free Trade Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROM</td>
<td>Read only memory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPC</td>
<td>Report of Patent Design and Trademark Cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSC</td>
<td>Rules of the Supreme Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTR</td>
<td>Road Traffic Reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGA</td>
<td>Sale of Goods Act 1979/1893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGSA</td>
<td>Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRA</td>
<td>Self-regulatory agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSGA</td>
<td>Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSO</td>
<td>Structure, sequence and organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLD</td>
<td>Top level domain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCTA</td>
<td>Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCITRAL</td>
<td>United Nations Commission on International Trade Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Web JCLI</td>
<td>Web Journal of Current Legal Issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIPO</td>
<td>World Intellectual Property Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The rapid development of information technology presents challenges for the law; challenges which are not confined to any single one of the traditional legal categories but which arise in, for example, criminal law, intellectual property law, contract and tort. Even land law may not be untouched! Initially, these challenges manifested themselves at the micro, rather than the macro, level, with questions such as the applicability of copyright protection for computer programs. More recently, with the accelerating growth of the internet and the world wide web, some of these problems, such as privacy, have been exacerbated, and others, including the regulation of offensive material, have come to the fore. In effect, the questions posed for the law by the advancing technology are many and various but some idea of their scope can be gained by brief illustration:

- How does the law deal with computer hackers or those who introduce viruses?²
- Should a contract for the acquisition of software be categorised as one dealing with goods?³
- The exponential growth of e-commerce generates many issues, for example, how does the law deal with the new phenomenon of mass consumer purchases from other jurisdictions?⁴
- Can copyright subsist in a computer program? Would patent protection be more appropriate?⁵
- Does the widespread dissemination of text on networks herald the death of copyright?⁶
- Should the law regulate ‘cybersquatting’ and trafficking in domain names?⁷

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¹ Through, eg, computerisation of the Land Registry, raising the question of who could be liable if a defect in the software resulted in an inaccurate certificate. See Minister of Housing and Local Government v Sharp [1970] 2 QB 223 (below, p 236) for consideration of a slightly different question.
² See below, Chapter 8.
³ See below, Chapter 4.
⁴ See below, Chapter 6.
⁵ See below, Chapter 2.
⁶ See below, Chapter 9.
⁷ See below, Chapter 9.
Chapter 1: Information Technology Law

- Should the content of material on the internet be regulated and, if so, by whom?8 What about freedom of information and expression?9
- How is the privacy of the individual to be protected amid the increasing capacity for storing, gathering and collating information?10

The point has already been made that the developments in information technology present challenges for many of the established categories of law. This leads to the question of whether information technology law should be regarded as a subject in its own right. Obviously, the initial reaction in attempting to deal with novel problems is to try to accommodate them within existing legal frameworks. This results in a fragmentary approach, which may or may not be appropriate in the particular case. One of the important benefits of looking at the subject of information technology law as a whole is the opportunity to consider how apposite and coherent are piecemeal solutions which borrow from the different established legal areas. It may even lead to the recognition that there is a need for new legal concepts, transcending the traditional boundaries. The acknowledgment of information technology law as a subject worthy of study in its own right also produces a focus upon the issues which might not otherwise occur, with the risk that the particular problems generated by the scientific advances are otherwise merely regarded as footnotes to the established categories. Nonetheless, we have found it convenient to divide the discussion which follows in a way which largely reflects different established legal subjects, and this also reflects the current state of the law. We have also found it useful to divide the book into two parts—the first of these concentrates on problems generated by the nature of computer software, whereas the second considers the impact of computer networks. However, the reader is invited to consider the aptness of the solutions arrived at and the desirability of a more integrated approach.

8 See below, Chapter 8.
9 See below, Chapter 7.
10 See below, Chapter 7
PART I

THE CHALLENGES OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE
PROTECTING AND EXPLOITING RIGHTS IN SOFTWARE—INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

INTRODUCTION

Although it may be rather hackneyed to repeat the practical test of Petersen J in University of London Press Ltd v University Tutorial Press Ltd, \(^1\) namely, that what is worth copying is \textit{prima facie} worth protecting, the truth underlying this statement is demonstrated nowhere so strikingly as in the commercial exploitation of computer software. As the industry has developed, there has been a trend towards general applications programs, rather than specific bespoke software, and a massive amount of research and development time and money is devoted to the creation of such new computer software. A further feature is the vulnerability of the medium to reproduction by individuals and the consequent threat of widespread copying and piracy. The commercial factors alone would suggest powerful reasons for protecting the intellectual property rights in such software, but, when coupled with the ease of copying, they make protection imperative.

Despite these reasons, and the fact that computers have now been in existence for over half a century, protection of the intellectual property rights in computer programs has only really become an issue since the advent of microcomputers, a much more recent development. In the early stages of development of the industry, the problem was not particularly acute, since computer systems were large, custom built affairs. They were only used by large institutions, whether commercial, industrial or educational, and the public had no general access to them. In those cases where intellectual property rights might have been an issue, the software and programs written for them could be adequately protected by contract, supplemented by actions for breach of confidence. These methods may still provide a useful remedy in certain cases. \(^2\) This situation changed dramatically as microprocessors and personal computers became commonplace; their use became widespread and was no longer confined to large institutions. At this point, it was not possible to rely purely on contract and confidence to protect intellectual property rights in computer programs. As early as the beginning of the 1970s, the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) had begun to turn its attention to the issue and, in 1978, produced Model

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1 [1916] 2 Ch 601, p 610, \textit{per} Petersen J.
2 The case of \textit{Ibcos Computers Ltd v Barclays Mercantile Highland Finance Ltd} (1994) (discussed below, p 52) concerned an action for breach of confidence, as well as an action for copyright infringement.
Provisions for the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in Computer Software. The following extract summarises the desirability of legal protection for computer programs.

**WIPO Model Provisions 1978**

*Introduction, para 6*

Legal protection of computer software is desirable for the following reasons:

(a) *Investment and time required.* The investment in computer software is large: under a recent estimate based on the number of computers currently in use, and the past and expected increase in that number, together with estimates of the staff employed on programming activities and the cost of software, it is possible that a sum of the order of 13 billion US dollars is spent annually on the creation and maintenance of software systems. Although this must vary considerably, the time required for the planning and preparation of computer programs is long, often amounting to many man-months of total effort. The need for legal protection of computer programs should be seen not only in terms of the large-scale investment in computer software but also from the viewpoint of the small software enterprise or individual creator of software. The existence of strong legal protection would encourage the dissemination of their creations and enable such creators to avoid duplication of work. Without such dissemination, numerous programmers may spend considerable time and effort in order to accomplish, in parallel work, the same objective; although the programs created by them may be different, any one of those programs would probably fully accomplish the said objective. In any case, legal protection will encourage exploitation of software for purposes other than internal use.

(b) *Likely future developments.* Already, software is estimated to account for by far the greater part of the total cost of computer systems. The proportions of 70 per cent and 30 per cent representing the expenditure on software and hardware, respectively, would seem to be a reasonable estimate. In any case it can be expected that the software elements will, in the future, account for a substantial, if not a predominant, proportion of the expenditure and that the total expenditure on computer software will constantly increase. At present, the largest amount of expenditure on computer software seems to be devoted to the creation and maintenance of specific purpose user programs, not of general applicability; since such programs are not of direct interest to third parties, their misappropriation is relatively unlikely in view of the adaptation required. However, there is a trend towards the creation of computer programs that are of interest to more than one user or even of general and widespread utility and thus can help to save expenditures; such a trend towards standardised user software is likely to increase as computers become more accessible to the public and easier to operate and as the proportion of the cost of the hardware components in computer operations decreases. In the context of the increasing accessibility of computer software, reference should be made to two important developments: the creation of computer networks among nations aided by sophisticated telecommunications systems (a trend which highlights the need for international protection), and the
move towards new programming techniques facilitating the use of computers by persons other than trained programmers.

(c) Protection as an incentive to disclosure. The importance of ensuring the ready accessibility of the important form of modern technology represented by computer software has been referred to on many occasions, particularly in the context of the needs of developing countries... Although some computer programs would not be made publicly available in any event (for example, programs revealing a trade secret of an enterprise or those designed to complement computer hardware and transferred only with the corresponding computer), it is reasonable to suppose that many proprietors of the rights in other programs would at present rely primarily on secrecy either in order to exclude all others from using the software or to permit only selected persons to use it under a confidential disclosure contract. Where effective legal protection is available, the proprietors of rights could instead rely on that protection and disclose the software.

(d) Protection as a basis for trade. The lack of legal protection may be particularly harmful in the context of trade. Both the seller and the buyer of computer software are interested in legal protection because it increases the legal security of their relationship. A system of protection would also be of advantage to developing countries; such a system would encourage dissemination of software to those countries, not only because the publication of the software would not defeat protection but also the protection would eliminate the uncertainty of enforcing a confidential disclosure contract. Also, legal protection would enable dissemination on favourable terms in some cases; for example, the proprietor of the rights in computer software might be encouraged to license it in a developing country at an especially low royalty if he could be sure of being able to take action against users in other countries if his software were accidentally disclosed by the licensee in the developing country. Moreover, the greater disclosure in the advertisement of software which, it is hoped, will result from legal protection may help such countries to evaluate the alternatives on the international market.

(e) Vulnerability of computer software. Consideration should also be given to the vulnerability of some forms of computer software; for instance, a ‘computer software package’ consisting of a computer program and related descriptive and explanatory documentation, is expensive to prepare and easy to copy as soon as the prototype is available.

Although the WIPO document was prepared more than 20 years ago and, therefore, has the status of a historical document as far as the computer industry is concerned, it shows that major problems were evident even at this early stage. The technology still had a long way to progress before it would be recognisable by present standards, but the trend towards standard application packages had been noted, together with the ease of copying and the global nature of the technology.

The purpose of the Model Provisions was to provide a framework which countries which were signatories to the agreement could use. Accepting that the legal protection of computer programs was desirable, the question that then had to be addressed was what was to be the most appropriate and effective
method of protecting the intellectual property rights in computer software and programs.

WIPO Model Provisions 1978
Introduction, para 7

Two forms of legal protection may be specifically directed to the results of the intellectual creativity in computer software: they are *patent protection* and *copyright protection*. In addition, there are *other branches of law* which can provide a means for protecting computer software, especially where it constitutes a trade secret.

(a) *Patent protection*. The patent would seem to be an appropriate form of legal protection of computer software since it covers new and inventive technical solutions. It can thus apply to programs embodying the same concept as a patented program, but in a completely different form; it can also be relied on to prevent others using the same program in a computer. However, in many countries, computer programs and other items of computer software, in particular algorithms, cannot be regarded as patentable inventions; the European Patent Convention, for example, contains an express provision to that effect (Article 52(2)(c)). In some countries, a computer program would seem to be at least *indirectly* protectable by, for example, a patent granted for a computer programmed in a new way or for a process relating to the use of a program as a means of operating a computer in a new manner or as a means of control in the manufacturing of articles. In most countries the question of patentability cannot be answered with any degree of certainty. Moreover, even if patent protection were generally available, it would probably cover only a minute proportion of computer programs since it is considered that only in a very few cases (perhaps 1 per cent) would a program have sufficient inventiveness to satisfy the requirements of patent law, although a large amount of time, effort and resources have been devoted to its creation. There are also serious practical difficulties to be taken into account: difficulties in conducting the examination relating to the novelty and inventiveness of a computer program, in establishing the documentation on the prior art and in finding qualified examiners. One further difficulty is that, under patent procedures, any person has access to a full disclosure of the invention enabling a person skilled in the art to make the patented product or use the patented process; in view of the relative difficulty of detecting misappropriations in a computer program, it could be argued that such an unrestricted disclosure to the public is not desirable; and yet, to make an exception in the case of computer programs might prejudice a fundamental principle of patent law: disclosure to the public.

(b) *Copyright protection*. Whereas patent law protects the technical idea underlying an invention, copyright law focuses on protecting the form in which ideas are expressed, although protection is not limited to that form. Thus, copyright protection would seem to be particularly appropriate for computer software as a whole (and not merely computer programs) since a large amount of computer software consists of descriptive or explanatory matter; even a computer program (consisting,
Protecting and Exploiting Rights in Software—Intellectual Property Rights

for example, of magnetic tape) is a form of expression—of the ideas contained in the software leading up to the program. In most cases the intellectual creativity in computer software resides in the skill and effort used to make those ideas ‘understandable’ to a computer, as economically and effectively as possible. However, although some kinds of computer software (especially those in verbal form) are clearly protectable under copyright laws, experts disagree on whether other kinds (particularly a computer program on magnetic tape, for example) can be considered a literary, artistic or scientific work, which are the traditional subjects of copyright protection. Moreover, such protection may be of very limited value since it essentially covers only copying (or related acts such as translation or adaptation); thus, in itself, the use of a program to operate a computer cannot be prevented by copyright law (just as the making of a cake cannot be an infringement of the copyright in the recipe). It is essential that use in a computer should be covered by the rights in computer software; it is, in fact, possible that copyright can provide a remedy in this case since it is probable that the use of a program always involves its copying in the computer memory, but the courts may not regard such internal reproduction as sufficient for the purposes of copyright law. The model provisions essentially adopt a copyright law approach which takes account of their subject matter’s affinity with copyright protection and overcomes the possible limitations indicated above.

(c) Other forms of protection. The laws of certain countries provide a number of means of preventing the unauthorised disclosure or use of secret information. There are a number of laws, which directly penalise or provide civil law remedies against the misappropriation of a trade secret or of information obtained in breach of confidence. A common means of protecting information concerning computer software, which is provided by all laws, is by contract. Even in the absence of an express term in a contract, persons in a fiduciary relationship with a computer enterprise, such as its employees, can be prevented from disclosing secret information. Secret information can also be indirectly protected by certain provisions in criminal law, by general provisions in civil codes or by certain actions in the law of torts. Even in the absence of secrecy, the misappropriation of computer programs may, in certain circumstances, be actionable in the context of unfair competition law. However, even in countries where trade secrets can be protected directly, there is uncertainty or differences as to the scope of protection and as to the conditions (for example, whether disclosure to a licensee or to a restricted number of other third parties would prejudice the secrecy of the know-how protected). The disadvantage of protection under contract law is that in most cases it will be difficult to prevent persons outside the contractual relationship from disclosing or using a program. Moreover, one of the advantages of the establishment of clear and adequate legal protection for computer software is to encourage greater disclosure of information on computer software which would otherwise be vulnerable to misappropriation. The aim of such protection is therefore precisely to avoid any necessity to rely on secrecy and on laws and legal measures safeguarding secrecy.

In considering the various forms of protection available to computer software, this comparatively early document has identified with accuracy a number of
issues which were to trouble the courts. The issues relating to patents are, as we shall see later, still substantially similar. With respect to the application of copyright principles, although we are probably no longer quite so concerned about programs on magnetic tape, the issue of whether a program could be regarded as a literary work is one which has been aired extensively in the courts in a number of jurisdictions.

The approach taken by the Model Provisions is essentially one of copyright drafted to protect the form of an original program, rather than the concepts on which it is based. This approach, which rewards the results of the creator’s own intellectual efforts, has proved to be very influential. Although the above extract does not enunciate in detail the reasons for this decision (and some of them are negative ones, such as the unavailability of patent protection in many cases), it is clear that, in view of the huge commercial significance of software development, it might be necessary to amalgamate the reasons and rationale underlying the continental and common law notions of copyright and take into account the encouragement of commercial innovation, the rights of the author as creator and also the public interest.

As can be seen, the resolution to use copyright and protect the intellectual property rights in software as if it was a literary work was, in many ways, a pragmatic response to an immediate problem. In formulating the Model Provisions, WIPO was not envisaging that they should be implemented as *sui generis* legislation but that the principles would be absorbed into the existing framework of protection. It was also hoped that the choice of copyright principles would lead to international protection based on the Berne Convention, although this clearly depends on whether a particular jurisdiction regards computer programs as appropriate subject matter for such protection. But computer programs are sufficiently dissimilar to other literary works that this decision was not adopted without dissent, and neither has this dissent been completely silenced by the application of current copyright law to computer programs. The following extract explains in more detail the reasons for the choice of copyright.

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The decision to protect computer programs under copyright was in fact a radical departure from traditional intellectual property principles. The reason is that computer software is functional—the technological means for using general purpose computing devices. Software is not art, music, or even literature. Software is developed with an end use in mind—an end use usually involving the performance of a task other than to please or inform human beings. Like all other technologies, software technology grows by incremental additions to the existing technological base. Programmers learn by studying existing programs, both at school and at their workplaces, and they adapt what they have learned to the new tasks that are placed before them.

... The famous case of Baker v Selden [101 US 99 (1879)] says that the functional aspects of works are properly the subject matter of patent law. Thus, under traditional intellectual property law, protected works of technology must show a considerable degree of inventiveness that is passed upon by an administrative review. Technological works that are insufficiently inventive to qualify for a patent are protected only for such time as they remain secret or invulnerable to reverse engineering.

Technology enjoys such limited protection, not because it is believed that technological creativity should go unrewarded. Rather, the law’s contribution is limited because too much protection would impede technological progress rather than advance it, by restricting subsequent creators in what they could draw from the existing technological base. While not perfect, the traditional scheme for protecting technology under intellectual property law has worked tolerably well in balancing the tension between incentives (rewarding creators through legal protection) and technological advance that builds on past creations (limitation or denial of legal protection).

Notwithstanding this long and nearly uniform history of denying copyright protection to functional works, a conscious choice has been made to protect computer programs under copyright. The reasons were perfectly sound, but it is worth spelling them out explicitly because they have implications for interpreting the appropriate scope of copyright protection in a program. First, programs are easy to pirate, notwithstanding that their creation can require a large investment of time, money and energy. Yet, traditional patent law could cover at most a small percentage of programs, because most programs are simply an application of well known techniques to a well defined problem. If an incentive is to be supplied for the production of useful but complex programs, patent law will often not be up to the task. Moreover, in the absence of contractual restrictions, trade secret law does not protect against taking a program from a disk or tape that was lawfully acquired. It, too, therefore fails to protect programs that are widely distributed.

Traditional copyright protection, on the other hand, arises immediately on creation and in most countries requires little or no showing of ‘inventiveness’. Moreover, copyright clearly protects against the one form of piracy that everyone agrees should be unlawful, namely, disk-to-disk, ROM-to-ROM, and
similar mechanical copying and translating from object code as well as line-by-line copying of source code. Copyright has the further advantage over a *sui generis* copyright-like statute in that protection against this kind of piracy is immediately international, without the need for formal action of any kind. When the problem to be solved is viewed as ‘piracy’ of this type, copyright law appears as a nearly obvious solution. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that so many countries have adopted it.

This seems to suggest that one of the most powerful arguments for copyright protection is a negative one: that, if such protection were to be denied, the patent system would not be of use either, since most programs are an application of well known techniques, often to well known problems. Another argument for the choice of copyright centres on the ease of copying:

> Because of the tremendous ease with which the creativity embodied in a program can be copied, copyright’s originality standard, rather than patent’s non-obviousness standard, better defines the level of creativity the law should require before it protects the typical computer program from copying.

This, coupled with the ease of piracy, would make innovations very vulnerable to having intellectual endeavour and investment in time and money abused. As we shall see, notwithstanding the objectives, both philosophical and pragmatic, for the choice of copyright for the protection of computer software, this choice can, at times, seem to raise as many problems as it solves. In addition, the courts have not always approached the issue with a unanimity of purpose. For these reasons, there are still a number of academics and practitioners who advocate a *sui generis* protection for computer software.

Samuelson *et al*., for instance, suggests that programs cannot be regarded merely as texts because ‘a crucially important characteristic of programs is that they behave; programs exist to make computers perform tasks’. Since this

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4 This argument can be compared with Scott Baker J’s more recent comment in relation to software as goods in *St Albans City and DC v ICL* [1995] FSR 686 (see, also, below, Chapter 4) that, ‘if the supply of software is not the supply of goods, it is difficult to see what it can be other than something to which no statutory rules apply, thus leaving the recipient unprotected in the absence of express agreement’.

5 See below, p 67.


7 It should also be noted that there is a limited precedent for the use of *sui generis* protection for new technologies in respect of the protection available to the topography of semiconductor chips. However, this is in the context of a market with a completely different structure, heavily dominated by the US, which, therefore, found itself in a position to enforce its standards on the rest of the world. Basically, the US Semiconductor Chip Protection Act 1984 did not protect the design of non-US chips unless reciprocal protection was available in that State. In view of US dominance, a number of States legislated accordingly, including the EC—in Council Directive 87/54/EEC (Legal Protection of Topographies of Semiconductor Products). The UK provisions are now contained in the Design Right (Semiconductor Topographies) Regulations 1989 (SI 1989/1100). It is unlikely that consensus over the form of a *sui generis* protection for computer software would be achieved so easily.
attribute is central to the essential nature of programs, it gives them a ‘dual character’: they can be regarded simultaneously as both ‘writings and machines’. This means that, in their view, neither copyright nor patent law are suitable for protecting software innovation. On the other hand, this view has been criticised as being overly pessimistic about the capabilities of existing legal regimes to accommodate new technological advances, although the very evolution of existing law to take into account new developments has been likened to a form of sui generis protection.

The two views expressed below perhaps summarise the opposite poles of the argument.

Is the centre beginning to hold in US copyright law?
Richard H Stern
[1993] 2 EIPR 39, p 40

That courts are beginning to learn how to be more rational in applying copyright principles to computer software does not mean that copyright is a legal scalpel, after all, rather than a blunt instrument. When both the Second Circuit in Altai and the Ninth Circuit in Accolade warned against ‘forcing a square peg into a round hole’, they meant that when one tries to apply ordinary principles of copyright law to computer software one gets very peculiar results—sometimes quite startling and unsatisfactory ones. Unless and until we devise a round peg for a round hole, we shall continue to lurch from one to another software law crisis...

We need a properly thought out utility model or petty patent type of law for computer software, treating it as the industrial property that it is, not as a species of poem or some other belle lettre or beau art. Copyright does not belong to the right one of Snow’s cultures to do the job properly. Bridging the two cultures may be a noble idea, but there would be much less wear and tear on the industry if the experiment were carried out at some other experimental subject’s expense... We need a system that borrows appropriately from copyright law, patent law, and utility model law—perhaps slavish imitation law as well—and combines selected features of each, and new features where the nature of software dictates it, to provide a form of legal protection congruent to the subject matter, the commercial needs of industry, software professionals, and software users, and the interests of


12 See below, p 37.
the public. The task of crafting such a system is not easy, but the alternative is perennial ineptitude and recurrent crisis.

In contrast, Miller warns against the ‘false icon of *sui generis* protection’:  

...seeking genre-specific limitations on particular program aspects or excluding them from copyright protection in favour of some—as yet undefined—form of *sui generis* protection is unnecessary and potentially mischievous. The effect would be to discard the growing experience under the present copyright law and the increasing certainty that it provides, in favour of something unknown, uncabined and unpredictable. This is especially dangerous given the dynamism of the software industry and the likelihood that today’s restrictions will be ill-suited to tomorrow’s innovations. Today’s attempt to draw a bright defensive perimeter may produce tomorrow’s Maginot line. Judgments as to the precise scope of copyright in the computer context are best left to judicial decision-making under a loosely textured and familiar statutory formula that can mature over time...

... Courts always have had to struggle with the delicate questions of where the commonplace becomes originality and where legitimate imitation shades into infringement, especially in the environment of a new mode of expression. This process admittedly is even more difficult when it involves computer programs of the size, complexity, and sophistication of modern operating systems. But this difficulty is an inevitable aspect of fact-based determinations, which would not be easier under any genre-specific provisions that might be inserted in the copyright law or under some other—most assuredly less predictable—*sui generis* regime invented out of the whole cloth.

It is a mistake to believe that creating highly refined legislative prescriptions or inventing an entirely new legal structure for software at this time will produce better results than carefully applying existing copyright principles to individual situations. As the case law involving the idea/expression dichotomy attests,  

the court decisions in this area are, by degree, crystallising into an understandable and sensible doctrinal matrix, obviating any need for a *sui generis* approach.

Doubtless, readers will formulate their own arguments about the most appropriate form of protection for the intellectual property rights in computer software, but whatever protection is developed needs to take into account the ‘distinctive character of software programs’.

Copyright has been chosen (even if by default) as the basis for protection, but what is it about computer programs and computer technology that might cause problems for traditional copyright law? In simple terms, there are two broad areas which need to be considered. The first, and simplest in conceptual terms, if not in solution, is the mode of operation of computers and the ease of copying.

14 See below, p 30.
Computer programs were made to be copied. It is impossible to run a computer program and avail oneself of its useful effects without copies being made, however transient, within the depths of the computer. Also, because programs may be corrupted or inadvertently erased, it is good computing practice to take and keep a back-up copy of each computer program. Whilst even this level of copying could constitute a technical breach of copyright unless express provision is made, it is clear that such copying cannot be construed as a threat to the commercial exploitation of that program. However, it is precisely the fact that the success of computer technology relies heavily on the ease with which programs can be copied that also makes it a trivial matter to produce multiple illicit copies, whether for private use, use within a commercial organisation or for selling on the open market. This is not an issue as far as the application of copyright law is concerned but causes significant problems for the enforcement of such law in relation to straight disk to disk copying and piracy of computer programs. No special equipment is needed to make copies and multiple copies can be made quickly and for minimal capital outlay. These can then be marketed at much lower prices than the authentic version. The widespread copying of software within an organisation can also have a severely prejudicial effect on the rights of the copyright owner. This problem of enforcement in relation to straight copying has been further exacerbated by the growth of the internet and the consequent ease with which software can be downloaded from remote sites.

It has proved much more difficult for traditional copyright rules to be applied to the actual process of copying at the stage at which the computer program is written by the programmer. Why should this be? Copyright was developed to protect the authors of literary, artistic and other works from those who might copy the way in which their ideas had been expressed, especially where this was done for commercial gain. On the face of it, therefore, it would seem to be an appropriate method for protecting the intellectual property rights in computer programs and, as we shall see, the way in which the law has developed in most jurisdictions, has been to protect programs as literary works. However, computer programs differ from conventional literary works in a number of important and fundamental ways, bringing into question the suitability of copyright for this purpose.

One important difference is that, in a computer program, the literary is combined with the technical, causing technology to operate to produce a defined result, either within the computer system itself or in the real world.

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16 See below, p 61.
17 In an early note, now of only historical significance, it was nevertheless recognised that widespread piracy was likely to be a problem in the industry, even in an age when only those large enough to own computers are well established businesses—see ‘Copyright protection for computer software’ (1964) 64 Colum L Rev 1274.
18 Cf Samuelson et al’s discussion of the ‘behavior’ of software, op cit, fn 8.
Neither can programs, in their ‘literary form’, be readily understood other than by a person skilled in the particular programming language employed. Indeed, end users of the program will often have no knowledge of the underlying program which is causing their computer to perform a particular task, nor will they have any need for such knowledge. Such characteristics are not shared by other literary works, even those of a utilitarian nature. The situation is further complicated by the fact that computer programs can be encapsulated in so many different media, ranging from hard-wired circuitry to transient impulses sent down telephone lines, neither of which, prima facie, has much in common with a literary work. In between these two extremes, programs may be held on disks or tape that, perhaps, seem to have more in common with sound recordings, for instance. To appreciate the problems that computer programs have caused for intellectual property law, it will be instructive to examine both the nature of the beast and the problems encountered in applying some of the concepts of copyright law to computer programs.

The first issue to be dealt with is the manner in which computer programs are written and constructed; it is common for cases concerning these issues to contain some brief explanation of these mysteries.

**John Richardson Computers Ltd v Flanders**

[1993] FSR 497, p 503

High Court

**Ferris J** In order for a computer to be given the appropriate instructions it is necessary to communicate with it in some way. The only instructions which a computer can understand are those which consist of a series of 0s and 1s. Instructions set out in this way are said to be written in ‘machine language’ or machine code. (This may represent something of an oversimplification. I gather that at least in some cases the machine code which is fed into the computer will be translated by the machine into a more elaborate series of 0s and 1s. However this description will suffice for present purposes.) The machine code for one type of computer will usually be different from that for another type, although there may, of course, be compatibility between different manufacturers’ products.

A suitably trained or skilled programmer will be able to write a program in machine code for a particular model of computer. But the process is slow and tedious and the program, although intelligible to the computer, will be virtually unintelligible to anyone except an equally skilled programmer. From the comparatively early days of computers, therefore, an alternative language for writing programs was devised. This was known as ‘assembler language’. It used a variety of abbreviations more akin to ordinary language than machine code. A computer could not itself understand such a language directly but a program could be, and was, devised which enabled a computer to convert assembler language into the machine code which could be understood by the computer. The translation process is usually possible only in one direction. Assembler language can be translated into machine code, but not vice versa.
While assembler language has advantages over machine code it still requires many instructions to be written in order to achieve the simplest tasks. A variety of so called high level languages has been devised in order to simplify the task of the programmer. These high level languages have been given names. They include such languages as Basic and derivatives of it, Fortran, Cobol and Pascal. The use of these languages enables the programmer to write a program in terms which more nearly resemble ordinary English than those used in lower level languages. They also permit what is, for the computer, quite a complex operation to be directed by a relatively compact command. Like assembler language, high level languages have to be translated into machine code before they can be understood and acted upon by a computer. The programs which have been devised to achieve this are called compilers. As with assembler language, the translation process is usually possible in one direction only. It is not generally possible to recreate a program in its higher language form from its translation into machine code.

In computer parlance the program as written in whatever language used by the programmer (whether machine code, assembler language or a high level language) is known as the source code. When this is converted by an assembler or a compiler into machine code it is known as the object code. In cases where the program is written in machine code, the source code and the object code are the same. When computer programs are exploited commercially it is usual for the end user to be supplied only with the object code, this being all that the customer needs to load into his computer. The customer does not generally have access to the source code and, because of the difficulties concerning retranslation, cannot generally reconstruct the source code from the object code.

This suggests that the computer programs themselves are rarely seen by the user—merely their effects are seen—but in written form can be expressed as source code and object code. The source code is the program as written by the programmer and can be in any one of a whole host of different languages. Many of these are the so called high level programming languages, that bear a certain resemblance to literary language and have their own rules of syntax and grammar. An example of part of a program written in the language C is shown below:

```c
int bubblesort(int num_list[],int length)
{
    int i,j,temp;
    for (i=length-1;i>0;i--)
    {
        for (j=length-1;j>0;j--)
            if (num_list[j]<num_list[j-1])
            {
                temp=num_list[j];
                num_list[j]=num_list[j-1];
                num_list[j-1]=temp;
            }
```
That there are similarities with literary language is clear. However, it is also evident that, without further specialist knowledge, the lay reader may get little further information. In fact, the purpose and function of this part of the program is to sort, in ascending order, an array of numbers. Readers with some knowledge of programming might have deduced this from the title ‘bubblesort’ and the fact that the variables have been given meaningful names: ‘num_list’ for number list, for instance. This represents a very simple routine which would be likely to be part of a more complex program. Due to its simplicity, it is unlikely that a programmer would annotate these lines of code any further. However, for longer and more elaborate programs, to assist understanding, comments are frequently added in literary language as markers to particular stages of the program. Thus, the program above could, if required, be annotated as follows:

```c
/* function bubblesort; takes an integer array and its length and reorders its elements into ascending order. */
int bubblesort(int num_list[],int length)
{
    int i,j,temp;
    for (i=length-1;i>0;i—) /* iterate over whole array */
    {
        for (j=length-1;j>0;j—)
            if (num_list[j]<num_list[j-1]) /* compare adjacent elements */
                {
                    temp=num_list[j];
                    num_list[j]=num_list[j-1]; /*...and swap if required */
                    num_list[j-1]=temp;
                }
    }
    return 0;
}
```

Although this program is beginning to appear more intelligible to the layperson, and certainly more understandable to a programmer, this version cannot be put into effect by the computer in its present form. In order that the function intended be performed, the source code has to be translated, or compiled, into the object code—a list of binary instructions which are represented on paper by a series of noughts and ones. It would be highly improbable for programmers to write directly in binary; most would select a suitable high level language,\textsuperscript{19} which would then be compiled as described, by means of another program, the compiler. Some of the simpler programming
languages such as machine and assembly code do approach simple binary form; these are much more difficult for even skilled programmers to follow but, nevertheless, are favoured by some programmers, as indeed was the case with Flanders in the previous extract.

In some respects, the explanation of Ferris J, above, oversimplifies the task of creating a workable computer program. When the source code is first compiled, the compiler translates the high level language into binary code, the so called relocatable object code, which is not quite the version which will produce the desired effect. Then, as the compilation proceeds, this relocatable object code will be linked to standard libraries of code which perform certain common functions and which would otherwise have to be written into the program from scratch—the PRINT command, for instance. The end result is the executable object code, which will cause the computer to perform the desired function.

Thus, a program is not created in a linear fashion, but has a particular structure at the level at which the computer operates. In addition to this, it will also have a certain structure at the higher level.

Ideas, process or protected experience?
Steven R Englund

A ‘computer program’ is defined in the 1976 Act as ‘a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result’. Although computers are only capable of directly executing ‘computer instructions’, which may be expressed as combinations of the binary digits zero and one, most programs are written in some sort of programming language that is more convenient to use. Such programs may only be indirectly executed by computer.

To understand how a computer program comes to have structure and why it is important that the processes implemented by programs and the ideas embodied may not be protected by copyright law, it is necessary to have some appreciation of computer programming. ‘Computer programming’ refers to the ‘designing, writing and testing’ of programs. Almost all programs are written with some concern for the efficient use of resources such as memory space and computer, programmer and user time. Since it will seldom, if ever, be possible to write a program minimising the use of all of these resources, programmers must choose some balance of these criteria appropriate to the nature of the particular program. There are as many ways to approach the task of writing a program to achieve certain efficiency objectives as there are programmers. It is, however, possible to make some generalisations about the techniques that most programmers use.

19 Many are developed for specific applications, eg, ADA is often used for safety related programming.
A programmer begins the process of writing a program by precisely defining the program’s ‘function’. A program’s function is what the program actually does, in contrast to its ‘implementation’, which is the method, including the instructions, that allow a program to accomplish that function.

After the function of a program has been precisely defined, a programmer decomposes that function into simpler constituent problems or ‘subtasks’. Subtasks themselves may be decomposed similarly. This process of decomposition requires skill and judgment on the part of the programmer; decisions made at this stage of the programming process can profoundly affect the quality of the resulting program by determining whether a program will be more or less efficient in its use of computer and human resources. The resulting decomposition is determined both by the nature of the problem and by the approach of the programmer. Different programmers faced with the same problem would ordinarily be expected to produce somewhat different decompositions.

Once the function of a program has been decomposed into subtasks, a programmer can determine how best to implement the functions of the subtasks and then write instructions in some programming language to do so. This Note refers to the portion of a program implementing a subtask as a ‘module’. A module is thus nothing more than a relatively short sequence of instructions in some programming language that, when executed, performs some well defined function that is one of the subtasks defined in the course of decomposing the ultimate function of the program. The functions of the modules in a program together with each module’s relationship to other modules constitute the ‘structure’ of the program.

The logic and instructions for implementing a subtask may often come from the work of others. The computer industry has long been characterised by the free sharing of programs and program parts among programmers. Not only does the borrowing of the implementation details eliminate the need to ‘reinvent the wheel’ with each new program, but borrowing and improving upon more general ideas is an important way in which the computer art progresses. This is important because, in order to ensure [that] its decisions in copyright cases involving computer programs promote progress in the computer art, a court should have some understanding of the role of copyright law in promoting progress in that art.

Thus, many aspects of a computer program may be copied, from straight line to line copying of both source and object code—so called literal copying, to copying of the structure of the program, often referred to as non-literal copying. Should all these aspects of copying be subject to the law of copyright, or only those which correspond to literal copying of the work, by analogy with a literary work? How far can computer programmers use the work done by others in their own creation of new programs without infringing the original developer’s rights? At what point does the code for a commonly used routine enter the public domain? These, and other issues, have resulted in discussion in many jurisdictions as to the extent of the scope of copyright protection for computer programs and the literature on the subject is now voluminous. As a number of these arguments continue to surface in discussions, both in academic literature and in judicial deliberations,
it is worth considering, in brief, the manner in which the arguments have developed thus far.

The first issue to be resolved was whether copyright could subsist in both source and object code. It has been accepted for a long time that copyright can subsist in code,\(^{20}\) that is, that a code could be construed as an original literary work.

**DP Anderson & Co v Lieber Code Co**

* [1917] 2 KB 469

*Bailhache J* …it is contended that [the code] is not a literary work, either original or otherwise, and the ground upon which that contention is based is that the words in the code are not words in the ordinary sense at all, but are merely collections of letters which are in themselves meaningless and are made up in a merely mechanical way. I cannot accede to that argument. The words—I call them so for want of a better name—are for use for telegraphic purposes and to each of them a meaning can be attached by the person sending the message and also by the addressee.

Did this, by analogy, mean that copyright could subsist in both source code and object code? This question caused a debate that will be examined in some detail, as it is highly illustrative of the way in which intellectual property law has been used to argue both for and against copyright protection for computer programs. US copyright law required the subject of copyright protection to be a ‘writing’ and also denied copyright protection to works of a utilitarian nature. This led to the suggestion that, although there might be copyright in the source code, this could not be true of the object code, which could not be construed as a ‘writing’. Further credence was given to this view by the argument that object code was created not by a person but by a machine, referring to the process of compilation described above. On the other hand, computer programs are contained within the definition of ‘literary work’ in the US Copyright Act 1976, and amendments introduced in 1980 included the definition ‘a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result’, suggesting that the use of the word ‘indirectly’ must be taken to include object code. In addition, the US courts were beginning to recognise that object code was subject to copyright protection in cases such as *Apple Computer Inc v Franklin Computer Corp.*\(^{21}\) These developments were mirrored in other jurisdictions, as, for example, in *SEGA Enterprises v Richards.*\(^{22}\) Whilst the court was happy to accept in principle that computer programs could be the subject of copyright, there was some discussion as to whether copyright could subsist in both the source code and the object code.

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\(^{20}\) *DP Anderson & Co v Lieber Code Co* [1917] 2 KB 469.

The above argument both depends upon and presupposes that copyright protection will be extended to software because of the writing requirement or, in many jurisdictions, that a computer program is a form of ‘literary work’, as opposed to any other type of creation attracting copyright protection. Even this view was challenged by the Australian case of *Apple Computer v Computer Edge Pty Ltd*, in which it was said that the purpose of literary works was for enjoyment, and so the court declined to think that computer programs could be protected in this way. This decision was subsequently reversed, the Full Court of the Federal Court holding that the source programs were protected by copyright as new and original literary works and that the object programs were protected in consequence as adaptations of the source programs. The issue was again considered on a further appeal to the High Court of Australia, which concluded, although not without difficulty, that the source programs were protected as literary works. The court was divided, however, over whether protection could be afforded to the object code on any basis.

*Computer Edge Pty Ltd v Apple Computer Inc*  
(1986) 161 CLR 171, p 187

**Gibbs J** The questions involved in this case are of considerable difficulty, and they have given rise to differences of opinion in the writings on the subject. We were referred to some authorities which are contrary to the conclusions that I have reached. In the United Kingdom, the provisional opinion has been expressed by judges in interlocutory proceedings that a machine code program is either a reproduction or an adaptation of an assembly code program... In Canada and South Africa it has been held that a program in an object code may be a literary work... There are some differences between the language of the statutes considered in those cases and that of the Copyright Act, but I am not sure that the differences are material. In the United States the question has been considered in a number of cases and it has been held that an object code is entitled to copyright protection...but the statute law in the United States is materially different from that of Australia. I have not found anything in those authorities that has persuaded me that a sequence of electrical impulses in a silicon chip, not capable itself of communicating anything directly to a human recipient, and designed only to operate a computer, is itself a literary work, or is the translation of a literary work within the Copyright Act.

The majority favoured the view that, as the only manifestation of the object code

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24 A view which echoes the *dictum* of Davey LJ in *Hollinrake v Truswell* [1894] 3 Ch 420, p 428.  
at issue was as electrical impulses in a silicon chip which could neither be detected by nor had any meaning for humans, it could not be construed as a literary work.

*Computer Edge Pty Ltd v Apple Computer Inc*  
(1986) 161 CLR 171, p 201

**Brennan J** A literary work need not have literary merit... The words ‘literary work’, as Peterson J pointed out in *University of London Press Ltd v University Tutorial Press Ltd*, ‘cover work which is expressed in print or writing, irrespective of the question whether the quality or style is high’. A ‘literary work’, according to Davey LJ in *Hollinrake v Truswell*, is a work ‘intended to afford either information and instruction, or pleasure, in the form of literary enjoyment’... The observation is not unduly restrictive. If the print or writing in which the work is expressed conveys information or instruction, albeit to a limited group with special knowledge, it is immaterial that the information or instruction is not expressed in the form of words, phrases or sentences. Thus a telegraphic code has been held to be a literary work though the words of the code were meaningless in themselves... The source programs were the product of substantial originality and skill, they were prepared as instructions for the manufacture of Apple II ROMs, they were in writing and they conveyed meaning at least to computer scientists and technicians. That is sufficient to bring them within the scope of literary copyright. The argument that a source program is not a literary work proposes a dichotomy between literary works and what are ‘merely adjuncts to the operation of a mechanical device’. The dichotomy is false, for it cannot be said that every book of instructions for the operation of a machine is outside the scope of copyright protection. Copyright might not protect every minor direction for use of a machine or device, but that is not the present case. Here, the source programs are a set of complex and precise instructions for the manufacture of Apple II ROMs. The source programs are substantial original compilations. It would be an infringement of Apple’s copyright in a source program to do in relation to that program in Australia without Apple’s licence any of the acts prescribed in s 31(1)(a) of the Act.

The corresponding object programs, on the other hand, are not in writing. The electrical charges which constitute them may be represented in writing, using the conventional binary or hexadecimal notations. However, the written representation must not be confused with what is represented but not written. Copyright protection under Pt III of the Act is given only to works; under Pt IV of the Act it is given to subject matter other than works. The object programs do not come within Pt IV. To be a ‘work’ within Pt III, an object program must be one of the four classes of works as defined by s 101(1)—literary, musical, dramatic or artistic. To come within the scope of ‘literary work’ as that term was defined in the Act prior to the 1984 amendment, a literary work had to be in print or writing. Peterson J in *University of London Press* said:
Copyright Acts are not concerned with the originality of ideas, but with the expression of thought, and in the case of ‘literary work’, with the expression of thought in print or writing.

And in *Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football) Ltd* Lord Hodson regarded it as the undoubted truth that ‘copyright is not concerned with the originality of ideas, but with the expression of thought, in the case of literary work with the expression of thought in print or writing’.

... Section 22 implies that the form in which a literary work is expressed is writing or some other material form. A material form is a form which can be perceived by the senses. That is not to say that copyright subsists in a document on which the writing of an original literary work appears... Copyright in a work is a right in respect of the form to which the work has been reduced, not a right of property in the object in or from which the form is perceptible. But a form from which the words, letters or figures of a literary work cannot be perceived by sight or touch (or, possibly, hearing) is not a material form to which the work has been reduced. The electrical charges which constitute the object programs cannot be seen or touched or heard or, if they can, they do not communicate the letters of the original literary work, the source programs. Nor, for that matter, do the electrical charges communicate the letters or figures by which an object program may be represented. The object programs are not literary works.

Neither, in the view of the majority, were they protected as adaptations of the source program.

*Computer Edge Pty Ltd v Apple Computer Inc*  
*(1986) 161 CLR 171, p 204*

**Brennan J** The action or process of turning the source program in ‘6502 Assembly Language’ into the object program in what is called ‘machine readable language’ is said to be a translation. It strains the meaning of ‘language’ to include within its denotation the alphabetic symbols in which the source programs were written. Although the alphabetic symbols of the source programs may be classified as literary in form for the purposes of the Act, I would not describe those symbols as a language, the primary meaning of which is ‘the whole body of words and of methods of combining them used by a nation, people or race’ *(Shorter Oxford Dictionary)*. It is difficult to divorce ‘language’ from human speech, and a means of communicating ideas which does not consist of words is not properly to be described as a language. A chemical formula or a mathematical equation are apt to communicate ideas, but I should not classify either as a language. ‘6502 Assembly Language’ is not a language; it is a code. Even if the code were thought to be susceptible of ‘translation’ into another language, it was not so translated: the electrical charges which constitute the object programs are clearly not a language. To describe such electrical charges—no doubt helpfully enough for the purposes of computer science—as ‘machine readable language’ is to make metaphor serve as reality. The machine has no comprehension of thought which it is the essential purpose of language to convey, and the fact that a microprocessor is activated by a sequence of
electrical charges in a predictable way does not mean that it has understood and executed some command.

The secondary meaning of translation comes closer to describing the connection between the sequences of electrical charges constituting the source programs and corresponding object programs. Like the messages sent by a morse telegraphist, the object programs might be regarded as an expression of the original text in a different medium: a translation of a written text into a sequence of electrical charges. The fact that an object program will so operate upon a suitably programmed computer as to cause it to print out either the original written text (the source program) or a binary or hexadecimal notation of the electrical charges (the object program) makes it arguable (I need put it no higher) that an object program is an expression of a source program in another medium and is a ‘translation’. This approach, freed from the confusion arising from the metaphorical use of ‘language’, might command acceptance if it were not for the necessity of the ‘adaptation’ being itself a ‘work’. In the Full Federal Court, the majority did not think it necessary to decide whether an ‘adaptation’ (that is, a ‘translation’) was a ‘work’ but I respectfully disagree. The language of s 31(1)(a)(vii) is clear, ‘a work that is an adaptation’. We have seen that a sequence of electrical charges constituting an object program is neither a literary work nor any other kind of ‘work’. An object program is therefore not ‘a work that is an adaptation’ of the source program in which copyright subsists.

As we shall see, this view has not survived and does not represent the protection offered to computer programs in any jurisdiction. With the benefit of hindsight, it may be that the dissenting judgments of Mason and Wilson JJ have turned out to be more influential, or, at least, to be a more accurate assessment of the current protection afforded to computer programs.

*Computer Edge Pty Ltd v Apple Computer Inc* (1986) 161 CLR 171, p 193

**Mason and Wilson JJ** We have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that each of the source programs was an original literary work... Whether or not a literary work must be in writing, these programs were written. Although the substance of the program in each case was expressed in 6502 Assembly Code, this is a language which was readily intelligible to anyone versed in computer science. Each program was the product of skill, time and effort. It was a particular kind of vehicle for the communication of useful information to persons who may desire it. The fact that its creation was a step towards the goal of facilitating the operation of a computer does not warrant its dismissal by the appellants as no more than a mere adjunct to the operation of a mechanical device... On any view, in the form in which it was created and before it was transformed into another medium, each source program had an existence which was entirely independent of the machine. It was capable of conveying meaning as to the arrangement and ordering of instructions for the storage and reproduction of knowledge. In that form it was entitled to copyright protection.
The second submission of the appellants is that even if the source programs are the subject of copyright, the object programs are not. It is said that the members of the Full Court who formed the majority erred in holding each object program to be a ‘translation’ of the relevant source program and therefore an adaptation of a literary work within the meaning of that term as defined in s 10(1). The arguments advanced in support of the submission may be summarised as follows: (a) the object programs are merely sequences of electrical impulses within the computer; (b) a translation, in order to constitute an adaptation, must be a translation from one human language to another; (c) a translation of a literary work must itself be a literary work; (d) a translation of a literary work must convey a clear idea of the literary work to human beings. It is not correct to describe an object program as merely a sequence of electrical impulses within the computer. Electrical impulses there are, but those impulses serve to identify a set of instructions in machine readable language designed to guide the machine in its basic operations. They do not form part of the computer itself, notwithstanding that they may be embodied in a ROM or ROMs located permanently in silicon chips in a machine. They might equally well be contained in a magnetic disc or tape which can be inserted into or removed from the machine at will. The language may be recorded in visible form in binary or hexadecimal notation. The same result as is achieved by the use of an object program could be achieved by the manual operation of a computer in accordance with instructions written out in ordinary English and contained in a manual. The only problem would be that such a process would be impossibly tedious and therefore wholly impracticable.

The next question is whether the object program is a translation of the source program. The word ‘translation’ is not defined in the Act. One of the meanings given in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary is ‘the expression or rendering of something in another medium or form’. In the Federal Court, Sheppard J was of the opinion that a translation did not encompass something which could neither be seen nor heard. With all respect to his Honour, we are unable to share that view. True it is that the object program can be neither seen nor heard, but there can be no doubt that it exists and one knows where it can be found and how it can be activated. It seems to us that the conversion of a source code into an object code, albeit by the mechanical operation of a computer, is a process which effects a ‘translation’ of the source code into another language. It is immaterial that the last-mentioned language takes a form which can only be read and understood in that form by a machine. It is an adaptation of a literary work. This conclusion finds support in the statement from the 1979 report of the United States National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyright Works, p 21, n 109, which was cited by Fox J in his Honour’s judgment in the Federal Court:

A source code is a computer program written in any of several programming languages employed by computer programmers.

An object code is the version of a program in which the source code language is converted or translated into the machine language of the computer with which it is to be used.
We therefore reject the argument of the appellants that the only relevant translation is that which translates one human language into another human language. We also find no warrant for the argument that a translation must convey a clear idea of the literary work to human beings although, if it matters, there is no reason why an object program may not be reduced to writing and understood by those skilled in the art.

The question whether an adaptation of a literary work must itself be a literary work is more difficult of resolution... Section 31(1)(a)(vii) provides that copyright, in relation to a literary work, is the exclusive right, inter alia, to reproduce in a material form a work that is an adaptation of that literary work. 'Work' is defined in s 10(1), unless the contrary intention appears, to mean inter alia a literary work. Prima facie, therefore, an adaptation of a literary work must itself satisfy the description of a literary work. Of course, one would expect that an adaptation, in this case a translation of the original literary work constituted by the source codes, would continue to display, in its new form, the characteristics which enabled the original work to satisfy that description. But it is argued for the appellants that that is not so in the present case because a literary work must be in writing. Ordinarily and traditionally it is no doubt true that a literary work would take a written form. But the Act does not require it to be so. Indeed, s 22(1) of the Act identifies the time when a work is made as the time when 'the work was first reduced to writing or to some other material form' (our emphasis): see also s 21 of the Act. There seems to be no reason to doubt that a literary work is made and entitled to copyright protection from the time it is first recorded on tape, if that be the first material form that the work takes: In our opinion, an object code, although brought into existence by mechanical means, takes on the same literary character as is possessed from the source code from which it is derived. This conclusion seems necessarily to follow, if the protection secured by the Act to the source programs as original literary works is to be effective. If there is no copyright in the object programs which are a natural and necessary derivative of the source programs then there is no point in protecting the source programs.

Notwithstanding this dissenting view, the majority decision led to some consternation in the common law world as to the correct mode of application of copyright principles to computer programs. Some of this was based on theoretical argument, but some related to the practical issue of whether or not intellectual property rights in object code could be protected at all, if copyright was not deemed to be an appropriate medium for that protection. This confusion led directly to statutory action being taken in the UK: the Copyright (Computer Software) Amendment Act was passed in 1985 and its provisions have now been re-enacted in the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (CDPA) 1988. Further amendments to this statute have now been incorporated by virtue of the Copyright (Computer Programs) Regulations 1992 and these will be discussed later.26

26 See below, p 63.
CDPA 1988 (as amended)

3(1) ‘literary work’ means any work which is written, spoken or sung and accordingly includes—
   (a) a table or compilation;
   (b) a computer program;
   (c) preparatory design material for a computer program.

17(1) The copying of the work is an act restricted by the copyright in every description of copyright work...

(2) Copying in relation to a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work means reproducing the work in any material form. This includes storing the work in any medium by electronic means.

Thus, prima facie, copyright law applies to both source code and object code and the owners of the copyright in the computer programs represented by this code have a legal remedy available in the case of unauthorised copying of those programs.

THE SCOPE OF PROTECTION

How much needs to be copied before an infringement occurs is defined differently in different jurisdictions. In the UK, the concept is one of taking a substantial part (s 16(3) of the CDPA 1988), whilst the US considers unauthorised copying in terms of substantial similarity. While the detail of these may differ, they both require some assessment of what and how much has been copied in comparison with the whole. A consideration of the manner of constructing computer programs, to which reference has already been made, will reveal that many aspects of a program can be copied, from straight, line by line copying of the source or object code (literal copying) to copying of the structure, sequence and organisation (SSO) of the program (non-literal copying). It has been established, in relation to other areas of copyright law, that the test of substantial taking may be either quantitative or qualitative. Thus, if part of a work is copied which is small in quantity but highly significant in terms of its overall contribution to the work, then an action will lie. It is common practice for programmers to include spurious lines of code which are not essential to the execution of the program but make the detection of copying easier. Other evidence may also raise a strong presumption of literal copying. Thus, in MS

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27 See, eg, Hawkes & Son (London) Ltd v Paramount Film Services Ltd [1934] Ch 593; Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football) Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 273, in which Lord Pearce said: ‘Whether a part is substantial must be decided by its quality rather than its quantity.’ This latter case was relied upon by Ferris J in John Richardson Computers v Flanders [1993] FSR 497: see below, p 46.
Associates v Power, it was noted that there were a number of similarities in the names of the variables in the defendants’ and plaintiffs’ programs—names which would be expected to be decided quite arbitrarily. It was also noted that the function ‘vtprs’ appeared in both the defendants’ and the plaintiffs’ list of variables, although the facts showed that the function was not used in the defendants’ program.

Where there are similar errors in two programs, a strong presumption of copying may be raised. However, this may be capable of rebuttal because of another difference between computer programs and other forms of literary work. Whereas it is statistically improbable that, if two authors independently have the same idea for a novel, they will write it in the same words and sentence construction, this is not such a remote possibility in the case of a computer program. If two programmers independently write a program to perform the same task, especially if this is a relatively simple task or sub-routine, it may be very likely that they will write the same or similar program. It is also equally possible that they may make the same errors. If such programs contain the same errors, then, although this may provide persuasive evidence, copying will not be a foregone conclusion, as some errors are more frequent and obvious than others. Illustrations of these issues are again to be found in MS Associates v Power, in which the same errors were noted in one part of the program but, in relation to another part, it was perhaps possible to explain the observed similarities.

MS Associates v Power
[1987] FSR 242, p 248

In the plaintiffs’ program the ‘oct’ function is arbitrarily grouped with the ‘hex’ function following it. In the defendant’s B-tran, the ‘oct’ function similarly is grouped with the ‘hex’ function in the source file called ‘hex c’. It is Mr Maskell’s evidence that there is no obvious reason why it should be grouped with the ‘hex’ function, other than that the plaintiffs had so grouped them together, and indeed that it would have been better not to put it there but to allocate it to a separate source file of its own. However, on commenting on this point, the first defendants’ evidence is that the ‘hex’ and ‘oct’ functions are commonly grouped together and are so in Microsoft BASIC.

Problems of this type create some fundamental difficulties in applying the law of copyright to computer programs. Copyright was developed to protect the form in which authors or artists create their work; to protect the expression of their idea rather than the idea itself. If, in the previous example, there is indeed only one way in which the program or part of the program can be written, can this reasonably be treated as the expression of an idea, or has the expression

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merged with the idea, so that the whole cannot be protected by copyright? This
issue, referred to as the idea/expression dichotomy, has now become central to
some discussions on the scope of copyright protection for computer programs.
Although the concept enjoyed a renaissance in connection with computer
software, this is not a new idea for copyright law to accommodate and the
boundaries of what is and is not copyrightable have been discussed elsewhere,
particularly in the US, where the distinction has been given a statutory basis.30
This has resulted in extensive discussion in the case law on the subject in the US,
concerning the formulation of rules and tests to distinguish idea from expression.
In particular, Learned Hand J, in Nichols v Universal Pictures Corp,31 devised the
‘levels of abstraction’ test:

Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of
increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is
left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of
what the play is all about, and at times might consist only of its title; but there is
a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since
otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his ‘ideas’ to which, apart
from their expression, his property is never extended.

But he went on to say, referring to the line between idea and expression, that
nobody ‘has ever been able to fix that boundary and nobody ever can’.

The problems caused by the idea/expression dichotomy have been further
exacerbated by the dispute surrounding the extent to which the non-literal
elements of a program, the SSO, can be protected by copyright, coupled with the
extent to which elements of the structure form part of the expression of that
program.

These non-literal elements are often referred to as the ‘look and feel’32 of a
program and are often precisely those factors that are likely to give a particular
program a competitive edge over its rivals, and, therefore, precisely those elements
which the originators of the program will most want to protect. Thus, the ‘look’ of
a program may include elements of the user interface, such as the screen display,
and determine the way in which the computer program appears to the user. The

30 US Copyright Act 1976, 17 USCS s 102(b), which provides that copyright protection does not
extend to any ‘idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle or
discovery’.
31 45 F 2d 119, p 121 (2nd Cir 1930), discussed in, eg, Englund, SR, ‘Idea, process or protected
expression? Determining the scope of copyright protection of the structure of computer
programs’ (1990) 88 Mich L Rev 866; Daniels, DWT, ‘Learned Hand never played Nintendo: a
better way to think about non-literal, non-visual software copyright cases’ (1994) 61 Chicago
UL Rev 613; Wilkins, JS, ‘Protecting computer programs as compilations under Computer
32 A concept which originated in relation to greetings cards and children’s books and entered the
analysis of copyright infringement of computer programs in cases involving video games. See,
eg, Ogilvie, JWL, ‘Defining computer program parts under Learned Hand’s abstractions tests
in software copyright infringement cases’ (1992) 91 Mich L Rev 526; Velasco, J, ‘The
'feel', on the other hand, includes those elements which determine the experience of using the program, such as the keystroke sequences or other means of operating the program. The generic term ‘look and feel’ recognises that these concepts may frequently overlap or be interdependent.

The situation in the US

The extent to which this SSO of a program can be regarded as the idea of the program or, alternatively, be protected by copyright law as part of the expression of that idea has, as already mentioned, been debated extensively by the courts in the US. Some of the arguments raised in these cases have been highly influential in stimulating the debate on the correct application of copyright principles to computer programs. The first such case was Whelan Associates v Jaslow Dental Laboratory Inc. A computer program had been devised by an employee to keep records in a dental laboratory. The employee concerned subsequently left that employment and later created another software package to perform the same function. It was accepted that both packages provided the same service, that is, the end product was the same, but that the coding was different; thus, literal similarities were absent. It was argued, for the defendants, that the structure of a computer program must be the idea, rather than the expression of that idea, and would therefore be beyond the scope of copyright protection. The US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit responded by trying to devise a rule for distinguishing idea from expression which they could then apply to the facts of the case.

Whelan Associates v Jaslow Dental Laboratory Inc
797 F 2d 1222 (1987), p 1234

1 A rule for distinguishing idea from expression in computer programs

It is frequently difficult to distinguish the idea from the expression thereof. No less an authority than Learned Hand J, after a career that included writing some of the leading copyright opinions, concluded that the distinction will ‘inevitably be ad hoc’... Although we acknowledge the wisdom of Judge Hand’s remark, we feel that a review of relevant copyright precedent will enable us to formulate a rule applicable in this case. In addition, precisely because the line between idea and expression is elusive, we must pay particular attention to the pragmatic considerations that underlie the distinction and copyright law generally. In this regard, we must remember that the purpose of the copyright law is to create the most efficient and productive balance between protection (incentive) and dissemination of

information, to promote learning, culture and development... We begin our analysis with the case of *Baker v Selden*, which, in addition to being a seminal case in the law of copyright generally, is particularly relevant here because, like the instant case, it involved a utilitarian work, rather than an artistic or fictional one. In *Baker v Selden*, the plaintiff Selden obtained a copyright on his book, *Selden’s Condensed Ledger, or Bookkeeping Simplified*, which described a simplified system of accounting. Included in the book were certain ‘blank forms’, pages with ruled lines and headings, for use in Selden’s accounting system... The dispute centred on whether Selden’s blank forms were part of the method (idea) of Selden’s book, and hence non-copyrightable, or part of the copyrightable text (expression). In deciding this point, the court distinguished what was protectable from what was not protectable as follows:

...where the art [that is, the method of accounting] it teaches cannot be used without employing the methods and diagrams used to illustrate the book, or such as are similar to them, such methods and diagrams are to be considered as necessary incidents to the art, and given to the public.

Applying this test, the court held that the blank forms were necessary incidents to Selden’s method of accounting, and hence were not entitled to any copyright protection. The court’s test in *Baker v Selden* suggests a way to distinguish idea from expression. Just as *Baker v Selden* focused on the end sought to be achieved by Selden’s book, the line between idea and expression may be drawn with reference to the end sought to be achieved by the work in question. In other words, the purpose or function of a utilitarian work would be the work’s idea, and everything that is not necessary to that purpose or function would be part of the expression of the idea... Where there are various means of achieving the desired purpose, then the particular means chosen is not necessary to the purpose; hence, there is expression, not idea. Consideration of copyright doctrines related to *scènes à faire* and fact-intensive works supports our formulation, for they reflect the same underlying principle. *Scènes à faire* are ‘incidents, characters or settings which are as a practical matter indispensable...in the treatment of a given topic’... It is well settled doctrine that *scènes à faire* are afforded no copyright protection. *Scènes à faire* are afforded no protection because the subject matter represented can be expressed in no other way than through the particular *scène à faire*. Therefore, granting a copyright ‘would give the first author a monopoly on the commonplace ideas behind the *scènes à faire*’... This is merely a restatement of the hypothesis advanced above, that the purpose or function of a work or literary device is part of that device’s ‘idea’ (unprotectable portion). It follows that anything necessary to effecting that function is also, necessarily, part of the idea, too. Fact intensive works are given similarly limited copyright coverage... Once again, the reason appears to be that there are only a limited number of ways to express factual material, and therefore the purpose of the literary work—telling a truthful story—can be accomplished only by employing one of a limited number of devices. Those devices therefore belong to the idea, not the expression, of the historical or factual work. Although the economic implications of this rule are necessarily somewhat speculative, we nevertheless believe that the rule would advance the basic purpose underlying the idea/expression distinction, ‘the preservation of the
balance between competition and protection reflected in the patent and copyright laws’…

As we stated above, among the more significant costs in computer programming are those attributable to developing the structure and logic of the program. The rule proposed here, which allows copyright protection beyond the literal computer code, would provide the proper incentive for programmers by protecting their most valuable efforts, while not giving them a stranglehold over the development of new computer devices that accomplish the same end. The principal economic argument used against this position—used, that is, in support of the position that programs’ literal elements are the only parts of the programs protected by the copyright law—is that computer programs are so intricate, each step so dependent on all of the other steps, that they are almost impossible to copy except literally, and that anyone who attempts to copy the structure of a program without copying its literal elements must expend a tremendous amount of effort and creativity. In the words of one commentator: ‘One cannot simply “approximate” the entire copyrighted computer program and create a similar operative program without the expenditure of almost the same amount of time as the original programmer expended.’ (Note, 68 Minn L Rev at 1290.) According to this argument, such work should not be discouraged or penalised. A further argument against our position is not economic but jurisprudential; another commentator argues that the concept of structure in computer programs is too vague to be useful in copyright cases… He too would therefore appear to advocate limiting copyright protection to programs’ literal codes.

Neither of the two arguments just described is persuasive. The first argument fails for two reasons. In the first place, it is simply not true that ‘approximation’ of a program short of perfect reproduction is valueless. To the contrary, one can approximate a program and thereby gain a significant advantage over competitors even though additional work is needed to complete the program. Second, the fact that it will take a great deal of effort to copy a copyrighted work does not mean that the copier is not a copyright infringer. The issue in a copyrighted case is simply whether the copyright holder’s expression has been copied, not how difficult it was to do the copying. Whether an alleged infringer spent significant time and effort to copy an original work is therefore irrelevant to whether he has pirated the expression of an original work.

As to the second argument, it is surely true that limiting copyright protection to computers’ literal codes would be simpler and would yield more definite answers than does our answer here. Ease of application is not, however, a sufficient counterweight to the considerations we have adduced on behalf of our position.

Finally, one commentator argues that the process of development and progress in the field of computer programming is significantly different from that in other fields, and therefore requires a particularly restricted application of the copyright law. According to this argument, progress in the area of computer technology is achieved by means of ‘stepping stones’, a process that ‘requires plagiarising in some manner the underlying copyrighted work’ (Note, 68 Minn L Rev at 1292). As a consequence, this commentator argues,
giving computer programs too much copyright protection will retard progress in the field.

We are not convinced that progress in computer technology or technique is qualitatively different from progress in other areas of science or the arts. In balancing protection and dissemination, the copyright law has always recognised and tried to accommodate the fact that all intellectual pioneers build on the work of their predecessors. Thus, copyright principles derived from other areas are applicable in the field of computer programs.

2 Application of the general rule to this case

The rule proposed here is certainly not problem-free. The rule has its greatest force in the analysis of utilitarian or ‘functional’ works, for the purpose of such works is easily stated and identified. By contrast, in cases involving works of literature or ‘non-functional’ visual representations, defining the purpose of the work may be difficult. Since it may be impossible to discuss the purpose or function of a novel, poem, sculpture or painting, the rule may have little or no application to cases involving such works. The present case presents no such difficulties, for it is clear that the purpose of the utilitarian Dentalab program was to aid in the business operations of a dental laboratory. It is equally clear that the structure of the program was not essential to that task: there are other programs on the market, competitors of Dentalab and Dentcom, that perform the same functions but have different structures and designs.

This fact seems to have been dispositive for the district court. The mere idea or concept of a computerised program for operating a dental laboratory would not in and of itself be subject to copyright. Copyright law protects the manner in which the author expresses an idea or concept, but not the idea itself... There are many ways that the same data may be organised, assembled, held, retrieved and utilised by a computer. Different computer systems may functionally serve similar purposes without being copies of each other. There is evidence in the record that there are other software programs for the business management of dental laboratories in competition with plaintiff’s program. There is no contention that any of them infringe although they may incorporate many of the same ideas and functions. The ‘expression of the idea’ in a software computer program is the manner in which the program operates, controls and regulates the computer in receiving, assembling, calculating, retaining, correlating, and producing useful information either on a screen, print-out or by audio communication.

... The conclusion is thus inescapable that the detailed structure of the Dentalab program is part of the expression, not the idea, of that program.

... The Copyright Act of 1976 provides further support, for it indicates that Congress intended that the structure and organisation of a literary work could be part of its expression protectable by copyright. Title 17 USC § 103 (1982) specifically extends copyright protection to compilations and derivative works. Title 17 USC § 101 defines ‘compilation’ as ‘a work formed by the collection and assembling of pre-existing materials or of data that are selected, co-ordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as
a whole constitutes an original work of authorship’, and it defines ‘derivative work’ as one ‘based upon one or more pre-existing works, such as...abridgement, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted’. Although the Code does not use the terms ‘sequence’, ‘order’ or ‘structure’, it is clear from the definition of compilations and derivative works, and the protection afforded them, that Congress was aware of the fact that the sequencing and ordering of materials could be copyrighted, that is, that the sequence and order could be parts of the expression, not the idea, of a work.

Despite the reference to Learned Hand, this judgment does not build on his famous abstractions test but, instead, relies on another line of case law and also on statute to show that the SSO of the program, the non-literal elements, should be afforded copyright protection. In brief, the court found that the purpose of the program at issue was the organisation of the dental laboratory records and that the structure of the program was not necessary to that purpose, following from the analogy with the reasoning in Baker v Selden (1879). In consequence, the structure of Whelan’s program was entitled to copyright protection.

One possible virtue of this approach is its simplicity, but, as Englund identifies below,34 this may generate its own problems:

Perhaps the single virtue of the Whelan rule is that it is easy to apply. The widespread application of the rule is likely to have undesirable consequences. Given the court’s broad conception of the purpose of a program as what a user might do with it rather than what the program actually does, almost any particular structure could be seen as not necessary to that purpose. The court failed adequately to consider the possibility that broad protection might allow Whelan to make it impossible for others to program a computer efficiently to perform the same function and employ the same process. Although the court purported to consider the need to ‘create the most efficient and productive balance between protection (incentive) and dissemination of information to promote learning, culture and development’, the court’s rule may thus actually impair progress in the computer art.

Velasco35 makes the point that the ideal test would be one which is both simple and accurate. In such a technically complex area as computer software, it has proved difficult to pursue either of these aims without compromising the other and it is unsurprising, therefore, that certain inadequacies have been identified in the simple test enunciated in Whelan. It can thus be criticised as being oversimplistic in its suggestion that it may be possible to both define and isolate a single purpose for a particular program. An obvious consequence of this is that, if programmers are to be able to devise other programs that perform the same

34 *Op cit*, Englund, fn 31, p 881.
35 *Op cit*, Velasco, fn 32.
function but do not infringe copyright, then there has to be a number of other possible structures for the program which could, reasonably and efficiently, fulfil that same purpose. If not, the Whelan formulation is capable of conferring an almost patent-like protection on the first programmer to develop a suitable structure. In reality, most commercially important programs consist of a number of sub-routines and modules, each of which could, validly, be considered as an idea. These problems were summarised accurately by Menell:

...it is apparent that the emerging interpretation of copyright protection for application program code is quite far off the mark. Under the Whelan test, copyright extends to the structure, sequence and organisation of application code as long as the overall purpose of the entire program, broadly defined, can be implemented in another manner. Since many aspects of application code are dictated by basic principles of software engineering, the Whelan rule makes it difficult for others wishing to market programs performing the same task as the first comer to perform it as effectively. In effect, the Whelan test enables first comers to ‘lock up’ basic programming techniques as implemented in programs to perform particular tasks. This gives the first comer significant market power. In addition, since the programmer did not have to contribute novel and non-obvious programming techniques to our state of knowledge in order to get this legal protection, the monopoly power bestowed will not, in most cases, be justified on the basis of sound public policy analysis.

Furthermore, in the light of the importance of sequential research in the application program industry, the Whelan test is likely to affect detrimentally the direction and cost of research and development. This can be seen clearly by analysing the set of options open to an application programmer who wishes to improve on an existing program that employs nothing more than good programming practice. In a world protecting only useful, novel and non-obvious programming elements, the programmer would be free to build upon the functional aspects of the first program. The Whelan test, however, prohibits the programmer from innovating in this way. The programmer would either have to: (1) secure a license for the original program (or its desired aspects) from the copyright owner; (2) circumvent the copyrighted material by expressing the desired functional aspects of the original program in a way that does not infringe its overall structure, sequence and organisation; or (3) independently develop the functional programming techniques. Plainly, all three of these options substantially raise the costs of innovative activity.

Karjala goes further and suggests that the reasoning based on the use of scènes à faire is inappropriate: ‘...computer programs are literary works only in form... In operation, they are pure works of function, that is, of technology. The analogy
with novels and plays…is totally inapt for works of technology.’ Although expressed as a criticism of the reasoning in *Whelan*, this could be regarded, more correctly, as a comment on the classification of computer programs as literary works for copyright purposes.

The US Court of Appeals Second Circuit recognised some of these problems in the later case of *Computer Associates v Altai*,\(^{39}\) noting that the decision in *Whelan* had received a ‘mixed reception’ in the courts and that ‘*Whelan* has fared…poorly in the academic community where its standard… has been widely criticised for being overbroad’,\(^{40}\) and went on to use rather different reasoning. The case concerned the development of an ‘operating system compatibility component’ by Computer Associates which enabled a program to work with a number of different operating systems. One of the members of the team that developed this feature was later employed by Altai to develop a version of one of its own programs which could be used on various operating systems. Without the knowledge of Altai, the programmer based the program on the Computer Associates program, including the literal copying of some 30% of the code. When Altai were made aware of this (by Computer Associates suing for copyright infringement!), they used different programmers to create a new version. Nonetheless, Computer Associates went on to sue for infringement of both programs, alleging that even the second program made use of the non-literal elements of their original program.

Not surprisingly, at first instance, the court found that there had been infringement in relation to the first program. However, this court absolved Altai of liability in relation to the second program and Computer Associates appealed, leading to the Second Circuit formulating what has become known as the ‘abstraction-filtration-comparison’ test as they struggled to formulate a suitable method for determining the copyrightability of the non-literal elements of a computer program. It was accepted in the case that copyright protection of computer programs extends beyond literal similarities in code and also includes similarities in structure. In contrast to the decision in *Whelan*, the judgment of the Second Circuit utilised Learned Hand’s famous abstractions approach, at least for the first part of the test, and the *Whelan* formulation, that the overall purpose of the program can be equated with its idea, was roundly criticised on the basis that the majority of programs do not consist of a single ‘idea’ but are more accurately described as composites. Circuit Judge Walker therefore introduced a different test and, in presenting

\(^{39}\) 982 F 2d 693 (2nd Cir 1992).

\(^{40}\) Ibid, p 705.

\(^{41}\) Ibid, p 706.
this test, the Second Circuit suggested that, when faced with this problem, courts:

…would be well advised to undertake a three step procedure based on the abstractions test utilised by the district court, in order to determine whether the non-literal elements of two or more computer programs are substantially similar. This approach breaks no new ground; rather it draws on such familiar copyright doctrines as merger, scènes à faire and public domain. In taking this approach, however, we are cognisant that computer technology is a dynamic field which can quickly outpace judicial decision making. Thus, in cases where the technology in question does not allow for a literal application of the procedure we outline below, our opinion should not be read to foreclose the district courts of our circuit from utilising a modified version.

In ascertaining substantial similarity under this approach, a court would first break down the allegedly infringed program into its constituent structural parts. Then, by examining each of these parts for such things as incorporated ideas, expression that is necessarily incidental to those ideas, and elements that are taken from the public domain, a court would then be able to sift out all non-protectable material. Left with a kernel, or possibly kernels, of creative expression after following this process of elimination, the court’s last step would be to compare this material with the structure of an allegedly infringing program. The result of this comparison will determine whether the protectable elements of the programs at issue are substantially similar so as to warrant a finding of infringement.

This was the source of what has become known as the abstraction-filtration-comparison test, which was subsequently enlarged upon by the court.

**Step 1: Abstraction**

… As applied to computer programs, the abstractions test will comprise the first step in the examination for substantial similarity. Initially, in a manner that resembles reverse engineering on a theoretical plane, a court should dissect the allegedly copied program’s structure and isolate each level of abstraction contained within it. This process begins with the code and ends with an articulation of the program’s ultimate function. Along the way, it is necessary essentially to retrace and map each of the designer’s steps—in the opposite order in which they were taken during the program’s creation...

At the lowest level of abstraction, a computer program may be thought of in its entirety as a set of individual instructions organised into a hierarchy of modules. At a higher level of abstraction, the instructions in the lowest level modules may be replaced conceptually by the functions of those modules. At progressively higher levels of abstraction, the functions of higher level modules conceptually replace the implementations of those modules in terms of lower level modules and instructions, until finally, one is left with nothing but the ultimate function of the program. A program has structure at every level of abstraction at which it is viewed. At low levels of abstraction, a program’s structure may be quite complex; at the highest level it is trivial…
Step 2: Filtration

... This process entails examining the structural components at each level of abstraction to determine whether their particular inclusion at that level was ‘idea’ or was dictated by considerations of efficiency, so as to be necessarily incidental to that idea; required by factors external to the program itself; or taken from the public domain and hence is non-protectable expression...

(a) Elements dictated by efficiency

... Copyrighted language may be copied without infringing when there is but a limited number of ways to express a given idea... In the computer context, this means that when specific instructions, even though previously copyrighted, are the only and essential means of accomplishing a given task, their later use by another will not amount to infringement.

... In the context of computer program design, the concept of efficiency is akin to deriving the most concise logical proof or formulating the most succinct mathematical computation. Thus, the more efficient a set of modules are, the more closely they approximate the idea or process embodied in that particular aspect of the program’s structure.

... Efficiency is an industry-wide goal. Since, as we have already noted, there may be only a limited number of efficient implementations for any given program task, it is quite possible that multiple programmers, working independently, will design the identical method employed in the allegedly infringed work. Of course, if this is the case, there is no copyright infringement.

... Thus, since evidence of similarly efficient structure is not particularly probative of copying, it should be disregarded in the overall substantial similarity analysis...

(b) Elements dictated by external factors

... Professor Nimmer points out that ‘in many instances it is virtually impossible to write a program to perform particular functions in a specific computing environment without employing standard techniques’... This is a result of the fact that a programmer’s freedom of design choice is often circumscribed by extrinsic considerations such as (1) the mechanical specifications of the computer on which a particular program is intended to run; (2) compatibility requirements of other programs with which a program is designed to operate in conjunction; (3) computer manufacturers’ design standards; (4) demands of the industry being serviced; and (5) widely accepted programming practices within the computer industry...

(c) Elements taken from the public domain

... Such material is free for the taking and cannot be appropriated by a single author even though it is included in a copyrighted work... We see no reason to make an exception to this rule for elements of a computer program that have entered the public domain by virtue of freely accessible program exchanges and the like.
Step 3: Comparison

The third and final step of the test for substantial similarity that we believe appropriate for non-literal program components entails a comparison. Once a court has sifted out all elements of the allegedly infringed program which are ‘ideas’ or are dictated by efficiency or external factors, or taken from the public domain, there may remain a core of protectable expression. In terms of a work’s copyright value, this is the golden nugget...

The court then went on to discuss what it believed to be the relevant policy issues in drawing the line between idea and expression. In doing this, they recognised that assessing non-literal similarity in this way is far more favourable to the defendant than the method of assessing non-literal copying used in Whelan which the court in Computer Associates explicitly rejected. Nonetheless, they felt that a correct application of copyright principles was of overriding importance and were of the view that this would not have disastrous consequences for the industry:

...we are unpersuaded that the test we approve today will lead to the dire consequences for the computer program industry that the plaintiff and some amici predict. To the contrary, serious students of the industry have been highly critical of the sweeping scope of copyright protection engendered by the Whelan rule, in that it enables first comers to ‘lock up’ basic programming techniques as implemented in programs to perform particular tasks.

While incentive based arguments in favour of broad copyright protection are perhaps attractive from a pure policy perspective, ultimately they have a corrosive effect on certain fundamental tenets of copyright doctrine. If the test we have outlined results in narrowing the scope of protection, as we expect it will, that result flows from applying, in accordance with Congressional intent, long standing principles of copyright law to computer programs. Of course, our decision is also informed by our concern that these fundamental principles remain undistorted.

This judgment was generally well received as demonstrating a good understanding of the way in which computer programs are designed and written. It was acknowledged by some writers that the decision was also able to deal with constraints of interoperability and compatibility: ‘...together, Altai and Sega provide a method by which the courts can permit copying of internal interface elements necessary for compatibility while protecting elements not needed for compatibility.’ On the other hand, some reservations were expressed.

43 See, also, below, p 55.
Although the *Altai* court attempted to balance the interests involved in the protection of these basic elements, the court was unduly constrained by a uniquely literary view of the creative process and thus failed to recognise its own ability to ‘keep pace’ with technological change within the traditional copyright framework. Because the court protected more than the ‘only and essential means’ of accomplishing a programming task, its test will discourage innovative programming techniques and leave non-literal elements of computer programs under-protected.

Notwithstanding this criticism, the writer still found some positive features in the judgment which might form the basis of a workable test, as long as certain provisos were taken into account:

In certain cases, it may be necessary to limit the copyrightability of an ‘essential means’ of accomplishing a particular programming objective in order to allow continuing innovation but this will rarely preclude copyrightability. Even assuming, as the *Altai* court did, that ‘efficiency’ takes a lot of the creativity out of programming, the court did not assert that no creativity is involved. Rarely is there only one way to accomplish a given programming task.

The ‘abstraction-filtration-comparison’ method of determining the copyrightability of a computer program’s non-literal elements may be imperfect, but is arguably a ‘practical necessity’ in the computer program context. Abstracting and then filtering out unprotected elements ‘eases the court’s task of discerning the boundaries of protectable expression’ by ‘separating the program into manageable components’. However, the only elements—whether literal or non-literal—that should be filtered out are those that constitute the ‘only and essential means’ of accomplishing a given task. Although there is ‘no statutory basis for treating computer programs differently from other literary work’, courts should attempt to develop an approach to copyrightability that acknowledges the unique creative challenges posed by computer programming.

The decision in *Altai*, although taking more accurate recognition of the way in which computer programs are developed and written, cannot deal satisfactorily with the situations such as that which occurred in *Apple Computer Inc v Microsoft Corp.* In this case, applying the abstraction-filtration-comparison test would result in there being little to compare, because the program had been constructed from existing sub-routines already in the public domain or dictated by efficiency requirements, with a consequent denial of copyright protection.

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45 35 F 3d 1435 (9th Cir 1994).
Apple v Microsoft: has the pendulum swung too far?
Steve S Moutsatsos and John CR Cummings
(1993) 9 CL & P 162

It could be strongly argued that the decision in Apple v Microsoft simply turned on its facts and that the ‘analytical approach’ remains a sound legal process through which to examine software copyright issues. On the other hand, it is also possible to assert that the ‘analytical approach’ as it is applied to computer software, by its nature, may inevitably lead to the conclusion that the constituent elements of a computer program are not protectable under copyright law. The analytical dissection of a computer program, which is essentially a utilitarian work, is more likely to produce constituent parts that are found to be functional, as opposed to a movie or a novel...

In such cases, whether or not there is any copyright protection will depend on an assessment of the way in which they have been assembled and interlinked. It will be at this stage that the case law on the copyright of compilations may become very relevant.46

The discussion on the previous pages has focused exclusively on the cases of Whelan and Altai, largely because they have subsequently been the ones referred to in the UK cases, but also because they have generally proved to be influential and have both generated much debate. Also, in some ways, they can be viewed as two ends of the spectrum of copyright protection for computer programs. As noted by Moutsatsos and Cumming,47 ‘Both approaches are rooted in and use the language and legal precedent of copyright law but with vastly differing results’. Whelan, with its almost patent-like protection, operates in favour of the original developer of the program, whereas application of the test in Altai reduces considerably this protection. The opposing effects of these two judgments may be of significance for certain sectors of the industry. Thus, in the appeal in Altai, the Software Publishers Association supported Computer Associates in opposing the lower court’s decision and in support of the Whelan approach, whereas the American Committee for Interoperable Systems favoured rejection of the Whelan rationale.48 Different commentators have both supported and opposed the decision in Altai, but Miller believes that Altai can be viewed as a further refinement of the approach begun in Whelan and suggests that the difference between the two has been overstated;49 ‘...it seems more accurate to view Altai as adopting a series of modifications of Whelan’s generalised statements and as

46 In the US, see Feist Publications Inc v Rural Telephone Service Co 113 L Ed 2d 358 (1991), cited in Altai in the UK. See the discussion of Richardson v Flanders, below, p 47.
49 Op cit, Miller, fn 13, p 1002.
using different terminology without deviating markedly from the Whelan court’s fundamental reliance on the idea/expression dichotomy.’

Whatever view is taken of the relationship between the decisions in these two cases, the situation in the US courts has been more complex than the analysis above might suggest. As we have seen, both Whelan and Altai were decided in different circuits of the US Court of Appeals and, despite the criticisms of Whelan contained in the court’s judgment in Altai, it was certainly not the case that the test in Altai immediately eclipsed that in Whelan. In addition, other circuits devised other tests which might be based in part on either of these tests. This resulted, at times, in certain contradictions and confusions and, in the words of the court in Altai,50 ‘many of the decisions in this area reflect the courts’ attempt to fit the proverbial square peg in a round hole’. The Ninth Circuit, for instance, developed its own test (the intrinsic/extrinsic test) for copyrightability of computer programs in Brown Bag Software v Symantec Corp.51 The proliferation of such tests and their subsequent modification led one commentator to state that ‘The “look and feel” cases…can fairly be characterised as a mess’.52 Thus, the situation with regard to copyrightability of computer software in the US courts has been more confused than is sometimes presented,53 although the Altai test now appears to be accepted in many US courts.54

Velasco has compared the various tests and has concluded that the test devised in Computer Associates v Altai is the best on offer from the courts.

The copyrightability of non-literal elements of computer programs
Julian Velasco
(1994) 94 Colum L Rev 242, p 284

...only the Altai test explicitly incorporates in a systematic way the abstractions test, the concept of merger, a very sophisticated understanding of the concept of scènes à faire, and the concept of public domain materials. In short, from the perspective of copyright doctrine, the Altai test is superior to the others.

Despite this tribute, he nevertheless goes on to point out a failing and suggest an improvement:

50 982 F 2d 693 (2nd Cir 1992), p 712.
51 960 F 2d 1465 (9th Cir 1992).
53 A more detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this publication; see, eg, ibid, Hayes; op cit, Miller, fn 13; op cit, Velasco, fn 32; Karjala, DS, ‘Recent US and international developments in software protection, Part 2’ [1994] EIPR 58; Drexl, J, ‘What is protected in a computer program? Copyright protection in the US and Europe’ (1994) 15 IIC Studies in Industrial Property & Copyright Law, Munich: VCH.
An inescapable failing of the *Altai* test is that its thoroughness in filtering out unprotectable elements of expression leads to underprotection... Application of the compilations doctrine rectifies this failing... works consisting entirely of uncopyrightable elements are often protected by the copyright law under the rubric of ‘compilations’. Based on an analogy to compilations, copyright protection should subsist in computer programs even if they consist entirely of uncopyrightable elements if those elements were selected or arranged in an original manner. Therefore, an additional step should be added to *Altai’s* ‘abstraction-filtration-comparison’ test. After the court has completed the successive filtering of the second step of the *Altai* test, it should re-evaluate the elements that have been excluded as uncopyrightable to determine whether there are elements, or groupings of elements, that, in their selection, coordination or arrangement, are sufficiently original to merit copyright protection as a group in a manner analogous to compilations. This would be a ‘re-incorporating’ stage since elements previously excluded from copyright protection are now reincorporated in the analysis, albeit as compilations... The addition of the compilations doctrine expands the scope of the *Altai* test... while simultaneously avoiding the overbreadth of ‘total concept and feel’. It strikes the appropriate balance between the two, providing the substance needed for analysis while ensuring that only expression is protected.

One final point should be made with regard to the proposed re-incorporating stage. In applying it, the court should recognise the fact that a work may be held to consist of more than one compilation, just as a work ‘may consist of a mixture of numerous ideas and expressions’...

With the elimination of the unnecessary limitations imposed by the court and the addition of this re-incorporating stage, the *Altai* test becomes complete. In theory, at least, it should provide protection to all the elements and only to the elements of a computer program that deserve protection. Although decisions will still be ‘ad hoc’ to a certain extent, this modified *Altai* test provides the decision maker with a framework for determining copyrightability that is solidly grounded in well established copyright principles.

Despite dissent in some quarters and the evolution of different tests (as mentioned earlier, the Court of Appeals in *Altai* itself thought that modifications would be appropriate in some circumstances), the test was generally greeted with favour and the prevailing opinion seemed to be that this was likely to become the preferred approach.\(^\text{55}\)

Given the prestige of the Second Circuit and the considerable persuasiveness of the opinions, it is fair to conclude that *Computer Associates* has now become the analytical starting point for further analysis in the United States of the appropriate scope of copyright protection for computer programs... The effects intended by the court in *Computer Associates*, of course, are greater competition, increased incremental innovation and a more public exchange or market in ‘ideas’. Wherever United States’ case law or legislation next turns, these should continue to be important objectives.

The situation in the UK

During the period in which the US courts were debating these issues, those involved in the UK waited impatiently for the first case to go to full trial. There was academic debate about how the approach of the UK courts might be influenced by the difficulties experienced by the US courts. There was also evidence provided by interlocutory hearings such as that of Computer Aided Design v Bolwell, in which Hoffman J made reference to the decision in Whelan v Jaslow, that, at the least, the judiciary were taking cognisance of the US decisions. Computer Aided Design (CAD) were suppliers of both software and hardware. In particular, they marketed a software package called BUSNIX-FLEET. In a common scenario in this type of case, three employees, including Bolwell, left CAD to set up a rival business, with the promise of both orders and financial assistance from a former customer of CAD who was dissatisfied with BUSNIX-FLEET. The defendants wrote a program using the fourth generation language, PROGRESS, and called the package the Towquest system. CAD then alleged that this had incurred both a breach of copyright and a breach of confidence. The respective programs used different codes and there was no allegation that the code itself was copied, rather that the overall design and structure, that is, the ‘look and feel’, of BUSNIX-FLEET had been substantially copied.

Although CAD failed to obtain an injunction because they were unable to satisfy the court that Towquest was arguably a substantial copy of BUSNIX-FLEET, Hoffman J said that the overall structure of a computer program was a form of literary expression in which copyright could exist and, in his express reference to the reasoning in Whelan v Jaslow, seemed to be condoning the approach in that case.

It was not until the end of 1992 that the High Court began to hear the case of John Richardson Computers Ltd v Flanders. The facts of the case are complex but, in brief, both parties developed and marketed programs to print labels for prescriptions at pharmacists and keep details of the stock of drugs. Flanders, a self-taught programmer with a penchant for writing programs in machine code, had worked for Richardson in the past, first as an employee and then as a self-employed consultant. After all ties with Richardson ceased, Flanders wrote a program in QuickBASIC for an IBM personal computer which he marketed through a company that he had established, called Chemtec. Richardson alleged that this program infringed his copyright in an earlier program written, with the help of Flanders, in assembler language for a BBC computer.

56 (1989) unreported, 23 August.
Ferris J identified a number of issues, of which the most important and interesting for our purposes was: ‘What ought to be the approach of the court to the appraisal of an allegation of breach of copyright in a computer program where it is not claimed that the source code has itself been copied?’

*John Richardson Computers Ltd v Flanders*

[1993] FSR 497, p 519  
High Court

6 Approach to be adopted by the court in this type of case

…it is apparent now that this is not a case where it can be said that any substantial parts of the source code of the BBC program have been copied in the Chemtec program. The two programs are, of course, written in different computer languages. This by itself would not avoid infringement if the Chemtec program could be said to be a translation of the BBC program, or a substantial part of it, into a different language (see section 1(2) of the 1985 Act, now section 21(4) of the 1988 Act). But this is not what is said to have happened. What is said is that the defendants have taken the general scheme of the BBC program, including the detail of certain routines of an idiosyncratic nature. The case was likened…to one in which the plot of a book or other literary work has been taken...

In making the analogy with novels and plays, this recalls the reasoning adopted in *Whelan v Jaslow,* and the argument continued to include both UK and US authorities. Ferris J then went on to discuss the proposition that the program could be protected as a compilation:

Mr Wilson, on behalf of JRC, also relied upon *Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football) Ltd.* In that case Ladbrokes admitted having copied some parts of Hills’ fixed odds football betting coupons, but denied that Hills were entitled to copyright in those parts. They admitted that certain other parts of Hills coupons were protected by copyright, but they had not copied those parts. It was held by the House of Lords that the coupon had to be looked at as a single literary work and that, having regard to the skill and effort involved in working out certain parts of Hills coupon, the coupon as a whole was an original compilation which was protected by copyright. I quote from the speech of Lord Pearce at page 291:

In deciding therefore whether a work in the nature of a compilation is original, it is wrong to start by considering individual parts of it apart from the whole, as the appellants in their argument sought to do. For many compilations have nothing original in their parts, yet the sum total of the compilation may be original...

In such cases the courts have looked to see whether the compilation of the unoriginal material called for work or skill or expense. If it did, it is entitled to be considered original and to be protected against those who wish to steal the fruits of the work or skill or expense by copying it without taking the trouble to compile it themselves.
This approach, of course, gives rise to a further question where it is contended that what the defendant has copied is one or more of the unoriginal parts, not the compilation as a whole. As to this question, Lord Pearce said (at p 293):

Whether a part is substantial must be decided by its quality rather than its quantity. The reproduction of a part which by itself has no originality will not normally be a substantial part of the copyright and therefore will not be protected. For that which would not attract copyright except by reason of its collocation will, when robbed of that collocation, not be a substantial part of the copyright and therefore the courts will not hold its reproduction to be an infringement. It is this, I think, which is meant by one or two judicial observations that ‘there is no copyright’ in some unoriginal part of a whole that is copyright. They afford no justification, in my view, for holding that one starts the inquiry as to whether copyright exists by dissecting the compilation into component parts instead of starting it by regarding the compilation as a whole and seeing whether the whole has copyright. It is when one is debating whether the part reproduced is substantial that one considers the pirated portion on its own.

In using the William Hill case by way of analogy, Ferris J found an English authority on which to base argument concerning the structure of the program, a process which begins to bear a resemblance to the assessment of substantial similarity required by US law. Having made reference to the non-literal elements in the fact that the compilation is itself an appropriate subject for copyright protection, Ferris J went on to apply the test from Computer Associates v Altai.

John Richardson Computers Ltd v Flanders
[1993] FSR 497, p 526
High Court

Ferris J In the test propounded in Computer Associates the discovery of a program’s abstraction levels is the first step. The second step is to filter these abstractions in order to discover a ‘core of protectable material’. In the process of filtration there are to be excluded from consideration (a) elements dictated by efficiency; (b) elements dictated by external factors; and (c) elements taken from the public domain. Each of these categories is explained at some length. The essence of the ‘elements dictated by efficiency’ is that if there is only one way to express an idea the idea and its expression are inseparable and copyright does not prevent the copying of the expression. The exclusion of ‘elements dictated by external factors’ arises from the fact that if two persons set about the description of the same event there may be a number of particular facts which can only be described in a particular way. The Court of Appeals cited with evident approval the observation of Professor Nimmer (a well known academic commentator on United States copyright law) that:

...in many instances it is impossible to write a program to perform particular functions in a specific computing environment without employing standard techniques.
As to ‘elements in the public domain’:

...plaintiffs may not claim copyright of an...expression that is, if not standard, then commonplace in the computer software industry.

The third step in the process suggested in the Computer Associates case is to compare what is left of the ‘abstractions’ made from the plaintiff’s case after filtering out these elements with the program which is said to be an infringement of that program.

I have thought it right to deal at some length with the Computer Associates case because it explores the difficulties which arise in applying copyright law to computer programs to a greater extent than an English authority does. In the even more recent case of Sega Enterprises Ltd v Accolade Inc, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit approved the approach adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Computer Associates. Not surprisingly, neither of these decisions have yet been considered in an English case. There are references to Whelan in the judgments of Hoffman J in Computer Aided Systems v Bolwell, and of Judge Paul Baker, QC in Total Information Processing Systems Ltd v Daman Ltd, but both these references are very general and neither of them can be said to indicate a preference for the Whelan approach over the approach which has since been adopted on two federal circuits in the United States.

There is thus nothing in any English decision which conflicts with the general approach adopted in the Computer Associates case. I think that in preference to seeking the ‘core of protectable expression’ in the plaintiff’s program an English court will first decide whether the plaintiff’s program as a whole is entitled to copyright and then decide whether any similarity attributable to copying which is to be found in the defendant’s program amounts to the copying of a substantial part of the plaintiff’s program. This was the approach which was held to be appropriate in the William Hill case. But at the stage at which the substantiality of any copying falls to be assessed in an English case the question which has to be answered, in relation to the originality of the plaintiff’s program and the separation of an idea from its expression, is essentially the same question as the United States court was addressing in Computer Associates. In my judgment it would be right to adopt a similar approach in England. This means that consideration is not restricted to the text of the code, as Mr McEwen submitted that it was when putting the defendant’s case at its highest level. Moreover the argument that consideration should be limited to the ‘structure and organisation’ of the program imports an unacceptable degree of uncertainty, because it is unclear at what level of abstraction (to use that term in the sense in which it was used in Computer Associates) the structure and organisation is to be discerned.

Despite the above analysis, when it came to applying the test to the facts of the case, there was no actual comparison of the BBC program code with the code of the Chemtec program, as might have been expected if the Computer Associates test had been used without modification. The expert witness had compared both codes in the report he compiled for the court. One factor that seems to have had a bearing on the lack of such comparison in arriving at the final decision appears
to be that Ferris J had trouble in understanding this part of the report, and also that the situation was not made any clearer during cross-examination.

The test which was evolved in the case can perhaps be summarised by the following steps:

- is the claimant’s program as a whole entitled to copyright protection?
- are there similarities to the claimant’s program in the defendant’s program?
- is any similarity attributable to copying?
- do any such similarities amount to the copying of a substantial part of the claimant’s program assessed by application of the abstraction-filtration-comparison test of Computer Associates v Altai?

The outcome of the case was that some infringement of Richardson’s copyright was found, but this was fairly minor and in only a few limited respects. In writing the new program, it appeared that Flanders had not copied or translated all or a substantial part of the source code of the BBC program; instead, he had created another program to fulfil a similar purpose and thus compete on the same market.

How are we to assess the first complete decision relating to copyright infringement of computer software in a UK court? In view of the length of time that such a case had been awaited, the judgment of Ferris J was perhaps subjected to more detailed scrutiny and analysis than is customarily awarded to decisions of the High Court. One aspect on which all seem to agree is that, in English law, as has been determined in the US, copyright infringement does not only occur in cases of literal copying but may be found when copying of non-literal elements of the program can be established. The question is, what is an appropriate test in such cases? It appears that, in starting from the judgment in William Hill, Ferris J does not believe that the abstraction-filtration-comparison test should be applied directly in an English case.

Although the abstraction process advocated in Altai, based as it is on earlier US authorities, in particular the judgments of Learned Hand J, may not be compatible with the way in which copyright law has developed in the UK, neither does it mean that the attempt of Ferris J in formulating a suitable test is any more successful. In particular, an important consideration is the appropriateness of the analogy between a compilation and a computer program, on which the application of the William Hill authority depends. Such an analogy might be appropriate in the case where a program is assembled from existing sub-routines, but it is questionable as to whether it is capable of more general application. A similar point was noted by Baker J in Total Information Processing Systems Ltd v Daman Ltd, who said that ‘The mere linking of programs is not in my judgment itself an original, literary or artistic work in the way that the collective presentation of literary works by divers authorities is’. Nor could the compilation be regarded as a computer program.
separate from and in addition to the individual programs. However, this statement was later to be criticised by Jacob J in *Ibcos Computers v Barclays Finance Ltd*\(^{59}\) as not being capable of general application, although relevant to the facts in *Total Information*.

A second point is how far it is sensible to apply the three stage test, based as it is on the more rigidly imposed distinction between idea and expression embodied in US law. Whether or not it is articulated as such, the distinction does exist in the UK, albeit expressed in rather a different way. Thus, in *Donoghue v Allied Newspapers Ltd*,\(^{60}\) Farwell J said: ‘…there is no copyright in an idea or ideas… If the idea, however original, is nothing more than an idea, and is not put into any form of words, or any form of expression…then there is no such thing as copyright at all.’ This notion was also taken up by Baker J in *Total Information*:\(^{61}\) ‘…stemming from the principle that copyright does not exist in ideas but in the expression of them, is the line of authorities commencing with *Kenrick and Company v Lawrence and Company*\(^{62}\) that if there is only one way of expressing an idea that way is not the subject of copyright.’

The US basis for copyright infringement of substantial similarity requires much more wrestling with the idea/expression dichotomy than the UK test of establishing whether there has been copying of a substantial part, and the attempt by Ferris J to marry the US and UK approaches has received a mixed reception. The above criticisms have been discussed by Arnold.

**Infringement of copyright in computer software by non-textual copying: first decision at trial by an English court**

Richard Arnold

[1993] EIPR 250, p 253

So far as the analysis of the law is concerned, it is submitted that much of what Ferris J says is sound. In particular, he was plainly right to reject the submissions that a substantial part can only be reproduced if there is textual copying. Furthermore, there is force in the criticism of the *Whelan* approach, although the criticisms underplay the detail in which the court in that case did in fact compare the code structure. Equally, the judge was correct that the *Computer Associates* approach of extracting a ‘core of protectable expression’ is incompatible with English authority, and in particular the speeches of the House of Lords in *William Hill*.

Where the analysis may be questioned, however, is when Ferris J states that in considering substantiality it is right to adopt a similar approach to the

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59 [1994] FSR 275; see below, p 52.
62 (1890) 25 QBD 99.
approach set out in *Computer Associates*. Although Ferris J is not explicit about this, it appears that he has in mind the point made by Lord Pearce in the passage quoted above. It is submitted that what Lord Pearce envisaged was a different procedure however. This involves the following steps. (1) Decide whether copyright subsists in the plaintiff’s work. (2) If so, decide whether there is a derivation. (3) If so, decide whether a substantial part has been reproduced; if the only part which has been reproduced is a part which by itself has no originality, then that part is not substantial. This is not the same thing as the filtering process described by the Court of Appeals in *Computer Associates*. It should be borne in mind that Lord Pearce was dealing with what was essentially a compilation case. At various places in the judgment Ferris J refers to a computer program as a compilation, but this does not seem to be correct except in the particular case where a program has been compiled from pre-existing sub-routines.

Although *dicta* may be found in English cases to the effect that there is ‘no copyright in ideas’, the general trend of English authority is rather against attempts rigidly to distinguish between ‘idea’ and ‘expression’. As Ferris J acknowledged, the position is different in the United States because the distinction has a statutory basis. Furthermore, as the judge has also acknowledged, reliance on the distinction can be dangerous. Despite this, Ferris J appears to have accepted that an English court should attempt to draw this distinction and moreover should engage in the *Computer Associates* filtering process in doing so. It is open to question whether this is the right approach under English law.

Even if the test is an appropriate one, it is difficult to apply—a fact which was recognised in the judgment itself—and the result of the case was, in fact, more dependent on practical and pragmatic considerations relating to the comparison of the mode of operation of the two programs and an assessment of the opportunity for copying.

*Richardson v Flanders* was soon followed by another case, that of *Ibcos Computers Ltd v Barclays Finance Ltd*. Again, the facts are rather complex, but the main features are as follows. In the 1970s, a programmer, Poole, wrote software for agricultural applications for a dealer, Clayton. Eventually, a company was set up in which both Poole and Clayton owned shares. Poole was the only employee of this company and continued to develop the software, now known as ADS. A deal between the company and a subsidiary of Barclays fell through but Poole, himself, was offered a two year consultancy and parted company with Clayton. As a result, Poole and Clayton signed an agreement by which Poole was to return all company property and agreed not to modify or provide customer support for the ADS package. Poole acknowledged that the software and manuals were the sole property of the company, whose assets were later transferred to Ibcos. Poole also agreed not to develop any agricultural software for two years.

In 1986, Poole rewrote the ADS package but it was not marketed until the two years had expired, in order to comply with the restrictive covenant. Poole received 10% of the licence fees.

The court agreed that there had been no breach of the restrictive covenant, but also had to decide whether Poole’s new version constituted a breach of copyright. Copyright infringement was claimed in the individual programs and sub-routines, the general structure and certain general features of the system which were identified in the expert witnesses’ report.

Jacob J considered a number of the issues and, in particular directed attention to the idea/expression issue.

*Ibcos Computers v Barclays Finance Ltd*

[1994] FSR 275, p 290

High Court

**Jacob J** It was sometimes suggested in a general sort of way that because a particular program had a function, and especially if that function could only be achieved in one or a limited number of ways, there could be no copyright on it. The extreme form of this idea is expressed by Judge Baker in the *Total* case. He said:

Secondly, stemming from the principle that copyright does not exist in ideas but in the expression of them is the line of authorities commencing with *Kenrick v Lawrence* that if there is only one way of expressing an idea that way is not the subject of copyright.

That statement is in error in two ways. First, *Kenrick* (the case of the drawing of a hand showing voters which way to vote on a voting slip) did not decide that if there is only one way of expressing an idea then no copyright can subsist in it. What was held was that there was no copyright infringement in taking the idea of using a picture of a hand showing how to vote. Accordingly, a different picture embodying the same idea was not taking a substantial part of the copyright work. In that sense, only the principle that there is no copyright in an idea applied.

Secondly, there is, I think, danger in the proposition that ‘If there is only one way of expressing an idea that way is not the subject of copyright’. As Lord Hailsham observed in *LB Plastics v Swish*:

But of course as the late Professor Joad used to observe it all depends on what you mean by ‘ideas’. What the respondents in fact copied from the appellants was a mere general idea.

It is of course true that copyright cannot protect any sort of general principle, such as the principle of drawing a hand to show how to vote, but it can protect a detailed literary or artistic expression... The true position is that where an ‘idea’ is sufficiently general, then even if an original work embodies it, the mere taking of that idea will not infringe. But if the ‘idea’ is detailed, then there may be infringement. It is a question of degree.

Jacob’s notion of a *detailed* idea that might be protected by copyright is, presumably, in the context of computer programs, that found when a number of
sub-routines are put together to form one program. This would be the result of the intellectual effort, skill and judgment of the software writer, as opposed to a general idea, which would not be protected by copyright, and presumably might equate with the ‘function’ in the Whelan sense. Thus, he did not give credence to the idea/expression dichotomy which has been much discussed in US law and, indeed, went on to discuss the use of US copyright principles in English cases. He pointed out that US copyright law is different from that in the UK, particularly in the fact that the idea/expression distinction has a statutory basis which has, necessarily, resulted in a different interpretation of that issue in the courts. On the question of judging substantial part, he found it unnecessary to consider US authorities as he felt that it unnecessarily complicated the issue, which could be resolved by applying the standard principles of UK copyright law.

*Ibcos Computers v Barclays Finance Ltd*

*[1994] FSR 275, p 302*

High Court

**Jacob J** For myself I do not find the route of going via United States case law particularly helpful. As I have said, United Kingdom copyright cannot prevent the copying of a mere general idea but can protect the copying of a detailed ‘idea’. It is a question of degree where a good guide is the notion of the overborrowing of the skill, labour and judgment which went into the copyright work. Going via the complication of the concept of a ‘core of protectable expression’ merely complicates the matter as far as our law is concerned. It is likely to lead to overcitation of United States authority based on a statute different from ours. In the end the matter must be left to the value judgment of the court. Having expressed this reservation, however, I thoroughly agree with what Ferris J went on to say: ‘Consideration is not restricted to the text of the code…’ That must be right: most literary copyright works involve both literal matter (the exact words of a novel or computer program) and varying levels of abstraction (plot, more or less detailed of a novel, general structure of a computer program).

I therefore think it right to have regard in this case not only to…‘literal similarities’ but also to…‘program structure’ and ‘design features’.

Thus, whether or not there is agreement on the reasoning, it appears that there is agreement that non-literal elements can be protected by copyright in the UK, as well as in the US. Despite Jacob J’s criticisms of the judgment in *Richardson v Flanders*, the *Ibcos* case was one in which there had been literal copying and so the assessment of a substantial part of the non-literal elements was not crucial to the case. It therefore remains to be seen how the test for copyright infringement of non-literal elements of computer programs will evolve in the UK.

At an international level, both the TRIPS Agreement and the European Community (EC) Software Directive\(^64\) preserve the idea/expression dichotomy, but without creating guidance on the practical impact on copyright protection.
It has been pointed out that, although there are a number of international agreements on copyright, there remains uncertainty over the scope of copyright protection for the non-literal elements of computer programs. In a global market, this can lead to software writers lacking confidence in the protection available in jurisdictions which are signatories to those agreements. Having reviewed the situation in the US, UK and Canada, Zimmerman calls for international guidance in the form of a ‘a set of limiting doctrines that signatory nations and their courts can follow in delineating the scope of software copyright’. There has been no corresponding activity in this direction, but it may be that the Altai approach has become the de facto standard, both within and without the US.

Pun notes that, since China introduced new software copyright law in 1990, the ongoing legal trend in China has been in step with most Western jurisdictions. In the Australian case of Data Access Corporation v Powerflex Services Pty Ltd, Jenkinson J, at first instance, referred extensively to US case law and seemed to suggest that the Australian courts were likely to follow the Altai test. The central issue in the case was whether user interface commands represented computer programs and were thus subject to copyright protection; if they were, the court would then need to consider whether a substantial part had been reproduced. The court took into account the dictum of Lord Pearce in Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football) Ltd that substantial copying was an issue of quality rather than quantity.

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64 See below, p 59.
65 Zimmerman, D, ‘Global limits on “look and feel”: defining the scope of software copyright protection by international agreement’ (1996) 34 Col J Transnat L 503.
67 See op cit, Lai, fn 54.
68 Pun, KH, ‘Five years since the Software Regulations—China’s recent developments in software copyright’ (1997) 28 IIC 347.
69 (1996) 33 IPR 194; text available at austlii.law.uts.edu.au.
71 [1964] 1 All ER 465, p 481.
Data Access Corp v Powerflex Services Pty Ltd
[1999] HCA 49

High Court of Australia

84 ...in determining whether something is a reproduction of a substantial part of a computer program, the ‘essential or material features of [the computer program] should be ascertained by considering the originality of the part allegedly taken’.

85 In order for an item in a particular language to be a computer program, it must intend to express, either directly or indirectly, an algorithmic or logical relationship between the function desired to be performed and the physical capabilities of the ‘device having digital information processing capabilities’. It follows that the originality of what was allegedly taken from a computer program must be assessed with respect to the originality with which it expresses that algorithmic or logical relationship or part thereof. The structure of what was allegedly taken, its choice of commands, and its combination and sequencing of commands, when compared, at the same level of abstraction, with the original, would all be relevant to this inquiry.

86 That being so, a person who does no more than reproduce those parts of a program which are ‘data’ or ‘related information’ and which are irrelevant to its structure, choice of commands and combination and sequencing of commands will be unlikely to have reproduced a substantial part of the computer program. We say ‘unlikely’ and not ‘impossible’ because it is conceivable that the data, considered alone, could be sufficiently original to be a substantial part of the computer program.

88 ...the Reserved Words are irrelevant to the structure, choice of commands and combination and sequencing of the commands in source code. They are merely literal strings which, from the computer’s perspective, could be replaced by any other literal string. Accordingly, they are not a substantial part of the Dataflex program as it appears in source code unless they have their own inherent originality.

REVERSE ENGINEERING AND DECOMPILATION

One feature which may be desirable in a computer program but which has no clear parallel in relation to more conventional literary works is the need for interoperability, that is, the capacity of the computer program to be compatible with other computer programs or hardware elements in a system, such as a printer. It will be remembered that the computer program at issue in Computer Associates v Altai had this property. If a computer program is to be interoperable with another, it may need to contain some of the same features, at least at the interface between the two. One way of producing a computer program which is interoperable with other programs is by decompiling (that is, compiling in

72 Available at austlii.law.uts.edu.au.
reverse), or reverse engineering, the object code of the program with which interoperability is desired, to obtain the source code in a high level language. This can then be used in the creation of the interface between the existing and the new or proposed program. Where the creator of the new program does not have the copyright in the other program, this can lead to allegations of copyright infringement as a result of the decompilation and subsequent development of the new program. Those sections of the industry that create software primarily for running on operating systems created by others clearly have a vested interest in allowing decompilation to the maximum extent without fear of infringement, whereas other sectors of the industry, such as those which produce complete systems, are less likely to wish to permit decompilation or any other form of reverse engineering or analysis.

To what extent can copyright holders prevent decompilation for this purpose? Until the advent of the EC Software Directive and implementing legislation, such activity was likely to breach copyright unless it could be brought within the fair dealing exceptions contained in the CDPA 1988. Similar principles pertained in the US under the fair use doctrine, which attempts to balance the author’s right to exploit his or her work against the public interest in the widest possible dissemination of information. The relevant provisions are contained in s 107 of the US Copyright Act 1976 and allow what would otherwise be infringements for such purposes as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship or research, always provided that the use is non-commercial, does not affect the potential market or value of the work, etc.73

There was much discussion surrounding the application of these provisions to reverse engineering and decompilation, but with no unanimity of opinion. The opposing points of view are well explained in the following two extracts.

Defining the scope of copyright protection for computer software
Susan A Dunn
(1986) 38 Stan L Rev 497, p 518

Copyright law should not prohibit disassembly of computer programs. If disassembly leads to the creation of a final product that is not substantially similar to the original program, consumers will be enriched by a wider choice of programs. Their options are enhanced at the expense of the owner of the original copyright, who will find the scope of his monopoly is narrowed. But copyright law inevitably balances the proprietor’s interest in protection against the public’s interest in disclosure. For example, copyright law protects only expression and not ideas so that the public can profit by using the ideas

73 See, eg, Asarch, CG, ‘Is turnabout fair play? Copyright law and the fair use of computer software loaded into RAM’ (1996) 95 Mich L Rev 654 for comment on AMI System Corp v Peak Computers Inc 991 F 2d 511 (9th Cir 1993) and problems encountered when an independent service organisation could not satisfactorily carry out computer maintenance without loading software into RAM, ie, making a copy, which was held to be a breach of copyright.
in copyrighted works. If examining a copyrighted computer program through disassembly were illegal, the public could not take advantage of many of the ideas it contains. Replacing the substantial similarity test with evidence of the course of development would sharply alter the balance of competing rights in favour of copyright proprietors.

Copyright protection for computer programs, databases, and computer-generated works: is anything new since CONTU?

Arthur R Miller

(1993) 106 Harv L Rev 977, p 1026

The simple truth is that permitting decompilation allows a second comer to create a market substitute and reap the benefits of a successful program after others have incurred the risk and expense of its development—an especially inappropriate result given the extraordinary discrepancy between the cost of creating the software and the cost of duplicating it. If an exemption from copyright is permitted, the decompiler will be able to reproduce the entire program of competitor—appropriating in one relatively simple procedure what may represent years of creative effort and investment—and then electronically massage the copy until every trace of that illicit reproduction is obscured. Yet the resulting program may be no less a derivative work founded on the first program than is a motion picture based on the cleverest plot details and juiciest dialogue of a novel. Both works encroach on the copyright proprietor’s statutory rights. Freedom to decompile also eliminates any incentive to produce an innovative or creative expression of one’s own, thereby debilitating one of the basic objectives of the copyright regime.

The court in Atari Games Corp v Nintendo of America Inc concluded that reverse engineering object codes to discern the unprotectable ideas in a computer program is ‘fair use’.74 In SEGA Enterprises v Accolade, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, reversing the decision of the district court, seemed to suggest that decompilation may be permissible in certain circumstances and found its reasoning to be compatible with that of Atari v Nintendo.75 Although this issue has not been discussed in the UK courts, making it difficult to ascertain whether or not the fair dealing provisions in s 29 of the CDPA 1988 apply to reverse engineering,76 similar arguments have been aired before the High Court of

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74 975 F2d 832, p 843 (Fed Cir 1992).
Singapore concerning the fair dealing provisions in the Singapore Copyright Act.

Aztech Systems Pty Ltd v Creative Technology Ltd77 concerned the development of computer sound cards which would be interoperable with the ‘Sound Blaster’ card—the market leader. Although it was alleged that this had been achieved by disassembly, the court found that there had been no actual decompilation but that the operation of the program had been studied using a logic analyser, a non-invasive operation, together with the use of program DEBUG, designed for fault-finding during program development and which could therefore be used to observe the operation of a program. Then, by a ‘process of trial, error and inference, they worked out what features a sound card must have to be compatible with “Sound Blaster” and designed their card accordingly’. Did this come within the provisions contained in s 35 of the Singapore Copyright Act of 1988, which allow for fair dealing for research and private study?

Research for industrial purposes or by companies was expressly excluded in the relevant legislation, and so reliance was placed on fair dealing for private study. The court found that ‘study’ meant ‘the devotion of time and attention to acquiring information and knowledge’ and the operations which had been carried out fell within this definition. As to the commercial aspect, it was held that the purpose had to be considered along with other relevant factors and that, in this case, there were public interest benefits in allowing this type of activity in terms of advantages to the consumer. However, notwithstanding this reasoning, the case was subsequently reversed by the Singapore Court of Appeal in November 1996,78 which held that the meaning of ‘private study’ should not be extended to include any study, the results of which were used for commercial purposes, otherwise this would ‘render otiose the specific exclusion of commercial research under s 35(5)’.79 On this reasoning, Aztech did not even qualify for the defence of ‘fair dealing’, and so there was no need to consider further the question of substantive fairness.

The issue of reverse engineering of software also arose in Data Access v Powerflex80 and, insofar as the High Court of Australia found this to be a breach of copyright in relation to the disassembly of a particular table, the court noted that this finding might ‘have wider ramifications for anyone who seeks to produce a computer program that is compatible with a program produced by others’. However, the Court considered that this consequence of its judgment

76 For a discussion of the application of the UK fair dealing provisions to copyright of computer programs see Reed, C, ‘Reverse engineering computer programs without infringing copyright’ [1991] EIPR 47.
79 Ibid, p 505.
80 Above, p 54.
was something which could be resolved only by the legislature reconsidering the appropriate legal framework for copyright in computer software. In Europe, this was effectively what had happened with the adoption of the ‘Software Directive’.

**THE ‘SOFTWARE DIRECTIVE’**

In parallel with the courts’ development of the interpretation of the existing copyright law to copying of computer programs, changes in the legislation itself, to take into account the nature of computer programs, were imminent, precipitated by the need to implement the EC Directive on Legal Protection of Computer Programs—that the so called ‘Software Directive’. This Directive was a recognition of the issues that had caused debate in relation to the protection of intellectual property rights in computer programs, and also of the fact that, without harmonisation of these provisions, the completion and operation of the Single European Market in goods and services might be compromised. This was particularly necessary in view of the fact that different States had adopted quite different attitudes to the legal protection of computer programs. Thus, notwithstanding that many other jurisdictions, both inside and outside Europe, were basing their protection on copyright principles, this was not possible in Germany, for instance, where computer programs were viewed as technical and scientific products, rather than literary works. The fact that such States might be signatories to the Berne Convention was of little relevance, as the issue was one of the categorisation of computer programs as copyright material. The Directive had a protracted gestation, not least because of a vociferous lobby from both sides of the industry relating to the scope of permissible decompilation contained in Art 6. Prima facie, the agreed Directive extends copyright protection to computer programs as literary works and makes it clear that this protection is afforded to expression rather than idea.

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Article 1  Object of protection

1 In accordance with the provisions of this Directive, Member States shall protect computer programs, by copyright, as literary works within the meaning of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. For the purposes of this Directive, the term ‘computer programs’ shall include their preparatory design material.

2 Protection in accordance with this Directive shall apply to the expression in any form of a computer program. Ideas and principles which underlie any element of a computer program, including those which underlie its interfaces, are not protected by copyright under this Directive.

3 A computer program shall be protected if it is original in the sense that it is the author’s own original intellectual creation. No other criteria shall be applied to determine its eligibility for protection.

The rights permitted to copyright holders are defined by Arts 4–6.

Article 4  Restricted acts

Subject to the provisions of Articles 5 and 6, the exclusive rights of the rightholder within the meaning of Article 2, shall include the right to do or authorise:

(a) the permanent or temporary reproduction of a computer program by any means and in any form, in part or in whole. Insofar as loading, displaying, running, transmission or storage of the computer program necessitates such reproduction, such acts shall be subject to authorisation by the rightholder;

(b) the translation, adaptation, arrangement and any other alteration of a computer program and the reproduction of the results thereof, without prejudice to the rights of the person whom alters the program;

(c) any form of distribution to the public, including the rental, of the original computer program or of copies thereof. The first sale in the Community of a copy of the program by the rightholder or with his consent shall exhaust the distribution right within the Community of that copy, with the exception of the right to control further rental of the program or a copy thereof.

Article 5  Exceptions to the restricted acts

1 In the absence of specific contractual provisions, the acts referred to in Article 4(a) and (b) shall not require authorisation by the rightholder where they are necessary for the use of the computer program by the lawful acquirer in accordance with its intended purpose, including for error correction.

2 The making of a back-up copy by a person having a right to use the computer program may not be prevented by contract insofar as it is necessary for that use.

84 For implementation in different Member States see op cit, Lehmann and Tapper, fn 3. For the UK position see below, p 63.
3 The person having a right to use a copy of a computer program shall be entitled, without the authorisation of the rightholder, to observe, study or test the functioning of the program in order to determine the ideas and principles which underlie any element of the program if he does so while performing any of the acts of loading, displaying, running, transmitting or storing the program which he is entitled to do.

**Article 6 Decomposition**

1 The authorisation of the rightholder shall not be required where reproduction of the code and translation of its form within the meaning of Article 4(a) and (b) are indispensable to obtain the information necessary to achieve the interoperability of an independently created computer program with other programs, provided that the following conditions are met:

   (a) these acts are performed by the licensee or by another person having a right to use a copy of the program, or on their behalf by a person authorised to do so;
   (b) the information necessary to achieve interoperability has not previously been readily available to the persons referred to in subparagraph (a); and
   (c) these acts are confined to the parts of the original program which are necessary to achieve interoperability.

2 The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not permit the information obtained through its application:

   (a) to be used for goals other than to achieve the interoperability of the independently created computer program;
   (b) to be given to others, except when necessary for the interoperability of the independently created computer program; or
   (c) to be used for the development, production or marketing of a computer program substantially similar in its expression, or for any other act which infringes copyright.

3 In accordance with the provisions of the Berne Convention...the provisions of this Article may not be interpreted in such a way as to allow its application to be used in a manner which unreasonably prejudices the rightholder’s legitimate interests or conflicts with a normal exploitation of the computer program.

Notwithstanding the explicit reference to contract in Art 5(2), Art 9(1) further provides that ‘Any contractual provisions contrary to Article 6 or to the exceptions provided for in Art 5(2) and (3) shall be null and void’. The provision regarding back-up copies was non-contentious. Taking a back-up copy of a program is good computing practice but, without such a right being included explicitly in the licence to use the software (as is the usual practice), such a practice would be a technical infringement. In the US, amendments introduced in 1980 to the Copyright Act 1976 had served a similar purpose. However the rights, contained in a limited way in Art 5(3) and in more extensive form in Art 6, to undertake reverse analysis or decompilation under certain circumstances
were to provoke much spirited debate both during the gestation of the Directive\textsuperscript{85} and after its adoption,\textsuperscript{86} in academic circles and also between representatives of different parts of the industry, in which the main protagonists took up positions similar to those evident in the extracts from Dunn and Miller, above.

One problem in framing the terms of Art 6 was the need to reconcile the common law approach, in which reverse analysis might be permitted, in certain circumstances, under fair dealing or fair use exceptions, with a civil law tradition which looks for legal certainty in the legislation. The situation was made more complex by the view of different sectors of the industry, discussed further below, of the extent to which any type of reverse analysis should be permitted. The resulting provision covers the circumstances in which decompilation, in particular, is allowed to take place, and also the purposes for which the information gained as a consequence can be used. The compromise arrived at in the Directive appears to be aimed at allowing products to be developed which are compatible with the original, rather than those which might be viewed as being in competition with the original.\textsuperscript{87} This is a fine line to draw.

The EC has thus tried to use legislation to deal with issues which have previously been dealt with by the courts in a number of jurisdictions. Although the Directive has attempted to grapple with particular aspects of computer programs, its provisions do not necessarily assist in the problem of defining the scope of protection itself, which may still fall to be determined by the courts.


Protecting and Exploiting Rights in Software—Intellectual Property Rights

Scope of protection in the European Community, in recent United States and international developments in software protection, Part 2
Dennis S Karjala
[1994] EIPR 58, p 63

The EC Software Directive, of course, fails almost completely to address either the scope-of-protection problem or the degree of copyright protection in user interfaces. Notwithstanding the Directive’s purported goal of uniformity, therefore, one can expect courts in the various Member States to grope their way towards appropriate solutions much as do courts in the US federal system. In the long run, this is likely to lead to a better and more stable balance of the social policy tensions involved in software protection than detailed statutory coverage adopted in a highly charged political atmosphere. Perhaps the courts in Europe will benefit from the opportunity to observe the successes and failures of the American courts. Even so, one should expect a good deal of lurching, backtracking and zigzagging before a general consensus is reached.

UK implementation of the Software Directive

The UK implemented the Software Directive by means of the Copyright (Computer Programs) Regulations 1992, which amended the 1988 Act, particularly in relation to the new permitted acts, the creation of back-up copies, error correction and decompilation. The first two of these were covered by the introduction of new ss 50A and 50C.

CDPA 1988 (as amended)

50A (1) It is not an infringement of copyright for a lawful user of a copy of a computer program to make any back up copy of it which is necessary for him to have for the purposes of his lawful use.

(2) For the purposes of this section and sections 50B and 50C a person is a lawful user of a computer program if (whether under a licence to do any acts restricted by the copyright in the program or otherwise), he has a right to use the program...

50C (1) It is not an infringement of copyright for a lawful user of a copy of a computer program to copy or adapt it, providing that the copying or adapting—

(a) is necessary for his lawful use; and
(b) is not prohibited under any term or condition of an agreement regulating the circumstances in which his use is lawful.

(2) It may, in particular, be necessary for the lawful use of a computer program to copy it or adapt it for the purpose of correcting errors in it...

This right to adapt, insofar as it is necessary for lawful use, extending even to the correction of errors, should be read in conjunction with the definition of ‘adaptation’ introduced by a new s 21(3)(ab), namely, ‘an arrangement or altered version of the program or translation of it’.

The manner of incorporating the decompilation right was to remove decompilation from the ambit of the fair dealing provisions relating to research and private study contained in s 29 and then to introduce it as a new permitted act in s 50B. The provisions of s 29 will still apply to computer programs in relation to activities other than decompilation.

CDPA 1988 (as amended)

29(4) It is not fair dealing—

(a) to convert a computer program expressed in a low-level language into a version expressed in a higher level language; or
(b) incidentally in the course of so converting the program, to copy it...

50B(1) It is not an infringement of copyright for a lawful user of a copy of a computer program expressed in a low-level language—

(a) to convert it into a higher level language; or
(b) incidentally in the course of so converting the program, to copy it (that is to ‘decompile it’), provided that the conditions in subsection (2) are met.

(2) The conditions are that—

(a) it is necessary to decompile the program to obtain the information necessary to create an independent program which can be operated with the program decompiled or with another program (‘the permitted objective’); and
(b) the information so obtained is not used for any purpose other than the permitted objective.

(3) In particular, the conditions in subsection (2) are not met if the lawful user—

(a) has readily available to him the information necessary to achieve the permitted objective;
(b) does not confine the decompiling to such acts as are necessary to achieve the permitted objective;
(c) supplies the information obtained by the decompiling to any person to whom it is not necessary to supply it in order to achieve the permitted objective; or
(d) uses the information to create a program which is substantially similar in its expression to the program decompiled or to do any act restricted by copyright.

(4) Where an act is permitted under this section, it is irrelevant whether or not there exists any term or condition in an agreement which purports to prohibit or restrict the act...

It is by no means clear that the definitions of decompilation contained in the Directive and the implementing regulations coincide. The regulations seem to confine decompilation exclusively to the situation in which the decompiler is working upwards from the low to the high level language. The Directive, on the other hand, refers to ‘reproduction of the code and translation of its form’ which appears to represent a much wider view of the scope of decompilation. The meaning of ‘translation’ of a computer program contained in s 21(4) of the 1988 Act includes ‘a version of the program in which it is converted into or out of a computer language or code or into a different computer language or code’. This corresponds more accurately with the terminology in the Directive but would not be included in the new definition of decompilation introduced by the Regulations.

The new s 50B(2) provides that decompilation will be allowed where it is ‘necessary to create an independent program which can be operated with the program decompiled or another program’. This, taken together with s 50B(3), suggests that it may be lawful to create a competing program, provided that it is not substantially similar to the original program, but that it would be impermissible to devise modifications to an existing program to make it interoperable with another. This latter act would, apparently, be permitted under the terms of the Directive, which allows decompilation where it is ‘indispensable to obtain the information necessary to achieve the interoperability of an independently created computer program with other programs’.

The Directive, in Art 5(3), refers expressly to the right to ‘observe, study or test the functioning of the program’, this being done ‘in order to determine the ideas and principles underlying any element of the program’. It might appear that this aspect has not been incorporated, since the only reference to ‘observation’ is to be found in the new s 296A(1), making any contractual terms purporting to place limits on this process void. On the other hand, fair dealing for the purposes of research and private study is still permissible under s 29(1) and it may be that observation can legitimately be construed as such research or private study.

In implementing the Directive, no express enactment relating to the idea/expression distinction referred to in Art 1 was included, so, insofar as this doctrine is a part of UK law, it remains on a case law basis, rather than having a statutory basis, as found in the US.
Sui generis rights revisited

At the beginning of this chapter, the reasons for the choice of a copyright scheme rather than a *sui generis* right for the protection of the intellectual property rights in computer programs was discussed. As we have seen, the law in a number of jurisdictions has struggled with, and has sometimes needed to modify, traditional copyright principles in order to apply them satisfactorily to computer programs. In the European Commission Green Paper, *Copyright and The Challenges of Technology—Copyright Issues Requiring Immediate Action*, a *sui generis* right for computer programs was rejected under the influence of the observed case law trend towards copyright already formulated by the courts in a number of jurisdictions. Nonetheless, it could be argued that some of the modifications that were negotiated for inclusion in the Software Directive, and that have led to the new derogations with respect to decompilation rights, modify traditional copyright principles to such an extent that the resulting protection is, more accurately, described as a *sui generis* right. Goldstein observes that *sui generis* protection for the intellectual property rights in computer programs is now less frequently advocated, and relates this to the protection which has evolved from the conventional copyright framework, both in the US and in Europe:

The principle reason in the decline in calls for *sui generis* legislation is that, in a very real sense, *sui generis* protection for computer programs is already being implemented throughout the world—albeit under the nominal auspices of copyright. Section 117 of the United States Copyright Act is specifically tailored to the special features of computer programs; sections 102(b) and 107 of the Act have also been interpreted with particular attention to the particular nature of software. The EC Directive represents, to date, the most systematic tailoring of copyright to meet the special needs of computer programs. Indeed, apart from its relatively long term of protection, the Directive more closely resembles a *sui generis* law than it does copyright. Most important, the deliberations on the Software Directive have shown that the Berne Convention’s rigorous standards, once thought to pose the most serious impediment to a copyright accommodation for computer programs, are sufficiently flexible to admit needed derogations from the reproduction and adaptation rights.

90 See, eg, the views expressed by Wiebe, *op cit*, fn 82.
Whereas it appears that, in the majority of cases, copyright will be the appropriate method of protecting the intellectual property in computer software, the question has also arisen as to whether patent protection might also, or alternatively, be available for computer programs. Certainly, if a patent could be obtained, it would be very valuable in providing the opportunity to those developing the programs to recoup their research and development costs. In recent years, therefore, a steady increase in the number of patent applications relating to computers and processing systems has been noted, and many of which have been for specific apparatus containing software which is, itself, novel or is used in a novel application, or for processes where the claimed invention is neither a pure mathematical algorithm nor a mental step. Clearly, these will be highly specialised situations and, to determine the conditions under which a patent might be available for such an invention, it is necessary to consider the relevant legal provisions in more detail.

In the UK, the Patents Act 1977 gave effect to the European Patent Convention (EPC) of 1973, the relevant provisions being Art 52 of the Convention and s 1 of the Act.

**EPC 1973**

**Article 52 Patentable inventions**

(1) European patents shall be granted for any inventions which are susceptible of industrial application, which are new and which involve an inventive step.

(2) The following in particular shall not be regarded as inventions within the meaning of paragraph 1:

(a) discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods;

(c) schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing games or doing business, and programs for computers;

(d) presentations of information.

(3) The provisions of paragraph 2 shall exclude patentability of the subject matter or activities referred to in that provision only to the extent to which a European patent application or European patent relates to such subject matter or activities as such.

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Patents Act 1977

1 Patentable inventions

(1) A patent may be granted only for an invention in respect of which the following conditions are satisfied, that is to say—

(a) the invention is new;
(b) it involves an inventive step;
(c) it is capable of industrial application;
(d) the grant of a patent for it is not excluded by subsection(s) (2)...

(2) It is hereby declared that the following...are not inventions for the purposes of this Act, that is to say, anything which consists of—

(a) a discovery, scientific theory or mathematical method;...
(c) a scheme, rule or method for performing a mental act, playing a game or doing business, or a program for a computer;
(d) the presentation of information,

but the foregoing provision shall prevent anything from being treated as an invention for the purposes of this Act only to the extent that a patent or application for a patent relates to that thing as such.

The Patents Act 1977, in recognition of its origins, directs that other legal rules will be of relevance:

91 Evidence of conventions...

(1) Judicial notice shall be taken of the following, that is to say—

(a) the European Patent Convention, the Community Patent Convention and the Patent Co-operation Treaty...;
(b) any bulletin, journal or gazette published under the relevant convention...;
(c) any decision of, or expression of opinion by, the relevant convention court on any question arising under or in connection with the relevant convention.

Clearly, the interpretation of ‘as such’ in Art 52 of the EPC and s 1 of the Patents Act 1977 is a key issue in determining the patentability or otherwise of inventions in which the inventive step falls within a computer program. The crucial question would seem to be, is the claim for a patent for an invention involving a computer program an application for a patent for a program ‘as such’ or, rather, is the effect to create an entirely new product or process within which the computer program can merely be regarded in the same light as any other component might be? In the US, where there was a similar statutory exclusion under 35 USC § 101, views on this matter have, arguably, polarised more distinctly. Many expressed the view that claims for patents involving computer software should be treated in the same way as those concerning computer hardware. On the other hand, others
advocate the opposite view on the basis that software technology is significantly different from that which applies to hardware.

Some of the perceived difficulties appear to have arisen from definitional difficulties. Since the statutory exclusion is for a computer program as such, a uniform interpretation of the exclusion is very dependent on an accepted and acceptable definition. What is a computer program? The origin of the exclusion appears to derive from the same source as the exclusion for mathematical methods, since computer programs can be expressed in the form of algorithms. For some time, there have been arguments that such an exclusion was unnecessary and that any bar to patentability should rest merely on the standards of novelty and non-obviousness. Chisum poses the question, ‘Why are new and useful developments in mathematics with direct industrial applications per se excluded from the patent system when developments in all other areas of applied technological knowledge are included?’ In his view, the confusion over patentability was entirely due to the decision of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v Benson, which had held that a mathematical algorithm could not be patented, no matter how new and useful, and that ‘policy considerations’ indicated that patent protection was as appropriate for mathematical algorithms that are useful in computer programming as for other technical innovations.

More recently, Harrington has suggested that the crux of the problem is the difference in the definition of ‘computer program’ as between lawyers and electronic or electrical engineers. Whereas lawyers tend to define a computer program in terms of instructions, creating a prima facie impression of non-patentability, electrical engineers are more likely to think in terms of ‘a process for performing a specific function or a means for creating circuitry in a block of silicon’, that is, a process for creating a new device; such an activity sounds much more like the substance of a patent claim. He cites with approval In re Allapat, in which Judge Rich said that it was ‘inaccurate and confusing to speak in terms of a mathematical algorithm as excluded subject matter when assessing the patentability of a computer related invention’ and used an approach which was

93 See, eg, op cit, Sterne et al, fn 92.
94 For a more philosophial discussion of the nature of technology and the purpose and application of both patents and exclusion from patentability see, eg, Von Helfeld, A, ‘Protection of inventions comprising computer programs by the European and German Patent Offices—a confrontation’ (1986) 3 CL & P 182.
96 409 US 63 (1972). But note the comment on the nature of algorithms in response to Chisum’s article in Newell, A, ‘The models are broken, the models are broken’ (1986) 47 Pitt UL Rev 1023.
97 Harrington, D, ‘The engineers have it! Patenting computer programs in the USA’ (1996) 1 Comm L 232.
much more in accordance with engineering definitions of ‘computer program’. In Harrington’s view, this approach ‘recognises the reality of what actually occurs when a program is run on a computer and the utility of the mathematical sciences as a powerful vehicle for applied technology’.

Some of the propensity for confusion can be observed in *Data Access v Powerflex*, where, albeit for the purposes of copyright law rather than the granting of a patent, it was vital to ascertain whether the user interface commands (the ‘Reserved Words’) could be computer programs based on a legal definition of a computer program as a set of instructions. The High Court of Australia noted that ‘the definition of a computer program seems to have more in common with the subject matter of a patent than a copyright’ but the lower courts nevertheless had conflicting views on whether the particular features at issue could be construed as a computer program.

*Data Access Corporation v Powerflex Services Pty Ltd*  
[1999] HCA 49

High Court of Australia

30 The trial judge held that each Reserved Word was itself a computer program. Jenkinson J said:

> Each of the words of the DataFlex language found also in the PFXplus language is in my opinion an expression of a set of instructions intended to cause a device having digital information processing capabilities to perform a particular function. The circumstance that the expression of those instructions in source code is different is in my opinion immaterial. At the level of abstraction under consideration the objective similarity is complete: the set of instructions intended to cause the performance of the particular function is expressed, at that level where the ‘language, code or notation’ is based upon concatenations of letters of the alphabet, by the same concatenation of letters in each language. If at that level some of the concatenations constitute or resemble words of the English language descriptive or suggestive of the functions to be performed, that may facilitate the use of the computer program by those who understand English. But each concatenation of letters is nonetheless an expression of a set of instructions intended to cause the device to perform a particular function, in my opinion, and therefore a ‘computer program’ within the meaning of that expression in the Copyright Act.

31 The Full Court came to the opposite conclusion. It said:

> Each of the words in the so called Dataflex language is but a cipher. The underlying program is the set of instructions which directs the computer what to do when that cipher is in fact used, for example by being typed on to the screen. It is not to the point that the cipher bears
some resemblance to an ordinary English word. The cipher or command is not an expression of the set of instructions, although it appears in that set of instructions. It is the trigger for the set of instructions to be given effect to by the computer.

It may not be inaccurate to describe each of the commands as itself an instruction. It is likewise not necessarily inaccurate to talk of each of those words as representing the set of instructions in the sense that the use of one of them triggers the instructions contained in the computer program to be acted upon. But it is in our view not accurate to refer to each of the words as being an expression of the set of instructions. The set of instructions is expressed in the source code which is the computer program and, at least at a higher level, includes the particular word which is a command. The computer program will also in other forms exist in lower level language, ultimately through to an object code in non-visible form. Each of these representations will fall within the definition of ‘computer program’. In each of them, in some language, code or notation, the word said to be part of the computer language will be able to be found.

In whichever jurisdiction they arise, relevant patent applications will, typically, fall into one of two basic categories:

(a) where the program embodies a procedure for performing a useful operation or a physical phenomenon forming part of the real world outside the computer;
(b) the program solves a technical problem in the operation of the system of which the computer on which it is running forms a part.

Notwithstanding the ongoing debate over the interpretation of the exclusions, it is still the case that no patent will be granted where the application relates merely to the operation of the computer under the control of the program. This was emphasised as early as 1979, in Guidelines from the European Patent Office (EPO):100

A computer program may take various forms, eg an algorithm, a flow-chart or a series of coded instructions which can be recorded on a tape or other machine-readable record-medium, and can be regarded as a particular case of either a mathematical method or a presentation of information. If the contribution to the known art resides solely in a computer program the subject matter is not patentable in whatever manner it may be presented in the claims. For example, a claim to a computer characterised by having a particular program stored in its memory or to a process for operating a computer under control of the program would be as objectionable as a claim to the program per se or the program when recorded on magnetic tape.

However, because the statutory exclusions are well known, it is unusual for a patent application to relate to a computer program without more, and there will always be an attempt to associate the application with some technical effect made possible by the novelty of the invention as a whole. The whole must therefore be examined for novelty and inventive step, taking into account the exclusions.

**European Patent Office Guidelines 1985 on the Protection of Inventions relating to Computer Programs**

G Gall

(1985) 2 CL & P 1985

Inventions which relate to computer programs or in which such programs constitute an essential element are subject to the general rules of patent law. Thus, in the case of inventions relating to programs for computers the relevant question is whether the invention is of a technical nature...

Guidelines make it clear that the basic test of whether there is an invention within the meaning of Article 52(1) EPC is ‘separate and distinct from the question whether the subject matter is susceptible of industrial application, is new and involves an inventive step’. If the subject matter claimed is not excluded from patentability as ‘non-technical subject matter’ the invention must still pass inter alia the test whether the invention involved an inventive step (Article 56 EPC). Patent protection is reserved for such inventions which go beyond the capacities of the so called ‘ordinary men skilled in the art’.

Faced with making such decisions, therefore, both the Technical Board of Appeals of the EPO and the courts in the UK need to assess whether there is a technical contribution to known art. If this is found, then the fact that the best method of doing it is by computer is no bar to patentability. However, the precise meaning of technical contribution in this sense has proved elusive; Tapper\(^{101}\) suggests that the ‘concept of “technical effect” is not self-evident’ and Lloyd\(^{102}\) has remarked that the ‘question what constitutes a technical advance is not always susceptible of ready or precise answer’.

Commentators are divided over the EPO’s approach to the interpretation of the computer program exclusion and the definition of ‘technical’. Watkins and Rau\(^{103}\) comment favourably on ‘the establishment by the EPO of a consistent policy towards computer related inventions’ and say that, in relation to the computer program exclusion, ‘the EPO now holds consistently that an innovation based on a new computer program can be patentable if it falls within one of two categories: (a) if it solves a technical problem associated with a computer apparatus; or (b) if it makes a contribution to another technical field’.

\(^{101}\) Tapper, CF, ‘United Kingdom’, in *op cit*, Lehmann and Tapper, fn 3, Pt II.


Although ‘technical’ is not defined by either the EPC or the EPO Guidelines, they believe that, nevertheless, the EPO has been fairly ‘generous to the patentability in principle of computer related inventions’.

In marked contrast, Newman\(^\text{104}\) is of the view that the ‘description of computer programs as non-technical sits uncomfortably with the reality that many programs are of technical “real world” significance’ and states baldly that, ‘[b]y any standards, the EPO has failed clearly to set out the criteria for determining which of the products of the computer industry are patentable’. Meanwhile, Davies\(^\text{105}\) points out that, during the 1990s, the European practice on software inventions had diverged from that of its two major trading partners, the US and Japan,\(^\text{106}\) both of which had become more flexible over the issue of patents for computer program claims. Neither need a parallel development in Europe be hindered by the requirements of the EPC:

…the EPO rejection of explicit computer program claims for inventions which are acknowledged as patentable represent an unjustified obsession with form over substance…there is a reasonable self-consistent interpretation of Art 52(2) EPC which recognises that an arbitrary computer program is not, of itself, an invention, but that this does not prevent acceptance of claims directed to computer program embodiments of technical inventions.

The apparently imprecise scope of the concept of ‘technical’ is summed up by Cohen:

What has always been patentable is software which produces a technical effect. What is meant by a technical effect has moved since the first questions were raised in the early 1980s, somewhat more in favour of allowing patents to be granted [Cohen, J, ‘The patenting of computer software’ [1999] EIPR 607].

The issue has been further complicated by the fact that different approaches to the interpretation of the exclusion are possible. Gall\(^\text{107}\) further points out that the EPC is a multilateral international treaty and so should be construed in the light of the corresponding international law, in particular Art 31(1) of the Vienna Convention, which requires the provisions of a treaty to be interpreted in good faith, taking into account the meaning of the words in context and having regard to the object and purpose of the provisions in question. Evidence of such a purposive construction can perhaps be identified in some of the decisions made under the EPC. In contrast, the UK courts lean towards a more literal, or technical, interpretation of ‘as such’.\(^\text{108}\) However, since decisions under the EPC


\(^{107}\) Op cit, fn 100.
have been both referred to and taken into account in judgments under the Patents Act 1977 (as would be expected, taking into account s 91(1) of that Act), the situation is by no means clear cut. Without doubt, therefore, the test for patentability of inventions relating to computer technology has proved difficult both to apply and to explain, and the most appropriate way of examining it is to consider some of the applications made and whether or not it proved possible to establish a case for patentability.

One of the leading cases in this area remains the decision of the Technical Board of Appeal in Vicom. The application concerned a claim for a method of digitally processing images in the form of a two-dimensional array which could be used to enhance or restore the technical quality of such images. It was the computer program that embodied the inventive idea which both controlled the process and gave it its value, but it was held that the application was not for the program as such, but for the invention it was used to perform. A decisive point was that the application was susceptible of industrial application, since it could be used for investigating the properties of a real or simulated object or for designing an industrial article. The requisite technical effect could therefore be ascertained.

**Vicom/Computer-related invention**

T208/84 [1987] EPOR 74

Technical Board of Appeal

12 The Board of Appeal is of the opinion that a claim directed to a technical process which process is carried out under the control of a program (be this implemented in hardware or software) cannot be regarded as relating to a program as such within the meaning of Article 52(3) EPC, as it is the application of the program for determining the sequence of steps in the process for which in effect protection is sought. Consequently, such a claim is allowable under Article 52(2) and (3) EPC...

15 ... Generally, claims which can be considered as being directed to a computer set-up to operate in accordance with a specific program (whether by means of hardware or software) for controlling or carrying out a technical process cannot be regarded as relating to a computer program as such and thus are not objectionable under Article 52(2) and (3) EPC...

16 ... Generally speaking, an invention which would be patentable in accordance with conventional patentability criteria should not be excluded from protection by the mere fact that, for its implementation, modern technical means in the form of a computer program are used.

108 On the relationship between the European Patent Convention and the Patents Act, Aldous LJ remarked in Fujitsu Ltd’s Application [1997] RPC 608, p 611 that ‘the intention of Parliament was that there should be uniformity in this regard. What is more, any substantial divergence would be disastrous’. For a consideration of the divergence of the case law of the EPO and the UK courts see Newton, J, ‘Software patents in the UK’ (1996) 1 Comm L 202.

Decisive is what technical contribution the invention as defined in the claim when considered as a whole makes to the known art…it would seem illogical to grant protection for a technical process controlled by a suitable programmed computer but not for the computer itself when set up to execute control.

In contrast, the IBM/Semantically related expressions application\(^{110}\) was found not to be patentable. The claim was for a method of generating a list of expressions semantically related to an input linguistic expression using a programmable data processing system. The semantic relationship was of abstract linguistic information content and did not relate to any physical entity.

It may be argued that the test is easier to apply to claims such as those of Vicom and IBM/Semantically related expressions, which could be said to represent opposite ends of the spectrum.\(^ {111}\) However, the application IBM/Data processor network\(^ {112}\) is, perhaps, more equivocal. It referred to a data processing system consisting of a plurality of data processors interconnected as nodes in a telecommunications network. Novel procedures enabled this network of computers to maintain concurrent connections between a terminal and more than one applications program and to provide simultaneous online processing, using several data files located at remote processors. Notwithstanding that the end result, an enhancement of the range of practical steps which could be performed by linked computers, was achieved using software, it was said to solve a problem which was essentially technical, even though that technical effect was manifested within the computer itself.

As has been indicated, one of the criticisms of the EPO’s interpretation of the computer program exclusion was that it was out of line with what was happening in some other jurisdictions. This argument was fuelled by the TRIPS Agreement, Art 27(1) of which states that ‘patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application’. Although no definition of ‘all fields of technology’ is provided, there seems to be no reason, \textit{per se}, why computer technology should be excluded. Two recent decisions of the Board of Appeals\(^ {113}\) in which the applicant referred to both the TRIPS Agreement and the developments in the US and Japan have provided the EPO with the opportunity to review its interpretation of the computer program exclusion.

\(^{112}\) T06/83 [1990] EPOR 91.
T1173/97 was a claim for an asynchronous resynchronisation of a commit procedure, a novel mechanism for resource management in distributed systems\(^{114}\) and the examining division, following previous decisions such as that in *Vicom*, concluded that the device was not patentable:

...since the data medium and the program recorded thereon were not technically related, except for features which were already known from the prior art, the technical character of the computer program could not be derived from the physical character of the storage medium on which it was recorded. The technical character could also not be derived from the method or system in which the computer program was used.

On appeal, in response to the points raised about TRIPS, the Board of Appeals, in its summary of its preliminary view, was swift to point out that this was not of immediate relevance to decisions of the EPO and that, although it should take cognisance of such developments, its duty was to interpret the EPC.

*In re IBM Corp T1173/97 EPO Board of Appeals*

Regarding the TRIPS Agreement, it was not clear whether this international treaty applied to the EPC at all...

In addition, there was no indication that the member states of the TRIPS Agreement intended to include computer programs within the scope of patentable subject matter...

When it came to the written reasons for the decision, after having agreed that it shared the appellant’s opinions about the significance of TRIPS in this context, it nevertheless appeared to be taking the same line:

However, for the time being it is not convinced that TRIPS may be applied directly to the EPC. Apart from any other considerations TRIPS is binding only on its Member States. The European Patent Organisation itself is not a member of the WTO and did not sign the TRIPS Agreement.

Having made this fundamental position clear, the Board then went on to say:

2.3 But although TRIPS may not be applied directly to the EPC, the Board thinks it appropriate to take it into consideration, since it is aimed at setting common standards and principles concerning the availability, scope and use of trade-related intellectual property rights, and therefore of patent rights. Thus TRIPS gives a clear indication of current trends.

Article 27(1) of TRIPS states that ‘patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application’. This general principle, when considered together with the provisions pursuant to

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\(^{114}\) A distributed system is a cluster of interconnected computers.
paras 2 and 3 of Art 27 concerning exclusion from patentability (which, however, do not comprise any of the subject matter mentioned in Art 52(2) of the EPC), can be correctly interpreted, in the Board’s opinion, as meaning that it is the clear intention of TRIPS not to exclude from patentability any inventions, whatever field of technology they belong to, and therefore, in particular, not to exclude programs for computers as mentioned in and excluded under Art 52(2)(c) of the EPC. Similarly, with respect to developments in the US and Japan, the Board said:

2.5 The appellant also referred to current practice in the US and Japanese Patent Offices and pointed out that, according to the recently revised guidelines for examination in both offices, claims for computer program products are now allowed…

The Board has taken due notice of these developments, but wishes to emphasise that the situation under these two legal systems…differs greatly from that under the EPC in that it is only the EPC which contains an exclusion such as the one in Art 52(2) and (3).

2.6 Nevertheless, as pointed out by the appellant, these developments represent a useful indication of modern trends. In the Board’s opinion they may contribute to the further highly desirable (worldwide) harmonisation of patent law.

Having pointed out that the only applicable law which the Board could be bound to consider was the EPC, it continued in its review of the interpretation of the exclusions in the light of the developments described:

3 … The Board will therefore now investigate what in its view would be the proper interpretation of the exclusion from patentability of programs for computers under Art 52(2) and (3) EPC…

5.5 The main problem for the interpretation of said exclusion is therefore to define the meaning of the feature ‘technical character’, in the present case with specific reference to programs for computers…

6.5 … a patent may be granted not only in the case of an invention where a piece of software manages, by means of a computer, an industrial process or the working of a piece of machinery, but in every case where a program for a computer is the only means, or one of the necessary means, of obtaining a technical effect within the meaning specified above, where, for instance, a technical effect of that kind is achieved by the internal functioning of a computer itself under the influence of said program.

In other words, on condition that they are able to produce a technical effect in the above sense, all computer programs must be considered as inventions within the meaning of Art 52(1) EPC, and may be the subject matter of a patent if the other requirements provided for by the EPC are satisfied…
9.4 ... Once it has been clearly established that a specific computer program product, when run on a computer, brings about a technical effect in the above sense, the Board sees no good reason for distinguishing between a direct technical effect on the one hand and the potential to produce a technical effect, which may be considered as an indirect technical effect, on the other hand.

A computer program product may therefore possess a technical character because it has the potential to cause a predetermined further technical effect in the above sense...

9.5 In contrast to the reasons given in the decision under appeal, the Board has derived the technical character of the computer program product from the potential technical effect the program possesses, which effect is set free and may reveal itself when the program is made to run on a computer...

9.6 A computer program product which (implicitly) comprises all the features of a patentable method (for operating a computer, for instance) is therefore in principle considered as not being excluded from patentability under Art 52(2) and (3) EPC...

10.1 The Board has analysed some aspects of the meaning of the expression ‘computer programs as such’, with the emphasis on the ‘as such’, and has arrived at the conclusion that a computer program product is not excluded from patentability if it possesses the potential to bring about a ‘further’ technical effect.

10.2 ...the Board has arrived at its interpretation in the light of developments in information technology. This technology tends to penetrate most branches of society and leads to very valuable inventions. In its interpretation the Board has in its view not gone beyond the ordinary meaning given to the terms of the EPC...

11.5 The present Board concludes from all this that, although the present decision may be based on a slightly different approach in thinking and reasoning than the case law of the boards of appeal of the EPO, it does not go directly against the existing case law when that case law is considered in the light of what was decided in the decisions concerned...

...a computer program claimed by itself is not excluded from patentability if the program, when running on a computer or loaded into a computer, brings about, or is capable of bringing about, a technical effect which goes beyond the ‘normal’ physical interactions between the program (software) and the computer (hardware) on which it is run.

The result of this difference in approach was that the decision of the examining division was set aside and the matter was remitted back for reconsideration in the light of the decision of the Board of Appeal. An essentially similar judgment and resultant outcome occurred in T935/97. It will be interesting to observe how this changes the approach to subsequent claims for computer related inventions and the influence on case law in the UK, where, as already pointed out, the approach has sometimes diverged from that of the EPO.
In the UK, both *Hitachi’s Application*\(^{115}\) and *Wang Laboratories Inc’s Application*\(^{116}\) failed to gain patent protection for their products. In the *Hitachi* case, the application was for a particular type of compiler program which was able to increase the speed of operation significantly. Hitachi tried to rely on the *Vicom* decision, saying that as the compiler was acting on a physical entity (the source program) this, therefore, could be regarded as constituting a technical process. The examiner found that just because a mathematical method operated on a physical entity it did not automatically follow that it was used in a technical process. The invention claimed amounted to a claim for the compiler program itself and therefore must be excluded.

*Wang Laboratories Inc’s Application* was an attempt to patent a computer system shell and expert system. Expert systems are computer programs that have been constructed, using the knowledge from a human expert, in such a way that they are capable of functioning at the same standard (at least) of human experts in a given field. They are used as high level intellectual aids to their users. Most expert systems contain a set of facts describing a particular problem domain and a set of assertions or inference rules defining relationships between the facts and specifying how new facts can be deduced from existing facts by means of the assertions. These attributes are known as the ‘knowledge base’.

In this case, the examining officer said that this was merely a claim for a computer program, *as such*, and should be excluded. The applicant’s argument was that this was use of a computer program in a novel way, and was not a claim for a program, *as such*. In addition, it was submitted that the words ‘a scheme, rule or method for performing a mental act’ in s 1(2)(c) were intended only to exclude those schemes which were intended to be, and could be, performed by a human mind. The Patents Court disagreed: this was not the correct interpretation of the phrase. A ‘scheme, rule or method’ for performing a mental act was excluded, whatever steps or processes were involved, and such a scheme was still excluded if the method was performed by computer, whether or not the computer program adopted steps that would not ordinarily be used by a human mind. Accordingly, the claim relating to the expert system was a claim to a scheme or method for performing a mental act using a computer program and was not allowable. The claim relating to the computer system shell was a claim for a computer program and nothing more. The computer remained separate even when programmed and did not combine with the program to form a new machine. It is this last fact which seems to be the salient feature on which patentability of computer software depends.

The difficulty of applying the test can be seen in *Re Gale’s Application*,\(^{117}\) which was a claim for a new method of calculating square roots, encapsulated in ROM


(read only memory). This was first of all refused by the patents examiner on the ground that it was merely an application for a computer program. This decision was reversed by the Patents Court, in which Aldous J argued that a distinction could be made between a disk containing a software program, which would not be patentable, and the hard-wired ROM. This distinction could be made, in his view, because the ROM was used as a dedicated piece of apparatus to perform a particular task. This reasoning was not accepted by the Court of Appeal, in which Nicholls LJ acknowledged the importance of decisions made under the EPC in deciding such cases, and, referring to the Vicom claim, restored the original decision.

Re Gale’s Application
[1991] RPC 305, p 327
Court of Appeal

Nicholls LJ In the present case Mr Gale claims to have discovered an algorithm. Clearly that, as such, is not patentable. It is an intellectual discovery which, for good measure, falls squarely within one of the items, mathematical method, listed in section 1(2). But the nature of this discovery is such that it has a practical application, in that it enables instructions to be written for conventional computers in a way which will, so it is claimed, expedite one of the calculations frequently made with the aid of a computer. In my view the application of Mr Gale’s formulae for the purpose of writing computer instructions is sufficient to dispose of the contention that he is claiming a mathematical method as such.

That still leaves the difficulty that those instructions when written, and without more, are not patentable, because they constitute a computer program. Is there something more? In the end I have come to the conclusion that there is not. The attraction of Mr Gale’s case lies in the simple approach that, as claimed, he has found an improved means of carrying out an everyday function of computers. To that extent, and in that respect, his program makes a more efficient use of the computer’s resources. A computer, including a pocket calculator with a square root function, will be a better computer when programmed with Mr Gale’s instructions. So it may. But the instructions do not embody a technical process which exists outside the computer. Nor, as I understand the case as presented to us, do the instructions solve a ‘technical’ problem lying within the computer… I confess to having difficulty in identifying clearly the boundary line between what is and what is not a technical problem for this purpose…in the present case Mr Gale has devised an improvement in programming. What his instructions do, but it is all they do, is to prescribe for the cpu [central processing unit] in a conventional computer a different set of calculations from those normally prescribed when the user wants a square root. I do not think that makes a claim to those instructions other than a claim to the instructions as such. The instructions do not define a new way of operating the computer in a technical sense…

Although there have been suggestions from time to time that the basic test of the ‘technical contribution to the known art’ might be subject to modification from time to time,\(^{118}\) the centrality of the basic test was affirmed in *Fujitsu Ltd’s Application*,\(^{119}\) a case which was welcomed by Newton as an ‘attempt to resolve these conflicting positions with a view to clarifying precise circumstances in which a patent may be obtained for a software related invention’\(^{120}\). The application was for a method and apparatus for modelling a synthetic crystal structure for designing inorganic materials. The applicant argued that, where there had been a technical contribution to known art, a patent should not be refused and, once a mental act had been tied to a technical application, it ceased to be merely a mental act and could, therefore, become the subject matter of a patent. The examiner distinguished a manipulation of the technical quality of the data (as in *Vicom*) and the manipulation of the content of the information in this application. The question then was whether the fact that the image represented, that is, the crystal structure, was a ‘technical artefact’, gave the whole application a technical character. The examiner found that, on the evidence, the application was not only for a computer program, but was, in substance, a scheme or method for performing a mental act and was therefore unpatentable. This decision was upheld on appeal, in which Laddie J summarised the requirements for patentability of computer programs.

*Fujitsu Ltd’s Application*

[1996] RPC 511, p 530

*Patents Court*

*Laddie J* It seems to me that the relevant provisions of the Act and the EPC… produce the following principles:

1. The types of subject matter referred to in section 1(2) are excluded from patentability as a matter of policy. This is so whether the matter is technical or not.

2. The exclusion from patentability is a matter of substance not form. Therefore the exclusion under section 1(2) extends to any form of passive carrier or recording of excluded subject matter. Thus, merely because a piece of paper is in principle patentable (save to the extent that it lacks novelty), it is not permissible, for example, to record a literary work (section 1(2)(b)) or a computer programs (section 1(2)(c)) on a piece of paper and then seek patent monopoly for the paper bearing the recorded work. Similarly, it is not permissible, without more, to seek protection for a computer program when it is stored on a magnetic medium or merely loaded into a computer.

3. *Prima facie* a computer running under the control of one program is a

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120 *Op cit*, Newton, fn 108, p 204.
different piece of apparatus from the same computer when running under the control of another program. It follows that a claim to a computer when controlled by a program or to a method of controlling a computer by a program or to a method of carrying out a process by use of a computer so controlled can be the subject of patent protection. However, because the court is concerned with substance not form, it is not enough for the designer of a new program to seek protection for his creation merely by framing it in one of these terms. The court or patent office must direct its attention not to the fact that the program is controlling the computer but to what the computer, so controlled, is doing.

Therefore a data processing system operating to produce a novel result would not be deprived of protection on the ground that it was a program as such. On the other hand, even if the effect of the program is to make the computer perform in a novel way, it is still necessary to look at precisely what the computer is doing, that is, at the nature of the process being carried out. If all that is being done, as a matter of substance, is the performance of one of the activities defined under section 1(2) as unprotectable, then it is still unprotectable.

In accordance with these principles, just as it would be possible to obtain a patent, considerations of novelty aside, for a faster chip or a more effective storage medium, there is no reason in principle or logic why modification of the computer to achieve the same speed or storage increase by means of software should be excluded from protection. The fact that the advance is achieved in software rather than hardware should not affect patentability. To use in a slightly different context Nicholls LJ’s words from Gale’s Application, that would be to exalt form over substance. Similarly, if a new process achieved by mechanical means would be patentable, there is no reason why the same process achieved by computer means should be any less patentable. If that is so, it does not matter whether the patent claims are drafted in terms of a process controlled by a computer, a computer when programmed in particular way or a method of controlling a computer. In each case the substance of the invention is the same.

… Is it enough for [counsel for the applicant] to demonstrate that his client’s advance is of a technical character and relates to a technical field? The answer depends on what is meant by the word ‘technical’. [He] appeared to me to use it as if it covered all areas of practical development which were not associated with the liberal arts. That is not what I understand to have been the way in which it was used in the decided cases. In particular in VICOM and IBM it is only processes or methods which do not fall foul of the express exclusions from patentability under section 1(2) which are treated as suitably ‘technical’. Therefore use of the word ‘technical’, the meaning of which takes its colour from its context, is apt to confuse. What counts in this area is whether the method or process controlled by the program or the computer running it is one which itself is excluded from patentability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed a further appeal, finding that the only question was whether there was a technical contribution in order that it could not be said that the invention consisted merely of a computer program per se. However, the Court produced little clarification of the meaning of ‘technical contribution’,
Aldous LJ finding little help from *Vicom*—‘The reasoning in *Vicom* as to what was the technical contribution is not easy to ascertain’—and holding that, overall, ‘what was and was not a technical contribution was not a clear one’, so that each case had to be decided on its own facts.

The problems surrounding the application of the test for patentability of computer programs are unlikely to deter the large producers of computer systems from seeking patents for their products where they feel that this is appropriate, especially in the light of a certain apparent relaxation of the rules in the Patent Offices of the US and Japan and the recent decisions of the EPO Board of Appeals.\footnote{122} This may, perhaps, be given additional impetus in the light of some of the uncertainty surrounding the application of copyright principles to computer programs. If a computer program can be granted a patent, then the producer will enjoy the monopoly that goes with it and will cease to be concerned about issues of decompilation, adaptation, and so on. Given the commercial importance of many software products and products containing software, it is not surprising that patent applications are filed in instances where designers/developers perceive novelty and inventiveness.

The issue of patentability of computer programs is also being pursued by the European Commission as a consequence of the follow-up to the Green Papers on *Innovation* and the *Community Patent*.\footnote{123} Both the Commission and the European Parliament support the patentability of computer programs,\footnote{124} both for internal market reasons and also in order to be on a par with the US and Japan as important trading partners. For these reasons, the Commission intends to introduce a draft Directive, aimed at harmonising Member States’ legislation on the patentability of computer programs. The intention is that this Directive should ensure uniform application and interpretation of the new rules on the patentability of computer programs throughout the Community.

\footnote{121}{[1997] RPC 608.}
\footnote{122}{Since the decision of the EPO Board of Appeals in the *IBM* case (above, p 76), the UK Patent Office has issued new guidelines on claims to programs for computers. See \url{www.patent.gov.uk/snews/notices/practice/programs.html}.}
\footnote{123}{COM (1999) 42 final.}
\footnote{124}{See *op cit*, Report from the Commission, fn 81.}
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN DATABASES

Computer technology has revolutionised information storage and retrieval and this has facilitated the creation and commercial exploitation of databases, providing ready access to information on a wide range of subject matter. Collections and compilations are not new, but the ease of search and correlation made possible by computerisation of such products has had a dramatic effect on both the ease of use and the ultimate usefulness. It is frequently the case that the value of the database lies not in the individual entries *per se*, since, depending on the nature of the database, these may be obtained from public domain material or be brief facts which are not individually subject to copyright protection. Instead, the value lies in the way in which this material is available for retrieval, the sheer volume and comprehensive nature of the material which may be accessed and the manner in which it is presented to the user. Cerina\(^ \text{125} \) points out that databases are invaluable tools of vital importance for users in many segments of the economy, but can be copied in a minute with almost no effort, despite the considerable effort and expenditure necessary to their development. This fact, coupled with the truth of Peterson J’s *dictum* quoted at the beginning of this chapter, suggests that some consideration of the way in which intellectual property rights in databases can be protected is essential.

Even prior to the burgeoning of the market in databases, many jurisdictions had found difficulty in extending copyright protection to collections, compilations and directories.\(^ \text{126} \) There was a marked division also between the common law and civil law approaches to copyright based on a different view of originality and its role in imparting copyrightability.\(^ \text{127} \) The acceptable standard of originality in the civil law ‘droit d’auteur’ reflects the fact that the material should exhibit something of the author’s personality and creativity or demonstrate original, in the sense of novel, intellectual activity. Such a standard will, inevitably, exclude many databases from being protectable by copyright.\(^ \text{128} \)

The common law approach, on the other hand, is based on a literal ‘copyright’—a legal method of safeguarding work against commercial exploitation arising as a result of copying by a third party. This requires only a low threshold of originality. It may be sufficient merely that the work is the

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128 See, also, *ibid*, Cerina.
author’s independent creation, and not copied from elsewhere, rather than the necessity of a finding of particular novelty. Instead of novelty, the common law courts have tended to look for a ‘sweat of the brow’ test for the subsistence of copyright. Lord Atkinson said that ‘it is necessary that labour, skill and capital should be expended sufficiently to impart to the product some quality or character which the raw material does not possess and which differentiates the product from the raw material’.\textsuperscript{129} Lord Pearce agreed with this reasoning, commenting that ‘the courts have looked to see whether the compilation of the unoriginal work called for work or skill or expense. If it did, it is entitled to be considered original and to be protected against those who wish to steal the fruits of the work or skill or expense by copying it’.\textsuperscript{130}

However, the ‘sweat of the brow’ test has become controversial, even in the common law world, as can be seen from the US case of \textit{Feist Publications Inc v Rural Telephone Service Company Inc},\textsuperscript{131} in which the Supreme Court did not extend copyright protection to a telephone directory. Despite earlier decisions which had found copyrightability in a ‘sweat of the brow’ or ‘industrious collection test’, the court held that originality was the only standard for deciding whether or not a factual compilation is protectable by copyright. It is clear from \textit{Feist}, however, that this standard of originality is somewhat lower than the civil law standard and is related purely to independent creativity.

\textit{Feist Publications Inc v Rural Telephone Service Co Inc}
\begin{flushright}
113 L Ed 2d 358 (1991)  
US Supreme Court
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... Originality does not signify novelty; a work may be original even though it closely resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying [p 369]...

...originality is not a stringent standard; it does not require that facts be presented in an innovative or surpassing way. It is equally true, however, that the selection and arrangement of facts cannot be so mechanical or routine as to require no creativity whatsoever. The standard of originality is low, but it does exist [p 379]...

Nevertheless, the court was at pains to point out that the decision would not deprive all compilations of copyright protection.

... Factual compilations...may possess the requisite originality. The compilation author typically chooses which facts to include, in what order to place them, and how to arrange the collected data so that they may be used effectively by readers. These choices as to selection and arrangement, so long as they are made independently by the compiler and entail a minimal degree of creativity, are

\textsuperscript{129} Macmillan & Co Ltd v Cooper (1924) 40 TLR 186, p 188.  
\textsuperscript{130} Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football) Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 273, p 291.  
\textsuperscript{131} 113 L Ed 2d 358 (1991).
sufficiently original that Congress may protect such compilations through the copyright laws... Thus even a directory that contains absolutely no protectable written expression, only facts, meets the constitutional minimum for copyright protection of it features an original selection or arrangement [p 370]...

It was against this general background of inconsistency and doubt over both the existence and scope of copyright protection for databases and factual and other compilations that the EC Database Directive was drafted and adopted. The main impetus was a desire to harmonise the legal protection provided for databases and, as an adjunct, to ensure there was no impediment to the free market in both information products and information services. Even before the judgment in Feist, some commentators\textsuperscript{132} had expressed concern that insistence on a high threshold of originality for copyright protection would cause problems for modern informational works and that copyright, at least in its common law manifestation, had always needed to balance creative aspects of the work with commercial demands. Ginsburg’s suggested solution was to recognise a differential between works of ‘high’ and ‘low’ authorship and to provide corresponding protection. In essence, this could be said to be what the Database Directive does by extending conventional copyright protection to those works which satisfy the requisite originality requirement and providing a \textit{sui generis} right for those databases which do not satisfy this test but are, nevertheless, the result of considerable investment.

\textbf{THE DATABASE DIRECTIVE}\textsuperscript{133}

The Directive applies to both electronic and non-electronic databases, but not to the underlying computer programs:

1 \textbf{Scope}

2 ‘database’ shall mean a collection of independent works, data or other materials arranged in a systematic or methodical way and individually accessible by electronic or other means.

3 Protection under this directive shall not apply to computer programs used in the making or operation of databases accessible by electronic means.

The copyright protection which is appropriate for databases is detailed in Art 3:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[133] Directive 96/9/EC, 11 March 1996 (Legal Protection of Databases).
\end{itemize}
3 Object of protection

1 In accordance with this Directive, databases which, by reason of the selection or arrangement of their content, constitute the author’s own intellectual creation shall be protected as such by copyright. No other criteria shall be applied to determine their eligibility for that protection.

2 The copyright protection of databases provided for by the Directive shall not extend to their contents and shall be without prejudice to any rights subsisting in those contents themselves.

Since ‘selection’ or ‘arrangement’ are essential criteria, large comprehensive databases may be excluded unless ‘the particular arrangement of material is capable, by dint of personal creativity, of satisfying the “own intellectual creation” test’.134

The EC Database Directive: an original solution to an unoriginal problem?
Diane Rowland
[1997] 5 Web JCLI

The standard required for copyright protection is higher than the ‘sweat of the brow’ test and in some cases there will be room for debate as to whether a database qualifies for protection. In such cases it will be a matter for national tribunals, in the first instance at least, to determine the boundaries of ‘originality’. One of the most significant legal reasons why copyright protection for databases in different Member States was so much at variance was the divergence over the most appropriate definition of originality and, notwithstanding the warning of the Economic and Social Committee to the Council to ‘resist being sidetracked into a debate on the legal philosophies which underlie the Directive, particularly on the subject of “originality”’, it is difficult at one level to see how this can be avoided. Any assessment of the likely effect of the directive as it stands will need to consider the test for copyrightability and Member States will need to consider the issue in ascertaining how it can be implemented into their domestic legislation.

This protection is then qualified by the restricted acts and their exceptions in Arts 5 and 6, which are similar in nature to those familiar from conventional copyright regimes. In common with other copyrights in the EU, the term of protection is 70 years. The duration of the sui generis database right, on the other hand, is 15 years (Art 10). Articles 7–9 delineate its scope, the rights and obligations of lawful users and exceptions to the right.

134 Op cit, Rowland, fn 126. The standard of copyright protection for databases in Art 3 also accords with that suggested under TRIPS, Art 10.2 and the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty, both of which provide no protection for databases which do not attain this standard.
7 Object of protection

1 Member States shall provide for a right for the maker of a database which shows that there has been qualitatively and/or quantitatively a substantial investment in either the obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents to prevent extraction and/or re-utilization of the whole or of a substantial part, evaluated qualitatively and/or quantitatively, of the contents of that database.

2 (a) ‘extraction’ shall mean the permanent or temporary transfer of all or a substantial part of the contents of a database to another medium by any means or in any form;
(b) ‘re-utilization’ shall mean any form of making available to the public all or a substantial part of the contents of a database by the distribution of copies, by renting, by on-line or other forms of transmission...

4 The right...shall apply irrespective of the eligibility of that database for protection by copyright or by other rights. Moreover, it shall apply irrespective of the eligibility of the contents of that database for protection by copyright or other rights...

5 The repeated and systematic extraction and/or re-utilization of insubstantial parts of the contents of the database implying acts which conflict with a normal exploitation of that database or which unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the maker of the database shall not be permitted.

In many European jurisdictions, databases which satisfy the requirements of Art 3(1) would be likely to qualify for copyright protection, even in the absence of the Directive, but, in the UK in particular, there are likely to be many databases which would have qualified for protection under the old ‘sweat of the brow’ test which will now be denied copyright protection. As long as these fulfil the requirement of ‘substantial investment’, which is not defined in the Directive, they will still qualify for the \textit{sui generis} database right in Art 7.

This approach has been criticised on the basis that a ‘two tier’ system has implicit connotations of a higher and lower mode of protection, and there have also been expressions of doubt as to whether the compromise solution of the combination of a traditional copyright with a new form of right is the correct model.\textsuperscript{135}

\textsuperscript{135} There have also been criticisms based on the fact that a ‘neighbouring rights’ regime would have provided a suitable solution without necessitating the creation of a specific \textit{sui generis} right. See, eg, Garrigues, CC, ‘Databases: a subject matter for copyright or for a neighboring rights regime?’ [1997] EIPR 3. Cornish, on the other hand, suggests that the \textit{sui generis} right is to take account of the fact that there is no harmonised law of fair competition in the EU: Cornish, WR, \textit{Intellectual Property}, 4th edn, 1999, London: Sweet & Maxwell, p 525.
During the consultation process, the Economic and Social Committee commented on the inadequacy of compromise solutions, expressing the view that once protection is deemed to be necessary, only a high standard of protection will suffice. It may be misguided though, to view the protection afforded by the *sui generis* right as second rate. A major threat to large databases is that of piracy and a fifteen year term of protection against copying is, in most cases, likely to be sufficiently extensive to accommodate the shelf-life of even the most enduring database. This should not be divorced from the fact that any further substantial investment, such as might be required by necessary revision and updating, will generate a further term of protection. It can thus be said that the two tier system, rather than providing a superior and an inferior protection, instead maintains the necessary balance between creativity and investment.

The Database Directive was implemented in the UK by the Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations 1997. These Regulations amend the CDPA 1988 in relation to copyright, by inserting definitions of ‘database’ and ‘originality in databases’ (new s 3A), making relevant amendments to s 29 (fair dealing) and s 50 (permitted acts), and also inserting a new s 296B, which provides that acts permitted by virtue of the amended s 50 cannot be excluded by contract.

The new database right contained in Pt III of the Regulations, not being a copyright as such, has not been subsumed within the text of the 1988 Act, although certain of the available rights and remedies are, nevertheless, those contained in that statute (see reg 23). The basic database right is contained in reg 13:

13(1) A property right (‘database right’) subsists...in a database if there has been substantial investment in obtaining, verifying or presenting the contents of the database.

(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1) it is immaterial whether or not the database or any of its contents is a copyright work within the meaning of Part I of the 1988 Act.

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137 SI 1997/3032.
It will be recalled that the Directive only provides a definition of ‘extraction and re-utilisation’, but the Regulations provide explicit definitions of both ‘substantial’ (whose meaning is implicit within the Directive with regard to extraction and re-utilisation) and ‘investment’:

12 Interpretation

(1) …‘investment’ includes any investment, whether of financial, human or technical resources;…

‘substantial’, in relation to any investment, extraction or re-utilisation, means substantial in terms of quantity, quality or a combination of both.

Subsequent regulations deal with other aspects of the database right, including infringement.

16 Acts infringing database right

(1) …a person infringes database right in a database if, without the consent of the owner of the right, he extracts or re-utilises all or a substantial part of the contents of the database.

(2) …the repeated and systematic extraction or re-utilisation of insubstantial parts of the contents of a databases may amount to the extraction or reutilisation of a substantial part of those contents.

Chalton has suggested that there are some issues which are still in need of resolution following the implementation of the Directive but that, in the absence of a complete overhaul of copyright legislation, such issues may only be clarified as litigation arises. Interestingly, the first UK case to take note of the new provisions concerned none of these apparently fundamental issues. For the purposes of the relevant discussion in Mars UK Ltd v Teknowledge Ltd, the pertinent question was whether there was any right of repair which could be read into the Database Regulations. Having decided that, notwithstanding the rights of error correction, etc, the permitted acts in relation to computer programs themselves revealed no such defence, Jacob J went on to consider the Database Regulations. He pointed out that the situation with respect to databases could be distinguished from that for software because the Database Directive itself allowed, in Art 6(2)(d), a defence ‘where other exceptions to


copyright which are traditionally authorised under national law are involved’. This, in Jacob J’s view, gave Parliament a right to impose limitations on the scope of rights but, in the absence of such legislative activity, gave no discretion to the courts in lieu.

At present, the creation and harmonisation of database rights in the European Union is specific to that region and similar modifications have not yet been adopted elsewhere. However, change in the US, which would be expected to have some impact on the situation in some other jurisdictions, such as Australia, may be in the offing. Following *Feist* (1991), Lavenue noted the paradoxical impact of the effect of this judgment:

\[\ldots\text{the US stands at the forefront in the development of computer technology, representing the world leader in the database market. Nevertheless, the US currently recognises no intellectual property protection for the content of databases such as a database right.}\]

He believed that the chances were good that such a change would be forthcoming. This appeared to be borne out when, although a previous version had failed, the Collections of Information Antipiracy Bill was introduced into the House of Representatives in January 1999, which was intended to supplement the protection already afforded in appropriate cases by copyright. The Report of the Committee on the Judiciary in September 1999 was favourable and the Bill was committed to the Committee of the Whole House in October 1999 but, at the time of writing, is still pending. It has been pointed out that the draft Bill contains significant divergences from the European model, which may hinder international harmonisation, but it is clear from the Committee on the Judiciary’s Report that European and other international activity was one of the reasons for legislation in the US and explains the reasons for some of the perceived disparities.

**Collections of Information Antipiracy Bill**  
**Report of the Committee on the Judiciary**  
**HR 354, 30 September 1999**

In Europe, a 6 year legislative process culminated in the issuance of a European Union Directive on Legal Protection of Databases in 1996. Among other things, the Directive creates a new *sui generis* form of property right for the legal protection of databases to supplement copyright. However, it denies this new protection to collections of information originating in the United

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141 Davison, MJ, ‘Proposed US database legislation’ [1999] EIPR 279. Surprisingly, perhaps, the draft Bill manages to avoid the use of the word ‘database’, referring throughout to a collection of information as ‘information that has been collected and…organized for the purpose of bringing discrete items of information together in one place or through one source so that persons may access them’.
States or other countries unless the other country offers ‘comparable’ protection to collections originating in the European Union. When fully implemented, the European Directive could place US firms at an enormous competitive disadvantage throughout the entire European market.

At the World Intellectual Property Organization, discussions are ongoing as to whether or not there is a growing international consensus supporting development of a new international treaty on *sui generis* property right protection for databases. This Bill rejects the notion that an exclusive *sui generis* property right is the only approach to strong database protection, but rather offers comparable protection through the implementation of a new copyright-related Federal misappropriation statute.

It remains to be seen what impact the US legislation will have, if it eventually becomes law, and whether or not it will precipitate similar activity by international organisations such as WIPO and WTO.

**CONCLUDING REMARKS**

The discussion in this chapter has demonstrated that the unique nature of computer software and the particular products and inventions which it makes possible have created a considerable challenge for intellectual property law. Despite the individual protagonists who champion copyright, patents or *sui generis* rights, it is apparent that, in appropriate situations, all these mechanisms have been, and are being, used to foster and protect exploitation of computer software and products relying on it. Globalisation is a significant feature of the software market and this has forced different jurisdictions, even in the absence of suitable international treaties, to take account of the legal and regulatory activity in other jurisdictions to an unprecedented degree. It should perhaps be no surprise that the needs and requirements of a worldwide market may operate as a more potent force for international harmonisation than intergovernmental co-operation.

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INTRODUCTION

Types of contract

There are numerous different types of contract which can relate to computer hardware and software: contracts for the sale or lease of hardware, or of a hardware and software package; contracts licensing software; contracts for the maintenance of hardware or software (which may be called support contracts); distribution agreements between manufacturers and distributors of software or hardware; bureau services contracts, under which one party which has computer hardware and software supplies computer services or facilities to a party which does not have its own hardware or software. These are just some examples of the different types of contract dealing with computer hardware and software which may be encountered. It is not the purpose of this chapter to set out in detail the terms that might occur in each type of contract; rather, it will deal with some of the issues which may arise in relation to contracts concerned with computer software. The focus is on software. Hardware clearly constitutes goods, and contracts dealing with goods are familiar from other contexts. It is software which principally poses the significantly different questions. The point should also be made that, although the term ‘software’ can be used widely, to mean anything which is not hardware, unless otherwise indicated, it will be used here to mean computer programs. This is the type of software which raises significant issues for information technology law.

Bespoke and standard software

Discussion of contracts dealing with software requires a distinction to be made between different basic types of software. At one end of the spectrum is ‘bespoke’ software. That is software written for a particular user. At the other end is mass produced software, which is simply bought ‘off the shelf’ by many users. Somewhere in between will be modified standard software, for which the basic program will be the same in each case, but it will then be modified to some extent to meet the needs of the individual user. This division may be relevant, for example, in considering whether a contract for the supply of software should be regarded as a contract for the sale of goods or the supply of services (or something else).
The software licence

When computers first began to be sold, the software was merely something to be supplied with them. It simply was not seen as something to be separately exploited. The focus was on the hardware. It was in the early 1970s that serious consideration began to be given to software as a resource to be protected and exploited and the practice grew up of using licenses to do so. The licence would set out what the acquirer could, and could not, do with the software. Despite initial uncertainly, it has become clear that licensing does, indeed, provide an appropriate approach to the exploitation of software. With the recognition that copyright can exist in software, the licence has become the vehicle by which the acquirer is given rights to use the software. In so doing, it provides the means by which those who develop software can recoup the large costs of that development, make a profit, and find encouragement to further development.

There are difficulties in licensing software when the developer does not deal directly with the end user and, with the trend away from bespoke to ‘off the shelf’ software, this has become a common situation. If the end user does not deal with the developer, how is his or her use to be licensed? There may be a chain of contracts. The end user may be a sub-licensee of a distributor who obtained a licence from the developer—the distributor’s licence, including the right to create sub-licenses. However, the mass production of standard software has posed its own legal difficulties. How are licenses to be ‘mass produced’ when someone can acquire software simply by walking into a shop, selecting software from a display and paying for it at a till? The attempt to create licenses in this type of case by means of what has been called the ‘shrink wrap’ licence will be returned to below.

Goods or services or something else?

One problem which is of particular conceptual and practical significance is the legal nature of software. Obviously, a program is, at bottom, information and is protected by intellectual property rights in the form of copyright. However, could software also be regarded as ‘goods’? Should the supply of software be regarded as a service? On a practical level, these questions arise in the context of the applicability of the legislation such as the Sale of Goods Act (SGA) 1979, the

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2 See, now, the CDPA 1988, ss 1, 3.
3 See below, p 123.
Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 and the Commercial Agents (Council Directive) Regulations 1993. The issue of classification will be returned to below, Chapter 4, when the question of liability for defective software is addressed.

Scope of the chapter

A single chapter in a book on information technology law cannot deal in depth with all aspects of contract law. Instead, the discussion here will focus on some aspects of contract law which are particularly relevant in the context of software transactions.

SUITABILITY/QUALITY OF SOFTWARE

Pre-contractual statements

The consumer who wants software will either simply walk into a shop and purchase it ‘off the shelf’, select and purchase it through a mail order catalogue or purchase and download it from the web. Businesses may acquire hardware and software in the same way if all that is required is, for example, a straightforward word-processing package. However, if a business wants software which is tailored to its particular needs, it will contract for ‘bespoke’ software, to be written for it, or for standard software to be modified to meet its particular circumstances, and those circumstances might relate not only to the type of business, but also to the need for new software to be compatible with an existing system.

In any of the above situations, but particularly in relation to bespoke or modified standard software, there may be discussions between the supplier and the acquirer as to the needs of the acquirer and whether the software will fulfil them. If, after the acquisition, the acquirer is unhappy with the software, disputes may arise as to what was said about it and the legal effect of any such statements. The acquirer may claim that the supplier is liable, on the basis that the pre-contractual statements became terms or that they were misrepresentations, and such claims have occurred in relation to the acquisition of software and computer systems in, for example, *Micron Computer Systems Ltd v Wang*[^4] and *Mackenzie Patten & Co v British Olivetti Ltd*.[^5] These two possible bases of liability should be considered.

[^4]: (1990) unreported, 9 May.
(a) Pre-contractual statements becoming terms

The question of whether a pre-contractual statement has become a term is often put in terms of whether the statement was a mere representation or a warranty. The basic test for whether a pre-contractual statement became a term of the contract is the intention of the parties, and that intention is objectively ascertained. It is not easy to apply a test dependent upon the ascertainment of intention. However, certain indicators of the parties’ intention have been focused on by the courts, such as the situation where it is clear to both parties that the statement in question is key to the decision to contract. However, in the context of software contracts, the indicators which are most likely to be relevant are reliance and the relative expertise of the parties. This relates to the situation in which one party relies on the statements of the other party and that other party possesses the greater expertise. This can be illustrated by the contrasting cases of *Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams* and *Dick Bentley Productions Ltd v Harold Smith (Motors) Ltd*.

*Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams*

[1957] 1 All ER 325

The defendant sold a Morris car to the plaintiff car dealer. The dealer was familiar with the car and had been given lifts in it. The defendant innocently described the car as a 1948 model and produced the registration book (‘log-book’) which stated it to be a 1948 car. At some time before the defendant became the owner of the car, its registration book had been tampered with and the car was actually a 1939 model. There was no difference in appearance between a 1948 and a 1939 model and the plaintiff did not discover the truth until eight months after the purchase. The plaintiff took action to recover the difference between what he paid for the car and what he would have paid for a 1939 model. He claimed that it had been a term of the contract that the car was a 1939 model. His claim failed—no such term was found.

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6 ‘Warranty’ can be used in more than one sense. In this context, it is used simply to mean a term. It may also be used in contrast with conditions and innominate terms to designate a particular type of term, breach of which leads to specific consequences. Breach of a warranty gives rise only to a right to damages. Breach of a condition gives a right to damages and also a right to terminate the contract. Breach of an innominate term gives a right to damages but only gives a right to terminate if the breach substantially deprives the injured party or all the benefit which they were intended to derive from the contract. See Koffman, L and Macdonald, E, *The Law of Contract*, 3rd edn, 1998, Croydon: Tolley, pp 117–32.


8 For a case which clearly shows the need for an objective approach see Thake v Maurice [1986] 1 All ER 497.


10 [1957] 1 All ER 325.

11 [1965] 2 All ER 65.
Denning LJ The material distinction here is between a statement which is a term of the contract and a statement which is only an innocent misrepresentation. This distinction is best expressed by the ruling of Holt CJ, ‘Was it intended as a warranty or not?’, using the word ‘warranty’ there in its ordinary English meaning; because it gives the exact shade of meaning required. It is something to which a man must be taken to bind himself.

In applying this test, however, some misunderstanding has arisen by the use of the word ‘intended’. It is sometimes supposed that the tribunal must look into the minds of the parties to see what they themselves intended. That is a mistake… The question whether a warranty was intended depends on the conduct of the parties, on their words and behaviour, rather than on their thoughts. If an intelligent bystander would reasonably infer that a warranty was intended that will suffice…

It is instructive to take some recent instances to show how the courts have approached this question. When the seller states a fact which is or should be within his own knowledge and of which the buyer is ignorant, intending that the buyer should act on it and he does so, it is easy to infer a warranty: see Couchman v Hill [1947] 1 All ER 103, where a farmer stated that a heifer was unserved, and Harling v Eddy [1951] 2 All ER 212, where he stated that there was nothing wrong with her. So also if the seller makes a promise about something which is or should be within his own control; see Birch v Paramount Estates Ltd (1956) 16 EG 396, decided…in this court, where the seller stated that the house would be as good as the show house. If, however, the seller when he states a fact, makes it clear that he has no knowledge of his own but has got his information elsewhere, and is merely passing it on, it is not easy to imply a warranty. Such a case was Routledge v Mackay [1954] 1 All ER 855, where the seller stated that a motor cycle combination was a 1942 model, and pointed to the corroboration of that statement to be found in the registration book, and it was held that there was no warranty.

Turning now to the present case, much depends on the precise words that were used. If the seller says, ‘I believe that the car is a 1948 Morris. Here is the registration book to prove it’, there is clearly no warranty. It is a statement of belief, not a contractual promise. If, however, the seller says, ‘I guarantee that it is a 1948 Morris. This is borne out by the registration book, but you need not rely solely on that. I give you my own guarantee that it is’, there is clearly a warranty. The seller is making himself contractually responsible, even though the registration book is wrong.

… What is the proper inference from the known facts? it must have been obvious to both that the seller himself had no personal knowledge of the year when the car was made. He only became owner after a great number of changes. He must have been relying on the registration book. It is unlikely that such a person would warrant the year of manufacture. The most that he would do would be to state his belief, and then produce the registration book in verification of it. In these circumstances the intelligent bystander would, I suggest, say that the seller did not intend to bind himself so as to warrant that the car was a 1948 model. If the seller was asked to pledge himself to it,
he would at once have said ‘I cannot do that. I have only the log-book to go by, the same as you’…

*Dick Bentley Productions Ltd v Harold Smith (Motors) Ltd*

[1965] 2 All ER 65

DB asked the car dealer S to find him a ‘well vetted’ Bentley car. S found a car and showed it to DB. He told DB that it had only been driven 20,000 miles since a new engine had been fitted and that was the mileage shown on the odometer. DB purchased the car and had numerous problems with it. It was discovered that it had done a far greater mileage than 20,000 since the new engine had been fitted. DB sued on the basis that the mileage had become a term of the contract—his claim was successful.

**Lord Denning MR** Looking at the cases once more, as we have done so often, it seems to me that if a representation is made in the course of dealings for a contract, for the very purpose of inducing the other party to act on it, and it actually induces him to act on it by entering into the contract, that is *prima facie* ground for inferring that the representation was intended as a warranty… Suffice it that the representation was intended to be acted on and was in fact acted on. But the maker of the representation can rebut this inference if he can show that it was an innocent misrepresentation, in that he was innocent of fault in making it, and that it would not be reasonable in the circumstances for him to be bound by it. In the *Oscar Chess* case the inference was rebutted… whereas in the present case it is very different. The inference is not rebutted. Here we have a dealer, Mr Smith, who was in a position to know, or at least to find out, the history of the car. He could get it by writing to the makers. He did not do so. Indeed it was done later. When the history of this car was examined, his statement turned out to be quite wrong. He ought to have known better. There was no reasonable foundation for it.

These cases illustrate that the courts regard the expertise of one party as relevant to the question of whether a statement has become a term. In the context of a software contract, the point can be further illustrated by *Mackenzie Patten & Co v British Olivetti Ltd.* In that case, a solicitors’ practice purchased hardware and software. The purchasers had no expertise or knowledge of computers and relied on the seller’s statements as to its suitability for their needs and as to the functions it could perform. It proved unsuitable and could not perform one of the functions which the solicitors had wanted. The solicitors sued, claiming both breach of a term and misrepresentation. They succeeded on the basis that the seller’s statements had become terms of the contract. The judge emphasised the purchasers’ lack of expertise and reliance on that of the seller. The remedy, as is usually the case for breach of contract, was damages.

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13 The alternative claim, based on misrepresentation, was not addressed by the judge once he had found for the purchasers on the basis of a breach.
Before leaving the question of whether a pre-contractual statement has become a term, some consideration should be given to the ‘parol evidence rule’. This becomes relevant when, for example, there is a document recording contract terms but it does not include the contents of a pre-contractual statement which, it is being argued, became a term. It has been said that ‘it is firmly established as a rule of law that parol evidence cannot be used to add to, vary or contradict a deed or other written document’.14 In other words, where there is a contractual document, it might be argued that the ‘parol evidence rule’ prevented any evidence being brought that a pre-contractual statement furnished an additional term. However, the status of the so called parol evidence rule is doubtful. It may be nothing more than a presumption that, if there is a written agreement which looks like a complete contract, it is the complete contract. But that presumption can be rebutted if it is shown that there were intended to be other terms. Once looked at in this light, the ‘rule’ ceases to have much force. In addition, whilst taking the view of the ‘rule’ indicated here, the Law Commission also concluded that even if it was, properly speaking, a rule of law, there were so many exceptions to it that it was unlikely to work injustice.15

(b) Pre-contractual statements as misrepresentations16

A misrepresentation requires a material statement of existing or past fact by the misrepresentor, to the misrepresentee, which induces the misrepresentee to contract with the misrepresentor. In other words, what is needed is a pre-contractual statement of material fact by one party to the other, which that other party relies upon in deciding to contract.17 As has already been suggested, reliance may well be present where there is an imbalance of knowledge or expertise, as there often will be in the acquisition of software. The point which needs to be considered here, because of its particular relevance to the situation where advice is being given on the suitability of software, is the division between statements of opinion and statements of fact.

It has already been stated that, for a misrepresentation to be found, there must be a statement of fact. Statements of opinion, intention or law will not suffice.18 However, in some situations, the courts have been willing to find statements of fact where, at first sight, there is merely a statement of opinion or intention or law. That is obviously the case where what is stated to be one party’s

14 Jacobs v Batavia and General Plantations Trust [1924] 1 Ch 287, p 295, per Lawrence J.
16 On misrepresentation generally see op cit, Koffman and Macdonald, fn 6, Chapter 13.
17 Smith v Chadwick (1884) 9 App Cas 187.
intention or opinion simply is not that party’s intention or opinion—clearly, there is a misrepresentation that the party has that intention or holds that opinion. Less obviously, the courts have also been willing to find statements of fact where what is, apparently, merely a statement of opinion is made by an expert or the person who is simply in the best position to assess the situation. So, for example, in *Smith v Land & House Pty Corp*, the court was concerned with a statement in the sale particulars of a hotel that it was occupied by a ‘most desirable tenant’ for a term of 272 years. The tenant in question had not been paying his rent on time and Bowen LJ said:

…if the facts are not equally known to both sides, then a statement of opinion by the one who knows the facts best involves very often a statement of material fact, for he impliedly states that he knows facts which justify his opinion.

The court concluded that stating that the occupier was a ‘desirable tenant’ was not merely a statement of opinion. There was also a misrepresentation. Similarly, this type of argument might prove relevant in relation to a software contract. In that context, it is likely to be the statement of an expert which is in question and the implied statement of fact there would seem to be that the expert has properly used his or her expertise in forming his or her opinion.

A misrepresentation makes a contract voidable, and so the contract can be rescinded provided that one of the bars to rescission is not operative. Damages can also be claimed for misrepresentation. If the case is one where the misrepresentation involves fraud, the tort action for deceit can be used. Alternatively, damages may be available because the situation is covered by the tort action for negligent misstatement, or because it falls within the ambit of s 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967. All of the actions for damages, including that under s 2(1), will result in damages being calculated on the tortious, rather than the contractual, basis—they will put the injured party in the position he or she would have been in had the contract not been breached, ie, the position he or she would have been in had the contract been performed (*Robinson v Harman* (1880) 5 App Cas 25, p 35, *per* Parke B).
she would have been in had the misrepresentation not occurred, that is, their pre-contractual position.\textsuperscript{26}

The action under s 2(1) will normally be the most favourable of the actions for damages. Obviously, the common law action for negligent misstatement merely requires the injured party to prove negligence, rather than the fraud which has to be established for the action for deceit, although the action for negligent misstatement will also require proof of a duty of care. However, the action under s 2(1) is generally the easiest for the injured party to use. Under s 2(1), it is for the person who made the misrepresentation to prove that he or she reasonably believed in the truth of what was being asserted; that is, it is for the misrepresentor to disprove negligence under this action—reversing the burden of proof from that applicable under the action for negligent misstatement\textsuperscript{27}—and, of course, no duty of care is required.

**TERMS**

When software is in question, some of the most significant terms will be those licensing its use and licence terms will be considered below. Here, we should briefly consider sources of contractual terms other than the pre-contractual statements looked at above and give some further consideration to the problem of the acquisition of suitable software, particularly in the context of development contracts.

If the injured party signed a contractual document, its contents will provide contractual terms, whether he or she has any knowledge of them or not.\textsuperscript{28} If such a document is not signed, then, in the absence of actual knowledge of its contents, its effectiveness to import terms into the contract will depend upon whether there has been reasonably sufficient notice of it.\textsuperscript{29} That is an objective test, requiring sufficient notice for the reasonable person, rather than the particular individual concerned.\textsuperscript{30} Even if clauses have not been appropriately introduced into a particular transaction, they may be imported if there has previously been

\textsuperscript{27} A factor which was vital to the success of the injured party in *Howard Marine & Dredging Co Ltd v A Ogden & Sons (Excavations) Ltd* [1978] QB 574. (The absence of any need to establish a duty of care under s 2(1) was also of significance.) The action under s 2(1) also has the benefit of at least some of the rules applicable to the tort action based on fraud rather than negligence, such as the more lax remoteness test—*Roiscott Trust Ltd v Rogerson* [1991] 3 All ER 294.

\textsuperscript{28} *L'Estrange v F Graucob Ltd* [1934] 2 KB 394. There are limited exceptions. If the content of the terms has been misrepresented, then the part misrepresented will not be enforced (*Curtis v Chemical Cleaning and Dyeing Co* [1951] 1 KB 805). Signed terms are also subject to a claim of *non est factum*.

\textsuperscript{29} *Parker v South Eastern Rly Co Ltd* (1877) 2 CPD 416. See, generally, *op cit*, Koffman and Macdonald, fn 6, pp 141–48. See, further, below, p 125.

\textsuperscript{30} *Thompson v LM & S Rly* [1930] 1 KB 41.
a consistent course of dealings between the parties, involving those terms. There is a considerable degree of artificiality in the way in which clauses can become terms of a contract. It means that written contractual terms, particularly standard terms, may be seen as having very little to do with the agreement of the parties in any subjective sense.

Contract terms may be implied as well as express. They may be implied by statute, as, for example, with the terms implied by the ss 13–15 of the SGA 1979, which are considered below, Chapter 4. Otherwise, at common law, they may be implied in fact, in law or by custom. Terms are implied in fact on the basis of the parties’ intention, but within very narrow confines. The tests applied are whether it is necessary to imply the term to give the contract ‘business efficacy’ and also the ‘officious bystander’ test, that is, whether the term was so obvious that, had an officious bystander approached the contracting parties and suggested it, they would have said that of course the term in question was included. The implication of terms in law is not based on the intention of the parties, but upon necessity and the type of contract; that is, the term must be one which it is ‘necessary’ to imply into the type of contract in question and not merely the particular contract. Intention is relevant only to the extent that a term will not be implied in the face of a contrary term.

DEVELOPMENT CONTRACTS

The trend is away from bespoke software but contracts to develop software, or a computer system, for a particular business are still of some significance and they may create the most difficult problems in relation to the contents of the contract. One particular difficulty with such contracts is identifying exactly what the acquiring party requires. As part of the contracting process, the parties should draw up a detailed functional specification, which then becomes part of the contract. This should state, in detail, what the proposed software will do. It may not be easy to draw up such a document—the software developer is an expert in software and what can be done with it, but he or she is not an expert in the

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32 See, generally, op cit, Koffman and Macdonald, fn 6, pp 100–11.
33 The Moorcock (1889) 14 PD 64.
34 Shirlaw v Southern Foundries Ltd [1939] 2 KB 206, p 227, per Mackinnon LJ.
35 Liverpool CC v Irwin [1976] 2 All ER 39.
36 Johnstone v Bloomsbury HA [1991] 2 All ER 293—the Court of Appeal indicated that an express contrary term might be treated as an exclusion clause falling within UCTA 1977 in appropriate circumstances (see Macdonald, E, ‘Exclusion clauses: the ambit of s 13(1) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977’ (1992) 12 LS 277).
acquirer’s business, whatever that may be, and it is obvious that problems may arise from this information gap. The acquirer may end up with a system which does not do some of what he or she needed it to do because those needs have not been explained to the software developer. In *Micron Computer Systems Ltd v Wang (UK) Ltd*, the purchaser of a system had expected the system to perform what he termed ‘transaction logging’. It did not do so. It was found that that did not mean that the system was in breach of a term that it should be reasonably fit for the buyer’s particular purpose. The buyer had never made known to the seller that ‘transaction logging’ was required.

It is difficult to draw up specifications of what the software should do. However, once that is done, the difficulty for the developer is the technical one of designing software which will do what is required. Once a program has been written, it will need to be tested and, as far as possible, ‘debugged’. An interesting view of this process, and of what would not amount to a breach, was taken in *Saphena Computing*.

*Saphena Computing Ltd v Allied Collection Agencies Ltd* 1995 FSR 616

Staughton LJ … software is not necessarily a commodity which is handed over or delivered once and for all at one time. It may well have to be tested and modified as necessary. It would not be a breach of contract at all to deliver software in the first instance with a defect in it. That seems to be confirmed in a passage in the expert report of Mr Larner, a witness called by the suppliers, dealing with the nature of the commodity. He said this:

> Just as no software developer can reasonably expect a buyer to tell him what is required without a process of feedback and reassessment, so no buyer should expect a supplier to get his programs right first time. He, too, needs feedback on whether he has been successful. This is why the buyer needs to run acceptance tests using typical business transactions to ensure that each works correctly. Inevitably, though, some will not. This may be the supplier’s fault but it is equally possible that the buyer may have got his requirements wrong, have expressed them badly or unwittingly have used terms which were open to different interpretations. Whatever the cause, the programs have to be modified and then retested until the correct result is achieved.

We were told that there was no dispute as to that passage, although there was or may have been a dispute as to what acceptance tests there were. It seems to show in my judgment, as I have already said, that software is not a commodity which is delivered once, only once, and once and for all, but one which will necessarily be accompanied by a degree of testing and modification. Naturally it could be expected that the supplier will carry out

37 (1990) unreported, 9 May.
those tasks. He should have both the right and duty to do so. For somebody else to modify another person’s software would necessarily, as the judge found in another connection, involve a degree of learning time.

So I conclude that it was part of the contract that the suppliers in this case should have the right and the duty to test and modify as necessary the software they supplied. No doubt there was a time limit for that purpose—a reasonable time is that which the law would ordinarily supply.

*Saphena Computing* raises a number of issues which need to be considered here—the idea of delivery followed by further work to bring software up to standard, and acceptance tests.

**Delivery and further work**

When goods are sold, there is a point at which the property in the goods, and the risk, pass to the purchaser. The ‘property’ in goods is, basically, their ownership. It can be distinct from delivery and there is no necessary connection between the passing of property and delivery. ‘Risk’ normally passes to the buyer at the same time as property passes.\(^{38}\) The ‘risk’ in question is not defined by the SGA 1979, but it would seem to be the risk that goods will be wholly or partly destroyed or damaged, or lost by theft, without the fault of either party.\(^{39}\) The point to be made here is that it is the time at which risk passes that consideration needs to be given to the question of compliance with the statutory implied terms,\(^{40}\) such as whether the goods are reasonably fit for the buyer’s particular purpose. If the same approach is taken to software, then, in asking whether the software is reasonably fit for the acquirer’s purpose, what should be focused on is not delivery but the passing of risk. It is at the point that risk passes that the question of whether the software is of the appropriate quality should be asked. The notion that risk and property could pass in the software and yet that there would remain an extended period over which the software could be brought up to standard is inconsistent with the analytical framework suggested by the approach taken to sale of goods contracts. It might be taken to suggest that software should not be regarded as goods.\(^{41}\) However, whether or not software is goods, there must be a point in time at which it has to comply with the standard specified. In *St Albans City and DC v ICL*,\(^ {42}\) in dismissing submissions based on the line taken by Staughton LJ in *Saphena*, Nourse LJ said:

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38 SGA 1979, s 20.
41 See below, p 172.
42 [1996] 4 All ER 481.
Parties who respectively agree to supply and acquire a system recognising that it is still in the course of development cannot be taken, merely by virtue of that recognition, to intend that the supplier shall be at liberty to supply software which cannot perform the function expected of it at the stage of development at which it is supplied.

It would seem that, rather than viewing the situation as one in which there would be a breach but for the fact that the software is still being worked on, as seems to have been the case in *Saphena*, greater consideration should be given to the appropriate point in time at which the contract requires compliance with the relevant standard.

**Acceptance tests**

One further factor to be considered here is that of ‘acceptance’. In the context of the sale of goods, acceptance is defined by s 35 of the SGA 1979:

1. The buyer is deemed to have accepted the goods subject to subsection (2) below—
   - when he intimates to the seller that he has accepted them; or
   - when the goods have been delivered to him and he does any act in relation to them which is inconsistent with the ownership of the seller.

2. Where goods are delivered to the buyer, and he has not previously examined them, he is not deemed to have accepted them under subsection (1) above until he has had a reasonable opportunity of examining them for the purpose—
   - of ascertaining whether they are in conformity with the contract; and
   - in the case of a contract for sale by sample, of comparing the bulk with the sample.

3. Where the buyer deals as consumer or (in Scotland) the contract of sale is a consumer contract, the buyer cannot lose his right to rely on subsection (2) above by agreement, waiver or otherwise.

4. The buyer is also deemed to have accepted the goods when after the lapse of a reasonable time he retains the goods without intimating to the seller that he has rejected them.

5. The questions that are material in determining for the purposes of subsection (4) above whether a reasonable time has elapsed include whether the buyer has had a reasonable opportunity of examining the goods for the purpose mentioned in subsection (2) above.

6. The buyer is not by virtue of this section deemed to have accepted the goods merely because—
   - he asks for, or agrees to, their repair by or under an arrangement with the seller; or
   - the goods are delivered to another under a sub-sale or other disposition.
(7) Where the contract is for the sale of goods making one or more commercial units, a buyer accepting any goods included in a unit is deemed to have accepted all the goods making the unit; and in this subsection ‘commercial unit’ means a unit division of which would materially impair the value of the goods or the character of the unit.

The significance of acceptance, in the context of sale of goods, is that, if goods are ‘accepted’ within the meaning of s 35(1), the right to reject for breach of a condition is lost and the breach will be treated merely as a breach of warranty. The question which must be asked is whether, if ‘acceptance tests’ are specified in a contract for the supply of software, they are to be understood as having the same effect as ‘acceptance’ under the SGA 1979. Do they show that the acquirer of software has ‘intimated’ his acceptance to the supplier and thereby lost the right to reject the goods but retained the right to claim damages? At common law, affirmation of a contract by the injured party, and the loss thereby of the right to terminate the contract for breach of condition, can only occur once the injured party knows of the breach, although, in limited circumstances, an injured party might also be prevented from terminating by waiver or estoppel.

Obviously, it will be important to determine whether the contract is one for the sale of goods, but the contract itself might make clear the impact of the successful completion of the acceptance tests. However, it can be suggested that, particularly if the contractual provision is more restrictive of the acquirer’s remedies than would otherwise be the case, either on the basis of the 1979 Act or the common law, the relevant contractual provision could be treated as an exemption clause, the effectiveness of which could be subject to the Unfair Contract Terms Act (UCTA) 1977.

MODIFYING THE CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS

The point has been made that, at the time when a contract is made, it may be difficult for the parties to accurately define the software required, particularly when a development contract is in question. Additionally, the software developer may encounter greater difficulties in producing the software required than was anticipated when the contract was made. These factors mean that software development contracts may well need to be modified before their performance is completed and a number of particular difficulties can arise in

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43 Section 11(4).
44 See s 35(1)(a).
45 See below, p 171.
46 On the 1977 Act generally, see below, p 134. The Act requires the drawing of a difficult borderline between clauses which exclude liability and those which define obligations, and it is not one that can simply depend upon the form of the clause. See ss 3 and 13 and see, generally, op cit, Macdonald, fn 36.
relation to contractual modifications. The more generally recognised ones of consideration and duress will be looked at below, but, first, a brief look should be taken at the way in which the difficulties of initially defining the software to be created was dealt with in Saphena Computing Ltd v Allied Collection Agencies Ltd.47

In Saphena, the acquirer was in business as a debt collecting agency. It made two contracts for the acquisition of software from the supplier: the first for the supply of software and hardware which would computerise its accounts and allow access to them through printouts; and the second for the extension of the system to make it ‘online’. An online system would have meant that the accounts could be viewed on a screen and that what was seen there would be up to date as soon as any new information (such as payment) was entered into the system. The first stage was completed satisfactorily in itself, but the attempt to bring the system online created problems with the software already installed and these were not easily remediable. The second contract had been made in August 1985 but the system was not satisfactory by February 1986, at which point the acquirers lost patience and agreed with the suppliers to end the contract. The case raised questions in relation to copyright and the acquirers’ rights to remedy defects in the program. What should be noted in this context is the view of the court as to the contents of the implied term that the system would be reasonably fit for the buyer’s particular purpose.48 Havery QC (Off Ref) said:

…it was an implied term of each contract for the supply of software that the software would be reasonably fit for any purpose which had been communicated to the plaintiff’s before the contract was made and for any purpose subsequently communicated, provided in the latter case that the plaintiffs accepted the defendant’s instructions to make the relevant modifications. The making of the modifications constitutes or implies acceptance of the instructions…

Havery QC regarded the contract as envisaging the modification of the content of the term that the goods should be reasonably fit for the acquirer’s particular purpose. This evidences the problems of drawing up the functional specification at the start of the contract: the acquirer may be unclear as to what is required or may not fully explain it to the supplier. The case also illustrates the fact that contracts for bespoke or modified standard software may need to be modified.

48 The basis of the implication is not clear in this case but a term requiring goods to be reasonably fit for the buyer’s particular purpose is implied by the SGA 1979, s 14(3) (see, also, the SGSA 1982). See below, p 211.
Problems may arise from that need and the alteration of contracts should now be examined.

**Consideration**

Unless it is embodied in a deed, an agreement requires the presence of consideration if it is to be legally binding as a contract. Consideration is basically some benefit to the promisee or detriment to the promisor and, obviously, the requirement applies to both parties.\(^{50}\) The benefit or detriment should be of some financial significance, rather than, for example, some emotional benefit,\(^ {51}\) but the level of financial benefit or detriment is generally irrelevant.\(^ {52}\) In other words, the law does not, in general, examine whether the parties have arrived at a ‘fair’ contract price.\(^ {53}\) This is usually expressed by saying that the law does not consider the adequacy of consideration and, in *Thomas v Thomas*,\(^ {54}\) for example, it meant that the adequacy of paying £1 a year rent for a valuable property was not regarded as legally relevant.

However, the law does label some consideration as insufficient and that is what must be focused on here. The point in relation to modifications of contracts is that, traditionally, a promise by X, to Y, to perform what is already required by another contract between X and Y, has not been regarded as sufficient consideration.\(^ {55}\) However, a more recent approach indicates that there will be sufficient consideration in this situation if there is some practical benefit to Y in obtaining performance, rather than merely being left with the right to sue X for breach of the first contract.\(^ {56}\) Of course, in such a case, X may be ‘extorting’ a promise to pay more for the performance already contracted for, but some protection is afforded to Y in such a situation by the doctrine of duress, which will be considered below. Here, the case of *Williams v Roffey Bros* should be considered—the case which introduced the more modern approach to the question of further payment for performance of an existing contractual duty.

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51 White v Bluett (1853) 23 LJ Ex 36, but see Ward v Byham [1956] 2 All ER 318.

52 *Thomas v Thomas* (1842) 2 QB 851; *Chappell & Co v Nestle Co* [1960] AC 87.

53 But see the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (SI 1999/2083), below, p 154.

54 (1842) 2 QB 851.

55 The same applied, and still applies, where the promised performance is of the carrying out of a public duty (*Collins v Godefroy* (1831) 1 B & Ald 950), but not where the existing contractual obligation is to a third party (*Scotson v Pegg* (1861) 6 H & N 295). There is no difficulty in finding consideration in any of the cases if some further consideration is supplied which goes beyond the existing duty (*Hartley v Ponsonby* (1857) 7 E & B 872).

56 This has been held not to extend to the situation where a debtor offers to pay only part of the money owed (*Re Selectmove* [1995] 2 All ER 531).
Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd
[1991] 1 QB 1

The defendant building contractors had contracted to do building work on a block of 27 flats. They sub-contracted the carpentry work to the plaintiff. Before the plaintiff had completed the carpentry work he found that he was in financial difficulties. The contract price had turned out to be a ‘bad deal’, from his perspective. The defendants were under pressure to complete on time because of clauses stating that certain sums were to be paid if completion was late. The defendants met with the plaintiff and offered him additional remuneration, to be paid as he completed the work on each flat. The defendants did not maintain the additional payments and the plaintiff sued for the extra sums promised. The question was whether the plaintiff had provided any consideration for the defendants’ promise to pay the additional sums, when he was merely doing what he was already bound to do under the existing contract. The Court of Appeal found that there was consideration in the practical benefit that the defendants gained in the flats being completed on time.

Glidewell LJ In his address to us, counsel for the defendants outlined the benefits to the defendants which arose from their agreement to pay the additional £10,300 as (i) seeking to ensure that the plaintiff continued to work and did not stop in breach of the sub-contract, (ii) avoiding the penalty for delay and (iii) avoiding the trouble and expense of engaging other people to complete the carpentry work.

However, counsel submits that, though the defendants may have derived, or hoped to derive, practical benefits from their agreement to pay the ‘bonus’, they derived no benefit in law, since the plaintiff was promising to do no more than he was already bound to do under his sub-contract, ie continue with the carpentry work and complete it on time. Thus there is no consideration for the agreement.

Counsel for the defendants relies on the principle of law which, traditionally, is based on the decision in Stilk v Myrick (1809) 2 Camp 317…

There is, however, another legal concept of relatively recent development which is relevant, namely that of economic duress. Clearly, if a sub-contractor has agreed to undertake work at a fixed price, and before he has completed the work declines to continue with it unless the contractor agrees to pay an increased price, the sub-contractor may be held guilty of securing the contractor’s promise by taking unfair advantage of the difficulties he will cause if he does not complete the work. In such a case an agreement to pay an increased price may well be voidable because it was entered into under duress. Thus the concept may provide another answer in law to the question of policy which has troubled the courts since before Stilk v Myrick and no doubt led at the date of that decision to a rigid adherence to the doctrine of consideration.

…[T]he present state of the law on this subject can be expressed in the following proposition: (i) if A has entered into a contract with B to do work for, or to supply goods or services to, B, in return for payment by B and (ii) at some stage before A has completely performed his obligations under the contract B has reason to doubt whether A will, or will be able to,
complete his side of the bargain and (iii) B thereupon promises A an additional payment in return for A’s promise to perform his contractual obligations on time and (iv) as a result of giving his promise B obtains in practice a benefit, or obviates a disbenefit, and (v) B’s promise is not given as a result of economic duress or fraud on the part of A, then (vi) the benefit to B is capable of being consideration for B’s promise so that the promise will be legally binding.

As I have said, counsel for the defendants accepts that in the present case by promising to pay the extra £10,300 the defendants secured benefits. There is no finding, and no suggestion, that in this case the promise was given as a result of fraud or duress.

If it be objected that the propositions above contravene the principle in *Stilk v Myrick*, I answer that in my view they do not: they refine and limit the application of the principle, but they leave the principle unscathed, eg where B secures no benefit by his promise. It is not in my view surprising that a principle enunciated in relation to the rigours of seafaring life during the Napoleonic wars should be subjected during the succeeding 180 years to a process of refinement and limitation in its application in the present day.

It is therefore my opinion that on his findings of fact in the present case, the judge was entitled to hold, as he did, that the defendants promise to pay the extra £10,300 was supported by valuable consideration, and thus constituted an enforceable agreement…

**Russell LJ**… In the late 20th century I do not believe that the rigid approach to the concept of consideration to be found in *Stilk v Myrick* is either necessary or desirable. Consideration there must still be but in my judgment the courts nowadays should be more ready to find its existence so as to reflect the intention of the parties to the contract where the bargaining powers are not unequal and where the finding of consideration reflects the true intention of the parties.

… The plaintiff has got into financial difficulties. The defendants, through their employee Mr Cottrell, recognised that the price that had been agreed originally with the plaintiff was less than what Mr Cottrell himself regarded as a reasonable price. There was a desire on Mr Cottrell’s part to retain the services of the plaintiff so that the work would be completed without the need to employ another sub-contractor. There was further a need to replace what had hitherto been a haphazard method of payment by a more formalised scheme involving the payment of a specified sum on the completion of each flat. These were all advantages accruing to the defendants which can fairly be said to have been in consideration of their undertaking to pay an extra £10,300. True it was that the plaintiff did not undertake to do any work additional to that which he had originally undertaken to do but the terms on which he was to carry out the work were varied and, in my judgment, that variation was supported by consideration which a pragmatic approach to the true relationship between the parties readily demonstrates.

For my part I wish to make it plain that I do not base my judgment on any reservation as to the correctness of the law long ago enunciated in *Stilk v Myrick*. A gratuitous promise, pure and simple, remains unenforceable
unless given under seal. But where, as in this case, a party undertakes to make a payment because by so doing it will gain an advantage arising out of the continuing relationship with the promisee the new bargain will not fail for want of consideration.

**Purchas LJ** The point of some difficulty which arises on this appeal is whether the judge was correct in his conclusion that the agreement reached on 9 April failed for lack of consideration within the principle established by the old cases of *Stilk v Myrick*, approving *Harris v Watson* (1791) Peake 102. Counsel for the plaintiff was bold enough to submit that...this court was bound by neither authority. I feel I must say at once that, for my part, I would not be prepared to overrule two cases of such veneration involving judgments of judges of such distinction except on the strongest possible grounds since they form a cornerstone of the law of contract which has been observed over the years and is still recognised in principle in recent authority... Although this rule has been the subject of some criticism it is still clearly recognised in current textbooks of authority...

In my judgment, therefore, the rule in *Stilk v Myrick* remains valid as a matter of principle... The modern cases tend to depend more on the defence of duress in a commercial context rather than lack of consideration...

The question must be posed: what consideration has moved from the plaintiff to support the promise to pay the extra £10,3000 added to the lump sum provision? In the particular circumstances...there was clearly a commercial advantage to both sides from a pragmatic point of view in reaching the agreement of 9 April. The defendants were at risk that as a result of the bargain they had struck the plaintiff would not or indeed possibly could not comply with this existing obligation without further finance. As a result of the agreement the defendants secured their position commercially. There was, however, no obligation added to the contractual duties imposed on the plaintiff under the original contract. *Prima facie* this would appear to be a classic *Stilk v Myrick* case. It was, however, open to the plaintiff to be in deliberate breach of the contract in order to ‘cut his losses’ commercially. In normal circumstances the suggestion that a contracting party can rely on his own breach to establish consideration is distinctly unattractive. In many cases it obviously would be and if there was any element of duress brought on the other contracting party under the modern development of this branch of the law the proposed breaker of the contract would not benefit.

**Duress**

When a contract has been made, and performance commenced, the parties may become heavily dependent upon each other. If only one party becomes dependent, then the situation is ripe for the other party to ask for further

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payment to perform what he or she is already bound to do by the terms of their existing contract. A partly developed software system might well give rise to such a situation, for example, and the enforceability of any new agreement might come into question. As has been indicated, since the decision in Williams v Roffey Bros, consideration has ceased to be the important factor in looking at the enforceability of any such new agreement. The main question is now clearly identified as whether the new agreement was made under duress.

The concept of duress requires the law to distinguish between acceptable hard bargaining and the use of unacceptable pressure, which will render a contract voidable. It is a difficult line to draw and it is only relatively recently that English law has been prepared to recognise duress in all but the most extreme of cases, such as a threat of physical violence to the person. In fact, the principle that a contract could be voidable on the basis of economic duress was not recognised until Mocatta J did so, obiter, in The Siboen and The Sibotre. Some of the difficulties in determining what should amount to economic duress are illustrated in the judgments in Universe Tankships Inc of Monrovia v International Transport Workers Federation.


A Liberian corporation owned a ship which sailed under a flag of convenience, thereby avoiding many requirements beneficial to its seamen. When the ship docked at Milford Haven, it was ‘blacked’ by the ITF in an effort to obtain improved conditions for the crew. The owners paid various sums to enable their vessel to leave port, including a ‘contribution’ to the ITF welfare fund. Once the ship was clear of port, the owners sued to recover their ‘contribution’ as money paid under duress, and succeeded.

Lord Diplock It is, however, in my view crucial to the decision of the instant appeal to identify the rationale of this development of the common law. It is not that the party seeking to avoid the contract which he has entered into with another party, or to recover money that he has paid to another party in response to a demand, did not know the nature or the precise terms of the contract at the time he entered into it or did not understand the purpose for which the payment was demanded. The rationale is that his apparent consent was induced by pressure exercised upon him by that other party which the law does not regard as legitimate, with the consequence that the consent is treated in law as revocable unless

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58 See, eg, Atlas Express v Kafco (Importers and Distributors) Ltd [1989] 1 All ER 641; North Ocean Shipping v Hyundai Construction Co Ltd (The Atlantic Baron) [1978] 3 All ER 1170.
approbated either expressly or by implication after the illegitimate pressure has ceased to operate on his mind. It is a rationale similar to that which underlies the voidability of contracts entered into and the recovery of money exacted under colour of office, or under undue influence or in consequence of threats of physical duress.

Commercial pressure, in some degree exists wherever one party to a commercial transaction is in a stronger bargaining position than the other party...

**Lord Scarman** It is, I think already established law that economic pressure can in law amount to duress...: *Barton v Armstrong* [1976] AC 104 and *Pau On v Lau Yiu Long* [1980] AC 614. The authorities upon which these two cases were based reveal two elements in the wrong of duress: (1) pressure amounting to compulsion of the will of the victim; and (2) the illegitimacy of the pressure exerted. There must be pressure, the practical effect of which is compulsion or the absence of choice. Compulsion is variously described in the authorities as coercion or the vitiation of consent. The classic case of duress is, however, not the lack of will to submit but the intentional submission arising from the realisation that there is no other practical choice open to him. This is the thread of principle which links the early law of duress (threat to life or limb) with later developments when the law came also to recognise as duress first the threat to property and now the threat to a man’s business or trade...

The absence of choice can be established in various ways, eg by protest, by the absence of independent advice, or by declaration of intention to go to law to recover the money paid or the property transferred: see *Maskell v Horner* [1915] 3 KB 106. But none of these evidential matters goes to the essence of duress. The victim’s silence will not assist the bully, if the lack of any practicable choice but to submit is proved. The present case is an excellent illustration. There was no protest at the time, but only a determination to do whatever was needed as rapidly as possible to release the ship. Yet nobody challenges the judge’s finding that the owner acted under compulsion...

The real issue in the appeal is therefore as to the second element in the wrong of duress: was the pressure applied by the ITF in the circumstances of this case one which the law regards as legitimate? For as Lord Wilberforce and Lord Simon of Glaisdale said in *Barton v Armstrong* [1976] AC 104, p 121D, ‘the pressure must be one of a kind which the law does not regard as legitimate’.

As the two noble and learned Lords remarked at p 121D, in life, including the life of commerce and finance, ‘many acts are done under pressure, sometimes overwhelming pressure’: but they are not necessarily done under duress. That depends on whether the circumstances are such that the law regards the pressure as legitimate...
Lord Scarman indicated two tests for the existence of economic duress and a two stage test has gained support. However, it differs somewhat from that stated by Lord Scarman. It is now put in terms of:

(a) the lack of a reasonable alternative to agreeing, for the person threatened; and

(b) the illegitimacy of the threat.

In other words, it is Lord Scarman’s reference to ‘pressure amounting to compulsion of the will of the victim’ which no longer accurately states the test. Rather, the test now reflects what he referred to as the ‘classic case of duress’. This is clearer than Lord Scarman’s original test, as it makes it obvious that the person against whom the threat is made makes a choice. It becomes clear that duress is not concerned with the person threatened being rendered incapable of making a choice because his or her ‘will’ is not functioning normally, but, rather that duress is concerned with someone having to make a decision in circumstances that the law regards as unacceptable.

However, the lack of a reasonable alternative to agreeing is not, in itself, sufficient to constitute duress. The second part of the test indicates that the circumstances of the decision will not be unacceptable unless the threat was ‘illegitimate’. Pressure would, generally, seem to be illegitimate where what is threatened is unlawful, in that it is a criminal or civil wrong (including the threat to breach a contract), or where the threat itself is such a wrong (for example, blackmail). In the case of CTN Cash and Carry v Gallaher, the Court of Appeal indicated, obiter, that this might be extended to threats to do something which is not unlawful (for example, a threat not to make a contract) but which took place in circumstances where the person making the threat was not acting bona fide and the relationship between the parties was a ‘protected’ one. The ambit of the category of ‘protected relationships’ was not made clear, but the court obviously did not think the two businesses in the instant case fell within it—the contrast was made between ‘protected relationships’ and a ‘purely commercial context’.


63 See the discussion in Dimskal Shipping Co SA v International Transport Workers Federation (The Evia Luck) [1991] 4 All ER 871.

64 [1994] 4 All ER 714.
COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP

When software is acquired, the copyright interest in it is not usually acquired as well, merely a right to use it under the terms of a licence. However, there will be some cases in which the acquirer also becomes the copyright holder. This might happen in relation to software which the acquirer commissioned the developer to devise for him or her. However, the ownership of copyright, particularly under a development contract, may be disputed and such a dispute will be considered below. First, the desirability of copyright ownership for both such parties is put in context by Chappatte.

Specific problems in the licensing of software
Philip Chappatte
(1995) 11 CL & P 16

The ownership of software is not normally an issue in commercial transactions except where one person (the software house) has agreed to develop application software for another (the user) involving either the developing of a complete software system or developing additions and improvements or adaptations to an existing system.

Let us take an example. If a manufacturer of heavy machinery asks a software house to develop application software to suit its specific needs and business environment, the software house may be able to suggest a standard software package which is 30 or 40 per cent fit for the user’s requirements. The rest of the software system will have to be specifically developed by the software house for the user.

Benefits of ownership for user

The user may acquire substantial benefits by obtaining ownership. I will mention three benefits:

(i) the user will be able to avoid all restrictions on use and transferability and the problems associated with a revocable licence if he acquires ownership;
(ii) if the software house uses the whole or part of the software developed for the user for the benefit of other persons, the user may be able to extract royalties from the software house for subsequent use and sub-licenses;
(iii) ownership of the software means control over software. What can often be the most important benefit for the user is that ownership will enable the user to ensure that none of his competitors will be able to obtain the right to use the software developed for him.

Disadvantages for the software house

If the user acquires proprietary rights, the software house will obviously lose the corresponding benefits acquired by the user. For example, the software house will not freely be able to use certain software routines developed for the user in our example for the benefit of another person or to incorporate
those routines in one of its standard software packages. But the software house may also face real practical difficulties if a user does acquire proprietary rights.

It may be administratively burdensome for the software house to develop an internal register dividing software it has developed in which it has a proprietary right and other software it has developed owned by its customers. It may be difficult for the software house to prevent its programmers and designers from drawing on their previous experience which may unwittingly involve the copying of customised software developed for and owned by a particular user.

In *Saphena Computing Ltd v Allied Collection Agencies Ltd*, the ownership of the intellectual property rights in the software was disputed. The acquirers argued that the beneficial interest in the copyright should vest in them, as they had commissioned the software. Havery QC (Off Ref) took the line that the starting point should be that the copyright, and the beneficial interest in it, belonged to the developer unless there was something to displace that assumption. He arrived at that conclusion because s 4(3) of the Copyright Act 1956 expressly provided that the person who commissioned a photograph, or the painting or drawing of a portrait, should be entitled to the copyright in it but, in contrast, there was no such allocation of copyright to the commissioner of a literary work and software is treated as a literary work for the purposes of the copyright legislation. In addition, in the instant case, there was nothing to displace the assumption that the commissioning party did not acquire copyright—no express or implied term and no implied or resulting trust.

**THE LICENCE**

*Licence terms*

The software licence will deal with such matters as:

- to whom the licence is granted;
- the equipment on which, and location at which, it may be used;
- the use to which the software can be put (for example, sub-licensing is usually forbidden);
- whether the source code or object code is supplied (normally, the acquirer only receives the object code);

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66 Defining the use rendered ‘lawful’ by the licence may be particularly important in the light of the CDPA 1988, s 50C, which bases its limited ‘right’ to, eg, copy, adapt or correct errors in software on what is necessary for the software’s ‘lawful’ use.
whether the licence is exclusive or non-exclusive (normally, it will be non-exclusive, unless it is being granted to a distributor who is to exploit the software through sub-licensing it);

whether the licensee can transfer the licence;  

the duration of the licence, which may be for a fixed or indefinite period. It will normally state that it is to terminate on the occurrence of certain breaches by the licensee or on the licensee’s insolvency;

confidentiality—the licence may state that the ‘software’ is confidential information which should not be disclosed, if the licensor is attempting to gain the protection afforded to such information;

exemption clauses—the licensor will insert an exemption clause in an attempt to exclude or restrict any liability he or she might incur to the licensee.

The effectiveness of exemption clauses must be considered in the light of UCTA 1977, which is considered below. In addition, the 1999 Regulations on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts will subject to a test of ‘fairness’ many non-individually negotiated terms in contracts between sellers or suppliers and consumers. The Regulations are also considered below.

**EC DIRECTIVE**

**Basic use of software**

It is generally said that using software will be in breach of copyright unless the user has a licence. This is because its use almost inevitably requires it to be copied onto hardware and, in the absence of a licence, such copying has generally been said to entail a breach of copyright. However, what must be considered is the effect on this of Art 5(1) of the EC Directive on the Protection of Computer Programs. This might be seen as providing the acquirer with a right to make the copy required for the basic use of software.

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67 The copyright holder may wish to prevent a licence from being transferred to a rival.
68 Such termination has serious potential consequences for a licensee whose business is organised around the use of the software. The purchaser of such a business may require a check to see that the relevant software licenses have not been infringed.
69 See p 134.
70 SI 1999/2083; see p 154.
71 See the CDPA 1988, s 17(1), (2), (6).
Article 5(1) states:

In the absence of specific contractual provisions, the acts referred to in Article 4(a) and (b) shall not require authorisation by the rightholder where they are necessary for the use of the computer program by the lawful acquirer in accordance with its intended purpose, including for error correction.

The ‘acts’ referred to in Art 4(a) and (b) are, inter alia, the ‘permanent or temporary reproduction of computer programs’ and ‘the translation, adaptation, arrangement and any other alteration of a computer program and the reproduction thereof’. This means that the Directive might be seen as providing the right to make the copy of software which its basic use requires. However, any such right would be limited and it would seem that the copyright owner could prevent any such right from being acquired by including an express contrary term.

Article 5(1) is reflected in what is now s 50C of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (CDPA) 1988, which states:

1. It is not an infringement of copyright for the lawful user of a copy of a computer program to copy or adapt it, provided that the copying or adapting—
   a. is necessary for his lawful use; and
   b. is not prohibited under any term or condition of an agreement under which his use is lawful.

2. It may, in particular, be necessary for the lawful use of a computer program to copy or adapt it for the purpose of correcting errors in it...

It should be noted that the section seems generally restrictive of any notion of a right to make basic use of software. There is an important difference to be noted between the Directive’s references to ‘lawful acquirer’ and use of the software in accordance with its ‘intended purpose’, and the statutory references to ‘lawful user’ and ‘lawful use’. It would seem that someone might well be argued to be a ‘lawful acquirer’ although they lacked the rights to make them a ‘lawful user’ (the same point can be made in relation to ‘lawful use’ and ‘intended purpose’ (‘lawful user’ is defined in s 50A(2)). Prima facie, the person who purchases software in a shop should be regarded as a ‘lawful acquirer’ but, on any natural meaning of the words, it seems doubtful that they can be registered as a ‘lawful user’ unless they have an effective licence. However, whatever the natural meaning of the words, the Act is an implementation of an EC measure and should be construed so as to achieve that implementation—‘lawful user’ may here be understood as ‘lawful acquirer’. These points will be returned to below in considering the ‘shrink wrap’ licence problem.

72 See above, p 60.
73 It should be noted that s 50C would require a contrary contract term. If the Directive is construed so that there is no right under Art 5(1) where there is a contrary agreement, it does not seem to require any such agreement to be contractual.
74 See below, p 128.
Back-up copies

The making of back-up copies of software is commonly regarded as sound practice. A disk can be affected, and the program corrupted, by a number of factors, such as a faulty disk drive, heat or an electro-magnetic field. Some copyright holders even put instructions in the manual that, before the software is put to any other use, it should be copied and a copy put in a safe place, to be used in the event of the other becoming corrupted. However, some copyright holders do not want any copies of this type made, perhaps for security reasons, but consideration should now be given to s 50A of the 1988 Act, which states that it is not an infringement of copyright for a ‘lawful user’75 of a copy of a computer program to make any back-up copy of it ‘which it is necessary for him to have for the purposes of his lawful use’ (s 50A(1)). This ‘right’ to make a necessary back-up copy cannot be removed by any contrary agreement. Section 50A(3) states that, where an act is permitted by the section, ‘it is irrelevant whether or not there exists any term or condition in an agreement which purports to prohibit or restrict the act’. Any such term is void under s 296A.

Section 50A is based on Art 5(2). Both are of limited scope. The right to make a back-up copy, irrespective of contrary agreement, is limited to cases where it is ‘necessary’ to make such a copy. If ‘necessary’ is strictly construed, this would be of very limited application. In most cases, a back-up copy will be highly desirable, but not strictly necessary for, in the sense of ‘essential to’, the actual use of the program. However, ‘necessary’ may be understood in its context. In a commercial context, it might be taken to mean ‘necessary’ for the commercial use of the software. It might then be found that having a readily accessible back-up copy would often be necessary for its commercial use, the business user effectively being unable to use it if it could become unavailable to him, or her, for a time, through corruption of the disc, for example. Obviously, it was this latter type of approach to necessity which was envisaged by Susan Singleton in her consideration of how a copyright holder who wished to avoid back-up copies being made might redraft his or her licenses appropriately.

75 See below.
Although many licenses do permit the making of back-up copies, in which case there is no need to amend licence provisions, some companies do not want a back-up copy [to be made] for security or other reasons. Indeed, they may make devices on the software which prevent the making of a back-up copy. How are they affected by the new law? If it is necessary for the user to make a back-up copy for his lawful use then he is allowed to do so and any condition prohibiting it is void. There are no restrictions on placing copyright protection devices on software. Those wanting to restrict copying can continue to use such devices… 

The question will be ‘what is necessary?’. Licensors should consider adding words such as the following, provided they reflect the true facts:

The licensor has available a 24 hour service for the provision of duplicate software to that licensed under this agreement in the event that the licensee requires a back-up copy, whether through total destruction of the software licensed, or its corruption. Given such availability there is no necessity for the licensee to have a right to make such copies of the software for any purpose, including without prejudice to the foregoing generality, for back-up purposes and therefore such right is prohibited in accordance with the provisions of section 50A of the Copyright, Design and Patents Act 1988.

If 24 hour facilities cannot be provided then a copy could be made available to a bank or other organisation under terms providing for release of the program when designated disaster circumstances arise.

Error correction

Error correction will normally require the use of the source code, rather than merely the object code. It will not normally be undertaken by the acquirer of software. In particular, a maintenance agreement will often be made in relation to software, coming into effect once acceptance has occurred and encompassing error correction. The question may arise as to whether the error in question amounts to a breach of the supply contract and that will depend upon the express and implied terms of that contract.

However, the point which should be focused on here is whether the acquirer can correct errors in the software and this question is affected by the EC Directive.

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76 There will be difficulties for the acquirer of software if access to the source code for necessary error correction is denied because the copyright holder becomes insolvent or otherwise ceases to function. To deal with these situations, ‘source code escrow’ is sometimes used; i.e, the source code is held by a third party, to be released to the acquirer on the happening of certain specified events, such as the copyright holder’s insolvency. There may, however, be difficulties with this under insolvency law.
and what is now s 50C of the CDPA 1988. Article 5 of the Directive includes ‘error correction’ within the acts which are not in breach of copyright when they are necessary for the intended purpose of a program77 (see above). Similarly, s 50C states that, subject to contrary agreement, the copying or adapting which is necessary for the lawful use of a program is not a breach of copyright and s 50C(2) makes it clear that ‘it may, in particular, be necessary for the lawful use of a computer program to copy or adapt it for the purpose of correcting errors in it’. Some of the difficulties in interpreting these provisions were outlined above. It should be noted that, whatever the extent of the ‘right’ conferred by the Directive, it is not the acquirer’s ‘right’ to have errors corrected; he or she can merely correct them without being in breach of copyright. In addition, it would seem that there is no obligation, in these provisions, on the seller to supply the source code, which is generally needed for error correction. The contractual obligation is normally only to supply the object code but it may provide for the supply of the source code. The Directive and the legislation would not seem to make the source code, as such, available to any greater extent to the acquirer. Under these provisions, it would seem to be a matter of acquirers merely being enabled to attempt to adapt (translate) the object code and use that for error correction, without being in breach of copyright.

In Saphena Computing Ltd v Allied Collection Agencies,78 the availability and use of source codes for error correction was considered. The case was concerned with an attempt to provide an ‘online’ computer system for a debt collecting agency. The plaintiff suppliers experienced difficulties in trying to make the software function as required. The time they spent in attempting to deal with the problems eventually led the defendant acquirers to agree to a termination of the contract and they then called in a third party to deal with the problems. The particular point which needs to be considered here is the question of whether the defendants were entitled to possession of the source code, and to use it to remedy the defects in the software. Havery QC (Off Ref) considered the question in general terms under the original supply agreement and in the more specific situation of the agreement to terminate an incomplete supply contract. In general, he thought there was no right to the source code but he was prepared to imply a term79 to give business efficacy to the termination agreement.

77 It has been argued to the contrary that, on its wording, Art 5(1) does not only encompass error correction which is necessary for the intended purpose of the program, but rather treats error correction as an intended purpose: see Sherwood-Edwards, M, ‘Seven degrees of separation: the Software Directive and UK implementation’ (1993) 9 CL & P 169.
79 See above, p 102.
[The] fact that source programs remain the property of the plaintiffs must entail two propositions: first, that once the plaintiffs have completed the supply of the software that has been agreed to be supplied, ie the object programs, they are entitled to remove the source program from the defendants computer. The only way of doing that is by deleting them. Secondly, it entails that the defendants are not entitled to copy the source programs if they do remain in their possession, since the source programs remain the property of the plaintiffs...and no licence is granted for their reproduction or adaptation.

In my judgment, this conclusion is not affected by the decision in British Leyland Motor Corp Ltd v Armstrong Patents Co Ltd [1986] AC 577. The factual basis of that case was that during its expected lifetime a car supplied by the plaintiffs and originally fit for its purpose would require, in order to continue to be fit for its purpose, to have its exhaust pipe replaced by a new one, the manufacture of which would involve the reproduction of the plaintiff’s copyright drawings. The ultimate purchaser would have no remedy against the person who supplied the car to him or against anyone else (subject, no doubt, to competition law) if he, the purchaser, could obtain no replacement exhaust pipe.

In the present case, on the other hand, once the software is fit for its purpose, it stays fit for its purpose. If by any chance a flaw is discovered showing that it is unfit for its purpose (which is hardly likely after prolonged use) there is a remedy in damages against the supplier, if solvent, until the expiry of the period of limitation. It may well nevertheless be that the effect of British Leyland is that if the software supplied by the plaintiffs to the defendants in the present case turns out to be unfit for its purpose, and the defendants at the time have access to the source code, the plaintiffs cannot restrain reproduction of the source code for the purpose of rendering the software fit for its purpose. But that does not mean either that the defendants can retain the source code against that eventuality, or that they are entitled to require the plaintiffs to supply it to them in that event.

... In the present case, I am satisfied from the evidence...that at any rate in the case of ready written programs, unlike the case of motor cars, the purchaser is not normally in a position, and therefore cannot reasonably expect, either to repair them or improve them. The factual basis for restricting what would otherwise be the plaintiff’s rights in their source code does not therefore exist.

But the position so far as completion of the software originally agreed to be supplied...is different. At the time that the relationship came to an end, the plaintiff was in the course of...removing bugs from it in order to make it fit for the purposes communicated to the plaintiff... It was not entirely fit for those purposes on [the termination date]. In my judgment, it cannot reasonably be held to have been the intention of [the defendants] and [the plaintiffs] when they determined their business relationship, that the software should remain with its bugs and though usable, not entirely fit for the purposes I have mentioned. Although [the plaintiff] was no longer to be involved, it must, in my judgment, have been implicit that he would let the
defendants have the use of the source programs which were necessary to put the software into a state where it was fit for those purposes. It was indeed accepted by counsel for the plaintiffs that the defendants were entitled to reproduce source programs for that purpose…

…the defendants would be entitled to copy the source programs to the extent necessary to complete the software…to make it reasonably fit for the purposes specified… In my judgment implied terms to that effect are necessary to give business efficacy to the agreement to bring the relationship between the parties to an end.

Of course, if the source program is available to the acquirer, s 50C(2) will now be relevant to the question of whether it can be copied in order to correct errors. The additional point to be made is that the Directive and s 50C only extend to error correction. They do not cover enhancement of software. A maintenance agreement will often cover updates.

THE ‘SHRINK WRAP’ LICENCE

Software may be acquired via the web, directly from the copyright holder. In such a situation, there is obviously no difficulty in creating a contractual licence for the acquirer of the software—all that is required is that the licence terms appear appropriately on the website for them to be incorporated. However, the more common situation is for the end user to acquire the software from a supplier who is not the copyright holder. This raises the issue of the creation of the licence, which has been termed the ‘shrink wrap’ licence problem.

The problem of the effectiveness of the shrink wrap licence can be epitomised by the purchase of software ‘off the shelf’ from a shop. The purchaser will take his or her newly acquired software home, open the box containing it and discover that it is contained in an envelope, on which it is stated that opening the envelope will constitute acceptance of the copyright holder’s licence terms, which are also included in the box. Alternatively, on starting to use the software, the acquirer may discover an on screen message stating that the software cannot be used unless there is an agreement to licence terms by ‘clicking’ on a button (if the acquirer is online, that may generate a message to the copyright holder). This is referred to as ‘click wrap’. In any event, whatever form it takes, the statement on

81 See above, p 101.
screen or on the box may well also state that, if the purchaser does not want to accept the licence terms, the software may be returned to the shop from which it was purchased for a full refund.82

There are numerous variations on the fact situation indicated above. The packaging arrangements may vary, but all raise the same type of issues. It may also be that the software is not acquired from a shop but by mail or telephone order. The software may also be downloaded from the web, from a supplier’s website, and a form of ‘click wrap’ will then be in question. Again, many of the same issues arise as under the above fact situation. Primary consideration will be given to the purchase in a shop, with comments on other situations where that is required. The basic question in each situation is whether the shrink wrap licence is effective, and there are two basic possibilities to consider.83 It might be argued to be part of the contract made between the supplier, S, and the acquirer, A, for the acquisition of the software (that is, the supply in the shop) or part of a contract formed when the envelope is opened, between A and the copyright holder, C.

Acquisition contract

In considering the acquisition of software from a shop, the first point to consider is whom the acquirer, A, contracts with. Prima facie, at that stage, there is simply a contract between the shop, S, and A. The transaction certainly looks like a simple sale of the software by S to A. On this basis, two issues need to be addressed: first, the timing of the introduction of the licence terms; and, secondly, the fact that the copyright holder, C, is a third party to the acquisition contract.

The first point to be made is simply that new terms cannot be introduced into a contract, once it has been made.84 If the licence terms are not introduced into the transaction until after the contract in the shop has been made, they cannot be part of the contract between A and S.

Contract formation is normally analysed in terms of offer and acceptance. An offer expresses a willingness to be contractually bound by certain terms,85 if the other party accepts them. An acceptance occurs when the other party agrees to the same terms.86 In a shop, the offer is normally made by the customer when the goods are taken to the till, and it is accepted by the assistant at the till.87

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82 There may be difficulties in finding that the supplier is under an obligation to the acquirer to take back the software and return the price paid—see below, p 129.
83 A third possibility, combining elements of the two considered, was arrived at in the Scottish court in Beta Computers (Europe) Ltd v Adobe Systems (Europe) Ltd [1996] FSR 371.
84 Olley v Marlborough Court Hotel [1949] 1 KB 532; Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking [1971] 2 QB 163.
85 See, eg, Gibson v Manchester CC [1979] 1 WLR 294.
86 Jones v Daniel [1894] 2 Ch 332.
existence of licence terms does not become apparent until after the box has been
opened, and that does not take place before offer and acceptance have occurred,
obviously, they have been introduced too late, after the contract was made, and
cannot be part of it. This was recognised in the Scottish case of Beta Computers
(Europe) Ltd v Adobe Systems (Europe) Ltd. The same point can also be made in
relation to the mail order, or telephone order, of software. In those cases, the
contract will normally be made when the acquirer’s order (the offer) is accepted
by despatch of the goods (in the case of mail order) or by express acceptance on
the telephone, in the case of a telephone order. If not even the existence of
the licence was indicated prior to A’s opening of the box, it cannot form part of the
contract terms and a similar point can be made in relation to web-based order
and delivery.

The situation also has to be considered in which the licence terms are referred
to on the outside of the box (or on the website, when that is where the software
is acquired). Clauses may be incorporated into contracts from unsigned
documents on the basis of reasonably sufficient notice. It should also be noted
that incorporation by reference is possible, that is, the document providing notice
does not have to contain the terms but can merely refer to where they can be
found. The test is objective and whether incorporation by notice occurs is
basically a question of fact in each case, dependent upon such matters as the
legibility and prominence of the relevant writing. One factor which has been
seen as relevant to the test generally is whether the place where the notice is to
be found is the type of place in which the reasonable person would expect to

88 [1996] FSR 371; see below, p 128.
89 This fact seems to have been emphasised by the US court in ProCD v Zeidenberg No 96–1139 (US
Ct App 7th Cir) 20 June 1996. See below, p 130.
90 Parker v South Eastern Rly Co (1877) 2 CPD 416. The ‘red hand rule’ has been added to this, so
that the more unreasonable or unusual a clause, the greater the degree of notice required to
provide reasonably sufficient notice—Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking [1971] 1 QB 163; Interfoto
Picture Library v Stiletto Visual Programmes [1988] 1 All ER 348. (The name of the rule stems
from a famous dictum of Denning LJ, as he then was, in Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] 1 WLR 461.
He said (p 461): ‘The more unreasonable a clause is, the greater the notice which must be
given of it. Some clauses which I have seen would need to be printed in red ink on the face of
the document with a red hand pointing to [them] before the notice could be held to be
sufficient.’) On incorporation by notice generally, see op cit, Koffman and Macdonald, fn 6,
91 Thompson v LM & S Rly [1930] 1 KB 41. It would seem that a copy of the terms should be
accessible before A contracts.
92 In ibid, Thompson, it was indicated that it was irrelevant that the passenger in question was
illiterate. The reasonable person was to be presumed to be able to read English. The situation
would be otherwise where the party seeking to incorporate the terms knew, or should, as a
reasonable person, have known that the other party, or the group to which he or she belongs,
was in some way less able to read or understand the notice (Richardson, Spence & Co v Rowntree
93 But note the ‘red hand rule’ (above, fn 90).
find a contractual term. One reason why the clause on the deck chair ticket in Chapelton v Barry UDC\textsuperscript{95} did not provide reasonably sufficient notice of an exemption clause was that the ticket was seen as something which the reasonable person would view merely as a method of proving that the deck chair hire charge had been paid, rather than as a document containing contract terms. One question is whether people normally expect to find contract terms referred to on the back of a box containing software. The size and position of any such notice on the box would also be relevant and it would, for example, be ineffective if the shop had stuck a price tag, or some other label, over it.\textsuperscript{96} It should be easier for such incorporation to take place as acquirers, in general, begin to assume that the acquisition of software will involve licence terms.\textsuperscript{97}

However, if the licence is incorporated into the contract between S and A, the fact that C is a third party to that agreement must now be considered. Traditionally, the response in English law would have been that incorporation of the licence into the contract between A and S could not assist C. Traditionally, the doctrine of privity of contract would not have allowed a third party, C, to enforce contract terms, even if they were for the third party’s benefit. However, privity has now been considerably modified by the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. Basically, a third party may now enforce a term of the contract if either (a) ‘the contract expressly provides that he may’, or (b) ‘the term purports to confer a benefit on him’ and it does not appear that the parties did not intend the term to be enforceable by the third party.\textsuperscript{98} The overall effect of this would seem to be that if the licence terms are appropriately drafted (and they are drafted by C), then A will indirectly acquire a licence to use the software (through a chain from C, via S, to A) and C will have a right to enforce the licence terms, which can be regarded as providing him or her with a benefit. (The benefit of the protection of an exemption clause is expressly recognised as falling within the 1999 Act.)\textsuperscript{99} An analogy might be made with the Scottish case of Beta v Adobe,\textsuperscript{100} where, under Scottish law, the court did not have to contend with the privity rule and a third party could gain the benefit of a contract under the doctrine of \textit{ius quaesitum tertio}.

\textsuperscript{95} [1940] 1 KB 532.
\textsuperscript{96} Sugar v LM & S Rly [1941] 1 All ER 172.
\textsuperscript{97} Alexander v Rly Executive [1951] 2 KB 882, p 886.
\textsuperscript{98} Section 1.
\textsuperscript{99} Section 1(6).
\textsuperscript{100} [1996] FSR 371.
Opening the envelope

The second possibility to consider is that of a second contract, separate from the acquisition contract, made when A opens the packet or clicks on the button on screen. The argument would be that the offer is made by C and A accepts by performing the stated act of opening the envelope. Acceptance of an offer normally requires communication, and communication may occur in the click wrap situation if the acquirer is online, but it is possible to have acceptance by conduct. However, that conduct would have to be unequivocal and another explanation of the opening of the envelope may be possible. It could be argued that A may not be responding to C’s offer of a licence, but, rather, that he or she is exercising a right already acquired. The contention would be that, at the time that the software was acquired from S, A also acquired certain basic rights to use it. Such rights might stem from the legislation implementing the EC Directive on the Protection of Computer Programs, from a common law licence, or from terms implied into the contract between S and A.

As was indicated above, Art 5(1) of the EC Directive on the Protection of Computer Programs provides the ‘lawful acquirer’ of software with a right to, *inter alia*, copy it, where such copying is necessary for its use ‘in accordance with its intended purpose’. The reference to ‘lawful acquirer’ might well be seen as encompassing the person who buys software in a shop and as providing him, or her, with a right, which would explain the opening of the software packet as something other than an acceptance of the licence. However, as has already been indicated, what is now s 50C of the CDPA 1988, the provision intended as an implementation of Art 5(1), does not refer to the ‘lawful acquirer’ of software but, rather, to its ‘lawful user’, and also refers to ‘lawful use’ rather than ‘intended purpose’. It seems doubtful whether, without using an implied term (considered below) or some such device, the acquirer of the software in the shop can be seen as a ‘lawful user’ unless the licence is effective. Certainly, that would seem to be the case on any natural construction of ‘lawful user’, but the point should be made that something other than a natural construction of the section may be required, if it is to be seen as a proper implementation of the Directive. In addition, as it stands, any natural interpretation of the reference to ‘lawful user’ in s 50C is open to the criticism of circularity.

Another possible explanation for the opening of the envelope is that the common law provides a ‘limited licence’ for the acquirer of software so that the acquisition is not rendered pointless. An analogy with patent law might lead to such a conclusion. The point must be made, however, that it is, in any event,

101 *Brogden v Metropolitan Rly Co* (1877) 2 App Cas 666.
102 ‘Lawful user’ is defined in s 50A(2). For criticism of the phrase see *op cit*, Sherwood-Edwards, fn 77.
now unclear to what extent this analogy is still possible in the face of Art 5(1) of
the EC Directive. That Article provides for the basic use of software in the absence
of contractual provision. Certainly, it would seem that a non-contractual104
implied licence should not provide a means to reduce an acquirer’s rights below
the level provided for by Art 5, and the impetus for non-contractual rights to be
implied may not survive the Directive at all.

The final possibility to be considered here is that the opening of the software
envelope was based not on acceptance of the licence, but on a right to use the
software derived from an implied term in the contract under which the software
was acquired (that is, the contract made in the shop with S, in our primary
example). Certainly, in Saphena Computing Ltd v Allied Collection Agencies Ltd.105
where software was supplied to the defendants for the purposes of their
business as a debt collecting agency, the court regarded it as ‘perfectly clear’ that
there had to be an implied term ‘that the defendants should have a copyright
licence to enable them to use the software for that purpose’.106 Courts may well
be reluctant to find that a supply of software is quite pointless because the
acquirer has no right to use the software. They may be willing to imply a term in
law giving a basic right to use the software on the basis that such a term is
necessary in that type107 of contract.108 Of course, there are difficulties with the
idea of an implied term, conferring rights to do what would otherwise be a
breach of copyright, if the contract is not between the acquirer and the copyright
holder. A chain of implied terms might be suggested, although such a chain
would be vulnerable to the insertion of an express contrary term in the first
contractual link between the copyright holder and the person to whom he or
she supplies.109

Obviously, there are considerable hurdles in the way of finding that there
were two effective contracts—the supply contract and the licence. It should also
be noted that the two contract analysis was considered, and rejected, by the
Scottish court in Beta v Adobe110 because of the difficulties which might ensue. If
the situation was construed as one which could give rise to two distinct
contracts, with S, the supplier, not being a party to any second licence or

104 But note that s 50C, ‘implementing Article 5(1)’, merely refers to contrary agreement, without
specifying that it must be contractual.
106 Havery QC (Off Ref), p 637.
107 The argument here would seem to apply whether the transaction is a sale of the disk or merely
a hiring of it (as may sometimes be argued to be the case)—in either situation, its acquisition is
completely undermined if it cannot be used.
108 See above, p 102.
109 Even a term which would otherwise be implied in law will not be implied in the face of an
express contrary term, although sometimes the express contrary term might be rendered
ineffective, and the implication therefore allowed, under UCTA 1977 (Johnstone v Bloomsbury
HA [1991] 2 All ER 293). See, also, UCTA 1977, s 3; op cit, Macdonald, fn 36.
contract, Lord Penrose was concerned that A, the acquirer, might not be able to recover the purchase price of the software, or refuse to pay it, if A did not wish to accept the licence terms. Any statement on the packaging that A can recover the purchase price if the licence is unacceptable will not be contractually enforceable by A, against S, unless it has been properly incorporated into the contract between A and S. However, A might be able to claim that S’s supply was in breach of contract. It might be argued that the supply of software which, without further agreement with C, could not be used without infringing C’s copyright would be in breach of the term implied by the s 12 of the SGA 1979, that the seller has a right to sell the goods. In Niblett Ltd v Confectioner’s Materials Co Ltd, a breach of that implied term was found when the sellers supplied tins of condensed milk which were labelled in such a way as to infringe a third party’s trademark.

The problem considered by Lord Penrose, outlined above, obviously arises if the view is taken that A cannot use the software without accepting the licence terms. However, Lord Penrose’s other concern with the two contract analysis was in relation to the possibility that C’s attempt to create a licence with A would be ineffective but A would nevertheless be able to use the software. He was concerned that S might be liable to C, through a breach of the contract under which C supplied the software to S, and, more significantly, that the position of C, as the copyright owner, would be undermined.

Pragmatism

The desire of the Scottish court in Beta v Adobe not to undermine the position of the holder of the copyright was noted above, and it is also worth noting Lord Penrose’s statement that:

There is little doubt, in my mind, that the interests of the industry as a whole in the efficient and sensible management of transactions requires that effect should be given to the [licence] conditions if possible.

There may be an impetus to find shrink wrap licenses to be effective because that result is viewed as being of practical benefit. Something of this approach

111 See above, p 124.
112 A restitutitory claim might also be made, but it would prove problematic to argue that a total failure of consideration had occurred when A had, technically, received title to the disk—see the approach taken in Rowland Divall [1923] 2 KB 500.
113 If the contract is not one for the sale of goods, then it can be argued that an analogous term has been breached; see below, p 218.
114 [1921] 3 KB 387.
115 See below.
117 But see op cit, Smith, fn 103.
is also to be found in the US case of ProCD Inc v Mathew Zeidenberg and Silken Mountain Web Services Inc.\(118\) In that case, unlike the earlier Step Saver case,\(119\) the licence was held to be effective against a background of the court’s view of the benefits of such a conclusion.

In ProCD v Zeidenberg, ProCD used different licence terms to differentiate between consumer and commercial purchases of its database. The consumer was charged $150 for the purchase, which was much less than the commercial buyer, but was also authorised to do much less with the database than the commercial buyer. The court took that the view that it was beneficial to both consumers and commercial buyers that ProCD should take such an approach, which was obviously dependent on the effectiveness of the licence terms.

It should be noted that a statutory means of ensuring the validity of these licenses has now been decided upon in the US and is contained in the Uniform Computer Transactions Act. That is, however, a uniform code, requiring adoption by a State to give it force.

**Damages**\(120\)

A software ‘bug’ can cause considerable losses to a business when its impact is felt. The potential scope of the losses which a bug can cause are graphically illustrated by what occurred when one affected AT & T’s long distance telephone network. Within 10 minutes, 50% of calls were failing to get through and a day’s telephone traffic was lost before software ‘patches’ could be installed to avoid the bug. The direct cost of the day’s lost traffic to AT & T was between $60 and $75 million and, obviously, losses would also have been made by AT & T’s customers. Additionally, there were long term effects on AT & T through loss of confidence. It had been a company whose advertising had concentrated on its reliability to justify its pricing being higher than that of its competitors.\(121\)

Of course, the potential for losses caused by defective software will vary from business to business and the extent to which the business is dependent on the software, as well as the specific defect. It will also depend on the type of contract. The point has already been made as to the difficulties involved in drafting and performing a software development contract, for example.\(122\)

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120 See, generally, op cit, Koffman and Macdonald, fn 6, Chapter 21.
122 See above, p 102.
However, the damages recovered under contract law for any loss, no matter how large or small, depend upon the same basic rules. The basic principle on which an award of contractual damages is made is that damages should place the injured party in the position he or she would have been in had the contract been properly performed,\textsuperscript{123} that is, the position he or she would have been in had there been no breach. This means that, when a contract is breached, the injured party can recover for the profits he or she would have made had the contract been performed. In other words, in contract, the injured party can recover his or her expectation loss. It is, of course, possible for an injured party merely to claim expenditure wasted because of the breach.\textsuperscript{124} That party will not, however, be able to evade the basic principle by so doing. He or she will not recover any expenditure which the party in breach can establish would have been lost even if the contract been performed.\textsuperscript{125} Claiming for wasted expenditure does not allow the injured party to recover more than he or she would have obtained had the contract been performed, that is, an award of damages does not relieve the injured party from the consequences of having made a bad bargain.

There are certain limitations on awards of damages made under the above basic principle. For example, the injured party will not recover for a loss which is too remote. This means that he or she will not recover for a loss which, at the time the contract was made, was not within the reasonable contemplation of the parties as liable to result from the breach.\textsuperscript{126} This rule prevented recovery of some of the losses claimed in \textit{Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd v Newman Industries Coulson & Co Ltd}.\textsuperscript{127} The case was concerned with the late delivery of a boiler to a laundry at a time when there was a shortage of laundry facilities. The laundry could recover for the loss of ordinary laundry business which it could have undertaken had it had the boiler on time, but it could not recover for the loss of an unusually profitable dyeing contract which it would have undertaken had the boiler not been delivered late. The second loss was too remote to be encompassed within the damages awarded.

An award of damages may also be circumscribed by the duty to mitigate. This so called duty means that the injured party will not be able to recover for any loss which he or she could have avoided by behaving reasonably after the breach.\textsuperscript{128} In \textit{Salvage Association v CAP Financial Services Ltd},\textsuperscript{129} the question arose as to the damages recoverable when a system development contract had been

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{123} Robinson \textit{v} Harman (1880) 5 App Cas 25, p 35, \textit{per} Parke B.
\textsuperscript{124} Anglia TV \textit{v} Reed [1971] 3 All ER 690.
\textsuperscript{125} CCC Films (London) Ltd \textit{v} Impact Quadrant Films Ltd [1984] 3 All ER 298; C \& P Haulage \textit{v} Middleton [1983] 3 All ER 94.
\textsuperscript{126} Hadley \textit{v} Baxendale (1854) 9 Ex 341; Koufos \textit{v} Czarnikow Ltd [1969] 1 AC 350; Parsons (H) (Livestock) \textit{v} Uttley Ingham & Co Ltd [1978] 1 All ER 525.
\textsuperscript{127} [1949] 2 KB 528.
\end{flushleft}
terminated by SA because of CAP’s inability to successfully complete the system. It would seem to have been with the duty to mitigate in mind that the judge commented that:  

I am satisfied that SA’s decision to abandon the CAP system altogether and start afresh was entirely reasonable... CAP was not able to complete the system satisfactorily and there was no point in getting another software house to redesign and rebuild a discredited system. It was much more sensible to start afresh. The upshot was that the project to computerise SA’s head office accounting with a system designed and developed by CAP had failed and SA’s expenditure on that system had been wasted.

The injured party, SA, was able to recover all the money it had expended on the CAP system. Had it been found that the reasonable course was not to abandon the CAP system entirely but to contract with another company for its completion, then the duty to mitigate would mean that SA’s recovery would not have encompassed any expenditure on the CAP system which would not have been wasted had that system been salvaged.

**EXEMPTION CLAUSES**

Exemption clauses are basically clauses which exclude or restrict, or appear to exclude or restrict liability for breach of contract or other liability arising through tort, bailment or statute. They may be aimed at totally excluding liability (‘exclusion clauses’) or merely restricting or limiting it (‘limitation clauses’) by, for example, limiting the sum recoverable in damages.

To be effective in relation to contractual liability, an exemption clause must have been incorporated into the contract, it must be appropriately worded to cover the breach which occurred and it must not be rendered ineffective by legislation—basically, either UCTA 1977 or the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (SI 1999/2083). The question of incorporation of clauses into contracts has already been looked at. Brief consideration should be given to the construction of the contract (that is, interpreting it, or, more

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131 Obviously, in those circumstances, the cost of salvaging the system would have been recoverable—this is the other side of the duty to mitigate.
132 See *op cit*, Koffman and Macdonald, fn 6, Chapters 9, 10.
133 See above, pp 101, 125.
specifically, asking if the clause is appropriately worded to cover the breach), and the legislation must be looked at.

CONSTRUCTION

A strict approach is taken to the interpretation of exemption clauses and the *contra proferentem* rule is applied, which means that, if there is any ambiguity in the clause, it will be construed in the way which is least favourable to the party seeking to rely upon it. This can be illustrated by *Houghton v Trafalgar Insurance Co*.  

Houghton (H) had insured his car with T. H had an accident and tried to claim on his insurance policy for the damage to his car. The policy excluded liability where 'loss, damage, and/or liability caused or arising whilst any car is involved in racing, pace making...or is conveying any load in excess of that for which it was constructed'. When the accident occurred, there were six people in the car, instead of the five which it was designed to carry. The extra person had been sitting on the lap of one of the rear seat passengers. The insurers contended that they were not liable because of the exclusion dealing with conveyance of an excess 'load'. The Court of Appeal held that the insurers were liable. Whilst the first part of the exclusion clearly could relate to passenger vehicles, they interpreted the reference to a 'load' as relating to the situation where a vehicle, such as a lorry or van, has a specified 'load weight'. The clause was not regarded as sufficiently clear and unambiguous to remove the insurance company's liability for the accident to H's ordinary private car.  

One particular aspect of the *contra proferentem* rule occurs in relation to liability for negligence (for example, a negligent breach or negligence in tort). If a clause expressly refers to liability for negligence, obviously, it will cover that liability. The difficulties arise where there is no express reference to negligence as such, but a widely worded general clause is used, which it is argued encompasses liability for negligence (for example, a clause referring to 'any liability'). In these circumstances, the courts have taken an approach which means that the clause is more likely to be construed as covering liability for negligence if there is no other liability for it to cover and less likely to be construed as covering negligence if there is other, strict liability for it to cover. The idea would seem to be that it is unlikely that the injured party would have accepted a clause covering the other party’s liability in the event of negligence and, if there is

137 Eg, *Alderslade v Hendon Laundry Ltd* [1945] 1 KB 189.
138 *White v John Warwick & Co Ltd* [1953] 2 All ER 1021.
other liability, the clause can be assigned a purpose without the need for it to be understood as covering negligence.

Prior to the enactment of UCTA 1977, the courts were apt to take an extreme approach to construction to prevent exemption clauses from being effective. In *Hollier v Rambler Motors Ltd*[^139^] for example, they construed a clause as not covering liability based on negligence when there could be no breach in the absence of negligence—leaving the clause with no real role in the contract. Since the advent of the 1977 Act, it has been said that ‘strained construction’ should not be used.[^140^] It has also been indicated that the rules of construction should not be applied in ‘their full rigour’ to limitation clauses (in contrast with exclusion clauses).[^141^] However, this distinction does not seem justifiable in the extensive form envisaged. As the High Court of Australia said, in refusing to adopt the distinction, ‘a limitation clause may be so severe in its operation as to be virtually indistinguishable from that of an exclusion clause’.^[142^]

**UNFAIR CONTRACT TERMS ACT 1977**

**PART I**

1 **Scope of Part 1**

(1) For the purposes of this Part of this Act, ‘negligence’ means the breach—

(a) of any obligation, arising from the express or implied terms of a contract, to take reasonable care or exercise reasonable skill in the performance of the contract;

(b) of any common law duty to take reasonable care or exercise reasonable skill (but not any stricter duty);

(c) of the common duty of care imposed by the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 or the Occupiers’ Liability Act (Northern Ireland) 1957.

(2) This Part of the Act is subject to Part III; and in relation to contracts, the operation of sections 2 to 4 and 7 is subject to the exceptions made by Schedule 1.

(3) In the case of both contract and tort, sections 2 to 7 apply (except where the contrary is stated in section 6(4)) only to business liability, that is liability to breach of obligations or duties arising—

(a) from things done or to be done by a person in the course of a business (whether his own business or another’s); or


[^141^]: *Ailsa Craig Fishing Co Ltd v Malvern Fishing Co Ltd* [1983] 1 WLR 964; *ibid*, Finney Lock Seeds.

[^142^]: *Darlington Futures Ltd v Delco Australia Pty* (1986) 68 ALR 385, p 391.
(b) from the occupation of premises used for business purposes of the occupier; and references to liability are to be read accordingly but liability of an occupier of premises for breach of an obligation or duty towards a person obtaining access to the premises for recreational or educational purposes, being liability for loss or damage suffered by reason of the dangerous state of the premises, is not a business liability of the occupier unless granting that person such access for the purposes concerned falls within the business purposes of the occupier.

(4) In relation to any breach of duty or obligation, it is immaterial for any purpose of this Part of this Act whether the breach was inadvertent or intentional, or whether liability for it arises directly or vicariously.

2 Negligence liability

(1) A person cannot by reference to any contract term or to a notice given to persons generally or to particular persons exclude or restrict his liability for death or personal injury resulting from negligence.

(2) In the case of other loss or damage, a person cannot so exclude or restrict his liability for negligence except in so far as the term or notice satisfies the requirement of reasonableness.

(3) Where a contract term or notice purports to exclude or restrict liability for negligence a person’s agreement to or awareness of it is not of itself to be taken as indicating his voluntary acceptance of any risk.

3 Liability arising in contract

(1) This section applies as between contracting parties where one of them deals as consumer or on the other’s written standard terms of business.

(2) As against that party, the other cannot by reference to any contract term—

(a) when himself in breach of contract, exclude or restrict any liability of his in respect of the breach; or

(b) claim to be entitled—

(i) to render a contractual performance substantially different from that which was reasonably expected of him, or

(ii) in respect of the whole or any part of his contractual obligation, to render no performance at all,

except in so far as (in any of the cases mentioned above in this subsection) the contract term satisfies the requirement of reasonableness.

4 Unreasonable indemnity clauses

(1) A person dealing as consumer cannot by reference to any contract term be made to indemnify another person (whether a party to the contract or not) in respect of liability that may be incurred by the other for negligence or breach of contract, except in so far as the contract term satisfies the requirement of reasonableness.
(2) This section applies whether the liability in question—
   (a) is directly that of the person to be indemnified or is incurred by him vicariously;
   (b) is to the person dealing as consumer or to someone else.

5 ‘Guarantee’ of consumer goods

(1) In the case of goods of a type ordinarily supplied for private use or consumption, where loss or damage—
   (a) arises from the goods proving defective while in consumer use; and
   (b) results from the negligence of a person concerned in the manufacture or distribution of the goods,
   liability for the loss or damage cannot be excluded or restricted by reference to any contract term or notice contained in or operating by reference to a guarantee of the goods.

(2) For these purposes—
   (a) goods are to be regarded as ‘in consumer use’ when a person is using them, or has them in his possession for use, otherwise than exclusively for the purposes of a business; and
   (b) anything in writing is a guarantee if it contains or purports to contain some promise or assurance (however worded or presented) that defects will be made good by complete or partial replacement, or by repair, monetary compensation or otherwise.

(3) This section does not apply as between the parties to a contract under or in pursuance of which possession or ownership of the goods passed.

6 Sale and hire-purchase

(1) Liability for breach of the obligations arising from—
   (a) section 12 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (seller’s implied undertakings as to title etc);
   (b) section 8 of the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973 (the corresponding thing in relation to hire-purchase),
   cannot be excluded or restricted by reference to any contract term.

(2) As against a person dealing as consumer, liability for breach of the obligations arising from—
   (a) sections 13, 14 or 15 of the 1979 Act (seller’s implied undertakings as to conformity of goods with description or sample, or as to their quality or fitness for a particular purpose);
   (b) sections 9, 10 or 11 of the 1973 Act (the corresponding things in relation to hire-purchase),
   cannot be excluded or restricted by reference to any contract term.

(3) As against a person dealing otherwise than as consumer, the liability specified in subsection (2) above can be excluded or restricted by reference to a contract term, but only in so far as the term satisfies the requirement of reasonableness.
(4) The liabilities referred to in this section are not only the business liabilities defined by section 1(3), but include those arising under any contract of sale of goods or hire-purchase agreement.

7 Miscellaneous contracts under which goods pass

(1) Where the possession or ownership of goods passes under or in pursuance of a contract not governed by the law of sale of goods or hire-purchase, subsections (2) to (4) below apply as regards the effect (if any) to be given to contract terms excluding or restricting liability for breach of obligation arising by implication of law from the nature of the contract.

(2) As against a person dealing as consumer, liability in respect of the goods’ correspondence with description or sample, or their quality or fitness for any particular purpose, cannot be excluded or restricted by reference to any such term.

(3) As against a person dealing otherwise than as consumer, that liability can be excluded or restricted by reference to such a term, but only in so far as the term satisfies the requirement of reasonableness.

(3A) Liability for breach of the obligations arising under section 2 of the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 (implied terms about title etc in certain contracts for the transfer of the property in goods) cannot be excluded or restricted by reference to any such term.

(4) Liability in respect of—

(a) the right to transfer ownership of the goods, or give possession; or

(b) the assurance of quiet possession to a person taking goods in pursuance of the contract,

cannot (in a case to which subsection (3A) above does not apply) be excluded or restricted by reference to any such term except in so far as the term satisfies the requirement of reasonableness.

(5) This section does not apply in the case of goods passing on a redemption of trading stamps within the Trading Stamps Act 1964 or the Trading Stamps Act (Northern Ireland) 1965.

9 Effect of breach

(1) Where for reliance upon it a contract term has to satisfy the requirement of reasonableness, it may be found to do so and be given effect accordingly notwithstanding that the contract has been terminated either by breach or by a party electing to treat it as repudiated.

(2) Where on a breach the contract is nevertheless affirmed by a party entitled to treat it as repudiated, this does not of itself exclude the requirement of reasonableness in relation to any contract term.

10 Evasion by means of secondary contract

A person is not bound by any contract term prejudicing or taking away rights of his which arise under, or in connection with the performance of, another contract, so far as those rights extend to the enforcement of another’s liability which this Part of this Act prevents that other from excluding or restricting.
11 The ‘reasonableness’ test

(1) In relation to a contract term, the requirement of reasonableness for the purposes of this Part of this Act, section 3 of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 and section 3 of the Misrepresentation Act (Northern Ireland) 1967 is that the term shall have been a fair and reasonable one to be included having regard to the circumstances which were, or ought reasonably to have been, known to or in the contemplation of the parties when the contract was made.

(2) In determining for the purposes of section 6 or 7 above whether a contract term satisfies the requirement of reasonableness, regard shall be had in particular to the matters specified in Schedule 2 to this Act; but this subsection does not prevent the court or arbitrator from holding, in accordance with any rule of law, that a term which purports to exclude or restrict any relevant liability is not a term of the contract.

(3) In relation to a notice (not being a notice having contractual effect), the requirement of reasonableness under this Act is that it should be fair and reasonable to allow reliance on it, having regard to all the circumstances obtaining when the liability arose or (but for the notice) would have arisen.

(4) Where by reference to a contract term or notice a person seeks to restrict liability to a specified sum of money, and the question arises (under this or any other Act) whether the term or notice satisfies the requirement of reasonableness, regard shall be had in particular (but without prejudice to subsection (2) above in the case of contract terms) to—

(a) the resources which he could expect to be available to him for the purpose of meeting the liability should it arise; and

(b) how far it was open to him to cover himself by insurance.

(5) It is for those claiming that a contract term or notice satisfies the requirement of reasonableness to show that it does.

12 ‘Dealing as consumer’

(1) A party to a contract ‘deals as consumer’ in relation to another party if—

(a) he neither makes the contract in the course of a business nor holds himself out as doing so; and

(b) the other party does make the contract in the course of a business; and

(c) in the case of a contract governed by the law of sale of goods or hire-purchase, or by section 7 of this Act, the goods passing under or in pursuance of the contract are of a type ordinarily supplied for private use or consumption.

(2) But on a sale by auction or by competitive tender the buyer is not in any circumstances to be regarded as dealing as consumer.

(3) Subject to this, it is for those claiming that a party does not deal as consumer to show that he does not.
13 Varieties of exemption clause

(1) To the extent that this Part of this Act prevents the exclusion or restriction of any liability it also prevents—

(a) making the liability or its enforcement subject to restrictive or onerous conditions;
(b) excluding or restricting any right or remedy in respect of the liability, or subjecting a person to any prejudice in consequence of his pursuing any such right or remedy;
(c) excluding or restricting rules of evidence or procedure; and (to that extent) sections 2 and 5 to 7 also prevent excluding or restricting liability by reference to terms and notices which exclude or restrict the relevant obligation or duty.

(2) But an agreement in writing to submit present or future differences to arbitration is not to be treated under this Part of this Act as excluding or restricting any liability.

14 Interpretation of Part I

In this Part of the Act—

‘business’ includes a profession and the activities of any government department or local or public authority;
‘goods’ has the same meaning as in the Sales of Goods Act 1979;
‘hire-purchase agreement’ has the same meaning as in the Consumer Credit Act 1974;
‘negligence’ has the meaning given by section 1(1);
‘notice’ includes an announcement, whether or not in writing, and any other communication or pretended communication; and
‘personal injury’ includes any disease and any impairment of physical or mental condition.

PART II

[Deals with Scotland]

PART III

26 International supply contracts

(1) The limits imposed by this Act on the extent to which a person may exclude or restrict liability by reference to a contract term do not apply to liability arising under such a contract as is described in subsection (3) below.

(2) The terms of such a contract are not subject to any requirement of reasonableness under section 3 or 4: and nothing in Part II of this Act should require the incorporation of the terms of such a contract to be fair and reasonable for them to have effect.

(3) Subject to subsection (4), that description of contract is one whose characteristics are the following—
(a) either it is a contract of sale of goods or it is one under or in pursuance of which the possession or ownership of goods passes; and
(b) it is made by parties whose places of business (or, if they have none, habitual residences) are in the territories of different States (the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man being treated for this purpose as different States from the United Kingdom).

(4) A contract falls within subsection (3) above only if either—

(a) the goods in question are, at the time of the conclusion of the contract, in the course of carriage, or will be carried, from the territory of one State to the territory of another; or
(b) the acts constituting the offer and acceptance have been done in the territories of different States; or
(c) the contract provides for the goods to be delivered to the territory of a state other than that within whose territory those acts were done.

27 Choice of law clauses

(1) Where the law applicable to a contract is the law of any part of the United Kingdom only by choice of the parties (and apart from that choice would be the law of some country outside the United Kingdom) sections 2 to 7 and 16 to 21 of this Act do not operate as part of the law applicable to the contract.

(2) This Act has effect notwithstanding any contract term which applies or purports to apply the law of some country outside the United Kingdom, where (either or both)—

(a) the term appears to the court, or arbitrator or arbiter to have been imposed wholly or mainly for the purpose of enabling the party imposing it to evade the operation of this Act; or
(b) in the making of the contract one of the parties dealt as consumer, and he was then habitually resident in the United Kingdom, and the essential steps necessary for the making of the contract were taken there, whether by him or by others on his behalf.

SCHEDULE 1

SCOPE OF SECTIONS 2 TO 4 AND 7

1 Sections 2 to 4 of this Act do not extend to—

(a) any contract of insurance (including a contract to pay an annuity on human life);
(b) any contract so far as it relates to the creation or transfer of an interest in land, or to the termination of such an interest, whether by extinction, merger, surrender, forfeiture or otherwise;
(c) any contract so far as it relates to the creation or transfer of a right or interest in any patent, trade mark, copyright, registered design, technical or commercial information or other intellectual property, or relates to the termination of any such right or interest;
(d) any contract so far as it relates—
   (i) to the formation or dissolution of a company (which means any body corporate or unincorporated association and includes a partnership); or
   (ii) to its constitution or the rights or obligations of its corporators or members;
(e) any contract so far as it relates to the creation or transfer of securities or of any right or interest in securities.

2 Section 2(1) extends to—
   (a) any contract of marine salvage or towage;
   (b) any charter-party of a ship or hovercraft; and
   (c) any contract for the carriage of goods by ship or hovercraft; but subject to this sections 2 to 4 and 7 do not extend to any such contract except in favour of a person dealing as consumer.

3 Where goods are carried by ship or hovercraft in pursuance of a contract which either—
   (a) specifies that as the means of carriage over part of the journey to be covered; or
   (b) makes no provision as to the means of carriage and does not exclude that means, then sections 2(2), 3 and 4 do not, except in favour of a person dealing as consumer, extend to the contract as it operates for and in relation to the carriage of the goods by that means.

4 Section 2(1) and (2) do not extend to a contract of employment, except in favour of the employee.

5 Section 2(1) does not affect the validity of any discharge and indemnity given by a person, on or in connection with an award to him of compensation for pneumoconiosis attributable to employment in the coal industry, in respect of any further claim arising from his contracting the disease.

SCHEDULE 2

‘GUIDELINES’ FOR APPLICATION OF REASONABLENESS TEST

The matters to which regard is to be had in particular for the purposes of sections 6(3), 7(3) and (4)…are any of the following which appear to be relevant—

(a) the strength of the bargaining positions of the parties relative to each other, taking into account (among other things) alternative means by which the customer’s requirements could have been met;
(b) whether the customer received an inducement to agree to the term, or in accepting it had an opportunity of entering into a similar contract with other persons, but without having to accept a similar term;
(c) whether the customer knew or ought reasonably to have known of the existence and extent of the term (having regard, among other things, to any custom of the trade and any previous course of dealing between the parties);
(d) where the term excludes or restricts any relevant liability if some condition is not complied with, whether it was reasonable at the time of the contract to expect that compliance with that condition would be practicable;
(e) whether the goods were manufactured, processed or adapted to the special order of the customer.

Scope of the Act

Despite its name, UCTA 1977 does not deal with ‘unfair terms’ as such. For the most part, the Act applies to clauses which ‘exclude or restrict liability’. It can, basically, be said that the Act applies to ‘exemption clauses’. Of course, it does not apply to all exemption clauses, and the scope of the Act should be considered.

Basically, the Act applies to ‘business liability’ (s 1). However, certain contracts are excluded from its operation in whole, or in part (Sched 1). The important exclusion to consider here is that to be found in para 1(c) of Sched 1, which removes from the scope of ss 2 to 4 of the Act contracts insofar as they relate to the creation, transfer or termination of intellectual property rights. The scope of this ouster from the operation of the Act was considered in The Salvage Association v CAP Financial Services Ltd.

The Salvage Association v CAP Financial Services Ltd
[1995] FSR 654

Judge Thayne Forbes (Off Ref) The use of the words ‘…any contract so far as it relates to…’ in subparagraph (c) shows clearly that the subparagraph is strictly limited in its application and that it does not necessarily extend to all the terms of a relevant contract. That is to be contrasted with the wording of paragraph 1(a) of Schedule 1 of the 1977 Act which provides that sections 2 to 4 do not extend to ‘any contract of insurance…’ ie the entire contract of insurance is excepted from the operations of sections 2 to 4, not just certain provisions of the contract: see Micklefield v S A C Technology Ltd [1990] 1 WLR 1002 at p 1008.

I agree with Mr Blunt’s submission that paragraph 1(c) applies only to those provisions of a contract which deal with the creation or transfer of a right or interest in the relevant intellectual property. It does not extend generally to all the terms of a contract simply because the contract is concerned overall with the provision of a service, performance of which will result in a product.

143 There is provision in it, most notably in ss 3(2)(b) and 13, to prevent it from being evaded by the redrafting of clauses to avoid its scope by avoiding the use of clauses in the form of exclusions or restrictions of liability.
144 The facts are given above, p 121.
to which the law affords the protection of one or more of the specified intellectual property rights. The individual terms of the contract in question have to be considered. Any term which is concerned with the creation or transfer of a right or interest in the intellectual property which attaches to the product will form part of the contract to which paragraph 1(c) applies... On the other hand if a term is one which is concerned with aspects of the contract between the parties other than the creation or transfer of rights in the intellectual property attaching to the product, then paragraph 1(c) does not apply.

In my opinion, the terms of the two contracts out of which the issues in this action primarily arise are not concerned with the creation or transfer of any right or interest in the intellectual property rights which attach to the System, its programs and documentation. This action is principally concerned with the contractual terms as to the competence of CAP’s staff, the quality of their performance, the quality of the subject matter of each contract, the time of completion of the System and the construction and application of terms which exclude or limit CAP’s liability for breach of contract or negligence. In my judgment therefore, paragraph 1(c) of Schedule 1 to the 1977 Act does not apply to the provisions of the two contracts which deal with such matters, because contractual terms such as these do not relate to the creation or transfer of an interest in any relevant intellectual property either in the System or its documentation.

This takes a restrictive approach to the para 1(c) exclusion.

If the exemption clauses in question are capable of falling within the 1977 Act, it must be decided which, if any, of the ‘active sections’ is relevant. These are the sections which state that something is to happen to a certain exemption clause, that is, either that it is automatically ineffective or that it is effective only if it ‘satisfies the requirement of reasonableness’. There are also ‘definition sections’ which assist in determining the scope of the ‘active sections’, and these will be looked at once the ‘active sections’ have been considered.

The active sections

Section 2 deals with liability arising from negligence. Section 2(1) renders automatically ineffective clauses which ‘exclude or restrict liability’ for negligently caused death or personal injury. Such terms are ‘black listed’. Their reasonableness or otherwise is irrelevant. Section 2(2) deals with clauses excluding or restricting any other sort of negligently caused loss or damage and renders them ineffective except insofar as they satisfy the ‘requirement of reasonableness’. The section deals not only with contractual clauses, but also covers, for example, non-contractual disclaimers, which may be used to try to exclude or restrict such liability in tort.

145 Section 1(1) makes it clear that this covers the situation where there is a breach of the duty to take reasonable care or exercise reasonable skill arising under the contract or in tort or under the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957.
Section 3 deals with the situation in which one party ‘deals as consumer’ or on the other party’s ‘written standard terms of business’. Contracts may come within both of the situations covered. Someone who deals as consumer may well contract on the other party’s written standard terms of business. The meaning of ‘deals as consumer’ is dealt with by s 12 and is considered below. There is no statutory definition of ‘written standard terms of business’. Whether a party has a set of ‘written standard terms’ should depend upon the pattern and degree of usage of the relevant terms. If the relevant party clearly has ‘written standard terms of business’, the question may arise as to whether the alterations of them in the instant case are such that the contract cannot be regarded as having been made on that party’s written standard terms of business. Determining that should be a matter of the extent of alteration of the original terms, and also of which terms are altered (some terms in a set of standard terms being intended to be particularised to individual contracts). One further point to be made is that what is required by s 3 is not merely that written standard terms of business be used, but that they should be the written standard terms of the relevant party. Should terms used throughout a particular trade and commonly used by the party in question be regarded as that party’s ‘written standard terms of business’ for the purposes of s 3?

Once it is determined that the contract in question falls within s 3, it should be noted that the scope of the section extends beyond terms which, in form, ‘exclude or restrict liability’. Such terms are covered by s 3(2)(a) and are rendered ineffective unless they ‘satisfy the requirement of reasonableness’. However, s 3(2)(b) extends the scope of the section beyond terms in the form of exclusions or restrictions of liability. It is one of the provisions of the Act which prevents its easy evasion by drafting which avoids those forms. Section 3(2)(b)(i), for example, extends the reasonableness test to terms under which the party who contracts on his own written standard terms of business, or who contracts with someone who deals as consumer, claims to render a performance substantially different from that which was reasonably expected of him.

Section 6 covers exemption clauses dealing with the terms implied into contracts for the sale or hire purchase of goods. There are analogous provisions in s 7 dealing with other contracts under which possession or ownership of goods passes. Section 6(1)(a) renders automatically ineffective any term excluding or restricting liability in relation to the terms implied by s 12 of the SGA 1979. Section

146 See p 145.
148 Ibid, St Albans.
149 For consideration of this case see British Fermentation Products Ltd v Compair Reavell Ltd [1999] 2 All ER (Comm) 389.
6(2)(a) does the same in relation to the exclusion or restriction of liability for breach of the terms implied by ss 13–15 of the 1979 Act, provided that the buyer ‘deals as consumer’. These are the other terms ‘black listed’ by the 1977 Act. However, if the buyer does not ‘deal as consumer’, liability for breach of the terms implied by ss 13–15 of the SGA 1979 can be excluded or restricted by a clause which satisfies the requirement of reasonableness.\(^{150}\) Section 6 also contains analogous provisions dealing with exemptions of the terms implied into hire-purchase contracts.\(^{151}\) Obviously, the question of whether the buyer ‘deals as consumer’ is very important in the context of s 6.\(^{152}\)

Unlike most of the other active sections, s 4 does not refer to terms which ‘exclude or restrict liability’. It deals with terms under which someone who ‘deals as consumer’ has to indemnify the other party in relation to that other party’s liability for negligence or breach of contract. Such clauses are ineffective unless they satisfy the requirement of reasonableness.

Section 5 of UCTA 1977 is of very limited application. It was enacted to deal with a very specific problem—that of manufacturers or distributors of goods attempting to remove their liability for goods which proved defective ‘in consumer use’ due to the negligence of the manufacturers or distributors. The relevant clause would be found in a ‘guarantee’, which also stated that the consumer had certain rights. This section does not apply between parties to a contract under which, or in pursuance of which, possession or ownership of goods passes (s 5(3)). It does not cover clauses in contracts between sellers and buyers of goods.

Section 10 deals with one of the ways in which the other sections of the Act might have been avoided. It prevents a term from being used in a second contract to achieve the exclusion or restriction of liability which the Act would prevent in a first contract.

**Definitions—‘deals as consumer’**

This phrase is dealt with by s 12. It is vital to the question of whether someone deals as consumer to determine whether they contract ‘in the course of a business’. The approach taken to this question can be seen in the case of *R & B Customs Brokers v United Dominion Trust*.
Chapter 3: Information Technology Law

R & B Customs Brokers v United Dominion Trust
[1988] 1 All ER 847

The plaintiff company was in business as a freight forwarding agent. It purchased a car, on credit terms, for the use of its two directors and sole shareholders. The car proved to be defective and did not comply with the terms implied by s 14(3) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. There was, however, a clause purporting to exclude the implied term unless the buyer ‘dealt as consumer’ within the meaning of s 12 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.

Dillon LJ Under the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 any person who in the course of a trade or business applies a false trade description to goods is, subject to the provisions of that Act, guilty of an offence. It is a penal Act, whereas the 1977 Act is not, and it is accordingly submitted that decisions on the construction of the 1968 Act cannot assist on the construction of s 12 of the 1977 Act. Also the legislative purposes of the two Acts are not the same. The primary purpose of the 1968 Act is consumer protection, and the course of business referred to is the course of business of the alleged wrongdoer. But the provisions as to dealing as a consumer in the 1977 Act are concerned with differentiating between two classes of innocent contracting parties (those who deal as consumers and those who do not) for whom differing degrees of protection against unfair terms are afforded by the 1977 Act. Despite these distinctions, however, it would in my judgment be unreal and unsatisfactory to conclude that the fairly ordinary words ‘in the course of a business’ bear a significantly different meaning in, on the one hand, the 1968 Act and, on the other, s 12 of the 1977 Act. In particular I would be very reluctant to conclude that these words bear a significantly wider meaning in s 12 than in the 1968 Act. I turn therefore to Davies v Sumner [1984] 1 All ER 831. That case was not concerned with a company, but with an individual who had used the car for the purposes of his business as a self-employed courier. When he sold the car by trading it in part exchange for a new one, he had applied a false trade description to it by falsely representing the mileage the car had travelled to be far less than it actually was. Lord Keith, who delivered the only speech in the House of Lords, commented that it was clear that the transaction...was reasonably incidental to the carrying on of the business, but he went on to say (at pp 833–34):

Any disposal of a chattel held for the purposes of a business may, in a certain sense, be said to have been in the course of that business, irrespective of whether the chattel was acquired with a view to resale or for consumption or as a capital asset. But in my opinion s 1(1) of the 1968 Act is not intended to cast such a wide net as this. The expression ‘in the course of a trade or business’ in the context of an Act having consumer protection as its primary purpose conveys the concept of some degree of regularity, and it is to be observed that the long title of the Act refers to ‘misdescription of goods, services, accommodation and facilities provided in the course of trade’. Lord Parker CJ in the Havering case [Havering LBC v Stevenson [1970] 3 All ER 609] clearly considered that the expression was not used in the
broadest sense. The reason why the transaction there in issue was caught was that in his view it was ‘an integral part of the business carried on as a car hire firm’. That would not cover the sporadic selling off of pieces of equipment which were no longer required for the purposes of a business. The vital feature of the Havering case appears to have been, in Lord Parker’s view, that the respondent business as part of its normal practice bought and disposed of cars. The need for some degree of regularity does not, however, involve that a one-off adventure in the nature of trade, carried through with a view to profit, would not fall within s 1(1) because such a transaction would itself constitute a trade.

Lord Keith then held that the requisite degree of regularity had not been established on the facts of Davies v Sumner because a regular practice of buying and selling cars had not yet been established at the time of the alleged offence. He pointed out for good measure that the disposal of the car was not a disposal of stock in trade of the business, but he clearly was not holding that only a disposal of stock in trade could be a disposal in the course of a trade or business.

Lord Keith emphasised the need for some degree of regularity, and he found pointers to this in the long title of the 1968 Act. I find pointers to a similar degree of regularity in the 1977 Act, where matters merely incidental to the carrying on of a business are concerned, both in the words I would emphasise, ‘in the course of’ in ‘in the course of a business’, and in the concept, or legislative purpose, which must underlie the dichotomy under the 1977 Act between those who deal as consumers and those who deal otherwise than as consumers.

This reasoning leads to the conclusion that, in the 1977 Act also, the words ‘in the course of a business’ are not used in what Lord Keith called ‘the broadest sense’. I also find helpful the phrase used by Lord Parker CJ and quoted by Lord Keith, ‘an integral part of the business carried on’. The reconciliation between that phrase and the need for some degree of regularity is, as I see it, as follows: there are some transactions which are clearly integral parts of the business concerned and these should be held to have been carried out in the course of those businesses; this would cover, apart from much else, the instance of a one-off adventure in the nature of trade where the transaction itself would constitute a trade or business. There are other transactions, however, such as the purchase of the car in the present case, which are at the highest only incidental to the carrying on of the relevant business; here a degree of regularity is required before it can be said that they are an integral part of the business carried on and so entered into in the course of that business.

Applying the test thus indicated to the facts of the present case, I have no doubt that the requisite degree of regularity is not made out on the facts. Mr Bell’s evidence that the car was the second or third car acquired on credit terms was, in my judgment, and in the context of the case, not enough. Accordingly, I agree with the judge...the company was ‘dealing as consumer’... A company can ‘deal as a consumer’. Simply because he,
she or it is in business does not prevent the relevant party from ‘dealing as consumer’. It is a matter of whether the transaction was integral, in itself, to that person’s business or merely incidental but occurring with sufficient ‘regularity’. The point should also be made that, despite the emphasis on ‘regularity’, it would seem that an element of frequency is also required. However, the phrase ‘in the course of business’ is also used in the SGA 1979\(^\text{153}\) and, in that context, the Court of Appeal has refused to take the above approach to the phrase. In *Stevenson v Rogers*,\(^\text{154}\) the Court of Appeal treated the phrase as being much broader, regarding its purpose as being to ‘distinguish between a sale made in the course of a seller’s business and a purely private sale of goods outside the confines of the business (if any) carried on by the seller’.\(^\text{155}\) However, some further thought should be given to the two categories of transactions which are ‘in the course of a business’ on the basis of the *R & B Customs Brokers* approach.

Although the *Havering* case is referred to above as one in which the transaction was ‘integral’ to the business, it would seem that it should be regarded as a case falling within the merely incidental but sufficiently regular category.\(^\text{156}\) *Havering* was concerned with a car hire business with a fleet of 24 cars. It was run on the basis that each car was changed after it had been used for about two years. In other words, there was a sale, on average, about once a month and it was against that pattern of dealing that it was held the sale of a particular car had occurred ‘in the course of a business’. The sale, in itself, would seem to be no more ‘integral to the business’ than that of the courier selling his car in *Davies v Sumner* or the sale of a car by a taxi business in *Devlin v Hall*.\(^\text{157}\) In both cases, the transactions were held not to have been made ‘in the course of a business’ because there was not a sufficient pattern of dealings, that is, the regularity of the transactions was the important factor—the transactions were not regarded as integral in themselves.

Additionally, it should be noted that, where the contract involves the supply of goods, there is a further requirement\(^\text{158}\) for the acquirer to be ‘dealing as consumer’. It is required that the goods be of ‘a type ordinarily supplied for private use or consumption’. This could affect the approach taken to a transaction involving software if it is found to be ‘goods’\(^\text{159}\) and it raises a number of problems. What is a ‘type’ of goods? What about software which can be supplied either as a program intended for domestic use or as a larger program intended for commercial use? Will the two programs constitute

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153 See below, p 204.
154 [1997] 1 All ER 613.
156 It may be that it should then be regarded as ‘integral’ to the business, although not integral in itself, because of its regularity.
158 Section 12(1)(c).
159 See below, p 171.
different ‘types’ of goods? Will either be ‘goods’ ‘ordinarily’ supplied for private use or consumption?160

Definitions—the ‘requirement of reasonableness’

The requirement of reasonableness is a key feature of the Act, with the effectiveness of exemption clauses often depending on whether they can satisfy the test. Section 11(5) of UCTA 1977 places the burden of proving ‘reasonableness’ on the person seeking to use the clause. The assessment of reasonableness does not occur in the light of the actual breach which occurred, but on the basis of what was known, or should reasonably have been contemplated, at the time of contracting,161 and that is very significant—a point which is illustrated by the outcome in Stewart Gill Ltd v Horatio Myer & Co Ltd.162 In that case, the clause failed to satisfy the requirement of reasonableness, not because of the breach to which it would have applied in the instant case, but because of the other situations which it could potentially cover. This means that there will be a greater possibility of a clause being effective if it is of narrow application and it would seem advisable to draft several clauses to cover different aspects of liability, rather than one wide one. In that way, at least some of the exemptions may be effective.163

Before considering the factors relevant to the ‘requirement of reasonableness’, the courts’ approach to appeals in relation to the application of this test should be noted. In George Mitchell Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd,164 Lord Bridge took the view that there could be legitimate differences of opinion on the reasonableness test and that:

…when asked to review such a decision on appeal, the appellate court should treat the original decision with the utmost respect and refrain from interference with it unless satisfied that it proceeded upon some erroneous principle or was plainly and obviously wrong.

Decisions on the ‘reasonableness’ of a clause in one case are of limited precedent value.166

161 Section 11(1).
162 [1992] 2 All ER 257.
165 Ibid, p 816.
166 But see Lord Griffiths’ comments on future cases in Smith v Bush, below.
Consideration should now be given to the working of the test and it should be noted that Sched 2 contains guidelines as to its operation. These guidelines are a non-exhaustive list of relevant factors and that, in itself, is indicative of the functioning of the test, which, basically, involves a weighing of the relevant factors in each case. This can be seen through considering the House of Lords’ decision in Smith v Bush.

Smith v Eric S Bush (A Firm)
[1990] 1 AC 831

The case was concerned with the liability of a surveyor for a negligent valuation of a house, which had been carried out for mortgage purposes. The valuation was paid for by the intending house purchaser, but the surveyor’s contract was with the building society and the action by the house purchaser arose out of tort rather than contract. The question was whether the surveyor could rely upon a disclaimer to avoid liability to the house purchaser. The disclaimer fell to be considered under s 2 of the 1977 Act, the requirement of reasonableness had to be applied, and it was held that it was not satisfied. The disclaimer was ineffective. (Although the action was a tortious one, the comments on the reasonableness test are generally applicable.)

Lord Griffiths I believe that it is impossible to draw up an exhaustive list of factors that must be taken into account when a judge is faced with this difficult decision [that is, the application of the ‘reasonableness’ test]. Nevertheless, the following matters should in my view, always be considered.

(1) Were the parties of equal bargaining power? If the court is dealing with a one-off situation between parties of equal bargaining power the requirement of reasonableness would be more easily discharged than in a case such as the present where the disclaimer is imposed on the purchaser who has no effective power to object.

(2) In the case of advice, would it have been reasonably practicable to obtain the advice from an alternative source taking into account considerations of costs and time? In the present case it is urged on behalf of the surveyor that it would have been easy for the purchaser to have obtained his own report on the condition of the house, to which the purchaser replies that he would then be required to pay twice for the same advice and that people buying at the bottom end of the market, many of whom will be young first time buyers are likely to be under considerable financial pressure without the money to go paying twice for the same service.

(3) How difficult is the task being undertaken for which liability is excluded? When a very difficult or dangerous undertaking is

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167 By s 11(2), these guidelines are relevant to the reasonableness test when applied under ss 6 or 7. However, they are the type of factors which are likely to be relevant, simply on the facts in many cases and will then be looked at on that basis (eg, Phillips Products Ltd v Hyland [1987] 2 All ER 620, p 628).
involved there may be a high risk of failure which would certainly be a pointer towards the reasonableness of excluding liability as a condition of doing the work. A valuation, on the other hand, should present no difficulty if the work is undertaken with a reasonable skill and care. It is only defects which are observable by a careful visual examination that have to be taken into account and I cannot see that it places any unreasonable burden on the valuer to require him to accept responsibility for a fairly elementary degree of skill and care involved in observing, following up and reporting on such defects. Surely it is work at the lower end of the surveyor’s field of professional expertise.

(4) What are the practical effects of the decision of the question of reasonableness? This must involve the sums of money potentially at stake and the ability of the parties to bear the loss involved, which in its turn, raises the question of insurance. There was once a time when it was regarded as improper even to mention the possible existence of insurance cover in a lawsuit. But those days are long past. Everyone knows that all prudent, professional men carry insurance, and the availability and cost of insurance must be a relevant factor when considering which of two parties should be required to bear the risk of a loss. We are dealing in this case with a loss which will be limited to the value of a modest family house and against which it can be expected that the surveyor will be insured. Bearing the loss will be unlikely to cause significant hardship if it is borne by the surveyor but it is, on the other hand, quite possible that it will be a financial catastrophe for the purchaser who may be left with a valueless house and no money to buy another. If the law in these circumstances denies the surveyor the right to exclude his liability, it may result in a few more claims but I do not think so poorly of the surveyor’s profession to believe that the floodgates would be opened. There may be some increase in surveyor’s insurance premiums which will be passed on to the public, but I cannot think that it will be anything approaching the difference between the [building society’s] offer of a valuation without liability and a valuation with liability discussed in the speech of my noble and learned friend Lord Templeman. The result of denying a surveyor, in the circumstances of this case, the right to exclude liability will result in distributing the risk of his negligence among all house purchasers through an increase in his fees to cover insurance, rather than allowing the whole of the risk to fall on the one unfortunate purchaser.

I would not, however, wish it to be thought that I would consider it unreasonable for professional men in all circumstances to seek to exclude or limit their liability for negligence. Sometimes breathtaking sums may turn on professional advice against which it would be impossible for the adviser to obtain adequate insurance cover and which would ruin him if he were to be held personally liable. In these circumstances it may indeed be reasonable to give the advice upon a basis of no liability or possibly of liability limited to the extent of the adviser’s insurance cover...

It must, however, be remembered that this is a decision in respect of a dwelling house of modest value in which it is widely recognised by surveyors
that purchasers are in fact relying on their care and skill. It will obviously be of general application in broadly similar circumstances. But I expressly reserve my position in respect of valuations of quite different types of property…

There will obviously be a variety of factors to be considered in each case and their importance will have to be assessed in the context of the particular case. The parties’ relative bargaining powers may be relevant, as may the question of whether the party against whom the clause is being used knew its contents or had ample opportunity to ascertain them.\(^{168}\)

However, although the application of the test is a weighing process and any factor is merely one indicator, some factors may be more significant than others. The existence, or otherwise, of an alternative to the particular contract has been important in some cases\(^ {169}\) and it was referred to by Lord Griffiths in *Smith v Bush*. The comment there was put in terms of whether or not the advice could have been obtained elsewhere, as advice was the commodity that the case was concerned with, but the availability of an alternative contract has been seen as generally relevant. It may be easier for a party to establish that his or her exemption clause is reasonable if it can also be established that he or she also offered an alternative, higher priced contract which did not contain the exemption clause.\(^ {170}\) However, as the judgment of Lord Griffiths indicates, the court will consider not merely the existence of an alternative, but also its reality. In *Smith v Bush*, cost was the factor making the alternative unrealistic, but insufficiently drawing an alternative to the attention of the other party might also adversely affect the court’s view of it.

However, it may be that the most generally significant factor is that of insurance. As we have seen, it was considered in *Smith v Bush*, and particular reference is made to it in s 11(4), in the context of determining the reasonableness of limitation clauses. The basic questions will be as to which party was in the best position to insure, and at what cost. That was considered by the House of Lords in *Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Ltd*.\(^ {171}\) In that case, the contract was for the provision of security services, which included periodic nightly visits to PP’s factory by S’s employees. On one visit, one employee of S decided to start a fire. The factory was burnt down. The question was whether S could rely upon an exemption clause in relation to its liability for the destruction

\(^{168}\) Eg, *Singer Co (UK) Ltd v Tees and Hartlepool Port Authority* [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 164; *Stag Line Ltd v Tyne Ship Repair Group Ltd (The Zinnia)* [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 211.


\(^{170}\) Ibid, *Woodman*.

of the factory. Because of the date when it was made, the contract was not one to which UCTA 1977 applied. However, having answered the construction question in S’s favour, and obviously aware of the test in the 1977 Act, the House of Lords commented that the clause was ‘reasonable’. The parties were of roughly equal bargaining power, the risk of fire damage had been allocated to the party best able to insure against it and S was providing a cheap service. PP had to insure its factory against fire damage in general and S could not have provided such a cheap service if it had needed to insure (even if it could have obtained such insurance).

In contrast with Photo Productions, the insurance factor was one indicator of the unreasonableness of the clause in Salvage Association v CAP,172 where the clause was being used against a party which, effectively, could not insure by the party which had insurance. Similarly, in Mitchell v Finney Lock Seeds,173 the insurance factor was one indicator of the lack of reasonableness of the clause. The seed sellers, who sought to rely on a limitation clause, could have insured without needing to materially increase their price.

Further light is shed on the insurance factor by Smith v Bush (1990). As we have seen, in that case, the disclaimer was held to be unreasonable even though it was clear that, if it was ineffective, the surveyors would have to increase their prices to pay for further insurance. There was a pointer to reasonableness, which was to be found in the correlation of a low price for a service hedged round by a limitation of liability and the need for surveyors to increase their prices, to cover increased insurance costs, if the limitation was not effective. However, in the circumstances, this pointer to reasonableness was outweighed by the consequences to individuals if the limitation was effective.

The potential consequences of allowing the disclaimer to be effective in Smith v Bush were extreme and arguably make it an unusual case, indicative of an approach which should not be followed too often. It should be noted that it was, however, followed in the case of St Albans City and DC v ICL,174 with the position of the council being equated with that of the house purchaser in Smith v Bush, which would seem to be considerable extension of the approach taken in the latter case. It seems that, more generally, and particularly in the commercial sphere, the question of the reasonableness of an exemption clause should, more usually, be determined by whether there was a correlation between the contract price and the use of an exemption clause, that is, whether the party accepting the exemption clause thereby had only to pay a relatively cheap price. Although, of course, this might well be overridden if the exemption clause transferred the burden of the loss onto the

party which was unable to insure, as in *Salvage Association v CAP*.\(^{175}\) However, in both that case and the *St Albans* case, it was indicated that, when a limitation clause is in question, it will be important to consider whether the precise level of the limit can be justified by some correlation to some other factor, such as the level of insurance cover available to the party seeking to rely on the clause.

In relation to software supplied in a commercial context, it would certainly seem that there should be a strong argument for accepting an exemption clause as reasonable in a contract for the development of software, provided that there is an appropriate correlation between the price, the availability of insurance and the exemption clause. The development of software is not a dangerous task but it might well be seen as a difficult one with a significant risk of failure or, at least, of problems (bugs are notoriously difficult to eradicate). In that light, Lord Griffiths’ third factor in *Smith v Bush* could be seen as indicating the reasonableness of an exemption clause in such a contract. It should be remembered that it was clearly key to the finding that the clause was unreasonable in the *Salvage Association* case that CAP themselves had decided that £25,000 was too low a limit in the type of contract in question.

**UNFAIR TERMS IN CONSUMER CONTRACTS REGULATIONS 1999\(^{176}\)**

1. These Regulations may be cited as the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 and shall come into force on 1st October 1999.

**Revocation**

2. The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994 are hereby revoked.

**Interpretation**

3(1) In these Regulations—

‘the Community’ means the European Community;

‘consumer’ means any natural person who, in contracts covered by these Regulations, is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business or profession;

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\(^{175}\) [1995] FSR 654.

\(^{176}\) SI 1999/2083. See *op cit*, Koffman and Macdonald, fn 6, Chapter 11.
‘court’ in relation to England and Wales and Northern Ireland means a county court or the High Court, and in relation to Scotland, the Sheriff or the Court of Session;

‘Director’ means the Director General of Fair Trading;

‘EE A Agreement’ means the Agreement on the European Economic Area signed at Oporto on 2nd May 1992 as adjusted by the protocol signed at Brussels on 17th March 1993;

‘Member State’ means a State which is a contracting party to the EEA Agreement;

‘notified’ means notified in writing;

‘qualifying body’ means a person specified in Sched 1;

‘seller or supplier’ means any natural or legal person who, in contracts covered by these Regulations, is acting for purposes relating to his trade, business or profession, whether publicly owned or privately owned;

‘unfair terms’ means the contractual terms referred to in regulation 5.

(2) In the application of these Regulations to Scotland for references to an ‘injunction’ or an ‘interim injunction’ there shall be substituted references to an ‘interdict’ or ‘interim interdict’ respectively.

Terms to which these Regulations apply

4(1) These Regulations apply in relation to unfair terms in contracts concluded between a seller or a supplier and a consumer.

(2) These Regulations do not apply to contractual terms which reflect-

(a) mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions (including such provisions under the law of any Member State or in Community legislation having effect in the United Kingdom without further enactment);

(b) the provisions or principles of international conventions to which the Member States or the Community are party.

Unfair terms

5(1) A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer.

(2) A term shall always be regarded as not having been individually negotiated where it has been drafted in advance and the consumer has therefore not been able to influence the substance of the term.

(3) Notwithstanding that a specific term or certain aspects of it in a contract has been individually negotiated, these Regulations shall apply to the rest of a contract if an overall assessment of it indicates that it is a pre-formulated standard contract.
(4) It shall be for any seller or supplier who claims that a term was individually negotiated to show that it was.

(5) Schedule 2 to these Regulations contains an indicative and non-exhaustive list of the terms which may be regarded as unfair.

Assessment of unfair terms

6(1) Without prejudice to regulation 12, the unfairness of a contractual term shall be assessed, taking into account the nature of the goods or services for which the contract was concluded and by referring, at the time of conclusion of the contract, to all the circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract and to all the other terms of the contract or of another contract on which it is dependent.

(2) In so far as it is in plain intelligible language, the assessment of fairness of a term shall not relate—

   to the definition of the main subject matter of the contract; or
   to the adequacy of the price or remuneration, as against the goods or services supplied in exchange.

Written contracts

7(1) A seller or supplier shall ensure that any written term of a contract is expressed in plain, intelligible language.

(2) If there is doubt about the meaning of a written term, the interpretation which is most favourable to the consumer shall prevail but this rule shall not apply in proceedings brought under regulation 12.

Effect of unfair term

8(1) An unfair term in a contract concluded with a consumer by a seller or supplier shall not be binding on the consumer.

(2) The contract shall continue to bind the parties if it is capable of continuing in existence without the unfair term.

Choice of law clauses

9 These Regulations shall apply notwithstanding any contract term which applies or purports to apply the law of a non-Member State, if the contract has a close connection with the territory of the Member States.
Complaints—consideration by Director

10(1) It shall be the duty of the Director to consider any complaint made to him that any contract term drawn up for general use is unfair, unless—

(a) the complaint appears to the Director to be frivolous or vexatious; or
(b) a qualifying body has notified the Director that it agrees to consider the complaint.

(2) The Director shall give reasons for his decision to apply or not to apply, as the case may be, for an injunction under regulation 12 in relation to any complaint which these Regulations require him to consider.

(3) In deciding whether or not to apply for an injunction in respect of a term which the Director considers to be unfair, he may, if he considers it appropriate to do so, have regard to any undertakings given to him by or on behalf of any person as to the continued use of such a term in contracts concluded with consumers.

Complaints—consideration by qualifying bodies

11(1) If a qualifying body specified in Part One of Sched 1 notifies the Director that it agrees to consider a complaint that any contract term drawn up for general use is unfair, it shall be under a duty to consider that complaint.

(2) Regulation 10(2) and (3) shall apply to a qualifying body which is under a duty to consider a complaint as they apply to the Director.

Injunctions to prevent continued use of unfair terms

12(1) The Director or, subject to paragraph (2), any qualifying body may apply for an injunction (including an interim injunction) against any person appearing to the Director or that body to be using, or recommending use of, an unfair term drawn up for general use in contracts concluded with consumers.

(2) A qualifying body may apply for an injunction only where—

(a) it has notified the Director of its intention to apply at least fourteen days before the date on which the application is made, beginning with the date on which the notification was given; or
(b) the Director consents to the application being made within a shorter period.

(3) The court on an application under this regulation may grant an injunction on such terms as it thinks fit.

(4) An injunction may relate not only to use of a particular contract term drawn up for general use but to any similar term, or a term having like effect, used or recommended for use by any person.
Powers of the Director and qualifying bodies to obtain documents and information

13(1) The Director may exercise the power conferred by this regulation for the purpose of—

(a) facilitating his consideration of a complaint that a contract term drawn up for general use is unfair; or
(b) ascertaining whether a person has complied with an undertaking or court order as to the continued use, or recommendation for use, of a term in contracts concluded with consumers.

(2) A qualifying body specified in Part One of Sched 1 may exercise the power conferred by this regulation for the purpose of—

(a) facilitating its consideration of a complaint that a contract term drawn up for general use is unfair; or
(b) ascertaining whether a person has complied with—

(i) an undertaking given to it or to the court following an application by that body, or
(ii) a court order made on an application by that body,
as to the continued use, or recommendation for use, of a term in contracts concluded with consumers.

(3) The Director may require any person to supply to him, and a qualifying body specified in Part One of Sched 1 may require any person to supply to it—

(a) a copy of any document which that person has used or recommended for use, at the time the notice referred to in paragraph (4) below is given, as a pre-formulated standard contract in dealings with consumers;
(b) information about the use, or recommendation for use, by that person of that document or any other such document in dealings with consumers.

(4) The power conferred by this regulation is to be exercised by a notice in writing which may—

(a) specify the way in which and the time within which it is to be complied with; and
(b) be varied or revoked by a subsequent notice.

(5) Nothing in this regulation compels a person to supply any document or information which he would be entitled to refuse to produce or give in civil proceedings before the court.

(6) If a person makes default in complying with a notice under this regulation, the court may, on the application of the Director or of the qualifying body, make such order as the court thinks fit for requiring the default to be made good, and any such order may provide that all the costs or expenses of and incidental to the application shall be borne by the person in default or by any officers of a company or other association who are responsible for its default.
Notification of undertakings and orders to Director

14 A qualifying body shall notify the Director—

(a) of any undertaking given to it by or on behalf of any person as to the continued use of a term which that body considers to be unfair in contracts concluded with consumers;
(b) of the outcome of any application made by it under regulation 12, and of the terms of any undertaking given to, or order made by, the court;
(c) of the outcome of any application made by it to enforce a previous order of the court.

Publication, information and advice

15(1) The Director shall arrange for the publication in such form and manner as he considers appropriate, of—

(a) details of any undertaking or order notified to him under regulation 14;
(b) details of any undertaking given to him by or on behalf of any person as to the continued use of a term which the Director considers to be unfair in contracts concluded with consumers;
(c) details of any application made by him under regulation 12, and of the terms of any undertaking given to, or order made by, the court;
(d) details of any application made by the Director to enforce a previous order of the court.

(2) The Director shall inform any person on request whether a particular term to which these Regulations apply has been—

(a) the subject of an undertaking given to the Director or notified to him by a qualifying body; or
(b) the subject of an order of the court made upon application by him or notified to him by a qualifying body,

and shall give that person details of the undertaking or a copy of the order, as the case may be, together with a copy of any amendments which the person giving the undertaking has agreed to make to the term in question.

(3) The Director may arrange for the dissemination in such form and manner as he considers appropriate of such information and advice concerning the operation of these Regulations as may appear to him to be expedient to give to the public and to all persons likely to be affected by these Regulations.
SCHEDULE 1
Regulation 3
QUALIFYING BODIES

PART ONE

1. The Data Protection Registrar.
2. The Director General of Electricity Supply.
3. The Director General of Gas Supply.
4. The Director General of Electricity Supply for Northern Ireland.
5. The Director General of Gas for Northern Ireland.
6. The Director General of Telecommunications.
7. The Director General of Water Services.
8. The Rail Regulator.
9. Every weights and measures authority in Great Britain.
10. The Department of Economic Development in Northern Ireland.

PART TWO


SCHEDULE 2

Regulation 5(5)

INDICATIVE AND NON-EXHAUSTIVE LIST OF TERMS WHICH MAY BE REGARDED AS UNFAIR

[See Annex of Directive—below.]

EC DIRECTIVE ON UNFAIR TERMS IN CONSUMER CONTRACTS

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, and in particular Article 100A thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,
In co-operation with the European Parliament,
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee,
Whereas it is necessary to adopt measures with the aim of progressively establishing the internal market before 31 December 1992; whereas the
internal market comprises an area without internal frontiers in which goods, persons, services and capital move freely;

Whereas the laws of Member States relating to the terms of contract between the seller of goods or supplier of services, on the one hand, and the consumer of them, on the other hand, show many disparities, with the result that the national markets for the sale of goods and services to consumers differ from each other and that distortions of competition may arise amongst the sellers and suppliers, notably when they sell and supply in other Member States;

Whereas, in particular, the laws of Member States relating to unfair terms in consumer contracts show marked divergences;

Whereas it is the responsibility of the Member States to ensure that contracts concluded with consumers do not contain unfair terms;

Whereas, generally speaking, consumers do not know the rules of law which, in Member States other than their own, govern contracts for the sale of goods or services; whereas this lack of awareness may deter them from direct transactions for the purchase of goods or services in another Member State;

Whereas, in order to facilitate the establishment of the internal market and to safeguard the citizen in his role as consumer when acquiring goods and services under contracts which are governed by the laws of Member States other than his own, it is essential to remove unfair terms from those contracts;

Whereas sellers of goods and suppliers of services will thereby be helped in their task of selling goods and supplying services, both at home and throughout the internal market; whereas competition will thus be stimulated, so contributing to increased choice for Community citizens as consumers;

Whereas the two Community programmes for a consumer protection and information policy underlined the importance of safeguarding consumers in the matter of unfair terms of contract; whereas this protection ought to be provided by laws and regulations which are either harmonised at Community level or adopted directly at that level;

Whereas in accordance with the principle laid down under the heading ‘Protection of the economic interests of the consumers’, as stated in those programmes: ‘acquirers of goods and services should be protected against the abuse of power by the seller or supplier, in particular against one-sided standard contracts and the unfair exclusion of essential rights in contracts’;

Whereas more effective protection of the consumer can be achieved by adopting uniform rules of law in the matter of unfair terms; whereas those rules should apply to all contracts concluded between sellers or suppliers and consumers; whereas as a result inter alia contracts relating to employment, contracts relating to succession rights, contracts relating to rights under family law and contracts relating to the incorporation and organisation of companies or partnership agreements must be excluded from this Directive;

Whereas the consumer must receive equal protection under contracts concluded by word of mouth and written contracts regardless, in the latter case, of whether the terms of the contract are contained in one or more documents;
Whereas, however, as they now stand, national laws allow only partial harmonisation to be envisaged; whereas, in particular, only contractual terms which have not been individually negotiated are covered by this Directive; whereas Member States should have the option, with due regard for the Treaty, to afford consumers a higher level of protection through national provisions that are more stringent than those of this Directive;

Whereas the statutory or regulatory provisions of the Member States which directly or indirectly determine the terms of consumer contracts are presumed not to contain unfair terms; whereas, therefore, it does not appear to be necessary to subject the terms which reflect mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions and the principles or provisions of international conventions to which the Member States or the Community are party; whereas in that respect the wording ‘mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions’ in Article 1(2) also covers rules which, according to the law, shall apply between the contracting parties provided that no other arrangements have been established;

Whereas Member States must however ensure that unfair terms are not included, particularly because this Directive also applies to trades, businesses or professions of a public nature;

Whereas it is necessary to fix in a general way the criteria for assessing the unfair character of contract terms;

Whereas the assessment, according to the general criteria chosen, of the unfair character of terms, in particular in sale or supply activities of a public nature providing collective services which take account of solidarity among users, must be supplemented by a means of making an overall evaluation of the different interests involved; whereas this constitutes the requirement of good faith; whereas, in making an assessment of good faith, particular regard shall be had to the strength of the bargaining positions of the parties, whether the consumer had an inducement to agree to the term and whether the goods or services were sold or supplied to the special order of the consumer;

Whereas the requirement of good faith may be satisfied by the seller or supplier where he deals fairly and equitably with the other party whose legitimate interests he has to take into account;

Whereas, for the purposes of this Directive, the annexed list of terms can be of indicative value only and, because of the cause of the minimal character of the Directive, the scope of these terms may be the subject of amplification or more restrictive editing by the Member States in their national laws;

Whereas the nature of goods or services should have an influence on assessing the unfairness of contractual terms;

Whereas, for the purposes of this Directive, assessment of unfair character shall not be made of terms which describe the main subject matter of the contract nor the quality/price ratio of the goods or services supplied; whereas the main subject matter of the contract and the price/quality ratio may nevertheless be taken into account in assessing the fairness of other terms; whereas it follows, inter alia, that in insurance contracts, the terms which clearly define or circumscribe the insured risk and the insurer’s liability shall not be subject to such assessment since these restrictions are taken into account in calculating the premium paid by the consumer;
Protecting and Exploiting Rights in Software—Contract

Whereas contracts should be drafted in plain, intelligible language, the consumer should actually be given an opportunity to examine all the terms and, if in doubt, the interpretation most favourable to the consumer should prevail;

Whereas Member States should ensure that unfair terms are not used in contracts concluded with consumers by a seller or supplier and that if, nevertheless, such terms are so used, they will not bind the consumer, and the contract will continue to bind the parties upon those terms if it is capable of continuing in existence without the unfair provisions;

Whereas there is a risk that, in certain cases, the consumer may be deprived of protection under this Directive by designating the law of a non-Member country as the law applicable to the contract; whereas provisions should therefore be included in this Directive designed to avert this risk;

Whereas persons or organisations, if regarded under the law of a Member State as having a legitimate interest in the matter, must have facilities for initiating proceedings concerning terms of contract drawn up for general use in contracts concluded with consumers, and in particular unfair terms, either before a court or before an administrative authority competent to decide upon complaints or to initiate appropriate legal proceedings; whereas this possibility does not, however, entail prior verification of the general conditions obtaining in individual economic sectors;

Whereas the courts or administrative authorities of the Member States must have at their disposal adequate and effective means of preventing the continued application of unfair terms in consumer contracts,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:

Article 1

1 The purpose of this Directive is to approximate the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to unfair terms in contracts concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer.

2 The contractual terms which reflect mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions and the provisions or principles of international conventions to which the Member States or the Community are party, particularly in the transport area, shall not be subject to the provisions of this Directive.

Article 2

For the purposes of this Directive:

(a) ‘unfair terms’ means the contractual terms defined in Article 3;
(b) ‘consumer’ means any natural person who, in contracts covered by this Directive, is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business or profession;
(c) ‘seller or supplier’ means any natural or legal person who, in contracts covered by this Directive, is acting for purposes relating to his trade, business or profession, whether publicly owned or privately owned.
Article 3

1 A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer.

2 A term shall always be regarded as not individually negotiated where it has been drafted in advance and the consumer has therefore not been able to influence the substance of the term, particularly in the context of a pre-formulated standard contract.

The fact that certain aspects of a term or one specific term have been individually negotiated shall not exclude the application of this Article to the rest of a contract if an overall assessment of the contract indicates that it is nevertheless a pre-formulated standard contract.

Where any seller or supplier claims that a standard term has been individually negotiated, the burden of proof in this respect shall be incumbent on him.

3 The Annex shall contain an indicative and non-exhaustive list of the terms which may be regarded as unfair.

Article 4

1 Without prejudice to Article 7, the unfairness of a contractual term shall be assessed, taking into account the nature of the goods or services for which the contract was concluded and by referring, at the time of conclusion of the contract, to all the circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract and to all the other terms of the contract or of another contract on which it is dependent.

2 Assessment of the unfair nature of the terms shall relate neither to the definition of the main subject matter of the contract nor to the adequacy of the price and remuneration, on the one hand, as against the services or goods supplied in exchange, on the other in so far as these terms are in plain intelligible language.

Article 5

In the case of contracts where all or certain terms offered to the consumer are in writing, these terms must always be drafted in plain, intelligible language. Where there is doubt about the meaning of a term, the interpretation most favourable to the consumer shall prevail. This rule on interpretation shall not apply in the context of the procedures laid down in Article 7(2).

Article 6

1 Member States shall lay down that unfair terms used in a contract concluded with a consumer by a seller or supplier shall, as provided for under their national law, not be binding on the consumer and that the contract shall continue to bind the parties upon those terms if it is capable of continuing in existence without the unfair terms.

2 Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the consumer does not lose the protection granted by this Directive by virtue of the choice of the law of a non-Member country as the law applicable to
Article 7

1 Member States shall ensure that, in the interests of consumers and of competitors, adequate and effective means exist to prevent the continued use of unfair terms in contracts concluded with consumers by sellers or suppliers.

2 The means referred to in paragraph 1 shall include provisions whereby persons or organisations, having a legitimate interest under national law in protecting consumers, may take action according to the national law concerned before the courts or before competent administrative bodies for a decision as to whether contractual terms drawn up for general use are unfair, so that they can apply appropriate and effective means to prevent the continued use of such terms.

3 With due regard for national laws, the legal remedies referred to in paragraph 2 may be directed separately or jointly against a number of sellers or suppliers from the same economic sector or their associations which use or recommend the use of the same general contractual terms or similar terms.

Article 8

Member States may adopt or retain the most stringent provisions compatible with the Treaty in the area covered by this Directive, to ensure a maximum degree of protection for the consumer.

Article 9

The Commission shall present a report to the European Parliament and to the Council concerning the application of this Directive five years at the latest after the date in Article 10(1).

Article 10

1 Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive no later than 31 December 1994. They shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof. These provisions shall be applicable to all contracts concluded after 31 December 1994.

2 When Member States adopt these measures, they shall contain a reference to this Directive or shall be accompanied by such reference on the occasion of their official publication. The methods of making such a reference shall be laid down by the Member States.

3 Member States shall communicate the main provisions of national law which they adopt in the field covered by this Directive to the Commission.

Article 11

This Directive is addressed to the Member States.
Done at Luxembourg, 5 April 1993.
ANNEX

TERMS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 3(3)

1 Terms which have the object or effect of

(a) excluding or limiting the legal liability of a seller or supplier in the event of the death of a consumer or personal injury to the latter resulting from an act or omission of that seller or supplier;

(b) inappropriately excluding or limiting the legal rights of the consumer vis-à-vis the seller or supplier or another party in the event of total or partial non-performance or inadequate performance by the seller or supplier of any of the contractual obligations, including the option of offsetting a debt owed to the seller or supplier against any claim which the consumer may have against him;

(c) making an agreement binding on the consumer whereas provision of services by the seller or supplier is subject to a condition whose realisation depends on his own will alone;

(d) permitting the seller or supplier to retain sums paid by the consumer where the latter decided not to conclude or perform the contract, without providing for the consumer to receive compensation of an equivalent amount from the seller or supplier where the latter is the party cancelling the contract;

(e) requiring any consumer who fails to fulfil his obligation to pay a disproportionately high sum in compensation;

(f) authorising the seller or supplier to dissolve the contract on a discretionary basis where the same facility is not granted to the consumer, or permitting the seller or supplier to retain the sums paid for services not yet supplied by him where it is the seller or supplier himself who dissolves the contract;

(g) enabling the seller or supplier to terminate a contract of indeterminate duration without reasonable notice except where there are serious grounds for doing so;

(h) automatically extending a contract of fixed duration where the consumer does not indicate otherwise, when the deadline fixed for the consumer to express this desire not to extend the contract is unreasonably early;

(i) irrevocably binding the consumer to terms with which he had no real opportunity of becoming acquainted before the conclusion of the contract;

(j) enabling the seller or supplier to alter the terms of the contract unilaterally without a valid reason which is specified in the contract;

(k) enabling the seller or supplier to alter unilaterally without a valid reason any characteristics of the product or service to be provided;

(l) providing for the price of goods to be determined at the time of delivery or allowing a seller of goods or supplier of services to increase their price without in both cases giving the consumer the corresponding right to cancel the contract if the final price is too
high in relation to the price agreed when the contract was concluded;
(m) giving the seller or supplier the right to determine whether the goods or services supplied are in conformity with the contract, or giving him the exclusive right to interpret any term of the contract;
(n) limiting the seller’s or supplier’s obligation to respect commitments undertaken by his agents or making his commitments subject to compliance with a particular formality;
o) obliging the consumer to fulfil all his obligations where the seller or supplier does not perform his;
p) giving the seller or supplier the possibility of transferring his rights and obligations under the contract, where this may serve to reduce the guarantees for the consumer, without the latter’s agreement;
(q) excluding or hindering the consumer’s right to take legal action or exercise any other legal remedy, particularly by requiring the consumer to take disputes exclusively to arbitration not covered by legal provisions, unduly restricting the evidence available to him or imposing on him a burden of proof which, according to the applicable law, should lie with another party to the contract.

2 Scope of subparagraphs (g), (j) and (l)

(a) Subparagraph (g) is without hindrance to terms by which a supplier of financial services reserves the right to terminate unilaterally a contract of indeterminate duration without notice where there is a valid reason, provided that the supplier is required to inform the other contracting party or parties thereof immediately.
(b) Subparagraph (j) is without hindrance to terms under which a supplier of financial services reserves the right to alter the rate of interest payable by the consumer or due to the latter, or the amount of other charges for financial services without notice where there is a valid reason, provided that the supplier is required to inform the other contracting party or parties thereof at the earliest opportunity and that the latter are free to dissolve the contract immediately. Subparagraph (j) is also without hindrance to terms under which a seller or supplier reserves the right to alter unilaterally the conditions of a contract of indeterminate duration, provided that he is required to inform the consumer with reasonable notice and that the consumer is free to dissolve the contract.
(c) Subparagraphs (g), (j) and (l) do not apply to: transactions in transferable securities, financial instruments and other products or services where the price is linked to fluctuations in a stock exchange quotation or index or a financial market rate that the seller or supplier does not control;—contracts for the purchase or sale of foreign currency, traveller’s cheques or international money orders denominated in foreign currency;
(d) Subparagraph (l) is without hindrance to price-indexation clauses, where lawful, provided that the method by which prices vary is explicitly described.
The 1994 Regulations came into force on 1 July 1995 to implement the EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts. They have now been replaced by the 1999 Regulations on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts. The Regulations do not simply apply to exemption clauses; they apply a fairness test to non-individually negotiated terms in contracts between consumers and sellers or suppliers, with certain ‘core’ terms being exempted from the test, provided that they are in plain, intelligible language.

The definition of ‘consumer’ is in reg 3. It is restricted to ‘natural persons’, which means that a company cannot be a consumer for the purposes of the Regulations. This differs from the category of those who ‘deal as consumers’ under UCTA 1977 and, in general, a mechanistic approach to the categorisation under the Regulations seems likely, with businesses simply being excluded from its protection without any consideration of how central the contract in question is to the operation of the business.

The fairness test is applied to terms which have not been individually negotiated. Most such terms will be contained in standard form contracts but the category does not seem to be solely limited to such terms. Regulation 5(2) states that:

…a term shall always be regarded as not having been individually negotiated where it has been drafted in advance and the consumer has not been able to influence the substance of the term.

The exclusion of certain ‘core’ terms from the fairness test is covered by reg 6(2). It would seem to cover terms defining the main subject matter of the contract or stating the price but its exact scope is problematic, and it should be emphasised that it is restricted to cases in which the ‘core’ terms are in ‘plain, intelligible language’. In any event, it would seem that the ‘core’ terms should always be taken into account in assessing the fairness of other terms.

Regulation 5(1) states that a term shall be regarded as unfair if:

…contrary to the requirement of good faith it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract to the detriment of the consumer.

Like ‘reasonableness’ under the 1977 Act, this is assessed against the background of the circumstances at the time of contracting. Looking for a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations would seem to require a

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177 OJ 1993 L 95/29—made under Art 100A on the basis that it is concerned with the establishment of an internal market.
178 Contrast the approach to ‘deals as consumer’ under the 1977 Act. See above, p 145.
180 See Recital 19 of the Directive.
weighing of the rights and obligations of the two parties. Further assistance in
determining which terms will be unfair can be found in Sched 2, which contains
a non-exhaustive list of terms which ‘may be regarded as unfair’.

The consumer can use the Regulations in the same way as someone can use
UCTA 1977 against an exemption clause. An unfair term will not bind the
consumer,182 and the consumer can rely on this when in dispute with a seller or
supplier. However, the Regulations also provide for a different form of attack on
unfair terms. The Director General of Fair Trading has the power to, \textit{inter alia},
obtain injunctions to prevent the use of unfair terms more generally183 and, under
the 1999 Regulations, that has been extended to certain qualifying bodies listed
in Sched 1, such as the Consumers’ Association.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[181] Regulation 6(1).
\item[182] Regulation 8(1).
\item[183] Regulation 12.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
CHAPTER 4

DEFECTIVE SOFTWARE—CONTRACT

INTRODUCTION

This chapter is concerned with contractual liability for defective software, principally computer programs, which raises questions unique to the area of information technology law. Unless otherwise indicated, the references to software should be understood accordingly. Obviously, such liability may well stem from an express term of the contract (see above, Chapter 3), but this chapter will focus on whether one of the statutory regimes implying terms into certain types of contract can apply to a contract for the supply of software. The Sale of Goods Act (SGA) 1979, for example, implies terms that goods must correspond with their description (s 13) and sample (s 15), and that they should be of satisfactory quality (s 14(2)) and reasonably fit for the buyer’s particular purpose (s 14(3)). Sections 8–10 of the Supply of Goods and Services Act (SGSA) 1982 imply similar terms into contracts for the hire of goods and s 13 implies a term into a contract for services that the services will be carried out with reasonable care and skill. Obviously, if applicable, such terms could be very helpful to someone seeking damages for defects in a program, but, before the content and application of those terms is considered, there is a major issue to be addressed—the classification of contracts for the supply of software. Can a contract for the supply of software constitute a contract for the sale of goods? Even if software can be described as ‘goods’, would a contract for its supply be better classified as a contract for services? These are the type of issues which will initially be considered in this chapter.

However, before addressing the question of whether software can be ‘goods’, some points should be made to clarify the discussion. Programs are most commonly supplied on a disk or other such medium and the focus will be on that method of supply. Unless otherwise indicated, references to ‘software’ will be to programs on disks. It will be made clear when what is being looked at is the treatment of any program which has been downloaded over a telephone line, or using some other such link.

1 Some amendment of these terms may occur upon the implementation of the EC Directive on Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees (99/44/EC).
In *St Albans City and DC v ICL*, Sir Iain Glidewell stated that software could constitute goods. That case should be looked at before embarking on a more general discussion of the question of that categorisation. His comments were *obiter* and the issue requires full consideration.

**St Albans City and DC v International Computers Ltd**  
[1996] 4 All ER 481

This case was concerned with the sale of a computer and software, by ICL, to the local authority, which wanted the computer to deal with the introduction of the Community Charge and its finances generally. A defect in the program led to an overstatement of the population figure for the council’s area and a consequent loss of revenue from central government and from the Community Charge itself (the rate was set too low for the smaller number of people from which the Community Charge would actually be collected), and also meant that the council had to pay a larger sum to the County Council by way of precept. The loss to the council was something in excess of £1.3 m. The question was whether this was recoverable from ICL. It was found that there was a breach of an express term. ICL claimed to rely upon a limitation clause to restrict this liability to £100,000 but Scott Baker J found that was ineffective under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the local authority recovered. The Court of Appeal basically agreed with the decision of Scott Baker J, except that the sum recoverable by the council from ICL was reduced to take account of the fact that the loss of revenue from the Community Charge itself had, rightly, been claimed from charge payers the following year. However, what is important here is that it was considered whether terms could be implied by the Sale of Goods Act 1979 into contracts for software.

Sir Iain Glidewell [Was] the contract between the parties subject to any implied term as to quality or fitness for purpose, and if so, what was the nature of that term? Consideration of this question during argument led to discussion of a more general question, namely: ‘Is software goods?’ To seek to answer this question, it is necessary first to be clear about the meaning of some of the words used in argument.

In his judgment, Scott Baker J ([1995] FSR 686, p 698) adopted a description of a computer system which contains the following passage which I have found helpful:

> By itself hardware can do nothing. The really important part of the system is the software. Programs are the instructions or commands that tell the hardware what to do. The program itself is an algorithm or formula. It is of necessity contained in a physical medium. A program in machine readable form must be contained on a machine readable

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2 [1996] 4 All ER 481.  
medium, such as paper cards, magnetic cards, magnetic tapes, discs, drums...

In relation to COMCIS, the property in the program, that is, the intangible ‘instructions or commands’, remained with ICL. Under the contract, St Albans was licensed to use the program. This is a common feature of contracts of this kind. However, in order that the program should be encoded in the computer itself, it was necessarily first recorded on a disk, from which it could be transferred to the computer. During the course of the hearing the term ‘software’ was used to include both the (tangible) disk onto which the COMCIS program had been encoded and the (intangible) program itself. In order to answer the question, however, it is necessary to distinguish between the program and the disk carrying the program.

In both the Sale of Goods Act 1979, s 61, and the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982, s 18, the definition of goods includes ‘all personal chattels other than things in action and money’. Clearly, a disk is within this definition. Equally clearly, a program, of itself, is not.

If a disk carrying a program is transferred, by way of sale or hire, and the program is in some way defective, so that it will not instruct or enable the computer to achieve the intended purpose, is this a defect in the disk? Put more precisely, would the seller or hirer of the disk be in breach of the terms as to quality and fitness for purpose implied by s 14 of the 1979 Act and s 9 of the 1982 Act? Mr Dehn QC, for ICL, argues that they would not. He submits that the defective program in my example would be distinct from the tangible disk, and thus that the ‘goods’—the disk—would not be defective.

There is no English authority on this question… We were referred as was Scott Baker J, to a decision of Rogers J in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Toby Constructions Products Pty Ltd v Computa Bar (Sales) Pty Ltd [1983] NSWLR 48. The decision in that case was that the sale of a whole computer system, including both hardware and software, was a sale of ‘goods’ within the New South Wales legislation, which defines goods in similar terms to those in the English statute. That decision was in my respectful view clearly correct, but it does not answer the present question. Indeed Rogers J specifically did not answer it. In expressing an opinion I am therefore venturing where others have, no doubt wisely, not trodden.

Suppose I buy an instruction manual on the maintenance and repair of a particular make of car. The instructions are wrong in an important respect. Anybody who follows them is likely to cause serious damage to the engine of his car. In my view, the instructions are an integral part of the manual. The manual including the instructions, whether in book or video cassette, would in my opinion be ‘goods’ within the meaning of the 1979 Act, and the defective instructions would result in a breach of the implied terms in s 14.

If this is correct, I can see no logical reason why it should not also be correct in relation to a computer disk onto which a program designed and intended to instruct or enable a computer to achieve particular functions has been encoded. If the disk is sold or hired by the computer manufacturer, but the program is defective, in my opinion there would prima facie be a breach of the terms as to quality and fitness for purpose implied by the 1979 Act or the 1982 Act.
Some unease may be generated by the idea of treating an error in the instructions in a manual as a defect in goods that could constitute a breach of the terms implied by s 14 of the SGA 1979. Someone exercising professional expertise is normally only required to do so with due care and would not usually be subject to strict liability, such as that embodied in the implied terms. However, whatever the situation in relation to an instruction manual, there may be a stronger argument for characterising software as goods because of its functional nature, a point which will be returned to below.\textsuperscript{4}

It should be emphasised that Sir Iain Gildewell’s comments were \textit{obiter}. There was an express term which covered the situation and, in any event, the case could not be one for the sale, or even hire, of goods, no matter what the characterisation of software. The disks containing the program were not supplied to the council; rather, a representative of ICL installed the program onto the council’s computers and the council did not come into possession of the disks as such. The case is an important one, but the question of categorising software should now be addressed generally.

The starting point for considering whether software can be goods should be the statutory definition of goods. Section 61 of the SGA 1979 states:

‘Goods’ includes all personal chattels other than things in action and money...

One argument is that a computer program cannot be goods, as it is, in nature, information and not a ‘personal chattel’. Another is that it is intellectual property, and so is covered by the exclusion from the definition of ‘things in action’. These two arguments should be considered.

\textbf{INFORMATION}

The argument that a program is information and so cannot be goods is put forward by Scott.

\textbf{Software as goods: \textit{nullum simile est idem}}

\textit{Andrew Scott}

\textit{(1987) 4 CL & P 133}

The starting point in determining whether to classify software as goods or services must be the definition of ‘goods’ in s 61 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. This defines ‘goods’ as including all personal chattels other than things in action and money. A personal chattel is a chose in possession, which is a form of personal property, that is, a thing in which a person has property rights.

\footnote{See p 177.}
Software, since it is simply coded information, is altogether different in nature from personal property. In *Prince Albert v Strange* (1849) 1 Mac & G 25, however, Lord Cottenham LC held that the plaintiff could restrain the publication of copies of etchings made by the plaintiff, on the basis of the existence of property rights in those etchings. His Lordship stated:

The property in an author or composer of any work of literature, art or science, such work being unpublished and kept for his private use or pleasure, cannot be disputed.

However, this proposition can no longer be considered good law. In *Fraser v Evans* [1969] 1 QB 349 Lord Denning MR stated that in proper circumstances the courts will restrain the publication or use of confidential information; but that the jurisdiction of the court to do so was not based on the existence of property rights or contract, but on the duty of good faith. The existence of property rights in information has been repudiated by high authority. In *Boardman v Phipps* [1967] 2 AC 46 Lord Upjohn stated:

In general information is not property at all. It is normally open to all who have eyes to read and ears to hear...[C]onfidential information is often and for many years has been described as the property of the donor... But in the end the real truth is that it is not property in any normal sense but equity will restrain its transmission to another if in breach of some confidential relationship.

Therefore rights with respect to information concern control over its use. It was this proposition which formed the basis of the decision of the stipendiary magistrate in *Oxford v Moss* [1978] 68 Cr App R 183, which was upheld on appeal. The defendant, who was an engineering undergraduate, was charged with the theft of confidential information from the senate of his university. This information consisted of the questions set for an examination. On appeal by the prosecutor, the Divisional Court held that confidential information was not ‘property’ within the meaning of s 4 of the Theft Act 1968, and therefore could not be appropriated.

Information, although not property, has value in itself. The courts recognise and protect this intrinsic value by permitting the author or donor control over its use. When information is recorded on some medium, that medium is then invested with the value of the information. Information, and therefore software, cannot be considered as ‘goods’ within the definition contained in s 61.

However, when a program is embodied on a computer disk or other such medium, the argument that it is simply information can be met from two perspectives—(a) the physical, and (b) the functional.
Chapter 4: Information Technology Law

(a) Physical

The physical argument, that the program has physical form on the disk or other such medium, was recognised in the St Albans case.\(^5\) It was also used in the criminal case of \(R v\) Whiteley,\(^6\) where the question was whether the alteration and deletion of computer files by a ‘hacker’ could constitute criminal damage within s 1(1) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971. Additionally, it has been focused on by the US courts, for example, by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in South Central Bell Telephone Co v Barthelemy.\(^7\) In considering whether the software Bell had acquired constituted ‘tangible personal property’ for the purposes of a New Orleans sales and use tax, it was said:

South Central Bell argues that the software is merely ‘knowledge’ or ‘intelligence’, and as such is not corporeal and thus not taxable. We disagree with South Central Bell’s characterisation. The software at issue is not merely knowledge but rather knowledge recorded in a physical form which has physical existence, takes up space on the tape, disk or hard drive, makes physical things happen and can be perceived by the senses…

\textbf{R v Whiteley}
\begin{flushright}
(1991) 33 Cr App R 25
\end{flushright}

Lord Lane LCJ gave the opinion of the Court of Appeal.

The principle ground of the defence which has formed the basis of the appeal to this court was that a distinction had to be made between the disc itself and the intangible information held upon it which, it was contended, was not capable of damage as defined in law. The argument put before the court of trial and repeated here was as follows:

The computers and the disc cannot be damaged by the sort of interference performed by the appellant. They were designed to perform a particular function and, despite the appellants actions, they were still capable of performing that function. Neither the computers nor the discs suffered any physical damage at all. Any destruction or alteration of the information on a disc, or the writing of information to a disc, only affects information on the disc and does not damage or impair the usefulness of the disc itself…

Section 10(1) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971, so far as material to the present case, defines ‘property’ as ‘property of a tangible nature’, whether real or personal…

The evidence before the jury was that discs are so constructed as to contain upon them thousands, if not millions, of magnetic particles. By issuing commands to the computer, impulses are produced which magnetise or demagnetise those particles in a particular way. By that

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\(^5\) In the St Albans case, Sir Iain Glidewell recognised that a program, ‘of itself’, was not goods, but concluded that it could be such when embodied in a disk—see above.


\(^7\) 643 So 2d 1240 (La 1994).
means it is possible to write data or information on the discs and to program them to fulfil a variety of functions. By the same method it is possible to delete or alter data, information or instructions which have previously been written on the disc. The argument advanced on behalf of the appellant when reduced to its essence seems to us to be this. That since the state of the magnetic particles on the disc is not perceptible by the unaided human senses, for instance sight or touch, the appellant’s activities only affected the ‘intangible information contained’ on the disc itself even if the absence of such a perceptible change is not fatal to the prosecution, goes on the submission, interference with particles cannot amount to damage in law.

It seems to us that the contention contains a basic fallacy. What the Act requires to be proved is that intangible property has been damaged, not necessarily that the damage itself should be tangible. There can be no doubt that the magnetic particles upon the metal disc were part of the discs and if the appellant was proved to have intentionally and without lawful excuse altered the particles in such a way as to cause an impairment of the value or usefulness of the disc to the owner, there would be damage within the meaning of s 1. The fact that the alteration could only be perceived by operating the computer did not make the alterations any the less real, or the damage...

It should be noted that the type of situation which was considered in Whiteley was taken outside the scope of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 by the Computer Misuse Act 1990, following the recommendations of the Law Commission. The basic approach remains of interest here. It emphasises the physical embodiment of the program on the computer disk or other such medium.

(b) Functional

The second point to be raised, against the argument that software cannot be goods because it is information, is that based on its functional aspect. In the South Central Bell case (above), reference was made to the fact that the software is used to make a computer (that is, hardware) ‘perform a desired function’ and this aspect of software should now be considered.

It should be asked whether a program, embodied on a disk and ready to be fed into a computer, is merely information. Is it distinguishable from the exam paper in Oxford v Moss which was referred to by Scott? If a program is likened to a literary work, which is the categorisation applied to it to provide it with the protection of copyright, then it is most like an instruction manual or ‘how to’ book, which was the analogy made by Sir Iain Glidewell in St Albans v ICL. Certainly, software is not like a novel! However, a program differs from even an
instruction manual. It does not simply tell the individual what to do. The software interacts directly, with the hardware. In *St Albans v ICL*,\(^\text{12}\) at first instance, Scott Baker J was of the opinion that software ‘is not simply abstract information like information passed by word of mouth. Entering software alters the contents of the hardware’. This may not be an entirely accurate view of the effect of software on hardware but the general idea is clear enough—software is not mere information, it has a direct effect on hardware. Another point can also be made, following on from this. If there is a defect in software, there may well not be a point at which an individual has an opportunity to exercise judgment, assess what is occurring and intervene to prevent some unexpected, and unwanted, result. Software may be information, but it is not simply information.

An analogy can be made here with the US case of *Winter v G P Puttnam & Sons*.\(^\text{13}\) In that case, the question arose as to the applicability of product liability laws to a book on collecting and cooking mushrooms. It was held that the information contained in the book was not a product. What is of interest here is that, in coming to that conclusion, the court contrasted the situation before it with one involving software. It was indicated that software would be a product. The software was seen as something more than just information.\(^\text{14}\) It can be contended that the functional aspect of software strengthens the case for the ‘goods’ categorisation to cover both a disk and the program embodied on it.

**INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY**

As we have seen, the definition of ‘goods’ in the 1979 Act excludes ‘things in action’ and it might be argued that programs are covered by this exclusion and, therefore, are not goods. However, the program is not itself copyright; it is protected by copyright. This was recognised by Steyn J in *Eurodynamics Systems v General Automation Ltd*.\(^\text{15}\) He said, ‘Although the ideas and concepts involved


\(^{13}\) 938 F 2d 1033 (9th Cir 1991).

\(^{14}\) See, further, Saxby, S (ed), *Encyclopedia of Information Technology Law*, 1990, London: Sweet & Maxwell, p 7084. In fact, this type of distinction has been made in relation to US product liability laws in a way which might be used to argue that a program supplied as a written source code could constitute goods. In *Saloomey v Jeppesen* 707 F 2d 671 (1983), airline charts were not treated like other printed information. When a chart failed to show a mountain which was in the vicinity of an airport, it was held to be a defective product. Such information is relied on more automatically, and with less scope for assessment, than most information, and the analogy with a computer program can be made. For discussion of the question of product liability, see below, Chapter 5.
in software remained [the defendants'] intellectual property, the reality of the
transaction is that there has been the transfer of a product'. When there is a
contract for the supply of a program, it is not simply an assignment of intellectual
property rights. In fact, as has been indicated,\(^\text{16}\) in most cases there will not be an
assignment of the copyright in a program, although licenses are normally
granted. Properly identified, the problem is whether, when intellectual property
rights are in question, they dominate the transaction to prevent the disk, with
the program embodied in it, from being regarded as goods. Copyright restrictions
are not seen as preventing a book, video tape or compact disc from being goods,
but such items do not have a functional use in the way that software does, and
that difference in use is not only noteworthy in itself, but also makes a
considerable difference to the impact of intellectual property rights. Intellectual
property rights impact upon the enjoyment of books and videos to a very much
more limited extent than upon the enjoyment of software.\(^\text{17}\) A book can be read
or a video watched without any need for the purchaser to obtain a licence to
avoid being in breach of copyright. In contrast, the use of software will entail
copying it onto hardware, which, in the absence of a licence, would, \textit{prima facie},
be in breach of copyright,\(^\text{18}\) although the impact of the EC Directive on this must
now be borne in mind.\(^\text{19}\) In other words, the basic purpose for which a book or
video is purchased can be fulfilled without any need for the purchaser to consider
intellectual property rights. The same is not true of software. Indeed, the view
has been taken that software cannot be likened to books or other such goods, but
must be regarded as \textit{sui generis}:\(^\text{20}\)

The analogy with a printed book is, in my opinion, false. Even if one considered
the wider field of printed material, there would be no true analogy. A book
typically is intended to be read, not copied, as a way of enjoying or using the
object...there are no limitations on accessing the information which affect
readers generally... In the case of software there is no possibility of accessing
the information without copying it. In my opinion the only acceptable view is
that the supply of proprietary software for a price is a contract \textit{sui generis}.

However, the argument that software cannot be goods because of the intellectual
property rights involved was considered by the US Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in \textit{Advent Systems Ltd v Unisys Corp}.\(^\text{21}\) The court had to determine
the applicability of Art 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code to a contract under

\(^{15}\) (1988) unreported, 6 September.
\(^{16}\) See above, p 115.
\(^{18}\) CDPA 1988, s 17(1).
\(^{19}\) See above, p 117, in relation to the impact of the EC Directive on the Legal Protection of
Computer Programs (91/250/EC).
Penrose.
which Advent agreed to supply hardware and ‘license software’ to Unisys.\textsuperscript{22} Weiss J, delivering the opinion of the court, said this:

That a computer program may be copyrightable as intellectual property does not alter the fact that once in the form of a floppy disk or other medium, the program is tangible, movable and available in the marketplace.

The court emphasised the physical embodiment of the program in a disk or other such medium in concluding that it was goods, and not merely intellectual property, and fell within Art 2. This same approach could be taken to indicate that a program embodied on a disk would be goods under the SGA 1979. However, some further, related points must be considered in relation to whether a contract for the supply of a disk containing a program can be a contract for the sale of goods within the 1979 Act.

\textbf{SALE OF GOODS TRANSACTIONS}

Section 2(1) of the SGA 1979 states that a contract of sale of goods is:

\begin{quote}
...a contract by which the seller transfers or agrees to transfer the property in goods to the buyer for a money consideration called the price.
\end{quote}

The ‘property in goods’ is not the physical object but, basically, the ownership of the goods.\textsuperscript{23} The person to whom a disk is supplied will take it subject to the restrictions of copyright and a licence will normally be involved. The question is whether those restrictions are sufficient to prevent that person acquiring the ‘property’ in the goods. Certainly, copyright restrictions are not seen as preventing there from being a sale of a book, video tape or compact disc, but, as has been indicated, such restrictions impact rather differently on books from their effect on software. However, if a disk with a program on it is classified as goods, it may be doubted whether this type of argument would prevail.

Of course, if there is clearly no transfer of the ownership, even of the disk or other such medium (which may well occur where non-standard software is in question), but a mere supply under an agreement that the disk will be returned when the program licence terminates, then the contract will not fall within the 1979 Act. However, it should be remembered that similar terms to those implied

\textsuperscript{21} 925 F 2d 670 (1991). But see Conopco Inc v McCreadie 826 F Supp 855 (1991). The argument was not considered, as such, in Beta v Adobe, but some support for it may be found in the approach there taken.

\textsuperscript{22} Article 2 applies to goods and intellectual property is outside the Uniform Commercial Code. See, generally, Rodau, A, ‘Computer software: does Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code apply?’ (1986) Emory LJ 853.

by the SGA 1979 are implied into contracts for the hire of goods by the SGSA 1982.

HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE AND PRAGMATISM

Consideration has been given to the arguments that a program is information or copyright and so cannot constitute goods. Some arguments in favour of that classification have been indicated, but we should now consider two further such arguments. One relates to the situation where software is sold with hardware, but another, based on pragmatism, is more general.

Hardware and software

In *St Albans v ICL* 24 Scott Baker J, and subsequently Sir Iain Glidewell in the Court of Appeal, 25 adopted the description of a computer system used in the Australian case of *Toby Constructions Products Ltd v Computer Bar Sales Pty Ltd.* 26

By itself hardware can do nothing. The really important part of the system is the software. Programs are the instructions or commands that tell the hardware what to do.

On this basis, where software is supplied with hardware, it is possible to draw an analogy with other cases falling within the SGA 1979 to argue that a problem in the program could lead to a breach of one of the implied terms as to quality or fitness for purpose in s 14. In *Wormell v RHM Agriculture Ltd,* 27 consideration was given to whether there was a breach of the term implied by s 14(3) of the SGA 1979 through the supply of weedkiller with misleading instructions. There was nothing wrong with the weedkiller as such—it would have been effective if properly used.

25 [1996] 4 All ER 481.
27 [1986] 1 All ER 769.
Wormell v RHM Agriculture Ltd
[1986] 1 All ER 769

Piers Ashworth QC [Willis v FMC Machinery and Chemicals Ltd (1976) 68 DLR 3d 127] was a case where the defendants sold a weedkiller which, when used on its own, was safe and effective, but, when mixed with an insecticide, reacted with that insecticide (the insecticide was also perfectly safe), was dangerous and destroyed the crop. The weedkiller taken by itself was certainly fit for its purpose. Nicholson J said this (p 148):

Having determined that there was in this contract an implied condition as to fitness of the product for a particular purpose, it becomes necessary to decide whether or not there was a breach of that condition. It is clear, without doubt, that Dacthal W-75 was fit for controlling weed infestation in the growing of turnips. However, it is also clear in the circumstances of this case that the use of the material Dacthal W-75 in combination with certain insecticides and under certain climatic conditions causes severe damage to the turnip plants. The evidence in this case establishes to my satisfaction that Dacthal W-75 is potentially dangerous to turnip plants and consequently cannot be said to be reasonably fit for use in the control of weeds because it cannot safely be applied in conjunction with certain insecticides under certain climatic conditions (not unusual in PEI). Where information of the potential danger is not given to a buyer as it was not in this case, there was a breach of the condition of fitness as set out in s 16(1) of the Sale of Goods Act.

That condition was similar to the condition of fitness in the Sale of Goods Act 1893.

That is in some respects the converse of the present case. It was a case where a warning of danger to the crops was not given. Certainly a warning of danger to the crops was given here. However, it does establish that in considering whether or not goods are fit for a purpose, instructions or warnings contained on the container must be taken into account or at any rate can properly be taken into account, and Rees J came to the same conclusion.

My view is that the instructions here were misleading. I appreciate that they are approved by the Advisory Council and by the schemes run within the industry. I appreciate that they cannot be changed without permission. Nevertheless, the onus must be firstly on the manufacturer to ensure that his instructions are clear. These in my view, were not clear, indeed I think they were positively misleading.

If a retailer then sells the goods (that is, the chemical together with its container and instructions) and those instructions make the goods not reasonably fit for their purpose, in my view there is a breach of s 14(3) of the 1979 Act. Furthermore, it is a breach by the retailer, ie the seller, even though the seller himself may not have sufficient technical knowledge to know whether or not these instructions are accurate. He of course would have his remedy against the manufacturer, and in this case it has been made clear to me that Shell are standing behind the retailer.
In the *Wormell* case, the Court of Appeal reversed the finding of a breach of s 14(3) by Piers Ashworth QC. However, they did so on the basis that, in the instant case, the instructions were not misleading. They did not cast doubt on the idea that a breach could occur if instructions were absent or misleading. There is some support here for the idea that a defective program could lead to a breach of the terms implied by s 14 if it was supplied in a package with hardware. However, some unease might be generated if the treatment of software packaged with hardware was divorced from that of software acquired alone.

**Pragmatism**

In the *St Albans* case, both Scott Baker J and Sir Iain Glidewell did not confine their comments to a program supplied with hardware. They indicated that a program supplied on a disk or other such medium, but without any hardware, should also be treated as ‘goods’. Scott Baker J’s reasoning was basically pragmatic. He took the view that otherwise no statutory regime would apply and the recipient would be unprotected in the absence of express terms. This type of pragmatic argument was seen as persuasive by Napier.

The future of information technology law
Brian Napier
[1992] CLJ 46

...we must first acknowledge the problem of knowing what software is in legal terms. When we acquire software, we acquire structured and coded information of a highly specialised nature. Software is of course protected by the law of intellectual property, but it is not itself intellectual property. It is essentially information, and as Lord Upjohn stated many years ago, information as such is generally not property. The law recognises its value by allowing restrictions on its use, not by bringing it within the realm of ownership. Information cannot be stolen and it would appear that it can be the subject of criminal damage only in so far as it is recorded on a physical storage medium. Thus it would seem to follow inexorably that no ‘goods’ within the meaning of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 are involved if a pure software transaction takes the form of a sale—though judges in England have hesitated to say so. When we buy pure software (ie structured information) we acquire the intellectual achievement of the individual who by his work has produced the information. But that is not all. In almost all cases such

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28 [1987] 3 All ER 75.
30 The argument would seem not to be that the software, or the instructions, are themselves goods, but rather that their deficiencies can nevertheless lead to a breach of the terms implied by s 14 in relation to the undoubted goods—the hardware.
purchase of information is accompanied by the acquisition of the medium—such as a floppy disc or chip—on which it is recorded. We normally acquire title to that medium—at least when we buy the whole product in the shops. But when software is captured on a physical medium do we have, by *specificatio*, creation of a new thing, capable of constituting a ‘good’...? If the answer is ‘yes’, as some have suggested then it might be objected that we have allowed the physical medium to dictate the legal message. But if we say ‘no’ we face a much greater evil—a flat contradiction between our commonsense expectations and legal analysis. Most consumers would be surprised, and rightly so, at the suggestion that the retailer from whom their software was bought guaranteed only the floppy disc and the system documentation (the handbook)—not the performance and quality of the programs recorded on it. The view that recorded software is ‘goods’ has recently been affirmed in the USA by a Court of Appeals considering the scope of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code.

Napier’s comments are in the context of protection for the consumer. The practical benefits of transactions in software being encompassed in an established category of contracts might be seen as more far reaching. In *Advent v Unisys*, in deciding that Art 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code applied, Weis J said:

Applying the UCC to computer software transactions offers substantial benefits to litigants and the courts. The Code offers a uniform body of law on a wide range of questions likely to arise in computer disputes... The importance of software to the commercial world and the advantages to be gained by the uniformity inherent in the UCC are strong policy arguments favoring inclusion.

The SGA 1979 does not provide a complete code. Even in relation to contracts falling within it, there are times when the general law of contract has to be considered. Nevertheless, it covers many issues and, certainly, it is not confined to providing protection for consumers.

However, even though there are undoubted attractions in finding software to be included in a well established legal category, it must be considered whether that is appropriate. The law may say that, henceforth, elephants are to be called mice, but the law cannot say that elephants are mice. Is software too unlike other things which are categorised as goods for the label to be appropriate? The goods which software is most akin to are books, music CDs and video tapes, but one of the factors used to indicate that software is not just information, its functional aspect, also makes it very different from those types of goods. Additionally, despite the comment of Scott Baker J in the *St Albans* case, it should be noted

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33 There are, eg, provisions dealing with payment (s 8), time (s 9), passing of property (ss 16–20B), delivery (ss 27–34) and remedies (ss 38–54).
that programs are not always transferred using a disk or some other such medium. Could a program transferred down a telephone line constitute goods?

That seems unlikely, but, if it cannot, then a problem with the pragmatic argument arises. The ‘goods’ categorisation might provide an existing legal framework for consideration of some transactions involving computer programs but certainly not all. Would categorising as goods a program embodied, and transferred, on a disk or other such medium inappropriately divorce its legal categorisation from that of programs transferred without the use of such a medium?

In Beta Computers (Europe) Ltd v Adobe Systems (Europe) Ltd, a Scottish case which dealt with the question of the effectiveness of a ‘shrink wrap’ licence, Lord Penrose, obiter, considered the contention that software should be regarded as goods. He said:

This reasoning [that software is goods] appears to me to be unattractive, at least, in the context with which this case is concerned. It appears to emphasise the role of the physical medium and to relate the transaction in the medium to sale or hire of goods. It would have the somewhat odd result that the dominant characteristic of the complex product, in terms of value or the significant interests of the parties, would be subordinated to the medium by which it was transmitted to the user in analysing the true nature and effect of the contract.

The final point to be made here relates to Scott Baker J’s concerns, in the St Albans case, that if the supply of software is not a supply of goods it will be ‘something to which no statutory rules apply, thus leaving the recipient unprotected in the absence of express agreement.’ The SGA 1979 is largely based on the 1893 Act of the same name. Legislation covering other contracts dealing with goods occurred much later (for example, the SGSA 1982). However, prior to the existence of wider legislation, the common law proved capable of often implying the same, or similar, terms into contracts dealing with goods which did not fall within the Sale of Goods Acts. Similarly, it would not be impossible for the court to find that the common law implied terms that programs should be of ‘satisfactory quality’ and ‘reasonably fit’ for the purchaser’s ‘particular

35 It seems doubtful that such a contract could be considered as a contract for the sale of goods. Such a categorisation would seem contrary to an approach which emphasises the importance of the embodiment of the program in a disk or other such medium. However, it has been indicated that it is uncertain whether electricity can constitute goods (Guest, AG (ed), Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, 4th edn, London: Sweet & Maxwell, para 1–084) and, if it could be so treated, it could similarly be argued that a program supplied by downloading could be goods (see ‘Computer programs as goods under the UCC’ (1979) 77 Mich L Rev 1149).
36 And of some cases where such a medium was used but not delivered to the recipient of the program, as in St Albans City and DC v ICL [1995] FSR 686.
38 See above, p 123.
39 [1995] FSR 686. There was an express term that the computer system would be reasonably fit for the buyer’s purpose in the St Albans case.
purpose’, even if, in all cases or some cases, software is not categorised as goods. When the Court of Appeal considered the St Albans case, Sir Iain Glidewell thought that, in the absence of an express term requiring the program to be fit for its purpose, one could have been implied at common law.41

As will be seen, when consideration is given to the terms implied by s 14 of the SGA 1979, those terms requiring the goods to be of ‘satisfactory quality’ and ‘reasonable fitness’ for the buyer’s ‘particular purpose’ are flexible in their content, and similar terms dealing with the functioning of the program may be appropriate, generally, in contracts for the supply of programs. It is worthwhile considering the terms implied by the SGA 1979 not only because software may be categorised as goods in some cases but also because, even if that is not seen as appropriate in any case, the common law may imply the same or similar terms.

SERVICES

Even if software can be goods and ownership of the disk passes, it may still be argued that it is inappropriate that its supply should be categorised as a sale of goods. It may be argued that the transaction should be regarded as a contract for work and materials (or, more broadly, for ‘services’), rather than for goods. Of course, there may well be found to be a contract for services if no goods are in question. However, what is of particular note here is the distinction between a contract for services, which also involves goods, and one that is simply for the sale of goods. The line between such contracts for services and contracts for the sale of goods has been one which the courts have attempted to draw in many different contexts and it has never proved an easy categorisation to make.42 Nevertheless, it may be a very important distinction. If a contract for the supply of software is one for the sale of goods, then, subject to the possibility of their inapplicability, or of the effectiveness of an exemption clause, the software will have to comply with the statutory implied terms as to description (s 13 of the SGA 1979), satisfactory quality (s 14(2)) and reasonable fitness for the buyer’s particular purpose (s 14(3)). Whilst the terms implied by s 14 set standards by reference to the ‘reasonable person’ (s 14(2)) or require ‘reasonable fitness’ (s 14(3)), they are all nevertheless strict. The seller cannot escape liability for their breach by proving that the problem with the goods was not due to any fault on his or her part.43 In contrast, if what is in question is the provision of a service,

40 Eg, Dodd v Wilson [1946] 2 All ER 691. See, generally, op cit, Atiyah, fn 23.
41 [1996] 4 All ER 481, p 494. The implication envisaged would appear to have been one made ‘in fact’, but such an implied term might be found more generally, ‘in law’. For the implication of terms at common law see above, p 102.
42 See, eg, Samek, RA, ‘Contracts for work and materials’ (1962) 36 ALJ 66.
then the relevant implied term stems from s 13 of the SGSA 1982, which merely requires that, where the supplier of a service acts in the course of a business, he or she should do so with due care. The strict terms, requiring goods to be, *inter alia*, of satisfactory quality, would apply only to goods supplied incidentally to the service.\(^44\) (It is possible for there to be additional terms which are either express or implied at common law, which impose stricter obligations in relation to what is produced by the services,\(^45\) but here we are primarily concerned with the terms implied by statute.)

In the context of contracts concerned with software and the statutory regimes, the impact of a contract being for services rather than goods can be illustrated. If there is a contract to write a bespoke program, which is categorised as a contract for services, then the strict liability would seem only to apply to the fabric of the disk.\(^46\) The content of the program would be the outcome of the services and the relevant statutorily implied term would simply be that requiring the services to be performed with due care. In other words, the strict liability terms would not apply to the product of the services; they would apply only to goods transferred to the other party incidentally to those services. A more complex problem might arise where the contract is for the supply and installation into the purchaser’s system of an ‘off the shelf’ program. If such a contract was characterised as being one for services, because of the work involved in the installation, then it would seem that any aspect of the program adapted by that installation would only be covered by the requirement that the work should be carried out with due care. However, if the ‘off the shelf’ software was goods, then any defect in the program which was not caused by the installation would seem to be subject to the strict requirements of the statutorily implied terms as to fitness for purpose and satisfactory quality.\(^47\)

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43 *Kendall v Lillico* [1969] 2 AC 31; *Frost v Aylesbury Dairy Co* [1905] 1 KB 685.
44 In *Dodd v Wilson* [1946] 2 All ER 691, the contract was for the services of a vet. He was strictly liable when a vaccine with which he inoculated a cow was not reasonably fit for its purpose. Of course, had the problem been with, eg, the way in which the injection was given, he would only have been liable in the absence of due care.
45 Eg, *Greaves & Co (Contractors) v Beynham Meikle and Partners* [1975] 3 All ER 99. An additional term implied at common law, that the software would be reasonably fit for its purpose, may be the explanation of the assumption in *Saphena Computing Ltd v Allied Collection Agencies Ltd* [1995] FSR 616 that it made no difference whether the contract was one for goods or services.
46 But see the assumption in *ibid*, *Saphena*, that it made no difference to the applicability of the strict liability terms as to quality whether the contract was characterised as being for goods or services (p 652, *per* Staughton LJ). See, also, above, fn 44; *St Albans City and DC v ICL* [1995] FSR 686, p 698, below, fn 47.
Two basic approaches to distinguishing contracts for the sale of goods and contracts for the supply of services can be found. These can be seen in the cases of *Lee v Griffin* and *Robinson v Graves*. *Lee v Griffin* was concerned with a contract made by a dentist to supply a set of false teeth, made to fit the individual patient. On appeal, that was concluded to be a contract for the sale of goods. In *Robinson v Graves*, a contract was made with an artist for a portrait of a particular individual and the Court of Appeal concluded that it was a contract for the services of the artist, rather than one for the sale of goods.

*Lee v Griffin*  
*(1861) 1 B & S 272*

**Crompton J...** The main question which arose at the trial was whether the contract...could be treated as one for work and labour, or whether it was a contract for goods sold and delivered. The distinction between these two causes of action is sometimes very fine; but, where the contract is for a chattel to be made and delivered, it clearly is a contract for the sale of goods. There are some cases in which the supply of materials is ancillary to the contract, as in the case of a printer supplying the materials on which a book is printed. In such a case an action might perhaps be brought for work and labour done, and materials provided, as it could hardly be said that the subject matter of the contract was a sale of a chattel; perhaps it is more in the nature of a contract merely to exercise skill and labour... I certainly do not agree to the proposition that the value of the skill and labour, as compared to that of the material supplied, is a criterion by which to decide whether the contract be for work and labour or for the sale of a chattel. Here however, the subject matter of the contract was the supply of goods. The case bears a strong resemblance to that of a tailor supplying a coat, the measurement of the mouth and fitting of the teeth being analogous to the measurement and fitting of the garment.

**Blackburn J...** the question is whether the contract was one for the sale of goods or for work and labour. I think that in all cases, in order to ascertain whether the action ought to be brought for goods sold and delivered, or for work and labour done and materials provided, we must look at the particular contract entered into between the parties. If the contract be such that, when carried out, it would result in the sale of a chattel, the party cannot sue for work and labour; but, if the result of the contract is that the party has done work and labour which ends in nothing that can be the subject of a sale, the party cannot sue for goods sold and delivered. The case of an attorney employed to prepare a deed is an illustration of this latter proposition. It cannot be said that the paper and ink he uses in preparation

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47 Could this provide, on the facts of the case, a justification for the odd assumption of Scott Baker J in *St Albans City and DC v ICL* [1995] FSR 686, p 698 that it made no difference to the implied terms whether the contract was characterised as being for goods or services?  
48 *(1861) 1 B & S 272.*  
49 *[1935]* 1 KB 579.
of the deed are goods sold and delivered. The case of a printer printing a book would most probably fall within the same category… In the present case, the contract was to deliver a thing which, when completed, would have resulted in the sale of a chattel; in other words, the substance of the contract was for goods sold and delivered. I do not think that the test to apply to these cases is whether the value of the work exceeds that of the materials used in its execution; for if a sculptor were employed to execute a work of art, greatly as his skill and labour, supposing it to be of the highest description, might exceed the value of the marble on which he worked, the contract would, in my opinion, nevertheless be a contract for the sale of a chattel.

*Robinson v Graves*

[1935] 1 KB 579

Greer LJ I can imagine that nothing would be more surprising to a client going to a portrait painter to have his portrait painted and to the artist who was accepting the commission than to be told that they were making a bargain about the sale of goods. It is, of course, possible that a picture may be ordered in such circumstances as will make it an order for goods to be supplied in the future, but it does not follow that that is the inference to be drawn in every case as between the client and the artist. Looking at the propositions involved from the point of view of interpreting the words in the English language, it seems to me that the painting of a portrait in these circumstances would not, in the ordinary use of the English language, be deemed to be the purchase and sale of that which is produced by the artist. It would, on the contrary, be held to be an undertaking by the artist to exercise such skill as he was possessed of in order to produce for reward a thing which would ultimately have to be accepted by the client. If that is so, the contract in this case was not a contract for the sale of goods.

… If you find as they did in *Lee v Griffin* that the substance of the contract was the production of something to be sold by the dentist to the dentist’s customer, then that is a sale of goods. But if the substance of the contract, on the other hand, is that skill and labour have to be exercised for the production of the article and that it is only ancillary to that that there will pass from the artist to his client or customer some materials in addition to the skill involved in the production of the portrait, that does not make any difference to the result, because the substance of the contract is the skill and experience of the artist in producing the picture.

… For these reasons I am of opinion that in this case the substance of the matter was an agreement for the exercise of skill and it was only incidental that some materials would have to pass from the artist to the gentleman who commissioned the portrait. For these reasons I think that this was not a contract for the sale of goods.

The Court of Appeal in *Robinson v Graves* attempted to argue that its approach was consistent with the line taken in *Lee v Griffin*, but it is clear that there are two different approaches operating.
In *Lee v Griffin*,\(^{50}\) the basic approach was that if the services produced goods, the ownership of which the supplier transferred to the other party, there was a contract for the sale of goods. This line was mitigated only in the situation where the transfer of ownership of any goods could be regarded as relatively insignificant, as in the example of the solicitor drawing up the deed. Clearly, Blackburn J’s references to the ‘substance’ of the contract were not intended to be taken any further than that.

*Robinson v Graves* takes an approach which allows much more scope for a contract to be characterised as one for services (or work and materials). It is a matter of looking for the dominant element in the contract—the end product or the skill and expertise of the person providing the services. This is commonly described as looking for the ‘substance of the contract’ but, as has already been indicated, this should not be confused with the line taken by Blackburn J in *Lee v Griffin*.

**The supply of software**

Obviously, the acquisition of bespoke software provides the strongest case for arguing that a contract for the supply of software must be regarded as one for services rather than goods. However, even then, the categorisation should not be assumed in every case. Two particular examples can be suggested where a contract for bespoke software might nevertheless be characterised as one for goods. The first example relates to the case in which, although the software is being written because it was requested by one particular company, the suppliers realise that there will be a market to supply it to other companies and intend to do so.\(^{51}\) It might be argued that the intent to subsequently ‘mass supply’ the software could affect the characterisation of a contract to supply what was, at that stage, bespoke software, making it appropriate to characterise it as being for goods, rather than services. The other example concerns the ‘turn key contract’. Even where goods are to be manufactured by a seller, it is possible for that seller to contract simply in relation to a result (the goods), rather than the manufacture and delivery of the goods. The former case may be argued to be one for the sale of goods rather than the supply of services and this argument would seem to apply to the so called turn key contract. That is the type of contract where a complete system is installed and then simply handed over to the party to whom it is being supplied. (The name ‘turn key contracts’ stems from those cases where the acquirer is ‘locked out’ until the system is completed, only at that point being given access to it.) In such contracts, the way in which the

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\(^{50}\) See, also, eg, *J Marcel (Furriers) Ltd v Tapper* [1953] 1 WLR 49.

\(^{51}\) This was the fact situation in *Saphena Computing Ltd v Allied Collection Agencies* [1995] FSR 616, which led to a dispute as to the ownership of copyright.
supplier arrives at the completed product seems to be irrelevant to the other party. It is a contract purely concerned with results and a ‘goods’ rather than ‘services’ categorisation may be appropriate, even where what is in question is bespoke software.

After considering bespoke software, modified standard (or modified ‘off the shelf’) software should be looked at. The approach taken in *Robinson v Graves* could provide a strong argument in favour of the services classification where some modified standard software is in question, depending upon the extent and novelty of the modification.

At the other end of the spectrum from bespoke software is standard, or ‘off the shelf’, software. There seems to be little scope for an argument that, even if such software is goods, a contract for its supply must nevertheless be characterised as one for services. In *Toby Constructions Products Ltd v Computer Bar Sales Pty Ltd*, where the contract was for the supply of a computer system composed of hardware and ‘off the shelf’ software, Rogers J concluded that he was dealing with a contract for goods and dismissed the argument that it was services that were in question. He said:

> Whilst representing the fruits of much research work, [the software] was in current jargon, off the shelf, in a sense, mass produced. There can be no comparison with a one off painting. Rather is the comparison with a mass produced print of a painting.

**SECTIONS 13–15 OF THE SGA 1979**

These sections imply terms into contracts for the sale of goods. They may prove very useful to the purchaser of defective software if such software is categorised as goods. However, as has been suggested, even if software is not characterised as goods, the courts may imply similar terms at common law. The value of examining these terms does not solely lie in the possibility that software will be construed as goods.

As has already been indicated, the possibility of excluding or restricting liability for breaches of the terms implied by ss 13–15 is restricted by s 6 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act (UCTA) 1977. The status of the implied terms should also be noted. They are conditions, and breach of a condition normally gives the injured party the right to reject the goods, as well as claim damages, no matter how trivial the breach. However, the effect of a breach of these conditions has

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52 See above.
55 *St Albans City and DC v ICL* [1996] 4 All ER 481; see above, p 185.
56 See above, p 144.
Section 15A of the SGA 1979 now states:

(1) Where in the case of a contract of sale—

(a) the buyer would, apart from this subsection, have the right to reject goods by reason of a breach on the part of the seller of a term implied by sections 13, 14, or 15 above; but

(b) the breach is so slight that it would be unreasonable for him to reject them, then, if the buyer does not deal as consumer,

the breach is not to be treated as a breach of condition but may be treated as a breach of warranty.

(2) This section applies unless a contrary intention appears in, or is to be implied from, the contract.

(3) It is for the seller to show that a breach fell within subsection (1)(b) above.

This means that (subject to contrary intention), if the buyer does not ‘deal as consumer’, then he or she has no right to reject the goods for a breach which is so trivial that it would be unreasonable to do so.

SALE BY DESCRIPTION—s 13

Section 13(1) of the SGA 1979 states:

Where there is a contract for the sale of goods by description, there is an implied term that the goods will correspond with their description.

Two basic questions arise under the section: when is a sale ‘by description’ and what constitutes ‘a description’ for the purposes of s 13?

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57 SSGA 1994, s 4, following the recommendations of the Law Commission (Law Com No 160, Cmd 137, 1987).

58 This phrase is taken from the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, where it is defined in s 12 (s 61(5A) Sale of Goods Act 1979). See above, p 145.

59 This innovation is analogous to the common law innominate term. However, when a term is innominate, rather than a condition or warranty, the right to terminate the contract for breach, or, in the language of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, the right to reject the goods, depends upon whether the injured party has been substantially deprived of all the benefit which he or she was intended to derive from the contract (Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha [1962] 2 QB 26). I.e., when a term is innominate, the right to reject is only present if the breach has very serious consequences. In contrast, s 15A means that rejection for breach of one of the terms implied by ss 13–15 is always available, except where the breach is trivial. Section 15A does not equate the implied terms with innominate terms but it is in keeping with their development. Both prevent a trivial breach from being used opportunistically, by the injured party, to escape from a contract which has simply become a bad bargain from that party’s perspective. See Koffman, L and Macdonald, E, The Law of Contract, 3rd edn, 1998, Croydon: Tolley, pp 121–24.
'By description'

Obvious examples will immediately spring to mind of situations in which there will clearly be a sale ‘by description’. It would seem inevitable that there will be a sale by description when the contract is for unascertained goods, for example (that is, goods not identified when the contract is made, such as a contract for purely generic goods—5,000 tons of coal). In relation to specific goods (that is, goods identified and agreed upon at the time that the contract is made), the obvious example of a sale by description is where buyer has not seen the goods before the contract is made.60 However, it is clear that sale by description is not restricted to such cases. There may be a sale by description where goods are seen, and even selected, by the buyer. Section 13(3) states:

A sale of goods is not prevented from being a sale by description by reason only that, being exposed for sale or hire, they are selected by the buyer.

This means that goods displayed in a shop and selected from the shelf by the buyer may still be sold by description. However, the emphasis here is on ‘may’. The question still arises as to when the goods involved in such sales, or other types of sales, are sold by description. In Grant v Australian Knitting Mills [1936] AC 85, Lord Wright said (p 100):

...a thing is sold by description though it is specific, so long as it is sold not merely as the specific thing but as the thing corresponding to a description.

In other words, the question is whether the parties were merely contracting about the thing in front of them (for example) or that thing as something corresponding to a description.61 In the latter case, the sale is ‘by description’. This was seen in terms of reliance by the Court of Appeal in Harlingdon & Leinster Enterprises v Christopher Hull Fine Art.62

Harlingdon & Leinster Enterprises v
Christopher Hull Fine Art
[1991] 1 QB 564

The defendant had two paintings for sale which had been described in a 1980 sale catalogue as the work of Gabrielle Munter, an artist of the German expressionist school. The defendant telephoned the plaintiff, telling him that he had two Munters for sale. When the plaintiff came to the defendant’s gallery, the defendant made it clear that he had no expertise in German expressionist painting. The plaintiff saw the paintings and bought one for £6,000. The invoice described the painting as being by Munter. The painting was discovered to be a fake and the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that there was a breach of the term implied by the Sale of Goods Act 1979, s 13(1). The

60 Varley v Whipp [1900] 1 QB 513.
61 See, also, Beale v Taylor [1967] 1 WLR 1193.
majority of the court, with Stuart-Smith dissenting, held that there had not been a sale by description.

Nourse LJ Section 13(1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 is in these terms:

Where there is a contract for the sale of goods by description, there is an implied condition that the goods will correspond with the description.

The sales to which the subsection is expressed to apply are sales ‘by description’. Authority apart, those words would suggest that the description must be influential in the sale, not necessarily alone, but so as to become an essential term, ie a condition, of the contract. Without such influence a description cannot be said to be one by which the contract for the sale of the goods is made.

I think that the authorities to which we were referred are consistent with this view of section 13(1)...

... It is suggested that the significance which some of these authorities attribute to the buyer’s reliance on the description is misconceived. I think that that criticism is theoretically correct. In theory it is no doubt possible for a description of goods which is not relied on by the buyer to become an essential term of a contract for their sale. But in practice it is very difficult, and perhaps impossible, to think of facts where that would be so. The description must have a sufficient influence in the sale to become an essential term of the contract and the correlative of influence is reliance. Indeed, reliance by the buyer is the natural index of a sale by description. It is true that the question must, as always, be judged objectively and it may be said that previous judicial references have been to subjective or actual reliance. But each of those decisions, including that of Judge Oddie in the present case, can be justified on an objective basis. For all practical purposes, I would say that there cannot be a contract for the sale of goods by description where it is not within the reasonable contemplation of the parties that the buyer is relying on the description.

Slade LJ While some judicial \textit{dicta} seem to support the view that there can be no sale by description unless there is actual reliance on the description by the purchaser, I am not sure that this is strictly correct in principle. If a party to a contract wishes to claim relief in respect of a misrepresentation as to a matter which did not constitute a term of the contract, his claim will fail unless he is able to show that he relied on this representation in entering into the contract; in general, however, if a party wishes to claim relief in respect of a breach of a \textit{term} of the contract (whether it be a condition or warranty) he need prove no actual reliance.

Nevertheless, where a question arises as to whether a sale of goods was one by description, the presence or absence of reliance on the description may be very relevant in so far as it throws light on the intentions of the parties at the time of the contract. If there was no such reliance by the purchaser, this may be powerful evidence that the parties did not contemplate that the authenticity of the description should constitute a term of the contract—in other words, that they contemplated that the purchaser would be buying the goods as they were. If, on the other hand, there was such reliance (as in \textit{Varley v Whipp} [1900] 1 QB 513, where the
purchaser had never seen the goods) this may be equally powerful
evidence that it was contemplated by both parties that the correctness of
the description would be a term of the contract (so as to bring it within
section 13(1)).

Note the different degrees of reliance which Slade and Nourse LJJ referred to.
Nourse LJ referred to sufficient reliance for the description to be an ‘essential
term’—a condition, whilst Slade LJ seems to have considered that sufficient
reliance to make it a term will suffice. As we shall see, there is only very limited
scope for a descriptive term to be the appropriate type of description to
fall within s 13. The greater reliance indicated by Nourse LJ is in keeping
with that.63

What constitutes a ‘description’ for the purposes of s 13?

At first sight, it might seem obvious what is being referred to when s 13 says that
goods must correspond with their description. However, not everything which
would be regarded as a description of the goods in everyday terms will constitute
a ‘description’ for the purposes of s 13. In fact, modern case law takes a very
restrictive view of which descriptions fall within s 13.

It has already become clear that only descriptions which are also terms of the
contract in their own right can constitute ‘descriptions’ for the purposes of s 13.
In other words, s 13 does not alter the balance between terms and
representations.64 However, not even all descriptive terms will now constitute
‘descriptions’ for the purposes of s 13.

In the past, in cases such as Re Moore & Co and Landauer & Co,65 a very wide
approach was taken in relation to which descriptive terms were capable of
falling within s 13. In that case, there was a contract for the sale of Australian
tinned fruit, packed in cases containing 30 tins each. The correct overall
number of tins was delivered but some of them were packed in cases of 24 tins.
The arbitrator found that it made no difference to the market value of the goods
whether they were packed in cases of 24 or 30 tins. The Court of Appeal,
nevertheless, held that there was a breach of the term implied by s 13. Bankes LJ
stated that it was irrelevant whether the trade viewed such matters as
important or whether they affected the market value of the goods if, on the face
of the contract, they were part of the description of the goods.66 However, the

63 But see Beale v Taylor [1967] 1 WLR 1193.
64 Harlington & Leinster Enterprises v Christopher Hull Fine Art [1991] 1 QB 564; T & J Harrison v
Knowles and Foster [1918] 1 KB 608. See, further, below, p 201, in relation to what purpose is
served by s 13 in the light of this.
65 [1921] 2 KB 519.
66 Ibid, p 523.
decision attracted criticism. As the implied term is a condition, this wide approach to s 13 meant that, at that time, the buyer could have a right to reject the goods for trivial breaches. In order to avoid rejection of goods for trivial breaches, the courts developed the modern approach to the scope of the implied term—they could not take the alternative course of altering the status of the term, as that was dictated by statute. The most significant case in considering the more modern, and narrower, approach to s 13 is Ashington Piggeries v Christopher Hill.

Ashington Piggeries v Christopher Hill
[1972] AC 441

The appellants (Udall) had approached the respondents (Hill), who were animal food compounders, to mix mink food for them. The respondents knew nothing about mink but the appellants supplied them with the formula to be used. One of the ingredients in the formula was herring meal. The respondents supplied the appellants with the compounded mink food which was known as ‘King Size’. However, they made up a quantity of ‘King Size’ using a batch of Norwegian herring meal. Unfortunately, the preservative in the meal had reacted, during its manufacture, to produce a chemical, dimethylnitrosamine (DMNA), which was poisonous to mink. The result was that the batch of ‘King Size’ made from Norwegian herring meal caused the death of some mink. The appellants claimed against the respondents on several bases. Their claim under s 13 was based on the argument that what had been used in the feed could not be described as ‘herring meal’ because of the DMNA. The respondents claimed, in turn, against the third party (‘the Norwegians’) who had supplied them with ‘herring meal’. Their claim under s 13 was on the basis that the substance had been stated to be ‘Norwegian herring meal. Fair average quality of the season’ and that there was a breach of s 13 as it was not ‘herring meal’ and it was not ‘fair average quality’. The description ‘herring meal’ was found to identify the goods and it fell within s 13 but there was no breach as the goods complied with that ‘description’, despite the DMNA. The descriptive words, ‘fair average quality’ did not identify the goods and so did not form part of the ‘description’ for the purposes of s 13.

Lord Diplock Not all statements about the characteristics of goods which are the subject matter of a contract of sale form part of the ‘description’ by which they are sold. Sections 13 and 14 draw a distinction between the description by which goods are sold, on the one hand, and their fitness for the particular purpose for which they are required and their quality, on the other. Section 14(4) recognises that a contract for the sale of goods may contain an express statement about the fitness of the goods for a particular purpose or their quality which does not form part of the description by which they are sold but constitutes a separate stipulation.

67 The SSGA 1994 amended the effect of the ‘condition’ classification (see above, p 192).
68 Reardon Smith Line v Hansen Tangen [1976] 1 WLR 989, p 998, per Lord Wilberforce.
in the contract which may be either a condition or warranty depending upon the construction of the contract (see section 11(1)(b)).

A contract for the sale of goods is one whereby the property in goods which have been physically identified is transferred from the seller to the buyer (see sections 1(1) and 16). But a contract may be made for the sale of unascertained goods before the actual goods in which the property is to be transferred are physically identified and agreed upon. At the time of making such a contract the kind of goods which are its subject matter can only be identified verbally and/or by reference to a sample. The ‘description’ by which unascertained goods are sold is, in my view, confined to those words in the contract which were intended by the parties to identify the kind of goods which were to be supplied. It is open to the parties to use a description as broad or narrow as they choose. But ultimately the test is whether the buyer could fairly and reasonably refuse to accept the physical goods proffered to him on the ground that their failure to correspond with that part of what was said about them in the contract makes them goods of a different kind from those he had agreed to buy. The key to section 13 is identification.

Udall bases his claim against Hill in the first instance on section 13 of the Act. The goods, he submits, did not correspond with the description by which they were sold. The contract was oral. The subject matter was unascertained goods, and it is common ground that the description by which they were sold was contained in Udall’s formula, which set out in detail the ingredients of the feeding-stuff to be compounded by Hill. One of the described ingredients was ‘herring meal’…

DMNA was not an ingredient referred to in the formula. Milmo J, following the cases about the sale of ‘copra cake’ which was contaminated with castor seed, held that a feeding-stuff which contained DMNA in quantities which rendered it toxic to mink did not correspond with the description by which the goods were sold.

I agree with your Lordships and the Court of Appeal that this is not so. Udall’s formula was commercial, not chemical. The ingredient described as ‘herring meal’ did not cease to comply with that description because it was manufactured from herrings to which a preservative had been added to prevent them from deteriorating. The most usual preservative is common salt (sodium chloride) but the evidence showed that another salt of sodium, sodium nitrite, had been used in Norway for several years before 1961. In certain conditions which can occur during the normal process of manufacture of herring meal the amino-acids naturally present in the herring break down into an organic chemical, dimethylamine, which can react with sodium nitrite to form DMNA. The occurrence of this reaction may affect the quality of the meal. It does not alter its identity as ‘herring meal’…

So I come once more to section 13 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893, upon which Hill in turn founds his claim against the Norwegians. Since the contract was in writing the description by which the goods were sold must be determined by construing the words used by the parties in the contract. What the contract said about the goods was ‘Norwegian herring meal, fair average quality of the season, expected to analyse not less than 70% protein, not more than 12%
fat and not more than 40% salt’. I agree with your Lordships that the description by which the goods were sold is limited to the words ‘Norwegian herring meal’. That is what identifies the subject matter of the contract. Where a contract contains an express statement about the quality of the goods to be supplied the \textit{prima facie} inference is that this was intended by the parties not as an identification of the kind of goods that are alone the subject matter of the contract, but as an express stipulation as to the standard of quality to which goods of that kind supplied under the contract shall conform. Such an express stipulation may be intended as a condition or as a warranty. Which it is depends upon the construction of the contract.

\textbf{Lord Wilberforce} The question is whether the compound mink food sold by the respondents (under the name ‘King Size’) corresponded with the description. The appellants’ case was that the food was to be made up according to a formula which identified generically the ingredients and specifically the chemical additives, quantifying precisely the proportions of each ingredient. One of these ingredients was herring meal. The food delivered in certain relevant months, it was claimed, did not correspond with the description because it contained a significant quantity of DMNA. The proposition is that ‘King Size’ made partly of herring meal which contains DMNA does not correspond with the description ‘King Size’. This can be reduced to the proposition that the herring meal ingredient did not correspond with the description because it contained DMNA. The analogy was invoked, inevitably, by the appellants of copra cake with castor seed; the respondents invoked that of oxidised iron. The learned judge accepted the former, the Court of Appeal the latter.

Whether in a given case a substance in or upon which there has been produced by chemical interaction some additional substance can properly be described or, if one prefers the word, identified, as the original substance qualified by the addition of a past participle such as contaminated or oxidised, or as the original substance plus, or intermixed with, an additional substance, may, if pressed to analysis, be a question of an Aristotelian character. Where does a substance with a quality pass into an aggregate of substances? I do not think that it can be solved by asking whether the chemical interaction came about by some natural or normal process, eg, preservation by the addition of salt (sodium chloride), or by some alien intrusion by the production of DMNA from sodium nitrite through a heating effect. I cannot see any distinction in principle in this difference. Further, I do not believe that the Sale of Goods Act was designed to provoke metaphysical discussions as to the nature of what is delivered, in comparison with what is sold. The test of description, at least where commodities are concerned, is intended to be a broader, more common sense, test of a mercantile character. The question whether that is what the buyer bargained for has to be answered according to such tests as men in the market would apply, leaving more delicate questions of condition, or quality, to be determined under other clauses of the contract or sections of the Act. Perhaps this is to admit an element of impression into the decision, but I think it is more than impression which leads me to prefer the answer, if not all of the reasoning, of the Court of Appeal that the defect in the meal was a matter of quality or condition rather than of description. I think that buyers and sellers and arbitrators in the market, asked what this was, could only
have said that the relevant ingredient was herring meal and, therefore, that there was no failure to correspond with description. In my opinion, the appellants do not succeed under section 13.

From *Ashington Piggeries*, the test for whether the relevant descriptive terms constitute ‘descriptions’ for the purposes of s 13 could be said to be that of ‘identity’, that is, only descriptions which identify the goods fall within the scope of s 13.70 Although Lord Diplock referred to unascertained goods, the test can be regarded as a general one for specific and unascertained goods—he was adopting an approach previously indicated in relation to specific goods. Note should also be made of Lord Wilberforce’s test for determining if the implied term has been breached—the ‘men in the marketplace test’.71

However, what needs to be considered further here is the meaning of the ‘identity test’. It would seem that s 13 covers descriptions which identify the goods in the sense that they indicate the ‘kind’ of goods with which the contract is concerned or that which is ‘essential’ about them. At this point, a philosophical discussion could be embarked upon as to the nature of identity and whether it is distinguishable from attributes. However, we should remember the context in which it has become necessary to consider the meaning of a test based upon identity and the way in which the courts are treating the test. Certainly, they do not seem concerned with the nature of goods in a metaphysical, or abstract, sense; rather, it is a question of whether the description relates to that which is essential about the goods in the eyes of the parties as reasonable people. Further assistance in understanding the ‘identity test’ can be gleaned from *Reardon Smith v Hansen Tangen.*72

*Reardon Smith v Hansen Tangen*

[1976] 1 WLR 989

A contract was made to charter a ship on which construction had not been commenced at the time of the contract. By the time the charter came to be fulfilled, the charter market had changed radically and the contract had become very costly to the charterers. The ship met the very detailed contract specifications but it was also stated in the contract that it was ‘354 Osaka’, which would normally have indicated that it would be the 354th ship to be built at the Osaka shipyard. However, it was not built at the Osaka yard, as it was too large, but rather at a new yard, Oshima, and at that yard it was known as 004 Oshima. Throughout the documents dealing with its chartering and sub-chartering the ship had been referred to as ‘354 Osaka’. In order to escape from the costly contract the charterers alleged they had a right to repudiate the contract, as the ship was not 354 Osaka. They were arguing by analogy with sale of goods contracts that there was a breach of condition as

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70 For an interesting discussion of this see Coote, B, ‘Correspondence with description in the law of sale of goods’ (1976) 50 ALJ 17.
71 Contrast the stricter approach in *Arcos Ltd v EA Ronaasen & Son* [1933] AC 470.
72 [1976] 1 WLR 989.
the ship did not comply with its description. The House of Lords found that they had no right to reject the vessel because it was 004 Oshima.

**Lord Wilberforce** In my opinion the fatal defect in their argument consists in their use of the words ‘identity’ or ‘identification’ to bridge two meanings. It is one thing to say of given words that their purpose is to state (identify) an essential part of the description of the goods. It is another to say that they provide one party with a specific indication (identification) of the goods so that he can find them and if he wishes sub-dispose of them. The appellants wish to say of words which ‘identify’ the goods in the second sense, that they describe them in the first… I can only read the words in the second sense.

The difference is vital. If the words are read in the first sense, then, unless I am right in the legal argument above, each element in them has to be given contractual force. The vessel must, as a matter of contract, and as an essential term, be built by Osaka and must bear their Yard Number 354—if not, the description is not complied with and the vessel tendered is not that contracted for.

If in the second sense, the only question is whether the words provide a means of identifying the vessel. If they fairly do this, they have fulfilled their function. It follows that if the second sense is correct, the words used can be construed much more liberally than they would have to be construed if they were providing essential elements of the description.

The appellants at one time placed great stress on the yard no provision. They contended that by using it the ‘owners’ assumed an obligation that the vessel should bear a number which would indicate that it would be constructed in the yard, where that number was appropriate, in sequence after vessels bearing earlier yard numbers (350–53). But this argument broke down in face of the fact, certainly known to Sanko which used and introduced the number into the charter-parties, that the sequence through 354 was the sequence used at Osaka Shipbuilding Company’s yard at Osaka, which yard could not construct the vessel. Thus the use of the yard no. for the contracted vessel must have had some other purpose than indicating construction at a particular yard. This turns the argument against the appellants—for it shows the words to be ‘labelling’ words rather than words creating an obligation.

Note Lord Wilberforce’s two meanings of ‘identity’ and ‘identification’. The court also considered whether it was vitally important that the ship was built at the Osaka yard because, for example, of the expertise available at that yard. Their consideration of whether ‘354 Osaka’ ‘identified’ the ship was relative to the views of the parties. It was not based on the abstract nature of a tanker (there was no search for what constitutes ‘essence of tanker’!).

Care is required in applying the identity test to distinguish which descriptive terms constitute ‘descriptions’ for the purposes of s 13. Only descriptive terms which state what is ‘essential’ about the goods, in the eyes of the parties, fall within s 13 and, in the light of Ashington Piggeries, it is clear that ‘essential’ has to be understood restrictively. In other words, the scope of the term implied by s 13 is very narrow. It would also seem that s 13 does very little. The older approach
meant that s 13 had the role of giving all descriptive terms the status of conditions (converting at least some of them from the status of mere warranties). In contrast, if the modern approach only includes descriptive terms which state that which is essential about the goods, it would seem that such terms would be conditions in their own right. This might be seen as making s 13 irrelevant and unnecessary. However, the impact of s 6 of UCTA 1977 must be borne in mind. That section provides significant protection against the exclusion or restriction of liability for breach of the statutorily implied terms. Certainly, those who deal as consumers acquire greater protection against a clause exempting liability for breach of one of the terms implied by the SGA 1979 than for breach of a simple express term of the contract.73

In the context of software, questions relevant to s 13 of the 1979 Act might arise in relation to the statement that, for example, what was being supplied was a ‘word-processing program suitable for office use’. Provided that the entire statement is part of the contract terms, the question of the scope of s 13 might become relevant. A number of examples can be considered:

- Section 13 might merely cover the statement that what was being supplied was a ‘program’. If there was some defect in its functioning, the question would then arise (following Lord Wilberforce in Ashington Piggeries) as to whether that defect would affect the characterisation of it by ‘the men in the marketplace’—would they still regard it as a ‘program’?
- It seems more likely that the situation would be one in which it would be found to be essential to the parties that the program should be a ‘word-processing program’. In this case, there would be a clear breach if what was supplied was not a word-processing program but a spreadsheet program. In the industry, these are clearly distinct types of program and are commonly advertised, and referred to, as such. In that context, the effect of the men in the marketplace test seems clear. However, if what has been supplied is a program which would be an efficient word-processor but for the defects in it, there seems less likely to be a breach (a merely defective program is still likely to be regarded as a word-processing program by the ‘men in the marketplace’, although it should depend upon the extent of the problems).
- The final possibility raised by the statement above is that the scope of s 13 extends to the statement that the word-processing program is for ‘office use’. As Lord Diplock indicated in Ashington Piggeries (see above), there is no easy distinction to be made between quality and description. Words indicating the quality of the goods may be part of the ‘description’ for the purposes of s 13, but that will not usually be the case. They will usually merely be of relevance to the terms implied by s 14(2) and (3) or in their own right, as express conditions, warranties or innominate terms. However, the

73 See above, p 145.
basic test must be applied in each case. What is important is the perceptions of the parties. It must be asked whether such a descriptive term ‘identified’ the goods in the relevant sense. If the statement that the program was for ‘office use’ was found to fall within s 13, then the ‘men in the marketplace test’ should be applied to the particular complaint, for example, that the program could not handle the integration of different documents well enough.

SATISFACTORY QUALITY

Section 14 implies a term that the goods are of satisfactory quality.

(2) Where the seller sells goods in the course of a business, there is an implied term that the goods supplied under the contract are of satisfactory quality.

(2A) For the purposes of this Act, goods are of satisfactory quality if they meet the standard that a reasonable person would regard as satisfactory, taking account of any description of the goods, the price (if relevant) and all other relevant circumstances.

(2B) For the purposes of this Act, the quality of goods includes their state and condition and the following (among other things) are in appropriate cases aspects of the quality of goods—

(a) fitness for all the purposes for which goods of the kind in question are commonly supplied;
(b) appearance and finish;
(c) freedom from minor defects;
(d) safety; and
(e) durability.

(2C) The term implied by subsection (2) above does not extend to any matter making the quality of the goods unsatisfactory—

(a) which is specifically drawn to the buyer’s attention before the contract is made;
(b) where the buyer examines the goods before the contract is made, which that examination ought to reveal; or
(c) in the case of a contract for sale by sample, which would have been apparent on a reasonable examination of the sample.

The SSGA 1994 substituted the term that goods should be of satisfactory quality for an older term which required goods to be of ‘merchantable quality’. The statutory definition of ‘merchantability’ was somewhat different from that of the new term. What was then s 14(6) of the 1979 Act stated:

Goods of any kind are of merchantable quality within the meaning of subsection (2) above if they are as fit for the purpose or purposes for which goods of that kind are commonly bought as it is reasonable to expect having regard to any description applied to them, the price (if relevant) and all the other relevant circumstances.
Whilst there are some similarities with the basic definition of satisfactory quality in s 14(2A) (in the references to description and price), on the whole, this looks very different from the new term. The definition of ‘merchantability’ focused upon goods being reasonably fit for at least one of the purposes for which they were commonly supplied. However, in its application, it may not have been very different from what is required by the new term. Certainly, despite the emphasis on fitness for purpose in what was then s 14(6), the courts’ interpretation of what was required for merchantability did not allow the term to be regarded as a simple requirement that the goods should function. A car might have been required to do more than simply get from A to B. It might have been required to do so with a degree of comfort, style and reliability, depending upon such factors as the price paid and the description of it. In addition, the aspects of quality listed in what is now s 14(2B) are all matters which had been identified in the case law as relevant to the question of merchantability. At the end of the day, the results arrived at in applying the new term may not be very different from those which would have resulted from requiring goods to be merchantable. However, the old case law should be considered with caution. Analogies will be appropriate in some cases but that will not always be so. The new term, requiring goods to be of satisfactory quality, should be applied as such and the basic test in s 14(2A) should be emphasised. It is a matter of what the reasonable person would regard as satisfactory. Of course, the reasonable person does not make the assessment in a vacuum, but against a background of ‘any description of the goods, the price (if relevant) and all other relevant circumstances’ and the assessment is also assisted by the list in s 14(2B) of ‘aspects of the quality of goods’.

74 See Rogers v Parish Ltd [1987] 1 QB 933, below.
Chapter 4: Information Technology Law

IMPLICATION OF THE TERM

Before the test of satisfactory quality is addressed, the background factors to the implication of the term will be considered (for example, the term is implied where the contract was made ‘in the course of a business’), as well as the situations identified in s 14(2C) in which there will not be a breach of the term requiring goods to be of satisfactory quality.

Sale ‘in the course of a business’

For the term requiring goods to be of satisfactory quality to be implied by s 14(2), the seller must contract ‘in the course of a business’. The same applies to the term implied by s 14(3) and it also applied to the term previously implied by s 14(2) (merchantability).

Section 61(1) tells us that ‘business’ includes ‘a profession and the activities of any government department or local or public authority’ but there is no further definition of ‘business’ or the phrase ‘in the course of a business’. The phrase had, however, been given meaning under the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 and UCTA 1977. In that context, we have seen that, in R & B Customs Brokers v United Dominion Trust, the Court of Appeal regarded a transaction as being in the course of a business if it was either integral to the business or, if merely incidental to the business, regularly occurring. The adoption of that approach can be criticised as inappropriate to the 1977 Act and, in Stevenson v Rogers, the Court of Appeal refused to follow it in the context of s 14 of the SGA 1979. In that case, the defendant had been a fisherman for some 20 years. He sold his boat, the Jelle, to the plaintiff in April 1988, intending to have a new boat built to his requirements. Shortly afterwards, he changed his mind and, in May, purchased another boat, the Marilyn Jane. He had previously owned and sold one other boat, the Dolly Mopp. The plaintiff claimed that the Jelle was not of merchantable quality within the term then implied by s 14(2) of the SGA 1979. (Since the amendments made by the SSGA 1994, the term implied by s 14(2) is that goods are of ‘satisfactory quality’.) However, a requirement of merchantability was only implied if the sale was made ‘in the course of a business’ (and that remains the case in relation to satisfactory quality). The meaning to be given to the phrase ‘in the course of a business’ came to be considered as a preliminary matter.

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76 [1988] 1 All ER 847; see above, p 145.
78 [1999] 1 All ER 613.
At first instance, the judge applied the test from *R & B Customs Brokers* and concluded that the defendant’s sale of his fishing boat did not occur ‘in the course of a business’ and that no term as to the quality of the boat was implied by s 14(2). Clearly, there was no regular pattern of such sales by the defendant, and the question of whether a transaction is ‘integral’ to a business depends upon the transactions carried out by a business as such and not what it uses to facilitate those transactions. A car is key to the way in which a courier by car, or a taxi business, earns money, but the sale of a car is, in itself, integral to neither. It is only if the business is buying and selling cars that the sale of a car is integral to the business; similarly, the sale of a ship by a fisherman is not integral to his business. However, the Court of Appeal in *Stevenson v Rogers* held that the judge had not applied the correct test in determining whether the sale was ‘in the course of a business’ within s 14(2) of the SGA 1979. The phrase had first appeared in the context of the implied term when it was amended by the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973. Until then, the SGA 1893 had implied the term as to merchantability only where goods were ‘bought by description from a seller who deals in goods of that description’. The change to a requirement that the sale be made ‘in the course of a business’ was to broaden the availability of the implied term. It was made to ensure that ‘every buyer from a business seller should have a right…to receive goods of merchantable quality’. The obligation was to be imposed on ‘every trade seller no matter whether he is or is not habitually dealing in goods of the type sold’. In other words, the reference to sales ‘in the course of a business’ in s 14(2) was not intended to be restrictive of the application of the implied term, but was supposed to remove any requirement of regularity of dealing in the goods sold. Potter LJ made the comment that the phrase was there to ‘distinguish between a sale made in the course of a seller’s business and a purely private sale of goods outside the confines of the business (if any) carried on by the seller’.

On the basis of the approach taken in *Stevenson v Rogers*, as long as a sale is even incidental to the seller’s business and not a ‘purely private sale’, it should be in the course of a business for the purposes of s 14(2), and that is in keeping with the legislative history of the subsection.

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79 *Davies v Sumner* [1984] 3 All ER 831; *Devlin v Hall* [1990] RTR 320.
82 [1999] 1 All ER 613, p 623.
‘Goods supplied under the contract’

This seems to mean ‘goods delivered in purported pursuance of the contract’, so that if the problem is something added to the goods contracted for, the seller cannot avoid liability simply by saying that there is nothing wrong with the contract goods themselves. In Wilson v Rickett, Cockerell & Co Ltd, there was a contract for the sale of coalite but, unfortunately, what was supplied was not merely coalite. Added to it was an explosive substance which detonated when the coalite was put in a fire. The seller was unsuccessful in his argument that there was no breach of the implied term, as there was nothing wrong with the coalite, the contract goods, as such. In the context of software, this type of argument might be raised if a virus had been added to the disk on which a program was supplied.

Exceptions

Subsection 14(2C) contains exceptions. If it applies, the buyer will not be able to claim that there has been a breach of the implied term. We are here concerned with the exceptions in s 14(2C)(a) and (b). Subsection (a) refers to the situation where a matter which would otherwise have made the goods of unsatisfactory quality does not do so because it was drawn to the buyers attention before the contract was made. Subsection (b) deals with the situation where a matter which would have made the goods of unsatisfactory quality does not do so because, before contracting, the buyer examined the goods and that examination should have revealed the matter in question. As the reference is to ‘that’ examination, the exception should only relate to matters which should have been revealed by the examination actually made, however cursory, and not a ‘reasonable examination’. However, in Thornett and Fehr v Beer & Son, the buyer had seen the outside of the barrels of glue which he was purchasing but, through lack of time, he had not opened any of them. The defect would only have been discovered had he opened the barrels, but the examination made prevented a claim. The case seems to relate the exception to a ‘reasonable examination’ but it need cause us no difficulties now, as it was decided under an older version of the statutory provision dealing with merchantability, which referred to ‘such examination’ rather than ‘that examination’. We are not now concerned with ‘merchantability’ and, in any event, as with the later provision dealing with merchantability, the reference now is to ‘that examination’. It

83 Wilson v Rickett, Cockerell & Co Ltd [1954] 1 QB 598, p 607, per Denning LJ.
84 [1954] 1QB 598.
85 See, also, Gedding v Marsh [1920] 1 KB 668.
86 Section 14(2C)(c) refers to the situation where a sale is by sample. See below, p 217.
87 [1919] 1 KB 486.
should be emphasised that there is no obligation on the buyer to make any examination at all. In fact, odd as it may seem, given the presence of the exception in s 14(2C)(b), it may be argued that it is better for the buyer not to examine the goods.\(^8\)

When software is in question, even a very detailed examination will not bring every ‘bug’ in the program to light and it should be emphasised that the exception should only relate to matters which should have been discovered by the examination actually made by the buyer. In addition, the point can be made that, for the exception in s 14(2C)(b) to apply, the buyer’s examination will have to have been of ‘the goods’. If software is purchased, it will often not have been the ‘the goods’ sold which were examined, but another copy, used for demonstration purposes. However, even if the exception will not technically apply, any difficulty revealed by an examination of another copy might affect what the reasonable person would regard as satisfactory—that is, it might affect the application of the basic test of satisfactory quality (see s 14(2A)).\(^9\) In addition, the exception in s 14(2C)(a) is not restricted to matters drawn to the buyer’s attention using ‘the goods’ sold to the buyer. Some limitation of the software sold to the buyer might be drawn to the buyer’s attention by using another copy of that software.

There may be some difficulty with the exceptions where some matter which, but for the exceptions, would make the goods of unsatisfactory quality becomes known to the buyer prior to the contract of sale but it is reasonably believed to be unimportant and rectifiable and subsequently proves to be neither. This sort of situation might arise in relation to software which must be fitted into an existing system.\(^9\) It arose in the context of the purchase of a car in *R & B Customs Brokers v United Dominion Trust* and was given some consideration by the Court of Appeal in the context of exception (b). In that case, R & B decided to purchase a Colt Shogun car and it was allowed to take possession of the car before the contract of sale was completed. Before the contract was made, R & B discovered that the car roof leaked. After the sale was completed, there were repeated, but unsuccessful, attempts to repair the leak and the upholstery became ‘sodden with water, mouldy and evil-smelling’. When R & B brought an action, the defendant argued that the car was merchantable, despite the leak, because it was known about before the contract was made. The Court of Appeal did not have to decide upon that question, as they found for R & B on the basis that, in this climate, a car with a leaking roof was not reasonably fit for its purpose under s 14(3) of the SGA 1979. However, Neill LJ did not find himself ‘persuaded’ that merchantability was excluded as regards a defect which had come to light before

\(^8\) Unless the sale is by sample. See s 14(2C)(c).
\(^9\) The case would be inappropriate to be a sale by sample. See s 15, below.
\(^9\) In *Saphena Computing Ltd v Allied Collection Agencies Ltd* [1995] FSR 616, Staughton LJ said (p 652): ‘It is important to remember that software is not necessarily handed over or delivered once and for all at one time. It may well have to be tested and modified as necessary.’
contracting ‘if, at the time the contract is made, the buyer is reasonably of the opinion that the defect can be, and will be, rectified quite easily at no cost to himself’.91

**WHAT CONSTITUTES SATISFACTORY QUALITY?**

As we have seen, the basic test of satisfactory quality is set out in s 14(2A). It refers to the standard that ‘a reasonable person would regard as satisfactory, taking account of any description, the price (if relevant) and all other relevant circumstances’. The reference to the standard of a reasonable person makes the test very flexible and able to encompass the vastly different types of goods to which the Act applies. The disadvantage of flexibility is that it makes it difficult to apply the term. There is some further assistance in the identification of certain ‘aspects of the quality of goods’ in s 14(2B).

Some idea of how the standard set by s 14(2A) may be applied may be gleaned from *Rogers v Parish Ltd*,92 although the court was applying the old implied term of merchantability. It is worth noting the way in which the court used the description and price of the goods to decide whether the goods had complied with the standard required. (It should be remembered that, despite the focus in the definition of ‘merchantability’ on the goods’ fitness for their common purpose, the court did not regard the mere basic functioning of the car as sufficient to render it merchantable.)

*Rogers v Parish Ltd*  
[1987] QB 933

The case was concerned with the purchase of a new Range Rover which proved to have faulty oil seals and problems with the engine, gear box and bodywork. The Court of Appeal found that it was not merchantable.

**Lord Mustill** Starting with the purpose for which ‘goods of that kind’ are commonly bought, one would include in respect of any passenger vehicle not merely the buyer’s purpose of driving the car from one place to another but of doing so with the appropriate degree of comfort, ease of handling and reliability and, one may add, of pride in the vehicles outward and interior appearance. What is the appropriate degree and what relative weight is to be attached to one characteristic of the car rather than another will depend on the market at which the car is aimed.

To identify the relevant expectation one must look at the factors listed in the subsection. First, the description applied to the goods. In the present case the vehicle was sold as new. Deficiencies which might be acceptable

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in a second hand vehicle were not to be expected in one purchased as new. Next, the description ‘Range Rover’ would conjure up a particular set of expectations, not the same as those relating to an ordinary saloon car, as to the balance between handling, comfort and reliability. The factor of price was also significant. At more than £14,000 this vehicle was, if not at the top end of the scale, well above the level of the ordinary family saloon.

The problems with the car rendered it unmerchantable when they were weighed against the reasonable expectations of the fitness of a passenger vehicle described as a ‘new Range Rover’ and for which the price charged was well above that of the ordinary family saloon. Similarly, when considering whether goods are of the standard that a reasonable person would regard as satisfactory, it should be a matter of balancing the problems with the goods against the standard suggested by such matters as description and price. In relation to software, a program might be of unsatisfactory quality if it was so difficult to use that doing anything with it would take the average consumer an inordinate length of time. That would particularly be the case if the program was marketed as one which was easy to use by the average consumer.

In the light of the above discussion, it may seem odd that the reference to price in s 14(2A) is qualified by the phrase ‘if relevant’. The immediate reaction to this may well be that the price must always be relevant. However, it is a factor over which care must be taken. It would not be relevant to set the standard for goods generally which were sold in, for example, the ‘January sales’ if the goods were not presented as ‘seconds’ or in any way ‘shop soiled’ or ‘defective’. In addition, the price factor may need to be treated with some care in relation to novel software. When a novel program is first put on the market, it will be expensive but it will have problems which have not yet come to light. Later versions will resolve the problems. It would seem that, despite the expense of a novel program when it is first put on the market, the reasonable person could nevertheless regard it as being of a satisfactory standard even though there were some problems with it. Obviously, whether it is of satisfactory quality would be a matter of the number and extent of the problems. Lloyd makes a similar point on the relevance of price. His comment was made in the context of merchantability but it seems that it should still be valid.

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93 Price would also seem to be less directly significant if the purchase was in some sense a ‘risk’. This would seem to provide the best explanation of why the price was seen as irrelevant to the question of the merchantability of the painting in Harlingdon & Leinster Enterprises v Christopher Hull Fine Art [1991] 1 QB 564.

94 But see St Albans City and DC v ICL [1996] 4 All ER 481.
Chapter 4: Information Technology Law

Liability for defective software
I Lloyd
(1991) 32 Reliability Engineering and System Safety 193

In Rogers the court went on to point out that the price charged for a motor car would influence the level of quality required from it. Although this factor will normally be relevant in determining the acceptability of manufactured products it may be of less utility in relation to computer programs. Here, the cost of raw materials constitutes a fraction of the total value of the software and, on the basis that it is easier to emulate than to innovate, the costs of a company making a derivative version of an existing program should be lower. On this basis, the purchaser of a ‘look alike’ or ‘cloned’ version of a program should not be obliged to accept any significant lowering of standards.

One further, and general, question which should be asked is whether the reasonable person’s assessment of what is a ‘satisfactory standard’ will take account of the normal standards of the computer industry, as the court did in Micron Computer Systems Ltd v Wang\(^\text{95}\) in relation to the question of merchantability. Against the background of the industry norm, it was decided that the time taken by the system to ‘back-up’ did not make it unmerchantable, and neither did the failure of the hard disk after one year. That was regarded as normal and to be expected. Such references to industry norms could be used to lower the requirements of the implied term. However, although there were some dicta which might have raised concern that such a situation could occur in relation to merchantability,\(^\text{96}\) a similar argument was firmly rejected by the Court of Appeal in Rogers v Parish.\(^\text{97}\)

After looking at the basic test of satisfactory quality, some consideration should also be given to the ‘aspects’ of quality identified in s 14(2B). Depending on the circumstances, they may be relevant to the reasonable person’s assessment of what constitutes a satisfactory standard for the type of goods in question. As has already been indicated, the courts had identified these ‘aspects’ of satisfactory quality as relevant to the question of merchantability.\(^\text{98}\) However, there is likely to be some difference in the treatment of the first aspect of quality—the fitness of the goods for all of the purposes for which goods of the kind sold are commonly supplied—and the way in which fitness for common purpose was treated in considering merchantability. The first point to be made is that ‘purpose’ is likely to be construed more narrowly now than when it provided the focus for the definition of merchantability. In the context of s 14(6), purpose had to be treated widely if merchantability was not to become a matter of whether the goods simply functioned. That impetus for a broad approach to ‘purpose’ is no longer present. ‘Purpose’ may now be regarded as referring to

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95 (1990) unreported, 9 May.
96 Eg, Bernstein Pansom Motors (Golders Green) Ltd [1987] 2 All ER 220, pp 228–29, per Rougier J.
97 Ibid, p 237.
98 See above, fn 75.
the mere functioning of the goods. In the context of a car, it may now be seen as merely referring to whether the car will get from A to B, without any requirement of a degree of style, comfort and reliability. Questions of style, comfort and reliability can now fall under other aspects of quality identified in s 14(2B) or could simply be encompassed within the general test of what a reasonable person would regard as satisfactory. The second point which should be made is that goods were merchantable if they were reasonably fit for one of their common purposes.99 However, this change in the law must be treated with some care. The statutory reference to fitness for all the purposes for which goods of the kind in question are commonly supplied is a change in the law which provides a further impetus for the narrowing of the meaning of purpose. It is also likely to lead to careful consideration of what ‘kind’ of goods a contract is concerned with. This question arose in relation to merchantability100 but the ‘kind’ of goods in question is likely to be more narrowly identified, now that what is relevant is fitness for all the purposes for which goods of the kind in question are commonly supplied and not merely fitness for one of those purposes.101 In relation to software, different versions of the same program may be supplied for home and office use. Provided that it was clear at the time of purchase that what was being bought was the version intended for home use, it would seem that the ‘kind’ of goods would not be ones which were commonly supplied for office use. Under those circumstances, the aspect of quality identified by s 14(2B)(a) would not indicate that the software was of unsatisfactory quality if it was not reasonably fit for office use, provided that it was reasonably fit for home use.

FITNESS FOR THE BUYER’S PARTICULAR PURPOSE—s 14(3)

The implied term dealing with fitness for the buyer’s purpose was originally dealt with by s 14(1) of the SGA 1893. An amended provision is now contained in s 14(3) of the SGA 1979, which states:

Where the seller sells goods in the course of a business and the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known—

(a) to the seller; or
(b) where the purchase price or part of it is payable by instalments and the goods were previously sold by a credit broker to the seller, to that credit broker,

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100 See, eg, Beecham v Francis Howard [1921] VLR 428; Brown v Craiks [1970] 1 All ER 823.
101 It seems likely, eg, that the kind of goods would now be more narrowly construed in a case like Aswan Engineering.
any particular purpose for which the goods are being bought, there is an implied obligation that the goods supplied under the contract are reasonably fit for that purpose, whether or not that is a purpose for which such goods are commonly supplied, except where the circumstances show that the buyer does not rely, or that it is unreasonable for him to rely, on the skill or judgment of the seller or credit-broker.

The implied term that the goods should be of ‘satisfactory quality’ sets a general standard for the goods. It is not a standard which relates to the buyer’s intended use of the goods. In contrast, the term implied by s 14(3) may result in the seller guaranteeing that the goods are reasonably fit for the buyer’s purpose. Of course, the seller should not be required to provide goods fit for some unusual and unknown purpose of the buyer and the term is restricted to the situation where the particular purpose has been expressly or impliedly made known to the seller and the buyer has reasonably relied on the skill or judgment of the seller. In addition, the term only requires reasonable fitness for the buyer’s particular purpose and the standard thereby set for the goods will depend upon how broadly or narrowly the particular purpose has been made known to the seller. These points will be considered further below in looking at the specific elements of s 14(3).102

Particular purpose

It has already been indicated that the importance of s 14(3) lies in the fact that it requires the goods to be fit for the buyer’s particular purpose. The reference to ‘particular’ does not mean that the purpose must be very narrow, it merely means ‘specified’. A particular purpose may be very general103 but, whether it is wide or narrow, it must be expressly or impliedly made known to the seller.

In some cases, it will be easy to establish that the particular purpose has been impliedly made known. It will not be difficult, for example, to find that the buyer of a hot water bottle impliedly made known to the seller that her particular purpose was to fill it with hot water.104 However, if the buyer’s actual intended

102 Like ‘satisfactory quality’, the term here is only implied if the seller ‘sells the goods in the course of a business’. We have already considered this requirement in the context of s 14(2) (see above, p 204). Similarly, the meaning of ‘goods supplied under the contract’ was also looked at above (see p 206). A point not looked at above, and which should be briefly explained here, is the reference in s 14(3) to ‘credit broker’. The reference to the buyer making his purpose known to a credit broker is intended to cover the situation where a purchaser wishes to pay the purchase price of the goods in instalments and the original owner, the credit broker, arranges this by selling the goods to a finance house, which then sells them to the buyer on such terms. The reference to ‘credit broker’ in s 14(3) ensures that the person who sells the goods to the buyer cannot escape the requirements of the implied term on the basis that the buyer’s purpose was made known not to him, but only to the original owner.

103 Kendall v Lillico [1969] 2 AC 31, p 114, per Lord Pearce.

104 Preist v Last [1903] 2 KB 148.
use of the goods is very specialised, or unusual, then it will have to be expressly brought to the seller’s attention if the buyer is to gain the protection of the implied term. In *Micron Computer Systems Ltd v Wang*,105 the buyers failed to make it known to the sellers that they wanted a system which would perform ‘transaction logging’. The failure of the system to do this, therefore, did not mean that it was not reasonably fit for the buyer’s particular purpose. A more general example is provided by *Griffiths v Peter Conway Ltd*.106

**Griffiths v Peter Conway Ltd**  
[1939] 1 All ER 685

The sellers made a Harris tweed coat for the buyer. When she wore it an adverse skin reaction was provoked which induced dermatitis. The buyer claimed that there was a breach of the term implied by s 14(1), which was the subsection which then covered the term now implied by s 14(3), as the coat was not reasonably fit for her to wear. The court found that the dermatitis had been caused because she had unusually sensitive skin and that a similar effect would not have been produced on normal skin. On that basis there was no breach of the implied term. Her ‘abnormal’ particular purpose had not been made known to the sellers.

**Sir Wilfred Greene MR** He says that the buyer, Mrs Griffiths, expressly made known to the defendants the particular purpose for which the coat was required, that is to say, for the purpose of being worn by her, Mrs Griffiths, when it was made. Once that state of affairs is shown to exist, Mr Morris says that the language of the section relentlessly and without any escape imposes upon the seller the obligation which the section imports.

It seems to me that there is one quite sufficient answer to that argument. Before the condition as to reasonable fitness is implied, it is necessary that the buyer should make known, expressly or by implication, first of all the particular purpose for which the goods are required.

The particular purpose for which the goods were required was the purpose of being worn by a woman suffering from an abnormality. It seems to me that, if a person suffering from such an abnormality requires an article of clothing for his or her use, and desires to obtain the benefit of the implied condition, he or she does not make known to the seller the particular purpose merely by saying: ‘The article of clothing is for my own wear.’ The essential matter for the seller to know in such cases with regard to the purposes for which the article is required consists in the particular abnormality or idiosyncrasy from which the buyer suffers. It is only when he has that knowledge that he is in a position to exercise his skill or judgment, because how can he decide and exercise skill or judgment in relation to the suitability of the goods that he is selling for the use of the particular individual who is buying from him unless he knows the essential characteristics of that individual? The fact that those essential

105 (1990) unreported, 9 May.  
106 [1939] 1 All ER 685. See, also, *Slater v Finning* [1996] 3 All ER 398.
characteristics are not known, as in the present case they were not known, to the buyer does not seem to me to affect the question. When I speak of ‘essential characteristics’, I am not, of course, referring to any variations which take place and exist within the class of normal people. No two normal people are precisely alike, and, in the ‘matter of sensitiveness of skin’, among people who would be described as normal their sensitiveness must vary in degree.

This does not mean that there is a line which it is the function of the court, or of a medical witness, to draw with precision, so as to define all cases where normality ceases and abnormality begins. The impossibility of drawing such a line by reference to some scientific formula or something of that kind does not mean that, for the present purpose, the difference between normality and abnormality is a thing that must be disregarded, cannot be ascertained. It is a question that no judge and no jury would have any real difficulty in deciding on the evidence in any particular case. In this particular case, the judge has found the existence of abnormality, and, that being so, it seems to me impossible to say that the seller here had the particular purpose pointed out to him so as to show that the buyer relied on his skill or judgment. After all, the object of that is to enable the seller to make up his mind whether or not he will accept the burden of the implied condition, and the effect of the argument addressed to us would be to impose that implied condition upon the seller without his having the opportunity of knowing the vital matter which would affect his mind.

One or two cases were referred to. The only one which I find it necessary to mention, and that for the purpose of distinguishing it, is *Manchester Liners Ltd v Rea Ltd* [1922] AC 74. That was a case where shipowners ordered from the defendants, who were coal merchants, 500 tons of South Wales coal for the bunkers of their steamship, the Manchester Importer. It so happened that, owing to the control of the coal trade that was in existence at that time, the supply of bunkering coal was very much restricted, and the defendants, having secured the right to a cargo through the coal controller, proceeded to supply bunker coal out of that cargo to the plaintiffs in satisfaction of the contract. It so happened that the coal so supplied was not suitable for the bunkering of that steamer, which was a natural draught steamer, and, as a consequence, she was obliged to return to port. The owners sued the coal merchants for damages, and relied upon the Sale of Goods Act 1893, s 14(1). It was held by the House of Lords that, on the facts of the case, the implication of the statutory warranty was not rebutted. The ground on which it was said that it was rebutted was connected with the coal control, which limited the source of supply available to the merchants for the purpose of fulfilling their contract. That was negatived. The important matter for the present purpose is that the House of Lords held that, by ordering bunker coal for that particular steamship, the buyer was making known to the seller the particular purpose for which the coal was required. Lord Buckmaster said:

> It then remains to be considered whether in the circumstances there was any warranty that the coal was suitable for the purpose for which it was required. It is plain that the order was expressed for the use of a
particular steamship, and it must, therefore, be assumed that the respondents knew the nature of her furnaces and the character of the coal she used, for it was this coal they contracted to supply.

Mr Morris relies on that passage, and says that this coat was for the use of a particular individual. However, there is all the difference in the world between a case such as that and a case like the present. Steamships differ in types—and some of them have one kind of furnace and some another, and so forth, and the coal which is suitable for one is not necessarily suitable for another. That was a matter which would be within the knowledge of coal merchants.

In Griffiths, all that had been made known to the sellers was that the coat was to be worn by the purchaser. That was not sufficient to bring into play the term implied by what is now s 14(3). Her wearing of the coat was regarded as ‘abnormal’. The situation would have been different had she informed the sellers that her skin was unusually sensitive and that she was relying on them to make her a coat which she could wear without skin problems arising. The situation should also be different where the goods are of a type which are known to have to be particularised to the user in relation to the relevant aspect of their use and that point provided the basis of the distinction made with the earlier case of Manchester Liners Ltd v Rea Ltd.107 It was known in the trade that ships’ boilers varied in the type of coal which they used. When the buyer stated the name of the ship, it was made clear to the seller that the buyer’s particular purpose was to use the coal in boilers of the type on the ship specified.

It will often be clear what the buyer’s general purpose is in buying software. A word-processing program will usually be purchased to word-process. However, if the buyer’s purpose is a more specialised one, and if s 14(3) is to apply, that specialised purpose may well have to have been drawn specifically to the seller’s attention. It may be that, for example, the software has to be compatible with an existing system. Sometimes, incompatibility with an existing system would make it a case analogous to Griffiths. On other occasions, if the software is such that it is normally used as a supplement to various systems, then the analogy would be with the Manchester Liners case. In more general terms, the test which was put in terms of ‘abnormality’ in Griffiths has been put in terms of whether the buyer’s actual purpose was ‘reasonably foreseeable’;108 for example, if a buyer just asks for a particular type of program, the applicability of s 14(3) to the question of compatibility depends upon whether it is reasonably foreseeable that the buyer’s actual purpose is to use the software as part of a system so that he or she needs compatible software.

107 [1922] AC 74.
Another issue in relation to the different uses to which software may be put and the scope of s 14(3) is raised by Lloyd.

**Liability for defective software**

I Lloyd

(1991) 32 Reliability Engineering and System Safety 193

Under the Act, whilst a purchaser is obliged to inform the seller if he intends to put a product to an unusual purpose, no specific intimation is required in respect of normal usage. As in many other respects, the application of this provision to computer software raises difficult issues. The development of cheap personal computers has led to the marketing of cut down versions of programs intended for commercial use. Although these may be adequate for domestic purposes they may prove incapable of coping with the more extensive demands of a business user.

Whilst the distinction between business and domestic use is not a new one, novelty does lie in the fact that, with a computer program, any design limitations are not as transparent as those pertaining to a more tangible product. Thus, for example, it will normally be apparent whether the features present in an electric drill render it suitable for home or for commercial use. This may face sellers with a dilemma. Given that the question whether a customer is obliged to give specific notice of an intended purpose is determined in large part by the seller’s claim in respect of the product, the latter may be well advised to make clear the design limits to which the product is subject. However, this may reveal the fact that the product is an inferior version of a species program. Although this may be justified by reason of a lower selling price it would not constitute a compelling marketing feature.

It should be emphasised that, for the term to be implied, not only must the buyer rely upon the seller to provide goods which are reasonably fit for the buyer’s particular purpose, but it must be reasonable for the buyer to so rely. Reliance can be partial, provided that it relates to the aspect of the goods’ fitness, which is relevant to the buyer’s claim. Reliance may not exist, or may not be reasonable, if the buyer has the greater expertise or is in much the best position to make an assessment of the goods’ suitability.

However, even if the particular purpose has been expressly or impliedly made known to the seller and the buyer reasonably relied on the seller, the question still has to be asked whether the implied term has been breached. Where the particular purpose that is made known is a general purpose, the fact that the goods are not fit for the buyer’s more specific, actual, purpose only means that they are not fit for part of the buyer’s particular purpose. Being unfit for only part of the particular purpose does not necessarily mean that they are not reasonably fit for the particular purpose as a whole. The ‘width of the [particular]
purpose is compensated, from the seller’s point of view, by the dilution of his responsibility’. More generally, ‘reasonable fitness for the buyer’s particular purpose’ will depend upon the seriousness of the problem with the goods and the proportion of the ‘particular purpose’ which is affected. Lord Pearce considered an example in *Kendall v Lillico* [1969] 2 AC 31:

I would expect a tribunal of fact to decide that a car was reasonably fit for touring even though it was not well adapted for conditions in a heat wave: but not if it could not cope adequately with rain. If, however, it developed some lethal and dangerous trick in very hot weather I would expect it to be found unfit...the rarity of the unsuitability would be weighed against the gravity of its consequences. Again if food was merely unpalatable or useless on rare occasions, it might well be reasonably suitable for food. But I should certainly not expect it to be held reasonably suitable if even on very rare occasions it killed the consumer.

In addition, the point can be made that the implied term may be breached by an accumulation of smaller difficulties. In *Saphena Computing Ltd v Allied Collection Agencies Ltd*, Havery QC (Off Ref) said:

...its main problems were those which are evidence of a lack of tuning—principally slow operation and poor design of input and output procedures...it is clear to me that on the evidence [these defects] represent a shortfall of the system below the standard required of fitness for its purpose.

**SALE BY SAMPLE**

Section 15 provides for implied conditions where the sale is by sample. Like s 13, and unlike s 14(2) and s 14(3), there is no requirement that the sale should be ‘in the course of a business’, although other sales are unlikely to be ‘by sample’. Section 15 states:

1. A contract of sale is a contract for sale by sample where there is an express or implied term to that effect in the contract.
2. In the case of a contract for sale by sample there is an implied term—
   a. that the bulk will correspond with the sample in quality;
   b. that the goods will be free from any defect, making their quality unsatisfactory, which would not be apparent on reasonable examination of the sample.

114 See, also, s 14(2C)(c), which prevents s 14(2) from being relied upon when the sample has not been inspected and the problem rendering the goods unsatisfactory would have been discoverable on a reasonable examination.
A sample serves much the same purpose as a description of the goods. In *Drummond v Van Ingen*, Lord Macnaghten said:115

The office of a sample is to present to the eye the real meaning and intention of the parties with regard to the subject of the contract which, owing to the imperfections of language, it may be difficult or impossible to express in words. The sample speaks for itself.

However, the mere fact that a small part of the goods was present at the time of contracting does not necessarily indicate that the sale is ‘by sample’ within s 15. The goods may have been displayed simply to provide a basic idea of the goods being offered. Under s 15(1), it is a matter of determining the parties’ intention, as embodied in an express or implied term. The question is whether the parties contracted for goods which corresponded with a sample.

Section 15 seems unlikely to have much application in relation to the sale of software. Software will seldom be bought under circumstances which mean that there is provision of a sample from a larger bulk of goods. If a disk is supplied with a ‘cut down’ version of a program on it to encourage the purchase of the full program, in everyday terms, that may well be described as ‘a sample’, but it would seem that it should not be regarded as part of the ‘bulk’ (that is, the full program). It is a copy of part of it. The term would be apposite if there was a purchase of multiple disk copies of a particular program and one of the copies had been tested before the purchase.

**RELEVANCE OF THE IMPLIED TERMS**

The implied terms considered above deal with the situation where there is a sale of goods. It has already been pointed out that similar terms are implied if the goods are not sold but hired out.116 However, the larger question remains as to the classification of software. Can it be goods? It was suggested above that this question might not be fundamental to the implication of these or similar terms. The same or similar terms might be implied at common law,117 even if software is regarded as *sui generis*.

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115 (1887) 12 App Cas 284, p 297.
117 See *St Albans City and DC v ICL* [1996] 4 All ER 481; above, p 186.
INTRODUCTION

The liability for defective software arising out of contract has already been discussed above, Chapter 4. As computer control becomes usual for many, if not most, applications, it becomes apparent that the failure of systems containing software may well have an impact on many people who are not a party to the contract to supply that software. They may suffer economic loss or physical injury. One of the most highly publicised system failures of this type was that of the Computer Aided Despatch system of the London Ambulance Service in October and November 1992. The Report of the Inquiry into the incident demonstrates a number of the difficult issues which may arise when attempting to apportion liability in an incident such as this. In contrast, more and more common domestic appliances are controlled by means of programmable devices. Unlike some of the other areas of law considered in this book, liability for defective software has no statutes dedicated to examine and no case law of significance to assist in predicting how existing legal principles might be applied to such situations. Some cases founded in contract have now come before the UK courts but these are a long way from answering some of the fundamental questions posed by such circumstances. There have, as yet, been no cases based in tort, although there has been much speculation as to how tortious principles should be applied. What follows is, therefore, an attempt to review and distil a number of the arguments that have been discussed into a coherent framework and to suggest how the law might move forward in this area. The case law which will be cited has been chosen in an attempt to provide suitable analogies with other situations; many of these are favourites of other commentators but, where they make a useful point, no excuse should be needed for a re-examination. It must be remembered, though, that such cases can only be useful by way of analogy and some will perform this task rather better than others.

In the event of a system containing defective software failing, there may be liability in negligence and also, for cases of physical injury or damage, under the Consumer Protection Act (CPA) 1987.

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Chapter 5: Information Technology Law

The CPA 1987

Whilst it is not the purpose or function of this work to assess the rationale and philosophy underlying the introduction of the product liability regime introduced in the UK by the CPA 1987, a consideration of some of the debate surrounding the genesis of this statute is, necessarily, incidental. The 1987 Act was passed to implement the EC Product Liability Directive,3 a document which had been some years in gestation. Article 1 of the Directive provides, quite simply, that ‘The producer shall be liable for damage caused by a defect in his product’. ‘Product’ is then further defined in Art 2 to include ‘all movables...even though incorporated into another movable or into an immovable’. This can be compared with the relevant section of the CPA,4 which provides that “‘product” means any goods or electricity and...includes a product which is composed in another product, whether by virtue of being a component part or raw material or otherwise’. In theory, the effect of product liability legislation, for those situations in which it applies, is to eliminate the necessity to show negligence and, instead, replace it with the requirement to demonstrate a causal link between the defect in the product and the damage caused. This is often referred to as a type of strict liability on the grounds that the culpability of the producer in relation to the defect is not a relevant factor.

Is software a product?

Can computer software fall within this definition of ‘product’? This question has stimulated much debate. Some of the arguments are, essentially, a reflection of the tangibility/intangibility debate already discussed in relation to software as goods and will not be repeated here,5 but other arguments are inextricably linked with the concept of product and the underlying premises on which the Act and Directive are based.6 The realisation that there might be problems with the categorisation of computer software had dawned prior to implementation of the Directive.

Implementation of the EC Directive on Product Liability
DTI, November 1985, para 47

Special problems arise with those industries dealing with products concerned with information such as books, records, tapes and computer software... It does not appear that the Directive is intended to extend liability in such

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4 Section 2(1).
5 See above, Chapter 4.
situations. On the other hand, it is important that liability is extended to the manufacturer of a machine which contains defective software and is thereby unsafe...the line between those cases may however not be easy to draw, particularly in the field of new technology where the distinction between hardware and software is becoming increasingly blurred.

This suggests that, even though software can be regarded as pure information in some respects, the development of technology, together with the way in which it might be used to control systems and apparatus, may conspire to make an apparently logical boundary indistinct. However, it appeared that, by the time of implementation, this issue had officially disappeared and the advice following implementation was that, in the event of a defect in software leading to physical damage, liability would rest with the producer of the complete system, implicitly rejecting the notion of software as a product in its own right.

Predictably, this did not silence the academic debate and there is still a considerable divergence of views on the answer to the question. These differing approaches are now found, not only in specialist works, but also in standard texts on the law of tort: 'It is unclear whether books and computer software, which may endanger persons if they contain inaccuracies, fall within the definition of “products”.' Compare, also, the following two views.

*The Law of Torts*
John G Fleming
8th edn, 1992, Sydney: Law Book Co, p 501

Products comprise ‘any goods and electricity’, including component parts. Presumably, however, not information contained in publications, however hardbound. Nor pure services: a designer is not liable unlike a producer of a defectively designed product. Misleading or inadequate warnings may make an accompanying product defective, but defective software instructions addressed to the computer, are not ‘goods’. What is the reason for drawing this distinction between goods and services, seeing that the rationale for the former—consumer protection—seems to apply equally to the latter? The distinction is doctrinally difficult to justify, seeing that the human element, albeit masked, is as much involved in the creation of products as is services and that the accident-preventive rationale necessarily targets human behaviour. The reasons are accidental and pragmatic. Foremost is the provenance of warranties attached to the sale of goods, from which the seminal American tort liability derived. More fundamental may be the fact that professional services are excluded because their product is furnished for one client at a time so that the cost of liability cannot be spread as widely as over a whole line of tangible products...

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9 Relying on Stapleton, J, ‘Software, information and the concept of product’ (1989) 9 Tel Aviv U Stud L 147.
It seems that information is not within the Act even though it is incorporated in tangible form in a book but the same may not be true of computerised information, where the line between ‘software’ and ‘hardware’ may be difficult to draw sensibly. If an airline crashes because a component in an automatic landing device fails above a certain temperature there is clearly a defective product within the Act. Can the position really be so different if it is programmed so that it simply does not operate in certain foreseeable conditions or if it gives the pilot a misleading indication? It has been said that, while software is not goods within the Sale of Goods Act, a disk containing a program is, and, when that is sold, the statutory implied terms apply to the software as well as the disk itself. Misleading instructions for use of a product are clearly not to be equated with ‘pure’ information, for they themselves render an otherwise perfect product defective.

A number of issues are raised in these two extracts: the ‘pure information’ theory, which is fatal to a classification of software as product; the goods/services distinction; and the pragmatic approach, which considers the end result of the defect rather than its location. If the first of these is to be argued successfully, it is important that all the attributes of computer software are fully taken into account. In order to make the problem accessible, a number of writers have used quite simple analogies.

Instructions and warnings are words that deal with how to operate the object. But in recipes the words do not tell readers what to do with the book as a physical object; rather the physical object is the medium by which the words, which are the real product are delivered…

Similar problems arise whatever the medium—a private letter, a video or a tape recording. Computer software may strike some people as different since the instructions it contains appear to be addressed in the first instance to a machine rather than a human. But the real difference between software and a recipe in a book is not the addressee of the instructions for in the end they are both instructions to human users, but simply the ease with which any mistake in the instructions may be identified. After all, computer programs are merely a form of complex recipe. The difference is that a mistake in a recipe will usually be easier to spot than a mistake in a computer program and so contributory negligence or even novus act interveniens will be easier to establish.

Despite the apparent ease of spotting a mistake (or a defect?) in a recipe, there was no liability for breach of warranty in the US case of Cardozo v True,\textsuperscript{10} in
which a recipe book failed to point out that a particular ingredient in a recipe was poisonous unless cooked properly. Arguably the novice in either cookery or programming may have equal difficulty in detecting the defect in the relevant medium. A more useful distinction might be between choosing to rely on information and being compelled to so rely.\textsuperscript{11} A further issue of the ‘software as information’ theory is explored in the next extract.

\textbf{Three problems with the new product liability}

Jane Stapleton

in \textit{Essays for Patrick Atiyah}

Peter Cane and Jane Stapleton (eds)

1991, Oxford: OUP, Chapter 11

My suggestion that the reform focus on defective products may have been strengthened by a doomed attempt to shift attention away from human conduct and make the imposition of stricter liability more palatable, gains some support from the attitude of reformers to computer software. Some years ago I argued that software, being mere information, is not a ‘good’\textsuperscript{12} for the purposes of the UK law of supply of goods; and that were defective navigational software to cause a plane to crash or a heart-lung machine to cut out, those thereby injured might at first seem to have problems establishing a cause of action under the CPA which defines the ‘product’ in terms of ‘goods’. But the CPA s 1(1) requires UK courts to construe its provisions to accord with the Directive which defines ‘product’ in terms of ‘movables’. This might not seem to help much, but some commentators suggest that defective software may fall under the Directive, and that the European Court of Justice might take a ‘flexible’ attitude to the notion of ‘product’ which will allow it to be expanded more widely than ‘goods’ to allow in phenomena which, in policy terms, are ‘like’ defective goods. But what is it about defective software that suggests that it might be like defective goods? Is it like goods because, although it is a service, the human origin of errors in a program is less obvious than the human origin of most pure services? Is their human origin masked in a way that facilitates imposition of liability? Perhaps; but it should be noted that the masking characteristic is a variable. Suppose that the designer (A) of a navigational software program incorrectly enters the height of a mountain, causing a plane to crash. If the software package is to be a ‘product’ for the purposes of the Directive, is a map incorrectly drawn by B, which carries the identically incorrect information to the pilot also to be a product? If so, what about where the same information is conveyed to the pilot orally by an on-board navigator (C)—is he the supplier of a ‘product’?…

\textsuperscript{10} 342 So 2d 1053 (1977).
\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Op cit}, Rowland, fn 1, p 81.
\textsuperscript{12} See above, fn 9.
In deciding if ‘defective software’ is to be a ‘defective product’ within the Directive, the ECJ has to identify what it is about defective ‘goods’ which makes claims arising out of the injuries they cause special. The warranty origin of the focus on defective goods does not provide the answer. Nor does the fact that many goods are mass-produced, because liability under the Directive is not confined to mass-produced goods and, in any case, non-goods such as software and maps can be mass-produced and cause physical injury. For the same reasons, the complexity of some goods and their sophisticated production techniques do not provide the key. Nor can the reason be that the focus on defects in goods in the Directive eliminates the necessity to evaluate conduct: it does not.

Although the fact of inputting inaccurate data may result in a malfunction, which, in turn, produces certain adverse consequences, this is a gross simplification of both the nature and the function of computer control in most systems. The potential defects that are likely to give rise to the severest problems are errors in coding or logic that cause the mode of operation of the computer controlled system to depart from its specification. This may not be traceable to any particular human error as such, but instead may be due to a ‘design error’ in the software. This is, arguably, the point at which software begins to diverge from ‘pure information’; although capable of reduction to written format, the program is designed to be a working entity and is ‘engineered’ in the true sense of the word, just as much as a more conventional control system might be. This suggests that the more accurate view is to consider a defect in the software as a design fault, and this argument can also take into account the more pragmatic approach suggested in the above extract from Winfield and Jolowicz.

The final issue raised is that of the goods vs services debate—the extent to which the categorisation of the contract to supply software can be described in terms of a contract for goods or a contract for services and the impact that this categorisation might have on the boundaries of the definition of product. Whittaker, in supporting the division of software into the two categories of mass produced package and specialist bespoke software, finds assistance in the US approach.

**European product liability and intellectual products**

Simon Whittaker

(1989) 105 LQR 125, p 135

Should computer software be included as a product for the purposes of the Directive? … English commentators in the specialist journals have merely raised the question of the application of the Directive to the area. The American materials are more helpful, although, somewhat surprisingly, there appears to be no American case decided specifically on the question whether computer software is a product for the purposes of its strict liability. However, American commentators agree that this issue should be determined by

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13 See the discussion above, Chapter 4.
deciding whether the reasons for imposing strict liability apply to software. Prince, for example, sees the placing of the product into the ‘stream of commerce’, the producer’s better position to control risks and his ability to spread the cost of accidents as the three rationales most commonly used by American courts considering the expansion of the scope of strict liability beyond chattels. He distinguishes two broadly different types of software: software which is specially designed for the needs and to the order of the consumer, and software which is a standard marketed package. Prince concludes that the reasons for strict liability do not apply to the specially designed computer program as it:

…is not really placed in the stream of commerce because it is distributed to only one customer. Also, because the program is only sold to one user, the supplier is not in a better position than the user to bear the costs. Since the supplier is not selling the product en masse, he cannot spread the cost of a defect over a number of consumers. Finally, the supplier may have more expertise and knowledge regarding the tailored program because the supplier wrote the program. However, in these situations, the user is normally very heavily involved in the design stage of the program because the user must tell the supplier what the program is to do.

On the other hand he considers that these same reasons do apply to ‘ready to use software’ as to any other product which is distributed en masse.

Ultimately, it will be for the courts decide to which of these interpretations of the nature of software they choose to give effect to. Evidence of the Commission’s view of the intention of the Directive, if not necessarily of the logic of classifying software as a product, was illustrated in the answer to the following question asked in the European Parliament:14 ‘Does the EEC Directive on product liability also cover…computer software?’ The answer to this was unequivocal on the basis that, as the term ‘product’ was defined as all movables even though incorporated into another movable or into an immovable, the Directive also applied to software. Returning to the distinction between bespoke and mass produced software, Whittaker raises a further issue for interpretation of European Community law and the potential harmonisation of services.

14 Written Question 706/88 OJ 1989 C 114/42.
extent. However, in the case of made to measure software, these arguments lose their force. Such programmes do not circulate in the market at all, whether within the Member State or within the Community. It is true that different liability rules would affect competition between software engineers of the Member States in question, but here it can be seen that we have strayed into the freedom of movement of services rather than of goods. This, of course, is also an important aspect of the common market and, moreover, the European Court has frequently taken the ‘context of all the provisions establishing a common organisation of the market’ into account in interpreting Community provisions.

Is there a defect?

If, indeed, computer software can be construed as a product, how is a defect in that software to be identified? This may raise practical as well as legal problems. Lloyd has remarked that ‘The quest for perfect software has proved as successful as the hunt for the Loch Ness monster’. In fact, the relevant issue may be not so much a question as to whether the sought after goal exists, but rather whether it is possible to demonstrate how far the search is from the target. The degree of complexity of most computer programs, creating manifold combinations and permutations, means that most computer software is impossible to test exhaustively for all foreseeable conditions. Comprehensive testing is therefore out of the question. Many faults will be discovered by routine testing but, as far as identifying defects that will compromise safety is concerned, these are more likely to be discovered by the testing of boundary conditions than by the testing of normal operating conditions. It is usual to assume that, in any piece of software, some residual ‘bugs’ will remain, but not all of these will give rise to ‘defects; only those that could lead to damage.

‘Defect’ was defined in the Directive as follows:

**Article 6**

1 A product is defective when it does not provide the safety which a person is entitled to expect, taking all circumstances into account, including:

(a) the presentation of the product;
(b) the use to which it could reasonably be expected that the product would be put;
(c) the time when the product was put into circulation.

2 A product shall not be considered defective for the sole reason that a better product is subsequently put into circulation.

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This was implemented in the CPA 1987, s 3(1) of which provides that ‘there is a defect in a product...if the safety of the product is not such as persons generally are entitled to expect; and for those purposes “safety” in relation to a product, shall include safety with respect to products comprised in that product’.

Basing the definition of defect on a safety standard that ‘persons are entitled to expect’ implies an objective assessment of ‘defect’. This is in accordance with the commentary on the Strasbourg Convention.16

Commentary on the Strasbourg Convention
Paragraph 35

...the committee [of experts] formulated a definition of defect taking as the basic elements ‘safety’ and ‘legitimate expectancy’.

This, however, does not involve the safety or expectancy of any particular person. The use of the words ‘a person’ and ‘entitled’ clearly shows that a product’s safety must be assessed according to an objective criterion. The words ‘a person’ do not imply any expectation on the part of a victim or a given consumer. The word ‘entitled’ is more general than the word ‘legally’ (entitled); in other words, mere observance of statutory rules and rules imposed by authorities do not preclude liability.

The committee did not wish to use the word ‘reasonably’. Such expression... could diminish the consumer’s rights, since it could include considering economic factors and assessing expediency which ought not to be taken into account in determining the safety of a product.

It is arguable whether, in fact, this is the standard which has survived the Directive and the 1987 Act, and there have been suggestions that, instead, reformers ‘have seized on the ill-defined concept of a product “defect” which required the benefits of the product as they were at the time of circulation to be balanced against its costs’.17 If it is this latter concept that has held sway, then the resultant effect is more akin to a negligence standard than one of strict liability. Moreover, the apparent decision, recorded above, not to employ a standard of reasonableness in the consideration of a safety issues is, itself, an interesting one when compared with the standards expected by other comparable legislation. The standard of safety for employees at work is governed primarily by the qualification ‘as far as reasonably practicable’,18 which imports precisely the risk-benefit analysis that is purported to be excluded in the product liability regime envisioned under the Strasbourg Convention.

18 See especially, in this context, the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, s 6; Edwards v NCB [1949] 1 QB 704, per Lord Asquith.
How, then, is the standard to be assessed in systems containing software? It has been suggested both that, ‘in those more complex situations where modern tort liability also operates, eg cases of foreseeable misuse or complex design systems where the standard is neither agreed nor obvious, the “expectations test” is misleading and inadequate’,19 and also that ‘[t]he “consumer expectations” test for legal defectiveness…has had limited appeal as an operational rule for complex design defect cases. Primarily this is because the consumer simply does not have adequate information to know what to expect’.20 A comparison can be made with the situation for ‘conventional’ products, where the general safety record may have a particular relevance in ascertaining whether the product was defective. This is unlikely to be the case for systems involving computer software, where failure free operation in the past is not necessarily an indication of failure free operation in the future, especially for products that are likely to be used in different situations and conditions. In such circumstances, a fault could remain hidden for some time until triggered by a particular combination of inputs that may not have occurred before. In addition, the operative time at which a diagnosis of defectiveness needs to be made is the moment of supply. It is possible that the software may have been updated, modified or otherwise upgraded, making it difficult to assess the defectiveness of the original version, but, in the absence of such changes, software does not ‘wear out’ in the same way as hardware.

Causation

The final factor which has to be established is that the defect caused the damage. This may be difficult to prove, depending on the nature and type of software involved. It goes without saying that any physical damage will always be inflicted by hardware, and so a causal link has to be established between the apparently defective software instructions, their effect on the hardware and the consequence to the victim. Such observations perhaps highlight the difference between software and pure information; once computer software has commenced giving instructions to the system under its control, it may activate an inevitable sequence of events which becomes difficult to interrupt.21

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21 Details and discussions of a number of software failures and near-failures can be found in the newsgroup comp.risks, available also at catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/—these include reports of the circumstances of some of the Airbus A320 accidents and reports of the incidents involving the Therac 25 radiotherapy machine.
It may be difficult to establish causation if there has also been some human input or intervention. In so called fly-by-wire aircraft, such as the Airbus A320 (now being superseded by the A330 and A340), the pilot flies the plane not directly but by means of a joystick connected to the appropriate mechanisms via a computer. The presence of the computer allows for intelligent control of the aircraft, which should be able to compensate for both malfunctions and pilot error. The role of the pilot (or, indeed, the operator/controller of other computerised systems) often only becomes crucial in the event of failure of the normal operating system. What is the situation if defective software causes such a malfunction and the pilot is unable to land the plane safely? What was the cause of the accident? Clearly, each case will hinge on its particular circumstances, but there are a number of general observations which can be made. There will be appropriate procedures which should be carried out in the event of a failure and, if the pilot fails to carry these out, there may be a break in the chain of causation and the accident may be put down to ‘pilot error’. However, the danger with human intervention being confined to abnormal cases can mean that there is very little opportunity to practise and become proficient in such skills. In addition, it is entirely possible that a situation could arise where the computer would ‘not allow’ the pilot to take corrective action or, alternatively, that the back-up system of control provided was inadequate to land the plane safely, especially in adverse weather conditions, even for an expert pilot. Although the root cause of the mishap might be the defective software, at least some of these elements would qualify as a novus actus interveniens, sufficient to break the chain of causation.

Some of the possibilities are illustrated by the facts revealed in *Airbus Industrie v Patel and Others*. On 14 February 1990, an Airbus A320 crashed on landing at Bangalore. In December 1990, the report of the Indian Board of Inquiry found that when the aircraft struck the ground it had been in ‘idle/open descent’ mode, which allowed the aircraft to descend in a glide with the engines idling. The investigation concluded that this was because the pilots had mistakenly instructed the aircraft to descend to 700 ft altitude instead of descending at a rate of 700 ft/min. Apparently, the altitude and vertical speed controls in A320s were, at that time, similar and adjacent to each other. The Report further concluded both that the pilots failed to observe their error until it was too late to gain any thrust from the engines and that there was no evidence of any failure of

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22 In fact, the A320 has five on-board computers, some of which are back-ups designed to switch into use if a fault is detected in the operational computer.

23 Apparently, human error is involved in about 60% of all aircraft accidents. Although this does not necessarily indicate ‘pilot error’, it does show that human factors are also a relevant consideration. See, eg, Storey, N, *Safety-Critical Computer Systems*, 1996, Harlow: Addison-Wesley.

24 The facts are set out in [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 8 (CA); [1998] 2 All ER 257 (HL), but the legal issue in this particular case actually concerned a conflicts of law point as to which was the appropriate forum to bring the action.
any part of the aircraft, its controls or its engines. The accident was therefore held to be the result of pilot error coupled with lack of training, and the airline, IAL, was criticised as employer, as was the airport authority at Bangalore—Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd—whose failure to have suitable accident arrangements exacerbated the outcome of the incident.

Despite the finding of the Report that there was no fault with the aircraft itself, a number of passengers and their relatives began proceedings in Texas, where the liability for defective products was strict and it is relatively easy to establish personal jurisdiction. On what basis might such an incident reveal a defect? Could ergonomic problems such as a confusing instrumentation layout compromise safety sufficiently to produce a finding of defectiveness? Does this not, in many ways, raise similar issues to confusing and inadequate instructions which are explicitly included in the law on product liability? As was pointed out following the Bangalore incident, ‘assuming that the systems are working properly, when does it stop being “human error” and become poor ergonomics?… [T]he very way the pilot interacts with the aircraft is also a safety issue’. Whether or not such problems would be sufficient to render a product defective in law, it is interesting to note that, following the above crash, it was reported that certain changes were made to the Airbus A320 control software to enable the engines to spool up faster if the pilot had to advance the throttle suddenly. Had this been in place at the time of the Bangalore incident, it would have enabled the pilots to rectify the situation once they had realised their mistake.

In the mid-1980s, defects in the software controlling the Therac-25 radiotherapy machine resulted in substantial overdoses of radiation being administered to several patients, with resulting injury, illness and death in some cases. Conceptually, this appears to be an example of where it is easier to accept the link between the defective software and the damage. Suppose, instead, that the software error had resulted in an underdose of radiation, with the result that patients died, not from the effects of the radiation, but from the cancer for which they were supposedly being treated. In this scenario, the damage would be the result of the original disease, that is, it would not be caused by the radiotherapy machine, which could not, therefore, be classed as ‘legally defective’.

27 For further details see Leveson, NG, Safeware: System Safety and Computers, 1995, Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, Appendix A.
28 A similar situation arose in relation to a radiotherapy device at a North Staffordshire hospital, although not as a result of a error in the software.
29 See, also, below, p 240 in relation to negligent designs.
The development risks defence

Notwithstanding the label of ‘strict liability’ applied to the products liability regime introduced by the EC Directive and the CPA 1987, it is possible for producers to escape liability if they can avail themselves of the so called ‘development risks’ defence contained in Art 7(e) of the Directive, ‘that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when he put the product into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of the defect to be discovered’. This is a controversial defence and the Member States were given the choice as to whether to include it in their implementing legislation. Interestingly, it had not been included in the Strasbourg Convention, for the reasons given below.

Commentary on the Strasbourg Convention
Paragraphs 39–40

Some experts maintained that ‘development risks’ should be a ground for exclusion of liability in the case of technically advanced products. Any stipulation to the contrary might discourage scientific research and the marketing of new products.

Against this opinion it was argued that such an exception would make the convention nugatory since it would reintroduce into the system of liability established by the convention the possibility for the producer to prove the absence of fault on his part. Exclusion of liability in cases of ‘development risks’ would also invite the use of the consumer as a ‘guinea-pig’.

In conclusion the committee considered that the problem was one of social policy, the main question being whether such risks should be borne by the consumer of the producer and/or, in whole or in part, by the community.

The committee considered that, as insurance made it possible to spread risk over a large number of products, producers’ liability, even for development risks, should not be a serious obstacle to planning and putting into circulation new and useful products.

The committee therefore decided that development risk should not constitute an exception to producers’ liability.

Despite criticisms over both the use of the defence as such and the change in wording from that supplied in the Directive, the UK included the defence in s 4(1)(e) of the 1987 Act:

...that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the relevant time was not such that a producer of products of the same description as the product in question might be expected to have discovered the defect if it had existed in his products while they were under his control.

The emphasis of this defence appears to be rather different and refers to a comparison with other producers, that is, a negligence-type test, whereas the Directive implies an obligation to consider the available knowledge in the world at large.\(^{32}\) Thus, in relation to the UK defence, Reed\(^{33}\) suggests that, given the practice in the industry, ‘it is arguable that a software producer who failed to discover a quite serious defect in his software would nevertheless be able to take advantage of the defence, so long as the defect is not in an area of the program that would be tested as a matter of course by others in the industry’.

The apparent divergence in the scope of Art 7(e) of the Directive and s 4(1)(e) led to the Commission bringing proceedings against the UK for failure to implement the Directive satisfactorily. In the absence of relevant case law, both the Advocate General and the European Court of Justice were of the view that there was no evidence that a UK court would not interpret the wording of s 4(1)(e) in the light of the arguably narrower scope of Art 7(e). The Commission’s application was, therefore, dismissed, but the Advocate General made some useful comments about the nature of the development risks defence.

**Case C-300/95 Commission v UK**  
[1997] ECR I-2649

19 …the Directive…opted for a system of strict liability which was no longer absolute but limited, in deference to a principle of the fair apportionment of risk between the injured person and the producer, the latter having to bear only quantifiable risks, but not development risks, which are by their nature unquantifiable. Under the Directive, therefore, in order for the producer to be held liable for defects in the product, the injured party is required to prove the damage, the defect in the product and the causal relationship between defect and damage, but not negligence on the part of the producer.

   The producer, however, may exonerate himself from liability by proving that the ‘state of the art’ at the time when he put the product into circulation was not such as to cause the product to be regarded as defective. This is what Art 7(e) of the Directive provides.

20 It should first be observed that, since that provision refers solely to the ‘scientific and technical knowledge’ at the time when the product was marketed, it is not concerned with the practices and safety standards in use in the industrial sector in which the producer is operating. In other words, it has no bearing on the exclusion of the manufacturer from liability that no one in that particular class of manufacturer takes the measures necessary to eliminate the defect or prevent it arising if such measures are capable of being adopted on the basis of available knowledge.


Other matters which likewise are to be regarded as falling outside the scope of Art 7(e) are aspects relating to the practicability and expense of measures suitable for eliminating the defect from the product. Neither from this point of view, can the fact that the producer did not appraise himself of the state of scientific knowledge or does not keep up to date with developments in this area as disclosed in the specialist literature, be posited as having any relevance for the purposes of excluding liability on his part. I consider, in fact, that the producer's conduct should be assessed using the yardstick of the knowledge of an expert in the sector.

21 Some additional considerations need to be explored, however, in order to tie down the concept 'state of knowledge'. The progress of scientific culture does not develop linearly in so far as new studies and new discoveries may initially be criticized and regarded as unreliable by most of the scientific community, yet subsequently after the passage of time undergo an opposite process of 'beatification' whereby they are virtually unanimously endorsed. It is therefore quite possible that at the time when a given product is marketed, there will be isolated opinions that it is defective, while most academics do not take that view. The problem at this juncture is to determine whether in such a situation, that is to say, where there is a risk that is not certain and will be agreed to exist by all only ex post, the producer may still rely on the defence provided in Art 7(e) of the Directive. In my view, the answer to this question must be in the negative. In other words, the state of scientific knowledge cannot be identified with the views expressed by the majority of learned opinion, but with the most advanced level of research which has been carried out at a given time.

22 That interpretation, which coincides with that suggested by the Commission ...is closest to the ratio legis of the Community rules: the producer has to bear the foreseeable risks, against which he can protect himself by taking either preventative measures by stepping up experimentation and research investment or measures to cover himself by taking out civil liability insurance against any damage caused by the defects in the product. Where in the whole gamut of scientific opinion at a particular time there is also one isolated opinion (which, as the history of science shows, might become with the passage of time opinio communis) as to the potentially defective and/or hazardous nature of the product, the manufacturer is no longer faced with an unforeseeable risk, since, as such, it is outside the scope of the rules imposed by the Directive.

23 The aspect which I have just been discussing is closely linked with the question of availability of scientific and technical knowledge in the sense of the accessibility of the sum of knowledge at a given time to interested persons. It is undeniable that the circulation of information is affected by objective factors, such as, for example, its place of origin, the language in which it was given and the circulation of the journals in which it was published...

24 ... More generally, the 'state of knowledge' must be construed so as to include all data in the information circuit of the scientific community as a whole, bearing in mind, however, on the basis of a reasonableness test the actual opportunities for the information to circulate.
Even with the proviso expressed in para 24, it should be noted that this view puts a very great burden on manufacturers to stay abreast of developments in their field which could be considered to be even higher than that imposed by the law of negligence (discussed below).

A number of commentators have discussed the various possible combinations envisaged by the defence. The two outer extremes are those where the defect is either unknown and undiscoverable or known and discoverable. In the former there will be no liability, whereas there will always be liability in the latter case. In between these two extremes are the situations where the defect is either known but undiscoverable or, conversely, unknown but discoverable. The latter is, arguably, the usual position, and one in which it is incumbent on the producer to utilise the current state of knowledge to uncover the defect. The former is more difficult to rationalise but is, perhaps, the one which best describes the position with respect to potential defects in software. It is never possible to provide assurance that any software is free from error and such errors are capable of becoming defects if they compromise the safety of the system. Techniques used to develop software for use in safety-critical systems take this fact into account by starting from the premise that such software is bound to contain errors. The use of the definite article in the wording of the defence seems to indicate that it refers to a specific defect. Such a concept is difficult to apply to software development and, based on this, the use of the defence appears problematic. On the other hand, if we start from the presumption of the presence of a defect, it may be that the situation is accurately represented by the phrase ‘known but undiscoverable’. It has been suggested that where the danger is known but science has not developed a means of eliminating the danger, then it would be open to the manufacturer to argue that the product is not defective instead of pleading a defence of development risks. In relation to defective software, though, the view has also been expressed that ‘the argument that a software producer could not be expected to discover his own mistakes is not a compelling one’. Since software is developed by human ingenuity, any faults should be regarded as introduced, rather than inherent. Neither is it clear how all of these factors affect, or are affected by, the question of resource allocation for research. Stapleton points out that the full pre-circulation screening test for some defects, including bugs in complex software, would be ‘astronomically expensive’, but suggests also that, ‘[t]o give the defence substance then it must protect in cases of defects


35 McKendrick, E, ‘Product liability and the development risks defence’ [1990] Law for Business 252, but compare Newdick’s view that the defence cannot be available once the possibility of a defect has been foreseen (ibid).

36 Op cit, Lloyd, fn 1.
which could only be discovered, if at all, by extraordinary means’. It is plain that testing cannot be carried on for ever, but when should a producer stop testing? Does this, necessarily, entail a comparison with the behaviour of the ‘reasonable’ producer?

It is also important to note that the issue of when knowledge becomes available is crucial—the defence is unavailable after the date at which the existence of the defect could have been discovered. This may be especially pertinent for non-research-based industries (this market is becoming increasingly relevant as increasing numbers of domestic appliances contain software) for which it is likely that there will be a lapse in time before the requisite information concerning the defect is available to the producer.

It is difficult to assess how important the availability of a development risks defence might be to the software industry. An argument that was advanced at the time of the Strasbourg Convention, albeit unsuccessfully, was that technically advanced industries needed a development risks defence if innovation and progress were not to be stifled. This was the primary reason for including it within the UK legislation. Nonetheless, a number of other Member States have chosen not to include the defence and producers exporting to those countries will need to take responsibility for their own development risks, even though this is unnecessary in relation to the domestic market. In addition, there is no similar defence in contract where liability is imposed when a defect would not be able to be detected even by the ‘utmost skill and judgment on the part of the seller’.

Some other statutory systems impose a much stricter standard. A case frequently referred to in this connection, by way of analogy, is that of *Smedley v Breed*, decided under the Food and Drugs Act 1955. The case arose out of a caterpillar in a tin of peas. The salient facts for comparison are that a stringent system of inspection had been instigated, the success of which was evidenced by the fact that there were only four complaints out of a total of 3.5 million tins, despite the fact that the caterpillars were difficult to detect, being of similar shape, size and colour to the peas themselves. So, even though the particular ‘defect’ might be difficult to discover, there was ample evidence that the defendant had taken steps to ensure that the number of such defects was minimised. Nonetheless, the court found that, under the strict liability scheme contained in the relevant statute, the only possible defence for the presence of extraneous matter was where this was ‘an unavoidable consequence of the process itself’.

Although the court accepted that the system was as good as reasonable skill and

38 Above, p 231.
diligence could make it, this could only go to mitigation and the fact that in any commercial process, however well managed, some failures are statistically predictable was irrelevant. Interestingly, the observed failure rate of four out of 3.5 million was clearly viewed as excellent by the court at the time; it is a moot point as to whether this would be an acceptable failure rate for safety-critical software for which probability of failure rates demanded are typically of the order of $10^{-8}$ and $10^{-9}$.

In contrast, s 6 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, which imposes requirements on those who manufacture ‘articles for use at work’, utilises a standard of ‘as far as reasonably practicable’, as referred to earlier, but also includes a positive duty to arrange for testing and examination to ensure safe design and construction, together with a duty to arrange for research to discover and hence eliminate or minimise risks.

**Negligence**

Whether or not the CPA 1987 can ever be said to apply to systems containing software, there will always be some situations involving defects in software where the regime is inappropriate, either because of the nature of the software at issue or because of the nature of the damage. In such cases, potential liability will be determined by the principles of negligence. Even then, there have been suggestions that negligence will not be capable of founding liability. It was suggested in *Ministry of Housing and Local Government v Sharp*, a case concerning an inaccurate land certificate, that, due to the likelihood of computerisation of the Land Registry, the Registrar’s absolute statutory duty of care should be held to exist independently of negligence, since ‘Computers might produce an inaccurate certificate without negligence on the part of anyone’. It might be supposed that the average person (and even the average judge!) now has a greater general understanding of computing, at least to the extent of realisation that computers can only be as accurate as the person who wrote the program, input the data or interpreted the output made them. Nonetheless, there is still some truth in Tapper’s assertion that ‘It is common experience that computer systems do malfunction without any negligence on anyone’s part, just because they are so complicated, and exhaustive testing in all possible situations in which they might be used is impossible’. The challenge is to distinguish the failures that are due to negligence from those that are not.

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41 Above, p 227.
42 See, further, *op cit* , Rowland, fn 1; *op cit*, Bott et al, fn 25.
43 [1970] 2 QB 223, p 275, *per* Salmon LJ.
Where the loss generated as a result of a defect in software is purely economic, then, if there is no remedy available in contract, the only possibility will be to consider liability for negligent misstatement, the operative principles for which were set out in *Hedley Byrne v Heller*.\(^{44}\) In order to limit the class of potential claimants, a special relationship is required between the parties, plus evidence of reliance on the statement. This test for liability could be appropriate when the loss is a consequence of relying on the output of the software\(^{45}\)—unless the act of reliance on the output can itself be construed as negligent. Such an approach might be suitable when considering the potential liability for artificial intelligence and expert systems, as it can be argued that diagnostic expert systems are tools to ‘aid’ professionals in making their diagnoses. They should not be relied on absolutely, as they are no substitute for intelligent thought but merely a useful pointer to a particular course of action. This could also be the case where the output is accurate but insufficient by itself.\(^{46}\) It has also been suggested that, given the problems with the intangible nature of software, the tort of negligent misstatement might have more general application in relation to computer software, in that the program instructions are ‘relied upon’ by the computer to attain the relevant result.

In the case of bespoke software, which, being categorised as the provision of services, is unlikely to fall within the ambit of product liability legislation, it will be necessary to show that the system was designed negligently.

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\(^{44}\) [1964] AC 465.

\(^{45}\) See, also, Sookman, BB, ‘The liability of information providers in negligence’ (1989) 5 CL & P 141.

\(^{46}\) Cf the situation in *The Lady Gwendolen* [1965] P 294, cited in, eg, *op cit*, Reed, fn 33.
negligent design both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords expressly accepted that finding.

The House of Lords in *IBA v EMI* and *BICC*\(^{47}\) could have found liability for negligent misstatement, as certain assurances were given concerning the efficacy of the design, but they equally found negligence in the design itself, which Lord Fraser regarded as ‘a distinct and sufficient reason for imposing liability’. How is the negligence of a designer of software systems to be judged? By what criteria should the achievements and failures of software engineers be assessed? It is clear that the individuals in question possess, or should possess, special expertise, and one area of law that has developed to examine the achievements of those professing a particular expertise is that of professional negligence. There have, as yet, been no cases which have had to consider the role of software engineer as designer or the status of software engineer as a ‘professional’. Could such a person be construed as coming within this latter category? Jackson and Powell\(^ {48}\) refer to the four attributes which are deemed to be necessary characteristics of professions, namely, the nature of the work, the moral aspect, collective organisation and status. Thus the nature of the work is expected or presumed to be of high intellectual content, requiring particular study and qualifications; professionals are expected to have some moral commitment to the community at large; they are expected to be governed by an organisation that sets the standards for, and regulates the conduct of, its members; and there should be evidence that they are accorded a particular status by the community. How far do these factors pertain to software engineers?

The extent to which software engineering may be regarded as a profession is debatable,\(^ {49}\) but, where the work undertaken is of a safety-critical nature, the relevant factors are becoming increasingly pertinent. Many transport systems, particularly air and rail, rely on computer control, as do major hazard installations such as nuclear reactors and chemical plants. Failure of such systems is likely to result in disaster such that it seems inconceivable that persons designing the software for those applications would not be cognisant of their duty to the public at large. The ‘profession’ is governed by two professional organisations, the Institution of Electrical Engineers (IEE) and the British Computer Society (BCS), which together have considered the entry qualifications and continuing professional development necessary for those engaged on such work. Both organisations create standards and codes of conduct, to which their

\(^{47}\) (1980) 14 BLR 1 and see below, p 245.


members are expected to adhere.\textsuperscript{50} Of particular relevance in this context is the following definition of competence from the IEE’s professional brief on safety-related systems.\textsuperscript{51}

Competence requires the possession of qualifications, experience and qualities which include:

- such theoretical training as would ensure acquisition of the necessary knowledge of the field in which they are required to work;
- a thorough knowledge of the hazards and failure of the equipment for which they are responsible;
- an understanding and detailed knowledge of the working practices used in the organisation for which they work, as well as a general knowledge of the working practices in other establishments of a similar type;
- a detailed working knowledge of all statutory provisions, approved codes of practice, other codes of practice, guidance material and other information relevant to their work, and an awareness of legislation and practices, other than those which might affect their work;
- the ability to give advice to others;
- the calibre and personality to enable them to communicate effectively with their peers, any staff working under their supervision, and their own supervisors;
- an awareness of current developments in the field in which they work;
- an appreciation of their own limitations, whether of knowledge, experience, facilities, resources, etc, and a preparedness to declare any such limitation.

The status of such engineers in the wider community is uncertain, as, arguably, is the status of a number of other branches of engineering that, nevertheless, have been considered as professions by the courts. It is certainly clear from the documentation of the relevant professional organisations that they feel they have the attributes of a profession, so would presumably expect their members to reach the standard that the law requires of a professional. The above definition of ‘competence’ has recently been developed even further\textsuperscript{52} to define specific competences for a wider range of safety-related tasks, although the extent to which these correlate with the standard that the law might expect from a ‘reasonably competent practitioner’ is by no means clear.

In any case, where the software engineer has contracted to design specialist bespoke software, the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 will imply a term that ‘reasonable care and skill’ will be used in the performance of the contract. It is submitted that such a term will, in any case, require a similar level of competence as that appropriate to the professional in negligence. Nonetheless, in negligence there will not necessarily be a duty of care towards all those who

\textsuperscript{50} Much of this activity had its genesis in joint IEE/BCS consultative document, \textit{Software in Safety-Related Systems}, 1989, London: IEE.


\textsuperscript{52} For further details see www.iee.org.uk/pab/hands/comp_pes.htm.
might be affected by the failure of the software. It is clear that there is a very different range of foreseeable claimants in relation to defects in the design of a radiotherapy machine as compared with a fly-by-wire aircraft, for instance. There are policy considerations which may pull in either direction and the dividing line may not be easy to draw. There may be such potential for damage that it may be considered unjust to hold the designer liable, but, equally, both contractor and client may have their own particular knowledge and expertise about the system such that an apportionment of liability may be more appropriate.

There will again be the necessity to show causation. Returning to the example of the radiotherapy machines, although an arguable case of negligence might be made out in relation to the overdose, because of the problems with proving causation, a claim of negligence might, again, be difficult to substantiate where the software fault resulted in an underdose. If a design standard was mandated for the design of the equipment and was not adhered to in either case, it is difficult to support the conclusion that the designer in the one instance is less culpable than the other. Similar issues were raised in a case involving the decision of a coroner’s court not to hold an inquest on the death of an asthmatic after an ambulance was delayed, on the basis that she did not die an ‘unnatural’ death. Coincidentally, this case was heard around the time of the failure of the London Ambulance Service computer system and, although, this was not the cause of the delay in this case, the court was clearly aware of the implications.

R v Poplar Coroner ex p Thomas
[1993] 2 WLR 547, p 552
Court of Appeal

Dillon LJ…it is easy to think of a variety of different scenarios as a result of which an ambulance could have arrived too late to save a patient who had suffered a severe attack of asthma like Miss Thomas’, eg: (i) the distance from the ambulance centre to the patient’s home was too great for there to have ever been any chance of the ambulance arriving in time to save the patient; (ii) there was much more traffic than normal in the locality and so the ambulance was delayed and arrived just too late; (iii) the ambulance was diverted on its journey and had to take a much longer route because of flooding caused by a burst water main, which may have been due to lack of proper maintenance by the water company; (iv) a newly installed computer installed by the ambulance service to handle emergency calls more efficiently malfunctioned, as newly installed computers are prone to; or (v) the ambulance came late because the ambulance crew were inefficient and the management was slack.

53 See above, p 230.
I do not suggest that any of these scenarios actually fits the facts of Miss Thomas’s case. I do not know what the cause of delay was. But in each of these scenarios common sense indicates that what caused the patient’s death was, on Lord Salmon’s test in *Alphacell Ltd v Woodward* [1972] AC 824, p 847, the asthmatic attack, not the congestion of the traffic, the bursting of the water main, the malfunction of the computer or the inefficiency of the ambulance service.

Although the court was not charged with any assessment of civil liability, the causation issue is set out in very plain terms. As to the existence of a duty of care, it does not seem unreasonable that, if someone is contracted to write software for an ambulance despatch system, then they might have in their contemplation the likely effect on a patient in the event of a system failure. Although agreeing with Dillon LJ as to the outcome of this case on the facts, Simon Brown LJ took a rather more circumspect view of the causation issue, especially as it might affect a negligence claim.

*R v Poplar Coroner ex p Thomas*

[1993] 2 WLR 547, p 554

*Court of Appeal*

Simon Brown LJ I do not find the question of causation in this context susceptible of quite the same sort of robust approach that the House of Lords advocated in a very different context in cases such as *McGhee v National Coal Board* [1973] 1 WLR 1. The question arising there was: can the court properly infer, in the absence of a provable direct link, that one particular state of affairs caused or contributed to another. In those cases the possibility of there being more than one cause was immaterial. Indeed courts often find there to have been several different causes of a given eventuality. Take this very case: can it really be doubted that if an action was brought in respect of Miss Thomas’s death, whatever the court found regarding negligence it would certainly find the death to have been caused at least in part by the late arrival of the ambulance?

A similar line of reasoning was taken by Kennedy LJ in *Kent v London Ambulance Service,* another case involving the delay of an ambulance called to attend an asthmatic patient, whose condition was severely exacerbated by its late arrival. Unlike the previous case, this was a negligence case, and so issues not only of causation but also of the existence of a duty of care were of central importance.

*Kent v London Ambulance Service*

[1999] Lloyd’s Rep Med 58, p 63

*Court of Appeal*

Kennedy LJ That leaves only the question of whether it is fair, just and reasonable that a duty of care should be imposed... I acknowledge that the
Ambulance Service operates in a difficult area, with cash limits, competing claims on limited sources, difficulty in deciding between competing calls from different locations, and the ever present problems of traffic hazard.

...an important consideration in relation to the ambulance service is demonstrated by the facts of this case. That is that if the ambulance service undertakes to attend, the person who has been promised that assistance, and those acting on his or her behalf normally abandon the search for other possible means of transport to the hospital... I...recognise that if a duty of care does exist it must make allowance for those factors to which I have just referred but I consider...that a court might well find not only sufficient proximity but also that it is just, fair and reasonable that a duty of care should be imposed.

Although neither of these cases involve software failures, they may nevertheless provide important pointers as to whether a duty of care might be adjudged to arise in safety-critical cases. Kennedy LJ implied, albeit indirectly, that the reliance on the emergency services was a factor. In cases where software controls a safety-critical function, there is clearly no option but to rely on the correct operation of that software, which is the responsibility of those who created it. Also in Kent, Schiemann LJ was inclined to find sufficient proximity between the parties to give rise to a duty of care merely from the fact that the degree of foreseeability of harm was high, a condition which will inevitably be satisfied in relation to safety-critical systems. However, although a relevant factor, it is clear from a number of other cases that the mere foreseeability of harm may not, of itself, give rise to a duty of care. As pointed out by Lord Bridge, 'It is never sufficient to ask simply whether A owes B a duty of care. It is always necessary to determine the scope of the duty by reference to the kind of damage from which A must take care to save B'. Nonetheless, in safety-critical cases, the likelihood of severe harm cannot be ignored and must surely be an essential factor in the equation.

Assuming that there are no problems in respect of causation, the standard of care required of a professional is that of the ordinarily competent member of that profession, as set out by McNair J in Bolam v Friern HMC:

When you get situations which involve the use of some special skill or competence, then the test as to whether there has been negligence or not, is not the test of the man on the top of the Clapham Omnibus, because he has not got that special skill. The test is the standard of the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing that special skill. A man need not possess the highest expert skill; it is well established law that it is sufficient if he exercises the ordinary skill of an ordinary competent man exercising that particular art.

56 Caparo Industries plc v Dickman and Others [1990] 2 AC 605, p 627; see, also, op cit, Rowland, fn 49.
57 [1957] 1WLR 582, p 586.
This basic test, then, has been refined in relation to different professions taking note of the fact that professions can be divided into two groups: those who cannot guarantee the results of their labour and those who could be said to impliedly warrant to produce a particular result.\(^{58}\) Engineers are likely to fall into the latter category, as noted by Lord Scarman in *IBA v EMI and BICC*:\(^{59}\) ‘In the absence of any terms (express or implied) negating the obligation, one who contracts to design an article for a purpose made known to him undertakes that the design is reasonably fit for the purpose.’ This can be construed as requiring a higher standard than the basic *Bolam* test.\(^{60}\)

A number of facets of the standard of care required of the emerging profession of the software engineer have been identified,\(^{61}\) but, of these, some are of particular concern to this discipline. The first is: on whom does the duty fall to identify the system as safety-related? Whereas it might be thought that the procurer would be in the best position to make this assessment, it cannot necessarily be assumed that the procurer is aware that safety-critical applications require design and implementation procedures that are any different from those used for ‘normal’ computer systems. This may be especially pertinent for systems for which the safety connection is not immediately obvious.\(^{62}\) However, neither can it be assumed that the software engineer is likely to be in a better position to make this assessment.

A common measure of the standard of care is provided by adherence to relevant standards and codes of practice\(^{63}\) and there is no reason why this should be any different for the software engineer.

This can include compliance not only with externally approved standards, but also with generally accepted practice in the industry. As pointed out by Viscount Simonds,\(^{64}\) ‘it would be unfortunate if an employer who has adopted a practice, system or set-up…which has been widely used without complaint could not rely on it as at least a prima facie defence to an action of negligence’. However, the fact of general acceptance of a particular practice does not automatically mean that the practice is a good one or that it should not be modified and reviewed in the light of technical developments.

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59 (1980) 14 BLR 1 and see below, p 245.
63 Bevan Investments v Blackhall and Struthers (No 2) [1973] 2 NZLR 45.
64 Cavanagh v Ulster Weaving Ltd [1960] AC 145, p 158.
Negligence, professional competence and computer systems

Diane Rowland

[1999] 2 JILT 65

...the courts have not fought shy of declaring common practice to be negligent. In general this is the result of application of objective tests of the reasonable man variety (see, eg, *General Cleaning v Christmas* (1953)). What should be regarded as reasonable in technical specialisms where knowledge is advancing all the time? Is there a duty to keep up to date? How far does this extend? What effect should new information have on an existing general practice?... Some guidance can be found in *Stokes v GKN (Bolts and Nuts) Ltd* (1968):

...where there is a recognised and general practice which has been followed for a substantial period in similar circumstances without mishap, he is entitled to follow it, unless in the light of common sense or newer knowledge it is clearly bad; but, where there is developing knowledge, he must keep reasonably abreast of it and not be too slow to apply it, and where he has in fact greater than average knowledge of the risks, he may be thereby obliged to take more than the average or standard precautions.

A example of the application of these principles can be seen in the cases relating to liability for noise-induced hearing loss where the above dictum of Swanwick J was quoted with approval in *Thompson v Smiths Shiprepairers (North Shields) Ltd* (1984)... The crucial factor was not when the knowledge (in this case that excessive exposure to noise resulted in hearing loss) was discovered in the absolute sense but when it should be deemed to be known in the industry. The clear implication is that if the industry is at the forefront of research and development then it will be expected to take technological advances into account very quickly. Clearly the salient issue is not just one of the actual knowledge of the producer or designer but also of his or her constructive knowledge.

With regard to externally imposed standards, reference has already been made to the definition of ‘competence’ in various professional and industry codes. There are also a number of standards laid down for specific industry sectors, such as defence and the aircraft industry.66 Until relatively recently, there were no widely accepted standards for the development of safety-critical software, other than a general acceptance that the usual practices of software development for non safety-related applications are inadequate for safety-related systems. However, after a long period of gestation, a generic international standard, IEC 61508, was adopted in 1999. The fundamental tenet of this standard is that there is a relationship between the level of competence required of a software engineer and the integrity required of the design. Given that the latter increases with the level of safety required, it is here that an awareness of the standard of care becomes paramount.

65 *Op cit*, Rowland, fn 49.
66 See, further, *op cit*, Bott et al, fn 25, Chapter 10.

244
At present, safety-critical practitioners seem to divide into three groups:

1. Those who are aware in general of the problems raised by safety-critical software development and are striving to adjust their working practices so as to produce software of what they consider to be an adequate quality.
2. Those who are attempting to follow, and where possible do better than, the emerging standards.
3. Those who are developing safety-critical systems and yet are not aware that there are special problems.

The first of these probably most accurately reflects what can be described as the ordinarily competent safety-critical practitioner, whilst a growing number of specialists fall into the second category. It is widely suspected that a significant proportion of companies producing safety-related software belong in the third category...

An important consideration for a technologically advanced industry such as the software industry is the legitimate concern that innovation should not be stifled by legal rules. Designs for systems that are ‘at the cutting edge of technology’ may not have been tried and tested in the same way as a more pedestrian project, and the industry owes its success to its ability to create and market new methods of control or new systems and products. Nonetheless, where there are safety implications in a design, the law has not shied away from requiring the highest consideration of the safety factors, as evidenced in the case of IBA v EMI and BICC67 concerning the collapse of the Emley Moor television transmitter in 1969. The defendants, BICC, argued vigorously that a finding of negligence would be likely to stifle innovation and inhibit technological progress. They produced evidence that there was neither any available source of empirical knowledge nor agreed practice; they were ‘both at and beyond the frontier of professional knowledge’.

In view of the potentially catastrophic consequences of collapse of the mast, the House of Lords were agreed that it would have been necessary for BICC to exercise a high degree of care. By applying standard principles of negligence Lord Edmund-Davies deduced:

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67 (1980) 14 BLR 1. For a more detailed consideration of this case see, eg, Stanton, KM and Dugdale, AM, ‘Design responsibility in civil engineering work’ (1981) 131 NLJ 583.
The graver the foreseeable consequences of failure to take care, the greater the necessity for special circumspection... The project may be alluring. But the risks of injury to those engaged in it, or to others, or to both, may be so manifest and substantial, and their elimination may be so difficult to ensure with reasonable certainty that the only proper course is to abandon the project altogether... The law requires even pioneers to be prudent.

It was found that the cause of the collapse was due to a combination of vortex shedding and asymmetric icing on the stays, which would be likely to cause problems at even relatively low wind velocities. The House of Lords unanimously agreed that these factors could reasonably have been foreseen and the fact that the project was at the forefront of knowledge at the time was no excuse. It was foreseeable that large quantities of ice might be deposited on the stays and that this was likely to be asymmetric, but that the resultant stresses would be exacerbated by vortex shedding had never been considered by BICC whose design was therefore held to be negligent.

The behaviour that the law expects of the reasonably competent professional who is operating at the frontiers of knowledge at the time can be inferred from this statement of Lord Edmund-Davies:

Justice requires that we seek to put ourselves in the position of BICC when first confronted by their daunting task, lacking all empirical knowledge and adequate expert advice in dealing with the many problems awaiting solution. But those very handicaps created a clear duty to identify and to think through such problems, including those of static and dynamic stresses, so that the dimensions of the ‘venture into the unknown’ could be adequately assessed and the ultimate decision as to its practicality arrived at.

The power of software arises principally from the relative ease with which highly complex systems can be created and changed. There is a consequent temptation to undertake development without adherence to appropriate engineering principles and to quite readily undertake a ‘venture into the unknown’; after all, software can be changed easily and it is tempting to think that any faults can be corrected easily. However, unless software is designed very carefully a seemingly simple change can have an unexpected side effect that may not become apparent for some considerable time afterwards, so that any departure from strict quality assurance procedures during development almost certainly becomes another ‘venture into the unknown’. In the case of software the ‘dimensions’ of such ventures are not readily assessed, so that departure from established methods can be particularly risky.

Finally, what is the standard that can be expected if the client requests (and pays for) the services of an acknowledged expert? Is the expertise of such a person to be judged by reference to the standards of the ‘ordinarily competent practitioner’? It seems reasonable to suggest that the standard of such individuals should, instead, be assessed by reference to a more limited class of those with specialist knowledge. This might create problems where the class is small such that the general or accepted standard is difficult to determine, but it has been confirmed that even a small number of specialists can constitute a reasonable body of opinion; the question is one of quality, not quantity. 68 In any event, if the
specialist is in possession of actual knowledge that might not be possessed by the general body of that profession, then he or she is under a duty to make use of that actual knowledge.69

Thus, although there may be a number of possible causes of action which could be pursued in the event of defective software which resulted in damage, there is considerable uncertainty about the scope and boundaries of liability and also about those on whom liability might fall. Modern technology relies extensively on software and it is perhaps surprising that there has been little activity in the courts as yet. Neither does this seem to be due to the excellence of the software: Hatton70 points out that ‘An explosion in the volume of software would not be a cause for concern if software quality was improving at the same rate proportionately. Unfortunately the plain truth is that software is simply not getting much better’. Given these concerns, it may only be a matter of time before the judiciary are called upon to decide some of the issues raised in this chapter.

INTRODUCTION

Scope

‘Definitions of e-commerce vary considerably.’¹ However, consideration of two brief definitions raises some basic issues. Thus, it has been said that:

Electronic commerce is a broad concept that covers any commercial transaction that is effected via electronic means and would include such means as facsimile, telex, EDI, internet and telephone. For the purposes of this report the term is limited to those trade and commercial transactions involving computer to computer communications whether utilising an open or closed network.²

In addition, it has also been said that:

Electronic commerce could be said to comprise commercial transactions, whether between private individuals or commercial entities, which take place in or over electronic networks. The matters dealt with in the transactions could be intangibles, data products or tangible goods. The only important factor is that the communication transactions take place over an electronic medium.³

These definitions raise issues in relation to the form of communication, the subject matter of the transactions and the contracting parties.

The first of the above definitions emphasises that e-commerce, in a broad sense, could encompass trading carried out by any means of communication that can be labelled ‘electronic’. However, it emphasises computer to computer transactions and the concern here is basically email and web-based communication, which are sufficiently different from the more traditional means of communication to raise significant issues for the law. The second definition includes some recognition of the different types of subject matter of electronic contracts. Such contracts may simply be concerned with traditional goods or services to be delivered in the traditional way. However, e-commerce does not

simply provide a new means of making contracts. In some situations, it also provides a new method of performance:

Certain products, such as software, video, books, music and even newspapers and magazines no longer have to be physically delivered in hard copy format to the purchaser. Suppliers can instead send the products in digital form over the internet, providing both time and cost saving.4

As we have seen, this type of supply challenges the traditional categorisation of goods and services5 and the use of the law which evolved around them, for example, the application of the quality terms implied into contracts for the sale of goods.6 The final point to be made here, and which is again raised by the second definition, relates to the parties contracting by email or over the web. A substantial number of such contracts will be business to business, but consumers are now also making use of the technology and this raises issues of the application of consumer protection regimes in the e-commerce context.

Global nature

By its nature, e-commerce is not restricted by geographical boundaries in the same way as more traditional business forms. Obviously, contracts have always been made between parties in different jurisdictions and have led to disputes involving elements from different countries, and the rules about the jurisdiction and the substantive law to be applied in such cases will be considered below. However, email and web-based contracting make it very easy for businesses to contract with businesses in other jurisdictions and, even more radically, those methods allow for a significant amount of consumer contracting outside of the consumer’s home country. In this context, a considerable impetus is generated to consider the differences between the legal regimes in different countries. It is recognised that measures relating to e-commerce cannot be efficiently taken by a single regime. The European Community (EC) already provides for measures dealing with a group of States and the need for such an approach in the e-commerce area has been recognised, as has the fact that the EC itself will not contain e-commerce within its borders—an even broader approach will be required.

The recitals to the EC Directive on Electronic Commerce7 state:

59 Despite the global nature of electronic communications, co-ordination of national regulatory measures at European level is necessary to avoid

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5 See above, p 185.
6 See above, p 191.
7 On the Directive generally, see below, p 281.
fragmentation of the Internal Market, and for the establishment of an appropriate European regulatory framework; such coordination should also contribute to the establishment of a common and strong negotiating position in international fora.

60 In order to allow the unhampered development of electronic commerce, the legal framework must be clear and simple, predictable and consistent with the rules applicable at international level so that it does not affect the competitiveness of European Industry or impede innovation in that sector.

61 If the market is actually to operate by electronic means in the context of globalisation, the European Union and the major non-European area need to consult each other with a view to making laws and procedures compatible.

62 Co-operation with third countries should be strengthened in the area of electronic commerce, in particular with applicant countries, the developing countries and the European Union’s other trading partners.

This chapter will refer not only to EC measures, but also to the work of even more broadly international bodies, such as the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).

**Regulation**

At a domestic level, we are used to some regulation of commerce, particularly, but not exclusively, where consumers are involved. Liability for breach of the statutorily implied terms as to the quality of goods cannot be excluded or restricted if the buyer ‘deals as consumer’, for example; but, even if the buyer does not deal as consumer, that liability can only be excluded or restricted by a reasonable term. There are obviously difficulties in regulating e-commerce—it is simply not geographically, or jurisdictionally, restricted in the same way as more traditional forms—and there are competing pressures to regulate or not to regulate. Some consideration is given to this in the extracts below.

*Borderless trade and the consumer interest: protecting the consumer in the age of e-commerce*

*James P Nehf*

*(1999) Colum J Transnat Law 457*

Governments continually struggle to balance the consumer interest against economic growth. The two priorities often find themselves at odds: more consumer protection usually means more restrictions on the freedom of sellers to manufacture, market and sell as they please. Conversely, policies designed to encourage business activity often do so at the expense of the

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8 [SGA 1979, s 14. See above, p 202.](#)
9 [UCTA 1977, s 6(2). See above, p 145.](#)
10 [Ibid, s 6(3). See above, p 145.](#)
consumer interest. Successful consumer protection regimes should result in a net benefit increase in social welfare, however measured, even if some business opportunities and profits are curtailed along the way.

This principle holds true in domestic, even local, transactions within any country, State or city. National laws, State initiatives and town ordinances can restrict business activity in an effort to increase the quality of life for the citizenry. In the current age of multilateral trade pacts such as GATT, NAFTA, EU and ASEAN, however, the trade-offs between encouraging international commerce and respecting the consumer interest are being re-examined in a new light. Government regulations within a country that have set strict consumer protection standards—for example, rules governing advertising and marketing claims—may strike an acceptable balance for domestic businesses and consumers, but they can also discourage or surprise foreign firms that wish to advertise and penetrate the market there.

A model for internet regulation
Lars J Davies
www.scl.org/content/ecommerce, s 1.3.2
(Report funded by the Society for Computers and Law)

...two dangers need to be avoided. The first is to under regulate. The second is to over regulate. The threat posed by over regulation is easy to see. It would result in too rigid a market, stifling it of the flexibility of operation, potentially its best feature, and so stifle development of electronic commerce, and could easily lead to commercial entities setting up in jurisdictions with less rigid controls. The formation of electronic commerce havens of a reduced or minimal control is a distinct possibility. Overly strong control could also lessen the financial attractiveness of conducting electronic commerce. Economic development would suffer as the benefits offered by this new activity would be lost to other markets with less rigid structures.

Though it would seem incongruous that it would be possible to under regulate in a market driven economy, which is essentially what the electronic market place appears to be, insufficient regulation can have several consequences. The lack of sufficient controls could also lead to the perception that electronic commerce is an activity that contains an unacceptably high element of risk and so prevent parties from engaging in the activity regardless of whether they are commercial entities or consumers.

Electronic data interchange (EDI)

EDI is a particular form of e-commerce, representing ‘one of the earliest forms’. Its distinguishing feature is that it is highly structured, and so it is more secure than simple email. There will be protocols for message formats, data storage

logs, acknowledgments of messages and confirmation of their content. It would be normal for parties trading together using EDI to have first established a regime for their communications under an interchange agreement. Such an agreement will not deal with the substance of a trading contract but, rather, will provide the basis for the parties to use EDI to make those contracts.\textsuperscript{12} The degree of structure means that it can be used for automated ordering by computerised stock systems without any need for direct human involvement, and that can be carried through to the generation of invoices and even payment by electronic means. The removal of the paper element and the automation of such transactions may provide considerable cost savings.\textsuperscript{13} However, the focus here is on email and simple web-based contracting. They now provide the more significant part of e-commerce.

**Scope of the chapter**

In a chapter on e-commerce, it would be impossible to include consideration of everything falling within ‘commercial law’ in a broad sense and ‘consumer law’ in the context of electronic communication. In other words, in a single chapter, comprehensive coverage of everything which might fall within the e-commerce category is impossible. Some particular issues, raising particular concerns in the electronic context, will be addressed:

- jurisdiction/the governing law;
- aspects of contracting by electronic means;
- requirements of writing and signature;
- the Distance Selling Directive (Directive on the Protection of Consumers in Respect of Distance Contracts (97/7/EC)).

In addition, it should be noted that the matters which are relevant here have been dealt with elsewhere. Exemption clauses will be used in e-commerce as in every other kind of contracting and they are dealt with above, Chapter 3, as are the Regulations on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts. Similarly, sale of goods contracts made electronically will raise issues as to the statutory implied terms (for example, as to satisfactory quality and reasonable fitness for the buyer’s particular purpose).\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{12} The EC has adopted a Model Interchange Agreement—94/820/EC OJ L338/98 (28 December 1994).
\textsuperscript{13} Op cit, Lloyd, fn 11, p 233.
\textsuperscript{14} SGA 1979, s 14. See above, p 202.
Chapter 6: Information Technology Law

JURISDICTION AND THE GOVERNING LAW

One of the significant impacts of e-commerce lies in the increase in trading involving more than one country. For example, an Englishman contracts with a Frenchman (each remaining in their respective countries) for the purchase of goods to be delivered from Spain. If a dispute arises, then the international element of the transaction will raise questions as to which court is to have jurisdiction and which country’s laws are to be applied to resolve the dispute. These can be described as the jurisdiction question and the governing law question.

JURISDICTION

Conventions and common law

In looking at the question of jurisdiction, consideration needs to be given to Conventions and the common law. The Brussels Convention basically relates to the EC. The Lugano Convention is in almost the same terms and relates to the EFTA. The Modified Convention applies when there are elements of the dispute involving different parts of the UK (and basically follows the Brussels Convention) and it also determines which part of the UK has jurisdiction, whereas the Brussels Convention merely refers to the jurisdiction of the UK. The focus here will be on the Brussels Convention (‘the Convention’) and the common law.

The Convention was implemented by the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982. It should be noted that it is proposed to replace and update the Convention by an EC Regulation; this is, in part, to take account of ‘new forms of commerce’, but its more general objective is to:

…maintain and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice, in which the free movement of persons is assured and litigants can assert their rights, enjoying facilities equivalent to those they enjoy in the courts of their own country.

15 European Free Trade Area.
17 Ibid, para 1.1.
However, the UK, Ireland and Denmark will have to ‘opt in’ to the application of the EC Regulation.\(^\text{18}\) To a considerable extent, the proposed EC Regulation mirrors the Convention. Some of the relevant provisions of the Convention are set out below. Initial consideration will be given to the Convention and then the common law will be addressed.

### The Brussels Convention

#### Title 1

**SECTION 1**

**SCOPE**

**Article 1**

This Convention shall apply in civil and commercial matters whatever the nature of the court or tribunal. It shall not extend, in particular, to revenue, customs or administrative matters.

This Convention shall not apply to—

1. The status or legal capacity of natural persons, rights in property arising out of a matrimonial relationship, wills and succession.
2. Bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding up of insolvent companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements, compositions and analogous proceedings.
4. Arbitration.

#### GENERAL PROVISIONS

**Article 2**

Subject to the provisions of this Convention, persons domiciled in a Contracting State shall whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that State.

Persons who are not nationals of the State in which they are domiciled shall be governed by the rules of jurisdiction applicable to nationals of that State.

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\(^{18}\) At a Council Meeting (Justice and Home Affairs, 12 March 1999), the UK and Ireland stated that they intended to be ‘fully associated with Community activities in relation to judicial co-operation in civil matters’—*see op cit*, fn 16, para 2.2.
Article 3

Persons domiciled in a Contracting State may be sued in the courts of another Contracting State only by virtue of the rules set out in Sections 2 to 6 of this Title. In particular the following provisions shall not be applicable as against them—

…in the United Kingdom: the rules which enable jurisdiction to be founded on: the document instituting the proceedings having been served on the defendant during his temporary presence in the United Kingdom;…

Article 4

If the defendant is not domiciled in a Contracting State, the Jurisdiction of the courts of each Contracting State shall subject to the provisions of Article 16, be determined by the law of that State.

As against a defendant, any person domiciled in a Contracting State may, whatever his nationality, avail himself in that State of the rules of jurisdiction there in force, and in particular those specified in the second paragraph of Article 3, in the same way as nationals of that State.

SECTION 2

SPECIAL JURISDICTION

Article 5

A person domiciled in a Contracting State may, in another Contracting State, be sued—

1 In matters relating to a contract, in the courts for the place of performance of the obligation in question; in matters relating to individual contracts of employment, this place is that where an individual employee habitually carries out his work, or if the employee does not habitually carry out his work in any one country, the employer may be sued in the courts for the place where the business which engaged the employee was or is now situated.

…

3 In matters relating to tort, delict or quasi delict, in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred.

4 As regards a civil claim for damages or restitution which is based on an act giving rise to criminal proceedings, in the court seised of those proceedings to the extent that that court has jurisdiction under its own law to entertain civil proceedings.

5 As regards a dispute arising out of the operation of a branch, agency or other establishment, in the courts of the place in which the branch, agency or other establishment is situated.

…
Article 6

A person domiciled in a Contracting State may also be sued—

1 Where he is one of a number defendants, in the courts for the place where any one of them is domiciled

2 As a third party in an action on a warranty or guarantee or in any other third party proceedings, in the courts seised of the original proceedings, unless these were instituted solely with the object of removing from the jurisdiction of the court which would be competent in this case.

3 On a counter claim arising from the same contract or facts on which the original claim was based, in the court in which the original claim is pending.

4 In matters relating to a contract, if the action may be combined with an action against the same defendant in matters relating to rights in rem in immovable property, in the court of the Contracting State in which the property is situated.

...

SECTION 3

JURISDICTION IN MATTERS RELATING TO INSURANCE

...

SECTION 4

JURISDICTION OVER CONSUMER CONTRACTS

Article 13

In proceedings concerning a contract concluded by a person for a purpose which can be regarded as being outside his trade or profession, hereinafter called ‘the consumer’, jurisdiction shall be determined by this section, without prejudice to the provisions of Article 4 and point 5 of Article 5, if it is—

1 a contract for the sale of goods on instalment terms, or

2 a contract for a loan repayable by instalments, or for any other form of credit, made to finance the sale of goods, or

3 any other contract for the supply of goods or a contract for the supply of services, and

(a) in the state of the consumer’s domicile the conclusion of the contract was preceded by a specific invitation addressed to him or by advertising; and

(b) the consumer took in that State the steps necessary for the conclusion of the contract.

Where a consumer enters into a contract with a party who is not domiciled in a Contracting State but has a branch, agency or other establishment in one of the Contracting States, that party shall, in disputes arising out of the operations of the branch, agency or establishment, be deemed to be domiciled in that State.
This Section does not apply to contracts of transport.

**Article 14**

A consumer may bring proceedings against the other party to a contract either in the courts of the Contracting State in which that party is domiciled or in the courts of the Contracting State in which he is himself domiciled.

Proceedings may be brought against a consumer by the other party to the contract only in the courts of the Contracting State in which the consumer is domiciled.

These provisions shall not affect the right to bring a counter claim in the court in which, in accordance with this Section, the original claim is pending.

**Article 15**

The provisions of this Section may be departed from only by an agreement—

1. which is entered into after a dispute has arisen,
2. which allows the consumer to bring proceedings in courts other than those indicated in this section, or
3. which is entered into by a consumer and the other party to the contract, both of whom are at the time of the conclusion of the contract domiciled or habitually resident in the same Contracting State, and which confers jurisdiction on the courts of that State, provided that such an agreement is not contrary to the law of that State.

**SECTION 5**

**EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION**

**Article 16**

The following courts have exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of domicile:

1. (a) in proceedings which have as their object rights in rem in immoveable property or tenancies of immoveable property, the courts of the Contracting State in which the property is situated;
   (b) however, in proceedings which have as their object tenancies of immoveable property concluded for temporary private use for a maximum period of six consecutive months, the courts of the Contracting State in which the defendant is domiciled shall also have jurisdiction, provided that the landlord and tenant are natural persons and are domiciled in the same Contracting State.

2. In proceedings which have as their object the validity of the constitution, the nullity or the dissolution of companies or other legal persons or associations of natural or legal persons, or the decisions of their organs, the courts of the Contracting State in which the Company, legal person or association has its seat.

3. In proceedings which have as their object the validity of entries in public registers, the courts of the Contracting State in which the register is kept.
In proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of patents, trade marks, designs, or other similar rights required to be deposited or registered, the courts of the Contracting State in which the deposit or registration has been applied for, has taken place or is under the terms of an international convention deemed to have taken place.

In proceedings concerned with the enforcement of judgments, the courts of the Contracting State in which judgment has been or is to be enforced.

**SECTION 6**

**PROROGATION OF JURISDICTION**

**Article 17**

If the parties, one or more of whom is domiciled in a Contracting State, have agreed that a court or the courts of a Contracting State are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have arisen or which may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, that court or those courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction. Such an agreement conferring jurisdiction shall be either—

(a) in writing or evidenced in writing, or  
(b) in a form which accords with practices which the parties have established between themselves, or  
(c) in international trade or commerce, in a form which accords with a usage of which the parties are or ought to have been aware and which in such trade or commerce is widely known, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular trade or commerce.

Where such an agreement is concluded by the parties, none of whom is domiciled in a Contracting State, the courts of other Contracting States shall have no jurisdiction over their disputes unless the court or courts chosen have declined jurisdiction.

...  

If an agreement conferring jurisdiction was included for the benefit of only one of the parties, that party shall retain the right to bring proceedings in any other court which has jurisdiction by virtue of this Convention.

In matters relating to individual contracts of employment an agreement conferring jurisdiction shall have legal force only if it is entered into after the dispute has arisen or if the employee invokes it to seise courts other than those for the defendant’s domicile or those specified in Article 5(1).
Chapter 6: Information Technology Law

Article 18

Apart from the jurisdiction derived from other provisions of this Convention a court of a Contracting State before whom a defendant enters an appearance shall have jurisdiction. This rule shall not apply where appearance has been entered solely to contest the jurisdiction, or where another court has exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Article 16...

The scope of the Convention depends upon the subject matter of disputes. It applies in ‘civil and commercial matters’ but does not extend to ‘revenue, customs or administrative matters’ and further exclusions are set out in Art 1, such as bankruptcy proceedings. Otherwise, the starting point for consideration of the application of the Convention is the domicile of the defendant (the meaning of ‘domicile’ is considered below). The basic rule, in Art 2, is that persons domiciled in a Contracting State ‘shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that State’ and may be sued in the courts of another Contracting State only by virtue of the rules in ss 2–6 of Title I (that is, Arts 5–18). In other words, where a dispute falls within the scope of the Convention and the defendant is domiciled in a Contracting State, jurisdiction is not given to another State under the common law rules—it is given only under the additional rules of the Convention. However, subject to certain exceptions, if the defendant is not domiciled in a Contracting State, then the jurisdiction of a Contracting State is determined by the law of that Contracting State (for example, the common law in England). Article 16 sets out certain ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ rules which apply ‘regardless of domicile’ (for example, where what is in question are rights in rem in immovable property situated in a Contracting State, then it is that State which has exclusive jurisdiction). In Art 18, subject to the exclusive jurisdiction provisions of Art 16, there is a recognition of jurisdiction for the courts of a Contracting State through submission to jurisdiction by the defendant entering an appearance in response to an action commenced by the other party. In addition, where one of the parties is domiciled in a Contracting State, there is exclusive jurisdiction for courts of the country agreed upon by the parties—the agreement must comply with one of the alternative requirements there set out. One of the alternative means of making such an agreement effective is for it to be ‘in writing or evidenced in writing’. As is discussed elsewhere, such requirements of form can provide barriers to e-commerce and it is proposed

19 Article 1.
20 See below, p 266.
21 Article 3.
22 Article 4. This is seen as ‘somewhat misleading’ in its indication that, subject only to Art 16, jurisdiction is dependent upon the common law rules unless the defendant is domiciled in a Contracting State—see Arts 17, 18; Clarkson, CMV and Hill, Jaffey on the Conflict of Laws, 1997, London: Butterworths. The situation is clarified in the proposed EC Regulation.
23 See, also, Arts 17, 18, 21–24.
that this be amended by the intended Regulation to ‘take account of the development of new communication techniques’. In other words, a potential disincentive to e-commerce was perceived and it is proposed that the equivalent Regulation provides that:

Any communication by electronic means which can provide a durable record of the agreement shall be deemed to be in writing.

As has been indicated, with limited exceptions, where the defendant is domiciled in a Contracting State, that State has jurisdiction. However, the Convention provides for alternative ‘special jurisdictions’ (at the choice of the claimant) in some cases. Article 5 allows for an alternative jurisdiction derived from a connection to the basis of the action. So, for example, under Art 5(5), where there is a ‘dispute arising out of the operations of a branch, agency or other establishment’ of the defendant, a person domiciled in a Contracting State may be sued ‘in the courts of the place in which the branch, agency or other establishment is situated’. Under Art 5(1), ‘in matters relating to contract’, there is jurisdiction ‘in the courts for the place of performance of the obligation in question’. Difficulties may arise in determining the place of performance and, under the Convention, it is left to the court with jurisdiction to determine the place of performance after applying its rules to ascertain the governing law. The proposed EC Regulation would give the ‘place of performance…an autonomous definition in two categories of situation’. Article 5 of the proposed EC Regulation states:

Unless otherwise agreed, the place of performance of the obligation in question shall be:

- in the case of sale of goods, the place in a Member State where, under the contract, the goods were delivered or should have been delivered;
- in the case of the provision of services, the place in a Member State where under the contract the services were provided or should have been provided.

This is envisaged as ‘pragmatic determination of the place of enforcement [applying] regardless of the obligation in question, even where the obligation is the payment of the financial consideration for the contract’. Identifying the place where the goods should have been delivered as a possible jurisdiction may be of assistance to e-commerce purchasers.

24 Article 18.
25 See below, p 308.
26 Op cit, fn 16, para 18.
27 Article 5(1).
28 See below, p 270.
29 Op cit, fn 16, para 4.2
30 See op cit, fn 16 on Art 5.
Article 6 provides for some situations in which there are multiple defendants or actions, allowing all of them to be addressed in one jurisdiction. So, for example, where he or she is one of a number of defendants, a person domiciled in a Contracting State ‘may also be sued in the courts of the place where one of them is domiciled’.  

The Convention makes special provision in relation to a number of types of contract where one party may require some protection of their interests because of inequality of bargaining power—namely, consumer contracts, employment contracts and contracts of insurance. In relation to some consumer contracts, for example, Arts 13–15 basically provide that, where a supplier is domiciled in a Contracting State, a consumer can sue in either the supplier’s or consumer’s domicile, but can only be sued in the consumer’s domicile. In addition, a jurisdiction agreement will only be effective in limited circumstances. It is necessary to determine which contracts are covered by these provisions. A ‘consumer’ is someone who contracts ‘for a purpose which can be regarded as being outside his trade or profession’ and the consumer contracts covered are set out in Art 13, including, in Art 13(3):

Any other contract for the supply of goods or a contract for the supply of services, and

(a) in the State of the consumer’s domicile the conclusion of the contract was preceded by a specific invitation addressed to him or by advertising; and

(b) the consumer took in that State the steps necessary for the conclusion of the contract.

This raises particular issues in the e-commerce context. Email might easily be seen as a ‘specific invitation’, but a web page advertisement is problematic. The above provision ‘has been interpreted as meaning that the trader must have directed the advertising to’ the consumer’s domicile. It would seem that an advertising website based in the trader’s State would not be ‘directed’ to the consumer’s State merely because it is accessible from that State. However, the

31 Where the customer is a consumer, see below.
32 Article 6(1).
33 Section 4.
34 Section 3.
35 If the supplier has a branch, agency or other establishment in a Contracting State and the dispute arises out of the operation of that branch, agency or other establishment, the supplier is deemed to be domiciled in that State (Art 13).
36 Article 14.
proposed EC Regulation would substitute a new paragraph for that set out above, including within the protective provision the situation where:

\[\text{…in all other cases, the contract has been concluded with a person who pursues commercial or professional activities in the Member State of the consumer’s domicile or, by any means, directs such activities to that Member State or to several countries including the Member State, and the contract falls within the scope of such activities.}\]

This is not restricted to goods or services contracts, as is the present provision. It removes any need for the contract to be concluded in the consumer’s domicile, circumventing what may be a difficult question in the e-commerce context.\(^{39}\) It also removes the reference to a ‘specific invitation’ and the point has been made that ‘the concept of activities pursued in or directed towards a Member State is designed to make it clear that [it] applies to consumer contracts concluded via an interactive website accessible in the State of the consumer’s domicile’.\(^{40}\) It is by no means obvious that the proposed provision is appropriately worded to achieve that effect. However, a recital has been proposed to make it clear.\(^{41}\) If it is made certain that the accessibility of a website is enough, the point has been made that businesses will be concerned. ‘Since an internet website is accessible anywhere in the world, [it] would subject an electronic trader to the jurisdiction of the courts of any Member State where a consumer who chose to contract with him resided even though he had no intention of targeting consumers in that State.’\(^{42}\) The issue of ‘directed’ advertising will be returned to below in the context of the Rome Convention, where it is similarly relevant in the context of Art 5—the consumer protection provision of that Convention.\(^{43}\)

In many cases, it is possible for the courts of more than one forum to have jurisdiction. Articles 21 and 22 contain measures which are aimed at preventing conflicting judicial decisions in different States in basically the same case,\(^{44}\) or in relation to related issues.\(^{45}\) Basically, precedence is given to the court ‘first seised’.\(^{46}\)

38 See, further, below, in relation to a similar provision in the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations.
39 See below, p 300.
40 See *op cit*, fn 16, p 16 on the proposed Art 15.
41 *Op cit*, Susman, fn 37.
42 *Op cit*, Susman, fn 37.
43 See below, p 278.
44 Article 21.
45 Article 22.
46 See, also, the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, s 49. Under the common law rules, there is considerable discretion vested in the court to stay proceedings. Section 49 controversially extends this power into the context of cases covered by the Convention where to use it ‘is not inconsistent with the Conventions’.
Before ending this discussion of the Convention, the final point to consider is the meaning of ‘domicile’—a concept which is key to the application of the Convention’s rules. The basic provisions for domicile in part of the UK are set out in ss 41 and 42 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982.

Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982

41 Domicile of Individuals

(1) Subject to Article 52 (which contains provisions for determining whether a party is domiciled in a Contracting State), the following provisions of this section determine, for the purposes of the 1968 Convention, the Lugano Convention and this Act, whether an individual is domiciled in the United Kingdom or in a particular part of, or place in, the United Kingdom or in a State other than a Contracting State.

(2) An individual is domiciled in the United Kingdom if and only if—

(a) he is resident in the United Kingdom; and

(b) the nature and circumstances of his residence indicate that he has a substantial connection with the United Kingdom.

(3) Subject to subsection (5), an individual is domiciled in a particular part of the United Kingdom if and only if—

(a) he is resident in that part; and

(b) the nature and circumstances of his residence indicate that he has a substantial connection with that part.

(4) An individual is domiciled in a particular place in the United Kingdom if and only if he—

(a) is domiciled in the part of the United Kingdom in which that place is situated; and

(b) is resident in that place.

(5) An individual who is domiciled in the United Kingdom but in whose case the requirements of subsection 3(b) are not satisfied in relation to any particular part of the United Kingdom shall be treated as domiciled in the part of the United Kingdom in which he is resident.

(6) In the case of an individual who—

(a) is resident in the United Kingdom, or in a particular part of the United Kingdom; and

(b) has been so resident for the last three months or more, the requirements of subsection (2)(b) or, as the case may be, subsection 3(b) shall be presumed to be fulfilled unless the contrary is proved.

(7) An individual is domiciled in a state other than a Contracting State if and only if—

(a) he is resident in that State; and

(b) the nature and circumstances of his residence indicate that he has a substantial connection with that State.
Domicile and Seat of Corporation or Association

(1) For the purposes of this Act the seat of a corporation or association (as determined by this section) shall be treated as its domicile.

(2) The following provisions of this section determine where a corporation or association has its seat—

(a) for the purposes of Article 53 (which for the purposes of the 1968 Convention, or, as the case may be, the Lugano Convention equates the domicile of such a body with its seat); and

(b) for the purposes of this Act other than the provisions mentioned in s 43(1)(b) and (c).

(3) A corporation or association has its seat in the United Kingdom or part of the United Kingdom if and only if—

(a) it was incorporated or formed under the law of part of the United Kingdom and has its registered office or some other official address in the United Kingdom; or

(b) its central management and control is exercised in the United Kingdom.

(4) A corporation or association has its seat in a particular part of the United Kingdom if and only if it has its seat in the United Kingdom and—

(a) it has its registered office or some other official address in that part; or

(b) its central management and control is exercised in that part; or

(c) it has its place of business in that part.

(5) A corporation or association has its seat in a particular part place in the United Kingdom if and only if it has its seat in the part of the United Kingdom in which that place is situated and—

(a) it has its registered office or some other official address in that place; or

(b) its central management and control is exercised in that place; or

(c) it has a place of business in that place.

(6) Subject to subsection (7), a corporation or association has its seat in a State other than the United Kingdom if and only if—

(a) it was incorporated or formed under the law of that State and has its registered office or some other official address there; or

(b) its central management is exercised in that State.

(7) A corporation or association shall not be regarded as having its seat in a Contracting State other than the United Kingdom if it is shown that the courts of that State would not regard it as having its seat there.

(8) In this section—

‘business’ includes any activity carried on by a corporation or association and ‘place of business’ shall be construed accordingly;

‘official address’ in relation to a corporation or association, means an address which it is require by law to register, notify or maintain for the purposes of receiving notices or other communications.
As has been indicated, under the Convention (and the proposed EC Regulation), domicile is a key concept. The domicile of individuals and legal persons require separate consideration. Under Art 52 of the Convention, the question of whether an individual is domiciled in a State whose courts are seised of a matter is determined by the ‘internal law of that State’. In order to determine whether the individual is domiciled in another Contracting State, the law of that State is applied. Section 41 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 sets out the basic rule for deciding whether an individual is domiciled within the UK (and part of the UK). It is dependent upon ‘residence’ and ‘the nature and circumstances of [the] residence’ indicating a ‘substantial connection’ with the UK (and part of the UK). Three months’ residence raises a presumption of substantial connection.\(^47\) In relation to legal persons, the determination of domicile is dealt with by Art 53, under which the domicile of a company is its seat, and its seat is decided by the private international law rules of the court.\(^48\) Section 42 of the 1982 Act sets out when a company has its seat in the UK.

### The common law rules

Where the Convention does not apply, the common law rules determine the jurisdiction of the English courts. Three bases of jurisdiction need to be considered.

#### Presence

This basically relates to the ability to serve a writ on the defendant in the jurisdiction of the English courts. When an individual is in question, then temporary presence in England, to attend Ascot for example,\(^49\) may suffice. In relation to a company, it will depend upon it being registered in England, or having a branch office\(^50\) or a place of business\(^51\) in England. However, the link with England might be tenuous in some such cases and, under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the court has a discretion to stay the proceedings ‘if the defendant is able to show that there is a more appropriate forum’.\(^52\)

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47 Section 41(6).
48 I e, the court has to consider which country’s law should determine the issue and then apply the law which the courts of that country would apply.
49 Maharanee of Baroda v Wildenstein [1972] 2 All ER 689.
50 In respect of the business of the branch.
51 Companies Act 1985.
52 Op cit, Clarkson and Hill, fn 22, p 97.
Submission to jurisdiction

When the claimant commences an action in the English courts, the defendant may enter an appearance and submit to the jurisdiction. The English courts will then generally have jurisdiction under the Convention, but, in cases not falling within the Convention, it will be conferred at common law. No jurisdiction is conferred if the defendant is only appearing to contest jurisdiction.

Service out of the jurisdiction with the leave of the court

This is discretionary. The claimant will need to show that there is a serious issue to be tried, that the claim falls within the Rules of the Supreme Court (RSC) Ord 11 r 1(1) and that England is the appropriate forum (the forum conveniens). In this context, it should be noted that RSC Ord 11 r 1(1) allows for service out of the jurisdiction in relation to a breach of contract in England. In addition, it covers actions ‘to enforce, rescind, dissolve, annul or otherwise affect’ a contract in a number of situations:

- where English law governs the contract (which is determined according to the English choice of law rules);
- where the contract was made in the jurisdiction (issues as to the point of effective acceptance may arise, such as whether the acceptance is effective on receipt or dispatch. In this context, they will be resolved according to English law);
- where the contract was made by or through an agent trading or residing in the jurisdiction on behalf of the defendant;
- where a contract term confers jurisdiction on the English courts.

In addition, the need to deal with multiple defendants is addressed here, as it is under the Convention. It may be possible to serve a defendant out of the jurisdiction if there is another defendant to the claim who falls within the jurisdiction on one of the above bases.

53 Article 18.
54 Re Dulles’ Settlement (No 2) [1951] Ch 842; Williams and Glyn’s Bank v Astro Dynamico Cia Naviera SA [1984] 1 All ER 760.
55 Seaconsfar Far East Ltd v Bank Markhazi Jomhouri Islami Iran [1994] 1 AC 438, p 452, per Lord Goff. See op cit, Clarkson and Hill, fn 22.
56 See below, p 300 on the applicability of the receipt rule or the postal rule in relation to acceptance in the context or e-commerce.
57 In most cases involving such a term, Art 17 of the Convention will apply but the subject matter of a dispute may place it outside the Convention.
THE GOVERNING LAW

An English company may agree with a French company for the purchase of goods which are to be delivered from Spain. Questions arise as to which law is to apply in the event of a dispute—the contract law of England, France, Spain or even somewhere else—and the questions occur across the entire contractual spectrum, from formation to performance, breach and remedies. Obviously, the potential for such contracts is markedly increased with the advent of e-commerce, and what must be considered here are the rules which are used to determine which law will apply in the event of a dispute. Of course, no such issue would arise if each jurisdiction applied the same substantive law to a particular problem and there is, for example, a UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (the Vienna Convention 1980), but that has not yet been ratified by the UK. However, within the EC, the 1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations has provided considerable harmonisation of the choice of law rules and, in the UK, the law applied in relation to most contractual disputes will now be determined by that Convention (implemented in the UK by the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990). In ‘ascertaining the meaning or effect of any provision’ of the Rome Convention, the official Report on it by Guiliano and Lagarde⁵⁸ may be considered.⁵⁹ Under Art 1, the rules of the Convention apply to all disputes coming before the UK courts, whether or not it is the laws of contracting States which are involved. Article 1 also contains certain ousters from the scope of the rules (for example, obligations arising under bills of exchange or contracts of insurance (but not re-insurance)). The point should also be made that e-commerce may well prove to be the significant means for the supply of software, but the Guiliano-Lagarde Report interprets the Convention as also excluding intellectual property. However, this interpretation is made on the basis that, ‘since the law is only concerned with the law applicable to contractual obligations, property rights and intellectual property are not covered by these provisions’.⁶⁰ This ‘exclusion most likely only concerns proprietary rights, not contracts licensing or selling copies of intellectual property’.⁶¹ Some of the more relevant provisions of the Rome Convention are set out below.

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⁵⁹ Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990, s 3(2).
⁶⁰ In relation to Art 1.
⁶¹ Op cit, Chissick and Kelman, fn 4, para 4.23.
Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations

Article 3

Freedom of Choice

1 A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. The choice must be express or demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the case. By their choice the parties can select the law applicable to the whole or only part of the contract.

2 The parties may at any time agree to subject the contract to a law other than that which previously governed it, whether as a result of an earlier choice under this article or of other provisions of this Convention. Any variation by the parties of the law to be applied made after the conclusion of the contract shall not prejudice its formal validity under Article 9 or adversely affect the rights of third parties.

3 The fact that the parties have chosen a foreign law, whether or not accompanied by the choice of a foreign tribunal, shall not, where all the other elements relevant to the situation are connected with one country only, prejudice the application of rules of the law of that country which cannot be derogated from by contract, hereinafter called ‘mandatory rules’.

4 The existence and validity of the consent of the parties as to the choice of the applicable law shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of Articles 8, 9 and 11.

Article 4

Applicable Law in the absence of Choice

1 To the extent that the applicable law has not been chosen in accordance with Article 3, the contract shall be governed by the law of the country with which it is most closely connected. Nevertheless, a severable part of the contract which has a closer connection with another country may by way of exception be governed by the law of that other country.

2 Subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Article, it shall be presumed that the contract is most closely connected with the country where the party who is to effect the performance which is characteristic of the contract has, at the time of conclusion of the contract, his habitual residence or, in the case of a body corporate or unincorporated, its central administration. However, if the contract is entered into in the course of that party’s trade or profession, that country shall be the country in which the principal place of business is situated or, where under the terms of the contract the performance is to be effected through place of business other than the principal place of business, the country in which that other place of business is situated.

3 Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2 of this Article, to the extent that the subject matter of the contract is a right in immovable property or
a right to use immoveable property it shall be presumed that the contract is most closely connected with the country where the immoveable property is situated.

4 A contract for the carriage of goods shall not be subject to the presumption in paragraph 2. In such a contract if the country in which, at the time the contract is concluded, the carrier has his principal place of business is also the country in which the place of loading or the place of discharge or the principal place of business of the consignor is situated, it shall be presumed that the contract is most closely connected with that country. In applying this paragraph single voyage charterparties and other contracts the main purpose of which is the carriage of goods shall be treated as contracts for the carriage of goods.

5 Paragraph 2 shall not apply if the characteristic performance cannot be determined, and the presumptions in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 shall be disregarded if it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract is more closely connected with another country.

Article 5

Certain Consumer Contracts

1 This article applies to a contract the object of which is the supply of goods or services to a person (‘the consumer’) for a purpose which can be regarded as outside his trade or profession, or a contract for the provision of credit for that object.

2 Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 3, a choice of law made by the parties shall not have the result of depriving the consumer of the protection afforded to him by the mandatory rules of the law of the country in which he has his habitual residence—

- if in that country the conclusion of the contract was preceded by a specific invitation addressed to him or by advertising, and he had taken in that country all the steps necessary on his part for the conclusion of the contract, or
- if the other party or his agent received the consumers order in that country, or
- if the contract is for the sale of goods and the consumer travelled from that country to another country and there gave his order, provided that the consumer’s journey was arranged by the seller for the purpose of inducing the consumer to buy.

3 Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 4, a contract to which this article applies shall in the absence of choice in accordance with Article 3, be governed by the law of the country in which the consumer has his habitual residence if it is entered into in the circumstances described in paragraph 2 of this Article.

4 This article shall not apply to—

(a) a contract of carriage;
(b) a contract for the supply of services where the services are to be supplied to the consumer exclusively in a country other than that in which he has his habitual residence.

5 Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 4, this Article shall apply to a contract which, for an inclusive price, provides for a combination of travel and accommodation.

Article 6

Individual Employment Contracts

...

Article 7

Mandatory Rules

1 When applying under this Convention the law of a country, effect may be given to the mandatory rules of the law of another country with which the situation has a close connection, if and in so far as, under the law of the latter country, those rules must be applied whatever the law applicable to the contract. In considering whether to give effect to these mandatory rules, regard shall be had to their nature and purpose and to the consequences of their application or non-application.

2 Nothing in this Convention shall restrict the application of the rules of the law of the forum in a situation where they are mandatory irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract.

Article 8

Material Validity

[See below, p 307]

Article 9

Formal Validity

[See below, p 326]

Article 10

Scope of the Applicable Law

1 The law applicable to a contract by virtue of Articles 3 to 6 and 12 of this Convention shall govern in particular—

(a) interpretation;
(b) performance;
(c) within the limits of the powers conferred on the court by its procedural law, the consequences of breach, including the assessment of damages in so far as it is governed by the rules of law;
(d) the various ways of extinguishing obligations, and prescription and limitation of actions;
(e) the consequences of nullity of contract.

2 In relation to the manner of performance and the steps to be taken in the event of defective performance regard shall be had to the law of the country in which performance takes place.

Article 16

‘Ordre Public’

The application of a rule of the law of any country specified by this Convention may be refused only if such an application is manifestly incompatible with the public policy (‘ordre public’) of the forum.

Basic scope of the applicable law

Articles 3–6 are concerned with determining the ‘applicable’ law, and issues of ‘substance’ are determined by the ‘applicable law’. It encompasses questions of construction, the discharge of the contract (for example, frustration and termination for breach), performance generally, and the consequences of breach (such as whether a particular type of loss is recoverable), although the procedural aspects of calculation of damages will require reference to the law of the forum.

The applicable law—basic rule and limits

Under Art 3, the basic starting point for determining the applicable law is that of the parties’ choice. The choice may be express or ‘demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the case’. This reflects the idea of freedom of contract and, if an express choice is made, it is a means of promoting certainty. The suggestion has been made that:

62 Op cit, Clarkson and Hill, fn 22, p 236.
63 Article 10.
64 Article 10(1)(a).
65 Article 10(1)(d).
66 But note Art 10(2).
67 Articles 1(2)(h), 10(1)(c).
e-commerce vendors are advised always to make a choice of law in their standard terms and conditions. Express choice of law solidifies the governing law in nearly all cases, including, surprisingly enough, consumer contracts (subject to a few restrictions). If no ‘choice’ of law can be found to have been made by the parties, Art 4 applies the ‘law of the country with which the contract is most closely connected’ and supplies presumptions for determining that connection in some cases. It should be noted that there is also recognition that legal systems other than the applicable law may have an interest in a contract and the Convention provides some scope for the application of certain ‘mandatory rules’ from systems other than that of the applicable law. In addition, special provision is made for certain contracts where the parties’ ‘agreement’ to the use of a particular law may be affected by inequality of bargaining power—in, for example, consumer contracts and contracts of employment.

**Country of closest connection**

When the parties have not made a choice under Art 3, then, under Art 4, the country of closest connection is sought to determine the ‘applicable law’. In relation to most contracts, there is a presumption that refers to the country relating to the party who is to effect the ‘performance which is characteristic of the contract’. According to Giuliano and Lagarde:

>In bilateral (reciprocal) contracts… the counterperformance by one of the parties in a modern economy usually takes the form of money. This is not, of course, the characteristic performance of the contract. It is the performance for which the payment is due, that is, depending on the type of contract, the delivery of goods…the provision of a service.

So, for example, if the contract is entered into in the ‘course of’ the ‘trade or profession’ of the party rendering the characteristic performance, the country will be that in which that party’s ‘principal place of business is situated or where under the terms of the contract the performance is to be effected through a place of business other than the principal place of business, the country in

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68 *Op cit*, Chissick and Kelman, fn 4, para 4.31. On the situation in relation to consumers see below, p 278. The consumer cannot lose the benefit of the mandatory rules of his or her habitual residence.

69 Articles 3(3), 7—but note that the UK has derogated from the application of Art 7(1).

70 Article 5.

71 Article 6.

72 For the presumptions dealing with contracts ‘the subject matter of which is immovable property’ and contracts for the carriage of goods, see Art 4(3) and (4) respectively.

73 Article 4(2).

which that other place of business is situated’. In the e-commerce context, the question has been raised as to whether the supplier could artificially generate a ‘place of business’ through the location of his or her web server—75—the supply of an information service could occur through the server. However, the physical location of the server has no necessary link of any substance to the supplier’s business. Its arbitrary nature should mean that it is not sufficient to constitute a ‘place of business’.76 The ‘characteristic performance’ presumption will not apply if the ‘characteristic performance cannot be determined’ and, in any event, the presumption is disregarded ‘if it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract is more closely connected with another country’.77

Mandatory rules

The contracting parties might agree to an ‘applicable law’ in order to avoid particular rules of the more obvious legal system applying to their agreement. Some account of this is taken by Art 3(3), under which the fact that the parties have chosen a particular legal system does not prejudice the application of the ‘mandatory rules’ (that is, those which cannot be derogated from by contract) of a country in which are situated ‘all the other elements relevant to the situation at the time of choice’. The test is objective—there is no requirement that the choice be made to avoid the application of the relevant law. In addition, Art 7 deals with a more limited class of mandatory rules, that is, those which apply ‘irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract’. (The terminology ‘overriding rules’ has been suggested to describe this subset of mandatory rules.)78 Article 7(1), which does not apply in the UK, provides for the application of the mandatory (overriding) rules of a State with which ‘the situation has a close connection’. More significantly, as it does apply in the UK, Art 7(2) provides for the application of the mandatory (overriding) rules of the forum. ‘Whether a rule is optional, mandatory or overriding is a question of interpretation to be resolved by the law of the country of which the rule forms a part.’79 When a statute is in question, its application in situations with extraterritorial elements may be made clear. For example, consider s 27 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, which states:

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75 See, eg, op cit, Chissick and Kelman, fn 4, para 4.31.
76 See, eg, op cit, Chissick and Kelman, fn 4, para 4.31; Schu, R, ‘The applicable law to consumer contracts made over the Internet’ 5 Int JLIT 192, p 221.
77 Article 4(5).
78 Op cit, Clarkson and Hill, fn 22, p 216.
79 Op cit, Clarkson and Hill, fn 22, p 216.
(1) Where the law applicable to a contract is the law of any part of the United Kingdom only by choice of the parties (and apart from that choice would be the law of some country outside the United Kingdom) sections 2 to 7 and 16 to 21 of this Act do not operate as part of the law applicable to the contract.

(2) This Act has effect notwithstanding any contract term which applies or purports to apply the law of some country outside the United Kingdom, where (either or both)—

(a) the term appears to the court or arbitrator or arbiter to have been imposed wholly or mainly for the purpose of enabling the party imposing it to evade the operation of the Act; or

(b) in the making of the contract one of the parties dealt as consumer, and he was then habitually resident in the United Kingdom, and the essential steps necessary for the making of the contract were taken there whether by him or by others on his behalf.

It will be noted that s 27(1) is self-denying, ousting the operation of the Act where the applicable law is that of part of the UK ‘only’ by the choice of the parties. The question of a connection to the law stated should not be affected merely by the location of a web server, which need have no substantial connection to the transaction. However, it is s 27(2) which is primarily of interest here, as, in the circumstances specified in (a) and (b), it provides for the operation of the Act even where there is a term applying the law of some other country. In other words, in the circumstances specified, it makes the operation of the 1977 Act ‘overriding’. Although the position is ‘not entirely made clear’, it would seem that the application of s 27(2)(b) only requires the consumer’s ‘steps necessary for the making of the contract’ to have taken place in the UK, and not the conclusion of the contract as such. A standard internet consumer transaction seems to be caught by s 27(2), at least where the consumer is resident in the UK and uses a terminal there. A similar provision to s 27(2) is also to be found in reg 9 of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, which provides:

These Regulations shall apply notwithstanding any contract term which applies or purports to apply the law of a non-Member State, if the contract has a close connection with the territory of the Member States.

(The references to the laws of non-Member States follows from the fact that the Regulations are the UK implementation of the EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts and should have been implemented in all Member States.)

80 Op cit, Schu, fn 76, p 208.
81 Op cit, Schu, fn 76, p 208.
82 Op cit, Schu, fn 76, p 208.
83 Replacing the 1994 Regulations—see above, p 154. See, also, the Distance Selling Directive, Art 12(2) (on which see below, p 327).
The final point to note here is the possibility, under Art 16, of refusing to apply the law otherwise determined by the Convention on the basis of ‘public policy’. However, the point has been made that ‘it is intended that, under the Convention, public policy should have a very narrow scope’ and it should also be emphasised that the need to refer to public policy is diminished by the scope given to ‘overriding rules’, indicated above.

Consumers

Within a limited sphere, Art 5 ensures that, in contracting, a consumer will not lose the benefit of the mandatory rules of his or her habitual residence and may find that the applicable law is that of his or her habitual residence. When Art 5 applies, ‘a choice of law by the parties shall not have the result of depriving the consumer of the protection afforded to him by the mandatory rules of’ his habitual residence. In addition, if there is no choice of law under Art 3, the reference to the country of closest connection in Art 4 does not apply; rather, the applicable law will be that of the consumer’s habitual residence. However, it should be emphasised that the application of Art 5 is considerably circumscribed. The person to whom the supply is being made will be a consumer if the supply is ‘for a purpose which can be regarded as outside his trade or profession’.

It applies to contracts ‘the object of which is the supply of goods or services’ to a consumer or to contracts ‘for the provision of credit for that object’, but there is an exception to its application where the contract is for the supply of services and ‘the services are to be supplied to the consumer exclusively in a country other than that in which he has his habitual residence’. In addition, for Art 5 to apply, the contract must have been made in certain specified circumstances—the consumer’s habitual residence must have been relevant to the contract in one of a number of specified ways. That is, the rules in Art 5 apply:

(a) if, in that country, the conclusion of the contract was preceded by a specific invitation addressed to him or by advertising, and he had, in that country, taken all the steps necessary on his part for the conclusion of the contract; or

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84 Op cit, Clarkson and Hill, fn 22, p 223.
85 See, further, op cit, Clarkson and Hill, fn 22, pp 224–25.
86 Article 5(2).
87 Article 5(1).
88 Article 5(1).
89 Article 5(4)(b). It does, however, apply to a contract ‘which, for an inclusive price, provides for a combination of travel and accommodation’ (Art 5(5)).
(b) if the other party or his agent received the consumer’s order in that country; or
(c) if the contract is for the sale of goods and the consumer travelled from that
country to another country and there gave his order, provided that the
consumer’s journey was arranged by the seller for the purpose of inducing
the consumer to buy.

These specified circumstances, in particular, raise certain issues in the e-
commerce context. Several points should be addressed in relation to point (a).
First, the point is made elsewhere that it may be open to debate as to where a
contract made using email or the web is made. However, the words ‘steps
necessary on his part’ were ‘expressly adopted…in order to avoid the classic
problem of determining the place where the contract was concluded’.90 It
should be a matter of where the consumer does what he or she has to do in
order to conclude a contract—in this context, tapping out the necessary
message on his or her computer. Secondly, consideration should be given to the
requirement of a ‘specific invitation’ to the consumer. It would seem that this
has to take place in the consumer’s habitual residence and, whilst an email can
easily be envisaged as a specific invitation to the consumer to whom it is sent, a
question may be raised as to whether that requires the consumer to receive it in
that country and, if so, what is meant by ‘receipt’. An email message could be
regarded as received when put in the consumer’s ‘mailbox’ on the relevant
server, and that server need not be geographically close to the consumer—it
need not be in the place of the consumer’s habitual residence. However, the
point is made elsewhere that the location of a mail server can be purely
fortuitous. To avoid the arbitrary element, an email message should be
regarded as received where the consumer accesses it from91—which should
usually be their habitual residence.

The final point which will be considered here relates to website
advertisements. Clearly, such communications are not ‘specific invitations’ to
the individual consumer, so the question is whether they are advertisements
falling within Art 5. In relation to paper-based publication, the line taken is
shown by the following example:92

...if a German makes a contract in response to an advertisement published by a
French company in a German publication, the contract is covered by the special
rule. If, on the other hand, the German replies to an advertisement in American
publications, even if they are sold in Germany, the rule does not apply unless
the advertisement appeared in special editions of the publication intended for
European countries. In the latter case, the seller will have made a special
advertisement intended for the country of the purchaser.

90 Op cit, Guiliano-Lagarde Report, fn 74.
91 See below, p 306.
This carries with it some idea that the advertisement has to be ‘directed’ at consumers in the country in question if it is to fall within the bounds of Art 5. On this basis, the mere fact that a website can be accessed by a consumer in a particular country would not be sufficient for Art 5. However, there are indications that mere accessibility may become sufficient in the context of jurisdiction, where similar wording is used.\(^{93}\) As a website can be accessed from anywhere, such an approach might cause anxiety to businesses about being potentially subject to at least the mandatory rules of every country where a consumer is habitually resident. They might try to avoid this by including a disclaimer in the website, stating that the business will only contract with consumers in certain specified jurisdictions. The effectiveness of such a clause is open to doubt—under English law, if a contract was nevertheless made with a consumer from a non-specified State, the line might be taken that, by contracting, the business had thereby shown that it was not so restricting itself in the instant case.\(^{94}\) In addition, in the context of a similar rule in relation to jurisdiction,\(^ {95}\) the point has been made that:  

\(\ldots\) the fragmentary effect on the Internal Market of this [disclaimer] solution, as well as its incongruence with the ‘without frontiers’ and innovative basis on which the internet is founded, seems likely to detract from the appeal of this approach and may even constitute an infringement of EU principles of competition and free movement.  

**Particular issues**

It has been indicated that many contractual issues are dealt with by the applicable law,\(^ {97}\) but there are questions which are referred to another law. Matters of material validity, for example, are specifically dealt with by Art 8. That Article encompasses issues of formation—offer, acceptance, consideration, intention to create legal relations and matters affecting consent, such as duress. (It is considered further below in relation to offer and acceptance.)\(^ {98}\) Formal validity in dealt with under Art 9, and that is considered when issues such as writing and signature are addressed generally.\(^ {99}\)

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93 See above, p 265.
95 See above, p 265.
97 See above, p 274.
98 See p 307.
99 See below, p 326.
The EC Directive on Certain Legal Aspects of Electronic Commerce in the Internal Market (2000/31/EC) deals with certain areas of law, ‘the co-ordinated field’, in relation to ‘information society services’. It is concerned with basic issues and also some particular problems. It recognises the difficulties in businesses having to take account of different legal regimes in different countries and, within bounds, takes a home country approach, allowing a business ‘established’ in a Member State to rely on compliance with the requirements of that State. It contains requirements for information society service providers to make certain information available—some to facilitate transactions, and some to deal with specific problems. It also deals with some other barriers to e-commerce, providing some clarification of the contracting process, and requiring Member States to deal with formality requirements (for example, the requirement of ‘writing’) that might impede e-commerce. In addition, it deals with the liability of ‘intermediate service providers’, that is, those whose information society service is not concerned with the content of the information dealt with, but merely its transmission or storage for others. Finally, some provision is made in relation to dealing with disputes. These matters are given some consideration below, after part of the Directive has been set out.

EC Directive on Electronic Commerce

CHAPTER I

Article 1

Objective and Scope

1 This Directive seeks to contribute to the proper functioning of the Internal Market by ensuring the free movement of Information Society services between Member States.

2 This Directive approximates, to the extent necessary for the achievement of the objective set out in paragraph 1, certain national provisions on Information Society Services relating to the Internal Market, the establishment of service providers, commercial communications,
electronic contracts, the liability of intermediaries, codes of conduct, out of court settlements, court actions and co-operation between Member States.

3 This Directive complements Community Law applicable to Information Society services without prejudice to the level of protection for, in particular, public health and consumer interests, as established by Community Acts and national legislation implementing them insofar as this does not restrict the freedom to provide Information Society services.

4 This Directive does not establish additional rules on private International law nor does it deal with the jurisdiction of Courts.

5 This Directive shall not apply to—

(a) the field of taxation;
(b) questions relating to Information Society services covered by Directive 95/46/EC and 97/66/EC;
(c) questions relating to agreements or practices governed by cartel law;
(d) the following activities of Information Society services:
   - the activities of notaries or equivalent professions to the extent that they involve a direct and specific connection with the exercise of public authority;
   - the representation of a client and defence of his interests before the courts;
   - gambling activities which involve wagering a stake with monetary value in games of chance, including lotteries and betting transactions.

6 This Directive does not affect measures taken at Community or national level in respect of Community Law, in order to promote cultural and linguistic diversity and to ensure the defence of pluralism.

**Article 2**

**Definitions**

For the purpose of this Directive, the following terms shall bear the following meanings:

(a) ‘Information Society services’: services within the meaning of Article 1(2) of Directive 98/34/EC as amended by Directive 98/48/EC;
(b) ‘service provider’: any natural or legal person providing an Information Society service;
(c) ‘established service provider’: a service provider who effectively pursues an economic activity using a fixed establishment for an indefinite period. The presence and use of the technical means and technologies required to provide the service do not, in themselves, constitute an establishment of the provider;
(d) ‘recipient of the service’: any natural or person who, for professional ends or otherwise, uses an Information Society service, in particular for the purposes of seeking information or making it accessible;
(e) ‘consumer’: any natural person who is acting for purposes which are outside his trade or profession;

(f) ‘commercial communication’: any form of communication designed to promote, directly or indirectly, the goods, services or image of a company, organisation or person pursuing a commercial, industrial or craft activity or exercising a regulated profession. The following do not in themselves constitute commercial communications:

- information allowing direct access to the activity of the company, organisation or person, in particular a domain name or an electronic email address;
- communications relating to the goods, services or image of the company, organisation or person compiled in an independent manner, particularly when this is without financial consideration;

(g) ‘regulated profession’:

(h) ‘coordinated field’: requirements laid down in Member States legal systems applicable to Information Society service providers or Information Society services, regardless of whether they are general in nature or specifically designed for them.

(i) The coordinated field contains requirements with which the service provider has to comply in respect of:

- the taking up of the activity of an Information Society service, such as requirements concerning qualifications, authorisation or notification;
- the pursuit of the activity of an Information Society service, such as requirements concerning the behaviour of the service provider, requirements regarding the quality or content of the service including those applicable to advertising and contracts, or requirements concerning the liability of the service provider.

(ii) The coordinated field does not cover requirements such as:

- requirements applicable to goods as such;
- requirements applicable to the delivery of goods;
- requirements applicable to services not provided by electronic means.

**Article 3**

**Internal Market**

1 Each Member State shall ensure that the Information Society provided by a service provider established on its territory comply with the national provisions applicable in the Member State in question which fall within the coordinated field.

2 Member States may not, for reasons falling within the coordinated field, restrict the freedom to provide Information Society services from another Member State.
Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the fields referred to in the Annex.

Member States may take measures to derogate from paragraph 2 in respect of a given Information Society service if the following conditions are fulfilled:

(a) the measures shall be:

(i) necessary for one of the following reasons:

- public policy, in particular the prevention investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences, including the protection of minors and the fight against any incitement to hatred on the grounds of race, sex, religion or nationality, and violations of human dignity concerning individual persons;
- the protection of public health;
- public security, including the safeguarding of national security and defence;
- the protection of consumers, including investors;

(ii) taken against a given Information Society service which prejudices the objectives referred to in point (i) or which presents a serious and grave risk of prejudice to those objectives;

(iii) proportionate to those objectives before taking the measures in question and without prejudice to court proceedings, including preliminary proceedings and acts carried out in the framework of a criminal investigation, the Member State has:

- asked the Member State referred to in paragraph 1 to take measures and the latter did not take such measures, or they were inadequate;
- notified the Commission and the Member State referred to in paragraph 1 of its intention to take such measures.

Member States may, in the case of urgency derogate from the conditions stipulated in paragraph 4(b). Where this is the case, the measures shall be notified in the shortest possible time to the commission and to the Member State referred to in paragraph 1, indicating the reasons for which the Member State considers there is urgency.

Without prejudice to the Member State’s possibility to proceed with the measures in question, the commission shall examine the compatibility of the notified measures with Community Law in the shortest possible time; where it comes to the conclusion that the measure is incompatible with community law, the Commission shall ask the Member State in question to refrain from taking any proposed measures or urgently to put an end to the measures in question.
CHAPTER II

PRINCIPLES

Section 1: Establishment and Information Requirements

Article 4

Principle excluding Prior Authorisation

1 Member States shall ensure that the taking up and pursuit of the activity of an Information Society service provider may not be made subject to prior authorisation or any other requirement having equivalent effect.

2 Paragraph 1 shall be without prejudice to authorisation schemes which are not specifically targeted at Information Society services, or which are covered by Directive 97/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 April 1997 on a common framework for general authorisations and individual licenses in the field of telecommunication services.

Article 5

General Information to be Provided

1 In addition to other information requirements established by Community Law, Member States shall ensure that the service provider shall render easily, directly and permanently accessible to the recipients of the service and competent authorities, at least the following information:

(a) the name of the service provider;
(b) the geographic address at which the service provider is established;
(c) the details of the service provider, including his electronic mail address which allow him to be contacted rapidly and communicated with in a direct and effective manner;
(d) where the service provider is registered in a trade or similar public register, the trade register in which the service provider is entered and his registration number, or equivalent means of identification in the register;
(e) where the activity is subject to an authorisation scheme, the particulars of the relevant supervisory authority;
(f) as concerns the regulated professions:
   - any professional body or similar institution with which the service provider is registered;
   - the professional title and the Member state where it has been granted,
   a reference to the applicable professional rules in the Member State of establishment and the means to access them;
(g) where the service provider undertakes an activity that is subject to VAT, the identification number…

2 In addition to other information requirements established by Community Law, Member States shall at least ensure that, where Information Society
services refer to prices these are to be indicated clearly and unambiguously and, in particular, must indicate whether they are inclusive of tax and delivery costs.

Section 2: Commercial Communications

Article 6

Information to be Provided

In addition to other information requirements established by Community Law, Member States shall ensure that commercial communications that are part of, or constitute, an Information Society service comply at least with the following conditions:

(a) the commercial communication shall be clearly identifiable as such;
(b) the natural or legal person on whose behalf the commercial communication is made shall be clearly identifiable;
(c) promotional offers, such as discounts, premiums and gifts, where permitted in the Member State where the service provider is established, shall be clearly identifiable as such, and the conditions which are to be met to qualify for them shall be easily accessible and presented clearly and unambiguously;
(d) promotional competitions and games, where permitted in the Member State where the service provider is established, shall be clearly identifiable as such, and the conditions for participation shall be easily accessible and must be presented clearly and unambiguously.

Article 7

Unsolicited Commercial Communications

1 In addition to other requirements established by Community Law, Member States which permit unsolicited commercial communication by a service provider established in their territory shall be identifiable clearly and unambiguously as such as soon as it is received by the recipient.

2 Without prejudice to Directive 97/7/EC and Directive 97/66/EC, Member States shall take measures to ensure that service providers undertaking unsolicited commercial communications by electronic mail consult regularly and respect the opt out registers in which natural persons not wishing to receive such commercial communications can register themselves.

Article 8

Regulated Professions

1 Member States shall ensure that the use of commercial communications which are part of, or constitute, an Information Society service provided by members of a regulated profession is permitted, subject to compliance with the professional rules regarding, in particular, the independence, dignity and honour of the profession, professional secrecy and fairness towards clients and other members of the profession.
2 Without prejudice to the autonomy of professional bodies and associations, Member States and the Commission shall encourage professional associations and bodies to establish codes of conduct at Community level in order to determine the types of information that can be given for the purposes of commercial communication in conformity with the rules referred to in paragraph 1.

3 When drawing up proposals for Community initiatives which may become necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market with regard to the information referred to in paragraph 2, the Commission shall take due account of codes of conduct applicable at Community level and shall act in close co-operation with the relevant professional associations and bodies.

4 This Directive shall apply in addition to Community Directives concerning access to, and the exercise of, activities of regulated professions.

Section 3: Contracts Concluded by Electronic Means

Article 9

Treatment of Contracts

Member States shall ensure that their legal system allows contracts to be concluded by electronic means. Member States shall in particular ensure that the legal requirements applicable to the contractual process neither create obstacles for the use of electronic contracts nor result in such contracts being deprived of legal effectiveness and validity on account of their having been made by electronic means.

Member States may lay down that paragraph 1 shall not apply to all or certain contracts falling in one of the following categories:

– contracts that create or transfer rights in real estate, except for rental rights;
– contracts requiring by law the involvement of courts, public authorities or professions exercising public authority;
– contracts of suretyship granted on collateral securities furnished by persons acting for purposes outside their trade, business or profession;
– contracts governed by family law or by the law of succession.

Member States shall indicate to the Commission the categories referred to in paragraph 2 explaining the reasons why they consider it necessary to maintain the category referred to in paragraph 2(b) to which they do not apply paragraph 1.

Article 10

Information to be Provided

In addition to other information requirements established by Community Law, Member States shall ensure, except when otherwise agreed by parties who are not consumers, that at least the following information is given by the service provider clearly, comprehensibly and unambiguously and prior to the order being placed by the recipient of the service:
– the different technical steps to follow to conclude the contract;
– whether or not the concluded contract will be filed by the service provider and whether it will be accessible;
– the technical means for identifying and correcting input errors prior to the placing of the order;
– the languages offered for the conclusion of the contract.

Member States shall ensure that, except when otherwise agreed by parties who are not consumers, the service provider indicates any relevant codes of conduct to which he subscribes and information on how those codes of practice can be consulted electronically.

Contract terms and general conditions provided to the recipient must be made available in a way that allows him to store and reproduce them.

Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to contracts concluded exclusively by an exchange of electronic mail or equivalent individual communications.

Article 11

Placing of the Order

1 Member States shall ensure, except when otherwise agreed by parties who are not consumers, that in cases where the recipient of the service places his order through technological means, the following principles apply:

– the service provider has to acknowledge the receipt of the recipient’s order without undue delay and by electronic means;
– the order and acknowledgment of receipt are deemed to be received when the parties to whom they are addressed are able to access them.

2 Member States shall ensure that, except when otherwise agreed by parties who are not consumers, the service provider makes available to the recipient of the service appropriate, effective and accessible technical means allowing him to identify and correct input errors, prior to the placing of the order.

3 Paragraph 1, first indent, and paragraph 2, shall not apply to contracts concluded exclusively by exchange of electronic mail or by equivalent individual communications.

Section 4: Liability of Intermediary Service Providers

Article 12

Mere conduit

1 Where an Information Society service is provided that consists of the transmission in a communication network of information provided by the recipient of the service, or the provision of access to a communication network, member States shall ensure that the service provider is not liable for the information transmitted, on condition that the provider:
(a) does not initiate the transmission;
(b) does not select the receiver of the transmission; and
(c) does not select or modify the information contained in the transmission.

2 The acts of transmission and of the provision of access referred to in paragraph 1 include the automatic, intermediate and transient storage of the information transmitted insofar as this takes place for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission in the communications network, and provided that the information is not stored for any longer period than is reasonably necessary for the transmission.

3 This Article shall not affect the possibility for a court or administrative authority, in accordance with member States’ legal systems, to require the service provider to terminate or prevent an infringement.

Article 13

Caching

1 Where an Information Society service is provided that consists of the transmission in a communication network of information provided by the recipient of the service, Member States shall ensure that the service provider is not liable for the automatic, intermediate and temporary storage of that information, performed for the sole purpose of onward transmission to other recipients of the service upon their request, on condition that:

(a) the provider does not modify the information;
(b) the provider complies with conditions on access to the information;
(c) the provider complies with rules regarding the updating of the information, specified in a manner widely recognised and used by industry;
(d) the provider does not interfere with the lawful use of technology, widely recognised and used by industry, to obtain data on the use of information; and
(e) the provider acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information it has stored upon obtaining actual knowledge of the fact that the information at the initial source of the transmission has been removed from the network, or access to it has been disabled, or that a court or administrative authority has ordered such removal or disablement.

2 This article shall not affect the possibility for a court or administrative authority, in accordance with Member States’ legal systems, to require the service provider to terminate or prevent an infringement.

Article 14

Hosting

1 Where an Information Society service is provided that consists if the storage of information provided by a recipient of the service, Member
States shall ensure that the service provider is not liable for the information stored at the request of a recipient of the service, on condition that:

(a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which illegal activity or information is apparent; or
(b) the provider upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information.

2 Paragraph 1 shall not apply when the recipient of the service is acting under the authority or the control of the provider.

3 This Article shall not affect the possibility for the court or administrative authority, in accordance with Member States legal systems, to require the provider to terminate or prevent an infringement, nor does it affect the possibility for Member States to establish procedures governing the removal or disabling if access to information.

Article 15

No General Obligation to Monitor

1 Member States shall not impose a general obligation on providers, when providing the services covered by Articles 12, 13, and 14, to monitor the information which they transmit or store, nor a general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity.

2 Member States may establish obligations for Information Society service providers promptly to inform the competent authorities if alleged illegal activities undertaken or information provided by the recipients of their services or obligations to communicate to the competent authorities, at their request, information enabling the identification of recipients of their services with whom they have storage agreements.

…

Information society services\textsuperscript{106} and the ‘co-ordinated field’\textsuperscript{107}

Basically, the Directive is concerned with information society services and the provisions dealing with such services which fall within the Directive’s ‘co-ordinated field’. The references to ‘information society services’ cover ‘any service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance by electronic means and at the individual request of a recipient of services’\textsuperscript{108} ‘This spans ‘a wide range of economic activities which take place online’.\textsuperscript{109} These ‘activities can…consist of selling goods online’. Activities ‘such as the delivery of goods as

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Article 2, recital 18.
\item Article 2, recital 21.
\item Recital 18.
\item Recital 19.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
such or the provision of services off-line are not covered’. 110 If ‘a contract is made electronically for the for the supply of goods or the provision of services off-line, the Directive will apply to the making of the contract…but not to the performance (or non-performance) of the obligation to supply goods or provide the service’. 111 Further explanation is to be found in recital 18:

Information services also include services consisting of the transmission of information via a communications network, in providing access to a communication network or in hosting information provided by the recipient of the service; television broadcasting…and radio broadcasting are not Information Society services because they are not provided at individual request; by contrast, services which are transmitted point to point, such as video on demand or the provision of commercial communications by electronic mail are Information Society services; the use of electronic mail or equivalent individual communications for instance by natural persons acting outside their trade, business or profession including their use for the conclusion of contracts between such persons is not an Information Society service; the contractual relationship between an employer and employee is not an Information Society service; activities which by their very nature cannot be carried out at a distance and by electronic means, such as the statutory auditing of company accounts or medical advice requiring the physical examination of a patient, are not Information Society services.

Consideration is also required of the Directive’s reference to its ‘co-ordinated field’. It refers to requirements in the legal systems of Member States which are applicable to information society services, or their providers, in relation to the ‘taking up of the activity of an Information Service’ or the ‘pursuit of an activity of Information Service provider’. 112 It covers requirements ‘relating to online activities such as online information, online advertising, online shopping, online contracting and does not concern Member States’ legal requirements relating to goods, such as safety standards, labelling obligations, or liability for goods, or Member States’ legal requirements relating to the delivery or the transport of goods’. 113

Establishment—‘home country’ approach

As has been indicated, potential barriers to the growth of e-commerce stem from the different requirements of different legal systems. A trader may be reluctant to do business with those from other jurisdictions out of concern for the need to comply with a legal system with which he or she is unfamiliar. It has been said that ‘the problem of the modern law abiding merchant with international
ambitions is figuring out how to tailor its selling practices to the laws of each national market'.

To some extent, this concern is met in the E-Commerce Directive by the ‘home country’ approach of Art 3.

Article 3 requires a Member State to ensure compliance with relevant national provisions by information society service providers ‘established’ within its territory, and also requires other Member States not to ‘restrict the freedom to provide information society services from another Member State’. This has been characterised as the ‘home country’ approach and, as indicated, within its limited scope, enables a business to place some reliance on compliance with the rules of its own State as sufficient. However, the Directive recognises that there are other interests to be protected than simply those who wish to do business in the electronic environment, and ‘contractual obligations concerning consumer contracts’ are included in the specific exemptions from the application of Art 3(1) and (2) in the Annex to the Directive. Where the consumer, or other, exemption does not apply, it is clear that ‘establishment’ is a key concept. To be established within a Member State requires the pursuit of an economic activity using a fixed establishment for an indefinite period. The mere location of server is not sufficient to constitute a business’ ‘place of establishment’:

The place of establishment of a company providing services via an internet website is not the place at which the technology supporting its website is located or the place at which its website is accessible.

It is instead the ‘place where it pursues its economic activity’.

Information—basic and facilitative

One of the difficulties in trading online may lie in determining who the other party is and, if there are problems in the transaction, how they are to be located. Article 5 of the E-Commerce Directive requires the information society service provider to supply certain basic information. It must ‘render easily, directly and permanently accessible to the recipients of the service and competent authorities’ information such as the service provider’s name, geographic address at which he or she is established, details ‘including his electronic mail

116 See, also, Art 3(3).
117 Recital 19. It is made clear that ‘establishment’ is to be determined in conformity with the case law of the Court of Justice.
118 Recital 19.
119 Of course, the technology may be located in the place where a business ‘pursues its economic activity’, in which case the technology will be located in the business’ place of establishment.
address, which allow him to be contacted rapidly and communicated with in a direct and effective manner’; and, ‘where the activity is subject to an authorisation scheme, the particulars of the relevant supervisory authority’. Such information may make another party feel more secure in entering into a transaction electronically. Additionally, certain information requirements in Art 10 may facilitate contracting. So, for example, ‘except when otherwise agreed by the parties who are not consumers’, the information society service provider must ‘set out the different technical steps to follow to conclude a contract’.

Information—making the nature of a communication clear

There are further information requirements in relation to ‘commercial communications’ as defined in Art 2(f), above. The point has been made that, for ‘a borderless market to thrive, sellers must be able to communicate effectively with buyers in other countries’. However, it is desirable that the nature of such communication be clear to its recipient and the issue arises as to whether there should be protection from the intrusion of unsolicited emails. Article 6 sets out minimum requirements for ‘commercial communications which are part of, or constitute, an information society service’. The commercial communication must be, for example, ‘clearly identifiable as such’, as must the ‘natural or legal person on whose behalf the commercial communication is made’. In addition, there is a disparity between Member States as to permissible practices in relation to ‘special offers’. The line is taken that promotional offers permitted in the State where the service provider is established must be ‘clearly identifiable as such’ and ‘the conditions which are to be met to qualify for them’ must be ‘easily accessible and presented clearly and unambiguously’, and similar provision is made in relation to ‘promotional competitions or games’. A similar line is taken in dealing with the differing approaches of Member States to ‘spamming’—the sending of unsolicited emails. Article 7 requires Member States who permit spamming to ensure that ‘such commercial communication by a service provider established in their territory [be] identifiable clearly and unambiguously as soon as it is received by the recipient’. It also requires such Member States to ensure that the service providers ‘consult regularly and respect the opt out registers in

120 Article 5(1)(a).
121 Article 5(1)(b).
122 Article 5(1)(c).
123 Article 5(1)(e).
124 Article 10(1)(a)—there is an exception where contracts are made by email. See, further, below, p 300 et seq.
125 Op cit, Nehf, fn 114, p 458.
126 Article 7(1).
which natural persons not wishing to receive such commercial communications can register themselves’.\footnote{127} In the UK, the issue of spamming, and whether there should be an opt out or opt in system, is being considered in the context of the implementation of the Distance Selling Directive (97/7/EC).\footnote{128}

**Contracts concluded by electronic means**

Articles 9–11 deal with some aspects of electronic contracting. The information requirements in Art 10 were referred to above.\footnote{129} Other issues are considered where appropriate in relation to the general discussion of contracting electronically.\footnote{130}

**Liability of intermediary service providers**

Articles 12–15 deal with the liability of ‘intermediary service providers’—those concerned with the onward transmission or storage of information provided by others for others, that is, those who have concern not with the content of the information or its destination but merely with its movement or storage. Obviously, the providers of such services are important to the growth of e-commerce. The Directive seeks to ensure that they should not be inappropriately liable for the content of information, although that will not prevent a court or administrative authority ordering the service provider to terminate or prevent a legal infringement.

**Dispute resolution**

As has been indicated, the Directive is concerned to limit the deterrence to trade between States which is caused by the fear of encountering different legal regimes. Key to that is the ‘home country’ approach in Art 3. However, effective dispute settlement must also be highly significant in relation to the existence, or otherwise, of the confidence to make electronic contracts beyond the borders of the ‘home country’. In that context, it should be noted that the Directive requires Member States to ensure that their legislation does not ‘hamper the use of out of court schemes…for dispute settlement, including appropriate electronic means’.\footnote{131} In addition, Member States have to ensure that their laws ‘allow for the rapid adoption of measures, including interim measures, designed to

\footnote{127} Article 7(2).  
\footnote{128} DTI consultation paper, *Distance Selling Directive—Implementation in the UK*.  
\footnote{129} See above, p 293.  
\footnote{130} See below, p 300.  
\footnote{131} Article 17(1).
terminate any alleged infringement and to prevent any further impairment of the interests involved’.

SOME ASPECTS OF CONTRACTING BY ELECTRONIC MEANS

Introduction

The basic requirements of the contracting process have been considered. Here, consideration is given to a number of aspects of contract formation which raise particular issues in the e-commerce context.

‘Automated contracting’

The point has been made that ‘one of the advantages of e-commerce is the automation of tasks which previously required human involvement’. In attempting to make a contract by email or on the web, an individual’s communication may be met by the purely programmed response of a computer, without any immediate human knowledge or intervention. Is it possible for a contract to be formed in such circumstances? The issue is discussed by Glatt.

Comparative issues in the formation of electronic contracts Christopher Glatt
(1998) 6 Int JLIT 34

In an electronic environment email may be sent or answered by computers. Interactive websites enable users to transmit information directly by filling in an electronic form. The response will be generated by software. Where EDI is used, contract processes are likely to be fully automated: computers exchange offer and acceptance without any human participation. This raises the question of whether such interactions create valid contracts. Can it be said that they express the parties’ intention?

The problem is not entirely new. Courts have dealt with the lack of direct intention in cases where automatic machines were involved in contract formation. In these transactions machines are reacting automatically to the customer’s conduct… The machines cannot express intention and there is no

132 See above, p 124.
133 Op cit, Chissick and Kelman, fn 4, para 3.35.
real communication between offeror and acceptor. As Lord Denning put it in *Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking*: ‘...he [the customer] may protest to the machine even swear at it. But it will remain unmoved.’ Nevertheless, the courts had little difficulty in translating these situations into offer and acceptance. The physical involvement of a machine had no legal consequences because it was held to be only the result of prior human intention. Thus, automated declarations of offer and acceptance are valid.

Some argue that this reasoning is not applicable to electronic communications: prior intentions are not relevant because the principal has no influence on the single transaction directed by a complex program. This is not convincing. Even the most sophisticated software does not make autonomous decisions, but operates according to previous programming. The responsibility, therefore remains with the principal, who decides to use such a software with the intention of being bound by its ‘declarations’. The single transaction has to be seen in the context of the established communications system and its purpose.

The purpose of an EDI link, for instance, will be *inter alia* the formation of contracts. The parties clearly intend to be bound by the ‘declarations’ exchanged between their computer systems. Interactive web pages which are designed for commercial purposes are put on the world wide web in order to create binding agreements... Therefore as in the case of automated machines, it is of no legal consequences that a computer program completes a contract.

The idea that an automatically generated message can have legal effect because of the prior involvement of the relevant parties is embodied in the UNCITRAL135 Model Law on Electronic Commerce. Paragraph 35 of its Guide to Enactment states:

... Data messages that are generated automatically by computers without human intervention should be regarded as ‘originating’ from the legal entity on behalf of which the computer is operated.

However, the impact of the communication by one side being a purely computerised response will need to be considered further in relation to the issue of whether a communication is an offer or merely an invitation to treat.136

**Offer or invitation to treat?**

As has been indicated, contract formation will normally be analysed in terms of offer and acceptance.137 However, the question may arise as to whether a particular communication constituted an offer or was merely an ‘invitation to treat’.138 When an offer is made, there will be an intention on the part of the

136 See below, p 298.
137 See above, p 124.
offeror to be bound by its terms if the other party accepts them. The other party can accept them and thereby create a contract. An invitation to treat is merely an attempt to engage in negotiations or to elicit an offer, and it can be differentiated from an offer because of the lack of an intention to be bound. Although the question must always be as to the presence or absence of an intention to be bound, in the non-electronic context it has become established that certain communications will normally only amount to an invitation to treat. Thus, shop window displays and advertisements will normally only amount to invitations to treat, not offers.

In the e-commerce context, the question may arise as to the effect of a web-based advertisement and whether such an advertisement will normally be merely an invitation to treat. There are considerable arguments for the conclusion that such an advertisement will normally be an invitation to treat. In *Grainger & Son v Gough*, in the context of a distributed paper price list, the point was made that a supplier will not want to become bound to sell more of a particular item than he can supply, which could occur if the price list (or advertisement) was construed as an offer. Lord Herschell said:

> The transmission of such a price list does not amount to an offer to supply an unlimited quantity of the wine described at the price named so that, as soon as an order is given, there is a binding contract to supply that quantity. If it were so, the merchant might find himself involved in any number of contractual obligations to supply wine of a particular description which he would be quite unable to carry out, his stock of wine of that description being necessarily limited.

This argument will also often apply in the e-commerce context, but the point has been made that, ‘if the contract deals with the supply of data, the limited stock argument might fail. Software, information and other data is available in an unlimited number of copies’. However, it has also been noted that ‘copyright law…could restrict reproduction and so, again, a supplier cannot be held bound to an unforeseeable number of acceptances’. In addition, there are other reasons for arguing that suppliers will not normally intend their websites to constitute an offer—just as in the paper-based world, they may well not intend to be bound to contract with whomsoever responds. That may be, for example, because they

139 See, eg, *Gibson v Manchester CC* [1979] 1 WLR 294.
140 Eg, *Fisher v Bell* [1961] 1 QB 394.
141 Eg, *Partridge v Crittenden* [1968] 2 All ER 421. Note that the situation is different where the advertisement is setting out how a reward may be earned or is an analogous case; in that context, the advertisement may well be seen as an offer of a unilateral contract—see, most famously, *Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co* [1893] 1 QB 256.
142 [1896] AC 325.
145 *Ibid*. 

297
wish to limit their contracts to certain jurisdictions, in order to avoid those where
the law is in some way unfavourable to them.146

On the above reasoning, a web-based advertisement will normally amount
to an invitation to treat, rather than an offer. However, some separate
consideration is required of the situation where an order is placed through a
website and is dealt with by an automated response, without any immediate
human intervention. The general possibility of a contract being concluded by an
automated response was considered above.147 The point to be examined here is
whether the website will constitute an offer or an invitation to treat. The
mechanism for the making of a contract when money is put into a vending or
similar machine was outlined by Lord Denning MR in Thornton v Shoe Lane
Parking.

_Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking_

_[1971] 2 QB 163_

**Lord Denning MR** The customer pays his money and gets a ticket. He cannot
refuse it. He may protest to the machine, even swear at it; but it will remain
unmoved. He is committed beyond recall. He was committed at the very
moment that he put his money in the machine. The contract was concluded
at that time. It can be translated into offer and acceptance in this way. The
offer is made when the proprietor of the machine holds it out as being ready
to receive the money. The acceptance takes place when the customer puts his
money into the slot.

An analogy might be drawn between the situation considered above, in
_Thornton_, and automatic response systems which are linked to orders made
through websites. If such an analogy is accepted, then the website linked to
automated ordering would be viewed as an offer. However, the system dealing
with web-based orders may be much more sophisticated than Lord Denning’s
vending machine type of case. The system may have a function for examining
certain elements of the order. It might, for example, be programmed to reject
orders requiring goods to be delivered to a specified jurisdiction. In such cases,
there would be every reason to say that the web page was not intended as an
offer but merely an invitation to treat. There may be reasons not to follow Lord
Denning’s vending machine analogy in the context of an automated web-based
system.

146 There may be, eg, import/export restrictions, consumer protection legislation, regulation of
the activity provided by an online service (eg, financial services). See _op cit_, Chissick and Kelman,
fn 4, para 3.17 _et seq._

147 See above, p 296.
The above discussion indicates a general approach which regards website advertisements as invitations to treat rather than offers. This would lead to a situation in which the offer was made by the customer and accepted (or otherwise) by the supplier. Such an approach would be in keeping with the EC Electronic Commerce Directive (2000/31/EC). In the context of ‘information society services’, Art 11(1) states:

Member States shall ensure, except where otherwise agreed by parties who are not consumers, that in cases where the recipient of the service places his order through technological means, the following principles apply:

- the service provider has to acknowledge the receipt of the recipient’s order without undue delay and by electronic means;
- the order and the acknowledgment of receipt are deemed to be received when the parties to whom they are addressed are able to access them.

The second point will be returned to below in the context of the timing of the conclusion of a contract made electronically. The first point ‘shall not apply to contracts concluded exclusively by exchange of electronic mail or by equivalent individual communication’, but here we are concerned with web-based contracting and the point can be made that, on the above analysis, the ‘recipient’s order’ would constitute the offer and the ‘acknowledgment of receipt’ the acceptance—the ‘order’ and ‘acknowledgment of receipt’ would very naturally be part of the contracting process. In addition, in such circumstances, there is every reason for service providers to send an ‘acknowledgment’. Of course, some obligation to send it ‘without undue delay and by electronic means’ would still be required. It should be said that legislation to fulfil the requirements of Art 11 can be put in place, whatever the approach taken to whether a website-based advertisement normally constitutes an offer or an invitation to treat.

148 See below, p 300 et seq.
149 Article 11(3).
150 At common law, an offer can be withdrawn at any time up to acceptance, even if it has been specified that it will be open for a stated time period, unless consideration has been provided for the promise to keep it open for that period. However, the point which must be emphasised here is that, even without some specific withdrawal, an offer would normally only be open for a reasonable time, even if some time limit was not specified, and replying by the same means as the offer was communicated could also well be seen as required. I.e., the common law might be seen as capable of fulfilling most of the requirements of Art 11(1). Such an approach would, however, be open to doubt and the lack of certainty could be seen as detrimental to consumers in particular. Additionally, the common law position could be altered by agreement, whatever the status of the contracting parties, and Art 11 does not allow such alteration where the person contracting for the service is a ‘consumer’. On the common law generally in this area see Koffman, M and Macdonald, E, The Law of Contract, 3rd edn, 1998, Croydon: Tolley, Chapter 2.
Acceptance—effective on receipt or on posting?

Electronic communication will normally occur at a distance and questions can arise as to when, where and if a contract has been made. The situation may arise in which an acceptance is lost. More commonly, the question may simply be as to the time at which an acceptance became effective or where the contract was made. The general rule is that acceptance is only effective once it has been communicated to the offeror. However, when something other than simple face to face communication has been used between the parties, the question has often arisen as to whether that rule should apply. The ‘postal rule’ is well known and it means that, normally, a posted acceptance will be effective on posting, although that will not be the case if it goes astray because the acceptor has not addressed it properly or is otherwise at fault. In addition, it should be noted that the postal rule will not apply if the offeror has made it clear that it will not, by, for example, requiring actual receipt of acceptance. However, the postal rule has not been applied in the context of messages sent by telex machines, and we must consider the approach which should be taken to an offer and acceptance made using email or the web. It should be noted that, ‘except when agreed otherwise by the parties who are not consumers’ and prior to an order being placed, Art 10 of the EC Electronic Commerce Directive provides that the service provider must specify, inter alia, ‘the different technical steps to follow to conclude the contract’. That requirement does not apply in the context of ‘contracts concluded exclusively by exchange of electronic mail or by equivalent individual communication’, but, where it is required or occurs in specifying the ‘technical steps’, there may also be an express or implied specification of what is to amount to an offer and an acceptance. However, in the absence of some specification of what is to amount to an acceptance, the question remains to be asked as to whether the normal rule or the postal rule should apply. Some guidance on this may be found in considering the line taken by the courts in relation to acceptance sent by telex.

151 Or damaged so that it is unintelligible.
152 Entores v Miles Far East Corp [1955] 2 QB 327.
153 Adams v Lindsell (1818) 1 B & Ald 681.
154 Household Fire Insurance v Grant (1879) 4 Ex D 216.
156 See, generally, above, p 281.
157 Article 10(1).
158 Article 10(4).
Entores Ltd v Miles Far Eastern Corp
[1955] 2 QB 326

The plaintiffs, in London, made an offer by telex to the agents of the defendant corporation, in Holland. This was accepted by a telex which was received on the plaintiff’s telex machine in London. The relevant issue was whether the contract was made in England. If it was, that would provide a basis for the plaintiffs to serve a writ on the defendant corporation outside of the jurisdiction. The court held that the contract was made in London.

Denning LJ When a contract is made by post it is clear law throughout the common law countries that the acceptance is complete as soon as the letter is put into the post box, and that is the place where the contract is made. But there is no clear rule about contract made by telephone or by Telex. Communications by those means are virtually instantaneous and stand on a different footing.

The problem can only be solved by going in stages. Let me first consider the case where two people make a contract by word of mouth in the presence of one another. Suppose for instance that I shout an offer to a man across a river or a courtyard but I do not hear his reply because it is drowned by an aircraft flying overhead. There is no contract at that moment. If he wishes to make a contract, he must wait till the aircraft is gone and then shout back his acceptance so that I can hear what he says. Not until I have his answer am I bound…

Now take the case where two people make a contract by telephone. Suppose, for instance, that I make an offer to a man by telephone and, in the middle of his reply, the line goes ‘dead’ so that I do not hear his words of acceptance. There is no contract at that moment. The other man may not know the precise moment when the line failed. But he will know that the telephone conversation was abruptly broken off: because people usually say something to signify the end of the conversation. If he wishes to make a contract, he must therefore get through again to make sure that I heard. Suppose next, that the line does not go dead, but is nevertheless so indistinct that I do not catch what he says and I ask him to repeat it. He then repeats it and I hear his acceptance. The contract is made, not on the first time when I do not hear, but only on the second when I do hear. If he does not repeat it there is no contract. The contract is only complete when I have his answer accepting the offer.

Lastly, take the Telex, Suppose a clerk in a London Office taps out on the teleprinter an offer which is immediately recorded on a teleprinter in a Manchester office, and a clerk at that end taps out an acceptance. If the line goes dead in the middle of the sentence of acceptance, the teleprinter motor will stop. There is then obviously no contract. The clerk at Manchester must get through again and send his complete sentence. But it may happen that the line does not go dead, yet the message does not get through to London. Thus the clerk at Manchester may tap out his acceptance and it will not be recorded in London because the ink at the London end fails or something of that kind. In that case, the Manchester clerk will not know of the failure but the London clerk will know of it and will immediately send back a message—‘not receiving’. Then, when the fault is rectified, the Manchester clerk will repeat his message. Only then
is there a contract. If he does not repeat it there is no contract. It is not until the message is received that the contract is complete.

In all the instances I have taken so far, the man who sends the message of acceptance knows that it has not been received or he has reason to know it. So he must repeat it. But, suppose he did not know that his message did not get home. He thinks it has. This may happen if the listener on the phone does not catch the words of acceptance, but nevertheless does not trouble to ask for them to be repeated: or the ink on the teleprinter fails at the receiving end, but the clerk does not ask for the message to be repeated: so that man who sends an acceptance reasonably believes an acceptance has been received. The offeror in such circumstances is clearly bound, because he will be estopped from saying that he did not receive the message of acceptance. It is his own fault that he did not get it. But if there should be a case where the offeror without any fault on his part does not receive the message of acceptance—yet the sender of it reasonably believes it has got home when it has not—then I think there is no contract.

My conclusion is that the rule about instantaneous communication between the parties is different from the rule about the post. The contract is only complete when the acceptance is received by the offeror: and the contract is made at the place where the acceptance is received.

Brinkibon Ltd v Stahag Stahl und Stahlwarenhandelgesellschaft mbH
[1982] 1 All ER 293

The parties negotiated the sale of a quantity of steel bars. The buyers, an English company, accepted by telex sent from London to Vienna. The relevant question was whether the contract was made in England, allowing service out of the jurisdiction. The court held that the contract was made in Vienna.

Lord Wilberforce In this situation, with a general rule covering instantaneous communication inter praesentem or at a distance, with an exception applying to non-instantaneous communication at a distance, how should communication by telex be categorised? In Entores Ltd v Miles Far Eastern Corp the Court of Appeal classified them with instantaneous communications. Their ruling, which has passed into the textbooks...appears not to have caused either adverse comment, or any difficulty to businessmen. I would accept it as a general rule.

Since 1955 the use of Telex communication has been greatly expanded, and there are many variations on it. The senders and the recipients may not be the principals to the contemplated contract. They may be servants or agents with limited authority. The message may not reach, or be intended to reach, the designated recipient immediately: messages may be sent out of office hours, or at night, with the intention, or on the assumption, that they will be read at a later time. There may be some error or default at the recipient’s end which prevents receipt at the time contemplated and believed in by the sender. The message may have been sent and/or received through machines operated by third persons. And many other variations may occur. No universal rule can cover all such
cases, they must be resolved by reference to the intentions of the parties, by sound business practice, and in some cases by a judgment where the risk should lie...

**Lord Fraser** I wish only to add a comment on the subject of *where* a contract is made when it is accepted by telex between parties in different countries. The question is whether acceptance by telex falls within the general rule that it requires to be notified to the offeror in order to be binding, or within the exception of the postal rule whereby it becomes binding when (and where) it is handed over to the Post Office. The postal rule is based on considerations of practical convenience, arising from the delay that is inevitable in delivering a letter. But it has been extended to apply to telegrams sent through the Post Office, and in strict logic there is much to be said for applying it also to telex messages sent by one business firm directly to another. There is very little, if any, difference in the mechanics of transmission between a private telex from one business to another and a telegram sent through the Post Office, especially one sent from one large city to another. Even the element of delay will not be greatly different where the operator of the recipient’s telex is a clerk with no authority to conclude contracts, who has to hand it to his principal. In such a case a telex message is not in fact received instantaneously by the responsible principal. I assume that the present case is a case of that sort.

Nevertheless, I have reached the opinion that, on balance, an acceptance sent by telex directly from the acceptor’s office should be treated as if it were an instantaneous communication between the principals, like a telephone conversation. One reason is that the decision to that effect in *Entores v Miles* seems to have worked without leading to serious difficulty or complaint from the business community. Secondly, once the message has been received on the offeror’s telex machine, it is not unreasonable to treat it as delivered to the principal offeror, because it is his responsibility to arrange for the prompt handling of messages within his own office. Thirdly, a party (the acceptor) who tries to send a message by telex can generally tell if his message has been received on the other party’s (the offeror’s) machine, whereas the offeror, of course, will not know if an unsuccessful attempt has been made to send an acceptance to him. It is therefore convenient that the acceptor, being in the better position, should have the responsibility for ensuring that his message is received. For these reasons, I think that it is right in the ordinary simple case, such as I take this to be, the general rule and not the postal rule should apply. But I agree...that the general rule will not cover all the many variations that may occur in telex messages.

In asking the question whether the normal rule—requiring acceptance to be received—or the postal rule should apply, it is common to focus on whether the method of communication was ‘instantaneous’. This has become the point which is commonly emphasised from the above cases. However, it can be argued that such a focus is misconceived. In *Entores*, Denning LJ’s survey of the problem primarily dealt with situations in which one party should have known that a message had not arrived. Under those circumstances, the
answer as to whether or not there has been an effective acceptance seems self-evident. It is obvious, for example, that there should not have been an effective acceptance if the acceptor knew, or should have known, that his or her message had not arrived on the offeror’s telex. The more difficult situation is where the message is not received on the offeror’s machine and neither party is at fault, or should have known that it had not arrived. In that situation, what is required is a rule which allocates the risk that the message will not be received without either party having been in a position to know of that non-arrival, or being at fault in the non-arrival. In effect, Denning LJ chose the normal rule, rather than the postal rule, to allocate that risk. However, his choice on that issue does not seem to have had anything to do with whether the method of communication was instantaneous or not, and that point is made by Lord Fraser in *Brinkibon*, in making his analogy between telexes and telegrams.

In any event, acceptance telexes are generally only effective once received, but a brief clarificatory point should be made. In *Brinkibon*, Lord Fraser suggests that receipt of a telex should be taken to occur when it arrives on the offeror’s machine, ‘as it is his responsibility to arrange for the prompt handling of messages in his own office’. It would seem to be a commercially acceptable practice, and in keeping with the generally objective approach to contract, that the telex should be taken to have been received when it is printed on the telex of the offeror, rather than requiring the offeror actually to read it. However, a qualification should be placed on this where a telex arrives on the offeror’s machine outside of normal office hours. In that case, the better approach would seem to be that a message which arrives on the machine outside of office hours should only be effective once office hours have resumed.159

Against the above background, consideration should now be given to acceptance by email and on the web. The first situation to consider is where the parties are communicating by email. There are obvious analogies to be made with the situation in which the postal rule is applied. Although at first sight email might look like an ‘instantaneous’ method of communication, it soon becomes clear to users that that is not the case. There may be a delay of hours, or even days, before a message arrives. However, the point was made above that the question of whether a communication is ‘instantaneous’ was not the real question being asked in deciding if the postal rule should be applied; what was really in question was the appropriate allocation of risk. Similarly, the point has been made that the postal rule applies to allocate risk where the message is

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159 In *Mondial Shipping and Chartering BV v Astarte Shipping Ltd* [1995] CLC 1011, Gatehouse J took this approach to the question of when a notice of withdrawal of a ship became effective. For discussion of the case see Haslam, E, ‘Contracting by electronic means’ (1996) 146 NLJ 549.
entrusted to a third party and that, therefore, the question of its application, or otherwise, in the context of email should be dependent upon the ‘communication topography’, that is, whether the communication is seen as simply between two computers, as in the case of simple email between two computers linked to the internet, or communications via a common server, as with email sent through an online service provider to someone else using the same service (involving one third party) or via several servers. The appropriateness of these categorisations could be contested. However, it has been noted that, although the early case law on the postal rule placed some emphasis on the role of the post office as ‘agent’—explaining the effectiveness of acceptance on posting on the basis that the post office was the offeror’s agent to receive the communication of acceptance—the myth is not a current one (clearly, the post office is not empowered to receive the content of a communication on anyone’s behalf). The analogy does not provide a basis for determining the point of effectiveness of an emailed communication as an acceptance, that is, for making that determination dependent upon the ‘communication topography’ and whether one or more third parties were significantly involved in ‘conveying’ the communication. In addition, the point can be made that an approach which is dependent upon the communication topography is simply impractical. Most parties would not be aware of the ‘communication topography’ being used. Even commercial parties may often operate on the basis of relative ignorance of the legal background to their transactions, and the need for technological awareness should not be added to the difficulties they face when wishing to determine the legal impact of their communications.

As was indicated above in relation to telex communication, the courts did not favour extension of the postal rule. It would seem that it is unlikely to be revived in the context of email and, if it is not, then the emailed acceptance will only be effective once received. Of course, that raises the issue of what amounts to ‘receipt’. ‘Is receipt when the acceptance arrives at the offeror’s mail server, when it is downloaded onto the computer, or when the offeror reads it?’ The generally objective nature of contract law should prevent any claim that actual communication is required, and we have seen that, in the context of telex communication, all that was required was arrival on the offeror’s machine. That was, of course, qualified if a telex arrived outside of office hours, but the

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162 Ibid.
163 Op cit, Chissick and Kelman, fn 4, para 3.43.
timing of receipt was only then delayed until the recommencement of office hours. However, is arrival at the offeror’s ‘mailbox’ on his or her mail server sufficient, or does it have to be downloaded to the offeror’s machine? It has been contended that it is the point of downloading from server that is the relevant moment.\(^{165}\) However, in *Brinkibon*,\(^{166}\) Lord Fraser viewed arrival at the telex machine as sufficient because it was the offeror’s ‘responsibility to arrange for the prompt handling of messages in his own office’ and an analogy could be made with the arrival of the message at the offeror’s electronic ‘mailbox’. In addition, Art 11 of the EC Directive on E-Commerce\(^{167}\) provides for an ‘order’ and an ‘acknowledgment of receipt’ of the order and that:

\[
\text{...an order and the acknowledgment of receipt are deemed to be received when the parties to whom they are addressed are able to access them.}
\]

This could be seen as indicating that it is sufficient when the communications arrive at the mailbox of the offeree on the mail server he or she uses—at that point the offeree can access them—and an analogy might be made here with receipt of acceptance. However, even if a contract is concluded when the acceptance arrives in the mailbox on the mail server used by the offeree, the contract should not be taken as concluded where the relevant mail server is located. That location may well be in a country which is otherwise unconnected with the parties or the contract. The contract should be taken as concluded at the location of the offeror’s computer. This avoids potentially arbitrary places of contracting. It can be seen as not out of keeping with Art 11, above, with its reference to the ability of the parties to access the orders and acknowledgments. It merely requires an emphasis upon the place from which acceptances can be accessed, rather their arbitrary, intermediate location, and, under Art 15(4) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, ‘unless otherwise agreed between the originator and addressee, a data message...is deemed to be received where the addressee has its place of business’.

Some brief consideration should also be given to the situation where the parties are contracting via the web. The suggestion has been made that:\(^{168}\)

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\text{The world wide web exhibits the features of a method of instantaneous communication (interactive and real-time), the sender has almost immediate}
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\(^{164}\) See above, p 304.

\(^{165}\) *Op cit*, Chissick and Kelman, fn 4, para 3.45. The suggestion has been made that it is dependent upon the offeror’s control; ie, if the offeror uses an internet service provider, there is no receipt of acceptance until it is downloaded, as it is, until that moment, still ‘in transit’. But, if the offeror operates his or her own mail server, acceptance would have been received when it arrived at that server, the ‘transit’ of the message then being complete.

\(^{166}\) See above, p 302 *et seq*.

\(^{167}\) See above, p 281 *et seq*.

\(^{168}\) *Op cit*, Chissick and Kelman, fn 4, para 3.47.
feedback, and errors or faults are readily apparent. As a result the receipt rule will probably apply to web contracts.

The point was made above that the question as to whether communication is ‘instantaneous’ should not be perceived as the basis of the application or non-application of the postal rule. What should be emphasised here is that the receipt rule was contended for above, in the context of email, and any arguments against the receipt rule are even weaker in this context. (Email, at least, has some superficial similarity to ordinary mail.)

Law governing formation

The above discussion deals with the question of what approach English law will take to when and where an electronic contract will be taken to have been made. In relation to contracts involving communications between different countries, logically, the first question to ask is which country’s law governs that issue (the conflicts question). Under the Rome Convention, many contractual issues are referred to the ‘applicable law’. However, issues of material validity, such as whether there has been an effective offer and acceptance, are dealt with by Art 8. This states:

(1) The existence and validity of a contract, or of any term of a contract, shall be determined by the law which would govern under this Convention if the contract or term were valid.

(2) Nevertheless a party may rely upon the country in which he has his habitual residence to establish that he did not consent if it appears from the circumstances that it would not be reasonable to determine the effect of his conduct in accordance with the law specified in the preceding paragraph.

Article 8 generally refers such issues to the law which would govern if the contract were valid—the putative applicable law. Additionally, Art 8(2) provides an exception which may be used to find that there is no binding contract. A party may rely upon the law of his habitual residence to show that he did not consent if ‘it would not be reasonable to determine the effect of his conduct’ by the putative applicable law. The general rule is illustrated, in the context of posted communication, by an example given by Clarkson and Hill:

169 See above, p 271.
170 See above, p 274.
171 The material validity of a choice of law clause is referred to the law which would govern if the clause was valid—see Art 3(4).
172 Op cit, Clarkson and Hill, fn 22, p 229.
Suppose a Swiss seller sends by post an offer to sell goods to an English buyer, who posts back an acceptance which is lost in the post. By English law there is a contract, because acceptance is effective on posting; by Swiss law there is no contract, because acceptance is effective only on receipt. Which law is to decide whether a contract was made? The putative applicable law approach adopted by the Convention requires the court to determine which law would be the applicable law on the assumption that a contract was made.

Under such circumstances, if there was no choice of law by the parties, the putative proper law would be determined under Art 4 on the basis of the country with which the contract, if it existed, would be most closely connected. There is a presumption in Art 4(2) in favour of the country which is appropriately connected with the party who is to render the performance which is ‘characteristic of the contract’. In this case, that will be the Swiss seller (the English buyer’s performance being merely the payment of money) and, assuming that the seller entered into the contract in the course of his trade or business, the appropriate connection will be to his ‘principal place of business’. So, unless the presumption is rebutted on the basis that ‘it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract is more closely connected with another country’, the alleged contract is governed by Swiss law and, therefore, does not exist.

Formalities

Making a contract may involve formalities; for example, it may be required to be in writing. Requirements such as a signature or writing may provide obstacles to efficient electronic contracting. Formalities are considered below in the context of requirements such as writing and signature more generally.
as barriers to efficient e-commerce. As the Guide to the Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce states:

2 ... The communication of legally significant information in the form of paperless messages may be hindered by legal obstacles to the use of such messages, or by uncertainty as to their legal effect or validity...

3 ... in a number of countries, the existing legislation governing communication and storage of information is inadequate or outdated because it does not contemplate the use of electronic commerce. In certain cases, existing legislation imposes or implies restrictions on the use of modern means of communication, for example, by prescribing the use of ‘written’, ‘signed’ or ‘original’ documents.

English law has few requirements of form in relation to the making of contracts, but ‘legally significant information’ extends far beyond the contract as such. Requirements exist for a great variety of ‘documents’ and ‘notices’, and also for record keeping. There are, for example, the requirements in relation to communications to shareholders, or the lodging of proxies, set out in the Companies Act 1985. A broad range of existing legislation needs to be addressed if the potential for cost and time saving which is created by electronic communications is to be achieved. In considering the legislative references to such requirements, a basic principle has gained widespread acceptance, even if there is not the same level of similarity of approach to its implementation. The UNCITRAL Model Law, for example, has as one of its objectives the provision of ‘equal treatment to users of paper-based documentation and electronic information’ and this idea of such ‘equal treatment’ has also been expressed as one of ‘functional equivalence’, or ‘technology neutrality’. The steps being taken in the UK to deal with this issue in the Electronic Communications Act 2000 will be dealt with below, as will the need for UK law to comply with the EC measures in this area. ‘Writing’ and related issues will be considered before ‘signature’ is addressed.

179 DTI, Building Confidence in Electronic Commerce—A Consultation Document, 1999a, URN 99/642, para 16: ‘...ensuring that, as far as possible, the law does not discriminate between traditional and electronic ways of doing business, ie, that the law should be technology neutral in its application.’ It should be noted, however, that the terminology ‘technology neutrality’ has been given a different meaning elsewhere. In the Summary of the (Australian) Electronic Transactions Act 1999, para 4, it is stated that ‘Technology neutrality means that the law should not discriminate between different forms of technology—eg, by specifying technical requirements for the use of electronic communications that are based upon an understanding of the operation of a particular form of electronic communication technology’. It has also been used in this sense in the UK, eg, A Report for the DTI Summarising the Responses to Building Confidence in Electronic Commerce—A Consultation Document, 1999b, URN 99/981, para 32.
Writing, documents and notices

Initial consideration will be given to the situation in which references to, for example, ‘writing’, a ‘document’ or ‘notice’ might be seen as requiring a paper-based communication. English law frequently makes reference in statutes and regulations to ‘writing’ or communications in ‘written’ form, for example, and in most cases the individual pieces of legislation do not define such terminology. There is, however, a definition in the Interpretation Act 1978 and the view has generally been taken that it will not be satisfied by electronic communication. The Interpretation Act 1978 defines ‘writing’ as including:

…typing, printing, lythography, photography and other modes of representing or reproducing words in a visible form...

The approach has been taken that this definition, ‘by placing emphasis on visibility, rules out electronic “writing”, which is, in essence, a series of electronic impulses’.\(^{180}\) It should be said that this view is not universally accepted. There are those who consider ‘visibility’ on the computer screen to be sufficient\(^{181}\) even though it is the non-visible electronic charges by which the information is transmitted and recorded. The point might be made that the Interpretation Act refers to ‘photography’ and photography makes a record that it is only ‘visible’ after chemical treatment; by analogy, the ‘electronic pulses’ can be made visible on a computer screen. However, an analogy with something specifically included in a definition does not necessarily provide the strongest argument—specific inclusion may indicate an otherwise borderline case.\(^{182}\) In any event, even if some references to ‘writing’ might be found to be satisfied by electronic means, that outcome is by no means clear and a similar point can be made in relation to other legislative references which might be seen as ‘paper-based’. It can be argued, for example, that, in general, there is nothing to prevent requirements for a ‘document’ from being fulfilled by information in a digital form, as such, ‘because the essential feature of a document is that it conveys information’.\(^{183}\) However, in some cases, the focus may be on the medium of storage of the information—the physical ‘document’—rather than the information as such, and an electronic


\(^{182}\) In addition, it can be suggested that perception of the need for separate treatment of ‘electronic impulses’ may gain strength from the transitory nature of the visible production of the electronic pulses on a computer screen. Note the UNCITRAL Model Law, Art 6(1), with its references to accessibility for future reference: ‘Where the law requires information to be in writing, that requirement is met by a data message if the information contained therein is accessible so as to be usable for future reference.’

\(^{183}\) Reed, C, Digital Information Law—Electronic Documents and Requirements of Form, 1996, Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary and Westfield College, University of London, p 288.
communication might not then be found to be appropriate.\textsuperscript{184} What should be emphasised here is that even uncertainty as to the legal effectiveness of an electronic communication provides a barrier to efficient e-commerce. The need for it to be clear which communications can be made electronically is evident, and that applies whether the reference is to ‘writing’, ‘documents’ or ‘notices’, or some other related terminology. In the UK, much of this is in the process of being resolved under s 8 of the Electronic Communications Act 2000:

8(1) Subject to subsection (3), the appropriate Minister may by order made by statutory instrument modify the provisions of—

(a) any enactment or subordinate legislation; or
(b) any scheme, licence, authorisation or approval issued, granted or given by or under any enactment or subordinate legislation,

in such manner as he may think fit for the purpose of authorising or facilitating the use of electronic communications or electronic storage (instead of other forms of communication or storage) for any purpose mentioned in subsection (2).

(2) Those purposes are—

(a) the doing of anything which under any such provisions is required to be or may be done or evidenced in writing or otherwise using a document notice or instrument;
(b) the doing of anything which under any such provisions is required to be or may be done by post or other specified means of delivery;
(c) the doing of anything which under any such provisions is required to be or may be authorised by a person’s signature or seal, or is required to be delivered as a deed or witnessed;
(d) the making of any statement or declaration which under any such provision is required to be made under oath or to be contained in a statutory declaration;
(e) the keeping, maintenance or preservation, for the purposes or in pursuance of any such provisions, of any account, record, notice instrument or other document;
(f) the provision, production or publication under any such provisions of any information or other matter;
(g) the making of any payment that is required to be or may be made under any such provisions.

(3) The appropriate Minister shall not make an order under this section authorising the use of electronic communications or electronic storage for

\textsuperscript{184} Op cit, Reed, fn 183, pp 285–89.
any purpose unless he considers that the authorisation is such that the extent (if any) to which records of things done for that purpose will be available will be no less satisfactory in cases where use is made of electronic communications or electronic storage than in other cases.

(4) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), the power to make an order under this subsection shall include power to make an order containing any of the following provisions—

(a) provision as to the electronic form to be taken by any electronic communications or electronic storage the use of which is authorised by an order under this section;
(b) provision imposing conditions subject to which the use of electronic communications or electronic storage is so authorised;
(c) provision, in relation to cases in which any such conditions are not satisfied for treating anything for the purposes of which the use of such communications or storage is so authorised as not having been done;
(d) provision, in connection with anything so authorised, for a person to be able to refuse to accept receipt of something in electronic form except in such circumstances as may be specified in or determined under the order;
(e) provision in connection with any use of electronic communications so authorised for intermediaries to be used, or to be capable of being used, for the transmission of any data or for establishing the authenticity or integrity of any data;
(f) provision in connection with any use of electronic storage so authorised, for persons satisfying such conditions as may be specified in or determined under the regulations to carry out functions in relation to the storage;
(g) provision, in relation to cases in which the use of electronic communications or storage is so authorised, for the determination of any of the matters mentioned in subsection (5), or as to the manner in which they may be proved in legal proceedings;
(h) provision, in relation to cases in which fees or charges are or may be imposed in connection with anything for the purposes of which the use of electronic communications or electronic storage is so authorised, for different fees or charges to apply where use is made of such communications or storage;
(i) provision, in relation to any criminal or other liabilities that may arise (in respect of the making of false or misleading statements or otherwise) in connection with anything for the purposes of which the use of electronic communications or electronic storage is so authorised, for corresponding liabilities to arise in corresponding circumstances where use is made of such communications or storage;
(j) provision requiring persons to prepare and keep records in connection with the use of electronic communications or storage which is so authorised;
(k) provision requiring the production of the contents of any records kept in accordance with an order under this section;
(l) provision for a requirement imposed by virtue of paragraph (j) or (k) to be enforceable at the suit or instance of such persons as may be specified in or determined in accordance with the order;

(m) any such provision in relation to electronic communications or electronic storage the use of which is authorised otherwise than by an order under this section as corresponds to any provision falling within any of the preceding paragraphs that may be made where it is such an order that authorises the use of the communications or storage.

(5) The matters referred to in subsection 4(g) are—

(a) whether a thing has been done using an electronic communication or electronic storage;

(b) the time at which or the date on which a thing done using any such communication or storage was done;

(c) the person by whom such a thing was done; and

(d) the contents authenticity or integrity of any electronic data

(6) An order under this section—

(a) Shall not (subject to paragraph (b)) require the use of any electronic communications or electronic storage for any purpose; but

(b) may make provision that a period of notice specified in the order must expire before effect is given to a variation or withdrawal of election or other decision which—

(i) has been made for the purposes of such an order; and

(ii) is an election or decision to make use of electronic communications or electronic storage.

(7) The matters in relation to which provision may be made by an order under this section do not include any matter under the care and management of the Commissioners of Inland Revenue or any matter under the care and management of the Commissioners of Customs and Excise.

(8) In this section references to doing anything under the provisions of any enactment include references to doing it under the provisions of any subordinate legislation the power to make which is conferred by that enactment.

Section 8 of the Electronic Communications Act 2000 does not, in itself, amend any provision, but allows the ‘appropriate Minister’\(^\text{185}\) to do so by means of statutory instruments ‘for the purpose of authorising or facilitating the use of electronic communications or electronic storage for any purpose mentioned in subsection (2)’. Subsection (2) is broadly drafted to deal with many situations where legislative references might be seen as requiring, or allowing, paper-based communication or record keeping. It has references not only to ‘writing’, ‘document’, ‘notice’ and ‘instrument’, but also to related situations, such as

\(^{185}\text{As defined in s 9.}\)
where there is a requirement that information be posted (para (b)) or for the ‘provision, production or publication’ of information (para (f)). Subsection (4) makes it clear that the statutory instruments do not simply have to provide for a blanket conversion of such paper-based references. The statutory instruments may impose certain conditions on the use of the electronic medium. For example, under para (a), conditions may be imposed as to the form of electronic communication or storage to be used and, likewise, under para (j), as to record keeping. In addition, under para (g) and subsection (5), the statutory instrument may provide for the determination of certain matters or the manner in which they may be proved in court: whether a thing has been done using electronic communication or storage; the time at which it was so done; the person by whom it was done; and the contents, authenticity and integrity of any electronic data.

Section 8(3) makes it clear that ‘the appropriate Minister’ cannot make an order under s 8 unless sure that the availability of records will be no less satisfactory when electronic communications or storage is used than in other cases. This can be contrasted with the UNCITRAL Model Law, where the substitution of a ‘data message’ for the more traditional ‘writing’ is dependent upon the ‘accessibility’ of the information so as to be ‘usable for subsequent reference’. Article 6(1) states:

Where the law requires information to be in writing, that requirement is met by a data message if the information contained therein is accessible so as to be usable for future reference.

This was criticised as ‘introducing a new requirement that [electronic] communications wishing to be regarded as writing must be retained’, which, desirable as it may be evidentially, is not a ‘pre-requisite for the validity of a contract constituted in ordinary “hard copy”’. 186 Section 8(3) is not stated as an absolute requirement, but is relative to the situation in relation to ‘hard copy’.

It is made clear in s 8(6) that, even when an order has been made under the section allowing for the use of electronic communications, it will not generally require it. However, if an election has been made to use electronic communication or storage, provision can be made for a period of notice to expire before such electronic means cease to be used. 187

The general approach taken in s 8 is worthy of some consideration. As has been indicated, it does not itself make any necessary changes in the law—it merely allows for them to be made by statutory instrument. This means that

186 Op cit, Lloyd, fn 180, p 139.
187 Section 8(6)(b).
many further decisions have to be made in ‘updating of the law to reflect what is technologically possible’. The adoption of such an approach should be considered further, as should the factors affecting the appropriateness of the amendment of any particular piece of legislation.

The basic approach taken in s 8 to the amendment of the existing law can be understood by consideration of the DTI consultation document, Building Confidence in Electronic Commerce (URN 99/642):

17 ...the government recognises that requirements for signatures and writing have developed over many hundreds of years of custom and law. It would not be sensible to impose equivalence between traditional and electronic means of communication in one fell swoop. Such a move could have unforeseen consequences. Equally there will be cases (eg the registration of births, deaths and marriages) where it is not appropriate, at this stage to allow electronic means to be used alongside traditional means, or where it may be necessary to impose specific conditions or restrictions.

18 The government is therefore considering two ways of updating the law:

- One route would be to update statutory requirements for signature and writing individually in primary legislation. Such an option would have the advantage of avoiding the unforeseen consequences referred to above. It would, however, take time to assess the pros and cons of updating each individual requirement and, once a decision had been taken, would require time to be found in the timetable for primary legislation.
- The other option would be to take powers in primary legislation to enable the Government to amend legislation, by statutory instrument, on a case by case basis to facilitate legal recognition of electronic signatures and writing. Such an approach would allow the government to adopt a tailor made approach by introducing the recognition of electronic transactions gradually, after full consideration of the consequences in each case, but without the delay of having to find time in the legislative timetable. However, the Government recognises that there might be concern about seeking Parliament’s approval for powers to make such wide ranging charges by means of secondary legislation. To assuage such concerns the Government would ensure that any powers were tightly focused on the specific objective of legal recognition of electronic means, and subject to appropriate safeguards.

26 A related consideration is that there are requirements that necessitate the physical transmission, or sending, delivery or publication of
documents, where it might be appropriate to allow those requirements to be met by electronic means, subject to appropriate safeguards. For example, the DTI is looking at whether provision of this kind could be used to amend the Companies Act 1985 to facilitate the electronic delivery of communications to shareholders, or to the lodging of proxies by electronic means where companies so decided and where shareholders agreed...

In determining the appropriateness of enabling the replacement of paper-based communication by electronic means, the function of the paper-based communication should be considered. Addressing that issue may indicate that permitting electronic communication would be inappropriate or should only be permitted when certain conditions are complied with. Formalities in the contracting process may be required for a number of reasons,\textsuperscript{189} for example, promoting certainty through requiring clear evidence of the terms, encouraging the parties to fully consider the legal obligations being undertaken or to provide protection to the person in the weaker bargaining position.\textsuperscript{190}

The relevance of the function of paper-based communications is illustrated by the Guide to the Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce. In considering this, it should be remembered that s 8 of the Electronic Communications Act 2000 is wide ranging, encompassing what are identified in the Model Law as different levels of paper-based communication by the references merely to ‘writing’ or ‘documents’ (dealt with in Art 6)\textsuperscript{191} or to ‘originals’ (Art 8).\textsuperscript{192} The power, in s 8, to impose conditions on the use of electronic communications should also be borne in mind:

\textsuperscript{189} Fuller (1941) 41 Col LR 799; Law Com No 164, \textit{Formalities for Contracts for Sale of Land}, 1987.
\textsuperscript{190} Eg, the requirements of the Consumer Credit Act 1974.
\textsuperscript{191} See above, p 314.
\textsuperscript{192} Article 8 states:

(1) Where the law requires information to be presented or retained in its original form, that requirement is met by a data message if:

(a) there exists a reliable assurance as to the integrity of the information from the time when it was first generated in its final form, as a data message or otherwise; and
(b) where it is required that information be presented, that information is capable of being displayed to the person to whom it is to be presented...

For the purposes of subparagraph (a) of paragraph (1):

(a) the criteria for assessing integrity shall be whether the information has remained complete and unaltered apart from the addition of any endorsement and any change which arises in the normal course of communication, storage and display; and
(b) the standard of reliability required shall be assessed in the light of the purpose for which the information was generated and in the light of all the relevant circumstances...

The use of cryptography to ensure the integrity of an electronic communication is considered below in relation to ‘electronic signature’—see below, p 319.
In the preparation of the Model Law, particular attention was paid to the functions traditionally performed by the various kinds of ‘writings’ in a paper-based environment. For example, the following non-exhaustive list indicates reasons why national laws require the use of ‘writings’: (1) to ensure that there would be tangible evidence of the existence and nature of the intent of the parties to bind themselves; (2) to help the parties be aware of the consequences of their entering into a contract; (3) to provide that a document would be legible at all; (4) to provide that a document would remain unaltered over time and provide a permanent record of a transaction; (5) to allow for the reproduction of a document so that each party would hold a copy of the same data; (6) to allow for the authentication of data by means of a signature; (7) to provide that a document would be in a form acceptable to public authorities and courts; (8) to finalize the intent of the author of the ‘writing’ and provide a record of that intent; (9) to allow for the easy storage of data in a tangible form; (10) to facilitate control and subsequent audit for accounting, tax or regulatory purposes; and (11) to bring legal rights and obligations into existence in those cases where a writing was required for validity purposes.

However, in the preparation of the Model Law, it was found that it would be inappropriate to adopt an overly comprehensive notion of the functions performed by writing. Existing requirements that data be presented in written form often combine the requirement of a ‘writing’ with concepts distinct from writing, such as signature and original. Thus when adopting a functional approach attention should be given to the fact that the requirement of a writing should be considered as the lowest layer in a hierarchy of form requirements which provide distinct levels of reliability, traceability and unalterability with respect to paper documents. The requirement that data be presented in written form (which can be described as a ‘threshold requirement’) should thus not be confused with more stringent requirements such as ‘signed writing’, ‘signed original’ or ‘authenticated legal act’... In general notions such as ‘evidence’ and ‘intent of the parties to bind themselves’ are to be tied to more general issues of reliability and authentication of data and should not be included in a definition of a ‘writing’.

The purpose of Article 6 is not to establish a requirement that, in all instances, data messages should fulfil all conceivable functions of a writing... Article 6 focuses on the basic notion of information being reproduced and read. That notion is expressed in Article 6 in terms that were found to provide an objective criterion, namely that the data message must be accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference. The use of the word ‘accessible’ is meant to imply that information in the form of computer data should be retained. The word ‘usable’ is not intended to cover only human use but also computer processing. As to the notion of ‘subsequent’ reference, it was preferred to such notions as ‘durability’ or ‘non-alterability’, which would have established too harsh standards, and to such notions as ‘readability’ or ‘intelligibility’, which might constitute too subjective criteria...
If original were defined as a medium on which information was fixed for the first time, it would be impossible to speak of ‘original’ data messages, since the addressee of a data message would always receive a copy thereof. However, Article 8 should be put in a different context. The notion of ‘original’ in Article 8 is useful since in practice many disputes relate to the question of originality of documents, and in electronic commerce the requirement of presentation of originals constitutes one of the main obstacles that the Model Law attempts to remove...

Article 8 is pertinent to documents of title and negotiable instruments, in which the notion of uniqueness of an original is particularly relevant. However, attention is drawn to the fact that the Model Law is not intended only to apply to documents of title and negotiable instruments, or to such areas of law where special requirements exist with respect to registration or notarization of ‘writings’, eg family matters of real estate. Examples of documents that might require an ‘original’ are trade documents such as weight certificates, agricultural certificates, quality or quantity certificates, inspection reports, insurance certificates, etc. While such documents are not negotiable or used to transfer rights or title, it is essential that they be transmitted unchanged, that is in their ‘original’ form, so that other parties in international commerce may have confidence in their contents. In a paper-based environment, these documents are only accepted if they are ‘original’ to lessen the chance that they be altered, which would be difficult to detect in copies. Various technical means are available to certify the contents of a data message to confirm its ‘originality’...

The use of cryptography to ensure that an electronic communication has not been altered is considered below in relation to ‘electronic signatures’.

As has been indicated, the approach taken in s 8 of the Electronic Communications Act 2000 means that further action is required to actually amend paper-based legislative references. The basic alternative would have been an “opt out” approach, by means of a general validity law with a few specific exceptions to it (for example, transfers of land, wills, etc). It is this latter type of approach which is adopted, within a limited ambit, by the EC Directive on Electronic Commerce. Article 9 states:

1 Member States shall ensure that their legal system allows contracts to be concluded by electronic means. Member States shall in particular ensure that the legal requirements applicable to the contractual process do not

193 Op cit, DTI, 1999b, fn 179, para 17.
create obstacles for the use of electronic contracts or result in such contracts being deprived of legal effectiveness and validity on account of their having been made by electronic means.

2 Member States may lay down that paragraph 1 shall not apply to all or certain contracts falling into one of the following categories:

(a) contracts that create or transfer rights in real estate, except for rental rights;
(b) contracts requiring by law the involvement of the courts, public authorities or professions exercising public authority;
(c) contracts of suretyship granted and collateral securities furnished by persons acting for purposes outside their trade, business, or profession;
(d) contracts governed by family law or the law of succession.

3 Member States shall indicate to the Commission the categories referred to in paragraph 2 to which they do not apply paragraph 1. Member States shall submit to the Commission every five years a report on the application of paragraph 2 explaining the reasons why they consider it necessary to maintain the category referred to in paragraph 2(b) to which they do not apply paragraph 1.

It should be noted that this only relates to the making of contracts. As has been indicated, s 8 has a much wider scope, making it capable of encompassing communications and storage unrelated to contracting as such. Article 9 would obviously apply to requirements for contracts to be made in writing or evidenced in writing (or signed), but such requirements are limited to a few specific types of contract in English law. Of course, the reference in Art 9 to the ‘contractual process’ would makes it more widely applicable than simply in relation to the concluded contract, covering, for example, a requirement that a party be notified of specified information before a particular type of agreement can be effective as a contract. Despite the difference in approach of s 8 and Art 9, it would seem that compliance with Art 9 can be achieved in English law through the use of the ‘one amendment at a time approach’ in the Act.

Signature

The previous section was headed ‘writing, documents, notices’ and dealt with those terms and related references in legislation which could provide a barrier to e-commerce. Similarly, references to ‘signature’ might provide such a barrier and, as we have seen, in the context of ‘legal requirements applicable to the contractual process’, Art 9 of the Directive on E-Commerce requires that to be addressed. However, the point should be made that, although there are few such requirements in English law, the positive facilitation of e-commerce, rather than

194 See above, p 318.
the mere removal of 'barriers', means that consideration should be given more broadly to the role of the signature. The common law gives significance to signature in situations in which there is no requirement for it. This latter type of case can be exemplified by the situation in relation to the making of a contract which does not require any formalities but where signature is the simplest (and surest) method of establishing contractual agreement to standard terms.\textsuperscript{195} The EC Directive on a Community Framework for Electronic Signatures,\textsuperscript{196} although it does not 'cover aspects related to the conclusion and validity of contracts or other legal obligations where there are requirements as regards form prescribed by national or Community Law', does provide for the facilitation of e-commerce through the more general recognition of 'electronic signatures'. In English law, issues of signature are being addressed by ss 7 and 8 of the Electronic Communications Act 2000 and that legislation needs to be looked at both in itself and in the light of the EC Directive on E-Commerce and the EC Directive on a Community Framework for Electronic Signatures. However, some general consideration will be given to 'electronic signatures' before the legislation on e-commerce is addressed.

The discussion here of 'electronic signatures' is not of electronically produced fascimiles of signed names; rather, it relates to a functional equivalent of a signature which can be produced cryptographically—sometimes referred to as a 'digital signature'. Cryptography can provide a form of electronic signature, serving the purposes of identifying the sender of a message (authenticating it) and also of ensuring that it has not been altered (ensuring its integrity).\textsuperscript{197} One cryptographic method of dealing with the needs for authentication and integrity (and security) is through the use of two 'keys', as described in \textit{Building Confidence in Electronic Commerce—A Consultation Document}.\textsuperscript{198}

One way of providing electronic signatures is to make use of what is known as \textit{public key}, or \textit{asymmetric}, \textit{cryptography}. Public key cryptography uses two keys, also known as a \textit{key pair}. (These keys are both large numbers with special mathematical properties.) When this technique is used for signatures, the \textit{private key} (which as the term suggests is known only to its owner) is used to transform a data file, by scrambling the information contained in it. The transformed data is the electronic signature and can be checked against the original file using the \textit{public key} of the person who signed it. Anyone with access to the public key (which might, for example, be available on a website) can check the signature, so verifying that it could only have been used by someone with access to the private key. If the only one with access to the \textit{private key} is its owner, then the owner must have signed the message... If a third party had altered the message, the fact they had done so would be easily detectable.

\textsuperscript{195} See above, p 101.  
\textsuperscript{196} Directive 1999/93/EC  
\textsuperscript{197} The further use of cryptography is to provide security for messages (ie, to keep them confidential to the relevant persons).  
\textsuperscript{198} DTI, 1999, URN 99/642.
This describes one method of producing an electronic signature, but it should be borne in mind, in relation to both this technology and others in the area of e-commerce, that one aim of any relevant legislation will be ‘technology neutrality’, in the sense that it is not specific to the current technology but is flexible enough to deal with fresh technological advances; for example, it should not simply relate to ‘dual key’ cryptography as a means of producing an electronic signature. However, the point to be made here is that cryptography can produce something which could be regarded as an ‘electronic signature’. The question is whether, without special provision, such a device would be treated as having the same legal impact as a signature in more traditional form.

The meaning of ‘signature’ has been considered by the courts in the context of various statutes. In the absence of any definition, on the whole, a wide approach has been taken. In Goodman v J Eban Ltd,199 the use of a rubber stamp which contained a facsimile of the firm’s ordinary signature was held to be sufficient to comply with the requirement of signature in the Solicitors Act 1932.

Goodman v J Eban Ltd
[1954] 1 QB 550

Romer LJ It is stated in Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary (3rd edn) under the title ‘Signed; signature’ that ‘speaking generally a signature is the writing or otherwise affixing, a person’s name, or a mark to represent his name, by himself or by his authority with the intention of authenticating a document as being that of, or as binding on, the person whose name or mark is so written or affixed’. This statement appears to me to be in accordance with the authorities, and, in my opinion, Mr Goodman’s letter was ‘signed’ within this formula. The letter was typewritten and concludes with the words (also typed) ‘Yours faithfully Goodman, Monroe and Company’. This was immediately followed by a repetition of the firm name, in a form which at first sight looks as though it had been written by hand, but which in reality was impressed by Mr Goodman through the medium of a rubber stamp. This repetition would plainly be otiose were it merely intended to repeat the typed name of the firm; and the obvious intention of Mr Goodman was that it should be regarded as a signature for the purposes of authenticating the letter. If, in fact, his clients entertained any doubt as to the authenticity of the letter, nothing could be easier than to ask him, by telephone or letter, to confirm it. A manual signature is not necessary either for a will (which is at least as solemn a document as a solicitor’s bill of costs) or to satisfy the Statute of Frauds; and provided that affixing of a name by a rubber stamp complies in other respects with the definition in Stroud to which I have already

Chapter 6: Information Technology Law

referred, I see no reason why it should not be sufficient for the purposes of s 65 of the Solicitors Act 1932...

Printing or typewriting the relevant name can also be sufficient, and this type of approach could be seen as encompassing a digital signature, in the absence of any contrary indication in the specific statute.200

However, as we have seen, barriers to efficient e-commerce are raised by uncertainty as to whether electronic communication can constitute ‘writing’, ‘notice’ or a ‘document’, and this point can similarly be made in relation to uncertainty as to the effectiveness of ‘electronic signature’. The legislation in this area must now be considered.

As has been seen, s 8 of the Electronic Communications Act 2000 allows the ‘appropriate Minister’ to amend legislation by statutory instrument for ‘purposes of facilitating the use of electronic communications’ for any of the purposes ‘mentioned in subsection (2)’. Included in subsection (2)(c) is the ‘doing of anything which under any such provisions is required to be or may be authorised by a person’s signature’.201 This encompasses the possible amendment of legislative references to ‘signature’ in order to allow electronic communication to be used. The statutory instrument may contain ‘provision… for intermediaries to be used…for establishing the authenticity or integrity of any data’.202 Thus, it allows for provision to be made for third parties to provide certificates as to the authorship of an electronic signature or the integrity of the data.203 (The use of third parties to provide certificates to enhance the reliability of electronic signature is considered further below, p 324.) The section would seem to provide the means to fulfil the requirement of Art 9 of the Electronic Commerce Directive.204

However, s 7 of the Electronic Communications Act 2000 provides a basis for the use of electronic signatures more broadly. It states:

(1) In any legal proceedings—

(a) an electronic signature incorporated into or logically associated with a particular electronic communication or particular electronic data, and

(b) the certification by any such person of such a signature,

200 For further discussion see op cit, Reed, fn 183, p 300.
201 Subsection (2)(c) also encompasses deeds.
202 Section 8(4)(e).
203 In addition, s 8(4)(g) allows for the statutory instrument to provide for the ‘determination of any of the matters mentioned in subsection (5)’, which includes ‘(d) the contents, authenticity or integrity of any electronic data’. It should be noted, however, that s 14 provides that the Act does not confer any general power to require the deposit of a cryptographic ‘key’ with another person. Section 8 cannot be used to meet the problem or criminal activities being facilitated by encrypted communications by requiring the deposit of ‘keys’ for code breaking. Under s 14(2), the deposit of a key with the intended recipient of electronic communications can be required or there can be a requirement to otherwise prevent data from becoming inaccessible through the loss of a key or its becoming unusable. See, also, s 8(3).
204 For Art 9, see above, p 318 and note the exceptions in Art 9(2).
shall each be admissible in evidence in relation to any question as to the authenticity of the communication or data as to the integrity of the communication or data.

(2) For the purposes of this section an electronic signature is so much of anything in electronic form as—

(a) is incorporated into or otherwise associated with any electronic communication or electronic data; and
(b) purports to be so incorporated or associated for the purpose of being used in establishing the authenticity of the communication or data, the integrity of the communication or data, or both.

(3) For the purposes of this section an electronic signature incorporated into or logically associated with a particular electronic communication or particular electronic data is certified by any person if that person (whether before or after the making of the communication) has made a statement confirming that—

(a) the signature,
(b) a means of producing, communicating or verifying the signature, or
(c) a procedure applied to the signature,

is (either alone or in combination with other factors) a valid means of establishing the authenticity of the communication or data, the integrity of the communication or data, or both.

This section has a definition of ‘electronic signature’ (s 7(2)) and provides that it is admissible as evidence of the ‘authenticity’ or ‘integrity’ of the relevant communication or data (s 7(1)). ‘Integrity’ refers to ‘whether there has been any tampering with or other modification of the communication or data’ (s 15(2)(b)). If the signature is being used as evidence of ‘authenticity’, then, under s 15(2)(a), it is being used as evidence of one or more of the following:

(i) whether the communication or data comes from a particular person or source;
(ii) whether it is accurately timed and dated;
(iii) whether it is intended to have legal effect.

With its reference to the origin of the communication and ‘whether it is intended to have legal effect’, this would seem to allow for, for example, the possibility of an electronic signature on a contractual document having the same recognition as the common law gives to a more traditional signature to show that the document contains the terms of a contract to which the electronic signatory is a party; that is, in the absence of fraud, misrepresentation or non est factum, to make those terms binding upon the relevant party, whether he or she has read them or not.\(^{205}\) As can be seen, s 7 envisages not simply the use of electronic signatures, but also their ‘certification’. That is intended to provide support for

\(^{205}\) L’Estrange v Graucob Ltd [1934] 2 KB 394. See above, p 101.
the signature as evidence of the ‘authenticity’ or ‘integrity’ of the communication or data. A certificate can be furnished by ‘any person’ but the first part of the Act provides for the ‘registration’ of ‘approved providers of cryptography support services’, and these ‘approved providers’ of such services will have had to meet certain standards, including technical standards, adding weight to their certificate as evidence of the authenticity or integrity of communications or data which have been electronically signed. Registration of approved cryptography service providers was seen as a means of building ‘trust, both in the technology and the bodies offering it, by ensuring that minimum standards of quality and service are met’.

The 2000 Act does not specifically do so, but consideration needs to be given to the possibility of establishing a hierarchy of types of electronic signature. The adoption of a classification of ‘enhanced electronic signature’ to ‘describe signature techniques…capable of providing a higher degree of reliability than “electronic signatures” in general’ is under consideration in relation to the UNCITRAL Draft Uniform Rules on Electronic Signatures.

UNCITRAL Working Group on Electronic Commerce
36th Session, New York, 14–25 February 2000
A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP.84

I General Remarks

19 … It was suggested that dealing with enhanced electronic signatures offering a high degree of reliability was justified only if the Uniform Rules were to provide a functional equivalent to specific uses of handwritten signatures. Since this was likely to prove particularly difficult at the international level and be of limited relevance to international commercial transactions, the additional benefit to be expected from using an ‘enhanced electronic signature’ as opposed to a mere ‘electronic signature’ might need to be clarified. At the 35th Session of the Working Group support was expressed in favour of retaining the notion of ‘enhanced electronic signature’, which was described as particularly apt to provide certainty with respect to the use of certain types of electronic signatures, namely digital signatures implemented through public key infrastructure (PKI). In response, it was pointed out that the notion of ‘enhanced electronic signature’ made the structure of the Uniform Rules unnecessarily complex. In addition, the notion of ‘enhanced electronic signature’ would lend itself to misinterpretation by suggesting that various layers of technical reliability might correspond to an equally diversified range of legal effects. Widespread concern was expressed that an ‘enhanced electronic signature’ would be considered as if it were a distinct legal concept, rather than just a description of a collection of technical criteria, the use of which made a method of signing particularly reliable. While postponing its final decision as to whether the Uniform

Rules would rely on the notion of ‘enhanced electronic signature’, the Working Group generally agreed that, in preparing a revised draft of the Uniform Rules for continuation of the discussion at a future session, it would be useful to introduce a version of the draft articles that did not rely on that notion (A/CN.9/465, paragraph 66).

However, the EC Directive on a Community Framework for Electronic Signatures does refer to different ‘types’ of electronic signature. Just as s 7 provides broadly for the recognition of electronic signatures, so does Art 5 of that Directive. However, whilst providing for some recognition of electronic signatures generally, it gives a specific role to ‘advanced electronic signatures’, based on a ‘qualified certificate’ and created by a ‘secure-signature-creation device’. Article 5 provides:

(1) Member States shall ensure that advanced electronic signatures which are based on a qualified certificate and which are created by a secure-signature-creation device:

(a) satisfy the legal requirements of a signature in relation to data in electronic form in the same manner as a handwritten signature satisfies those requirements in relation to paper-based data; and

(b) are admissible as evidence in legal proceedings.

(2) Member States shall ensure that an electronic signature is not denied legal effectiveness and admissibility as evidence in legal proceedings solely on the grounds that it is:

– in electronic form, or
– not based on a qualified certificate, or
– not based upon a qualified certificate issued by an accredited certification-service-provider, or
– not created by a secure signature-creation device.

Definitions are dealt within in Art 2, so that ‘electronic signature’ means:

...data in electronic form which are attached to or logically associated with other electronic data and which serve as a method of authentication.

And an ‘advanced electronic signature’ is:

...an electronic signature which meets the following requirements:

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207 The limit on the scope of the Directive, set out in Art 1 and referred to above, p 320, should be remembered. Article 1 states:

The purpose of this Directive is to facilitate the use of electronic signatures and to contribute to their legal recognition. It establishes a legal framework for electronic signatures and certain certification-services in order to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market.

It does not cover aspects related to the conclusion and validity of contracts or other legal obligations where there are requirements as regards form prescribed by national or Community law nor does it affect rules and limits, contained in national or Community law, governing the use of documents.
(a) it is uniquely linked to the signatory;
(b) it is capable of identifying the signatory;
(c) it is created using means that the signatory can maintain under his sole control; and
(d) it is linked to the data to which it relates in such a manner that any subsequent change of the data is detectable.

In addition, a ‘secure-signature-creation device’ means ‘a signature-creation device which meets the requirements laid down in Annex III’. ‘Certificate’ means ‘an electronic attestation which links signature-verification data to a person and confirms the identity of that person’ and a ‘qualified certificate’ is one which ‘meets the requirements laid down in Annex 1 and is provided by a certification-service-provider who fulfils the requirements laid down in Annex II’.

There is no direct reflection of the EC approach, with its ‘advanced electronic signature’, in the Electronic Communications Act 2000. However, the Act does allow requirements to be made in relation to registered certification service providers and their certificates. That factor, combined with the flexible approach taken to signatures generally by the judges—with their past willingness to recognise, for example, rubber stamped fascimiles as equivalent to a signature in an appropriate case—may well mean that English law will not be out of step with the EC measure, but compliance is by no means obvious.

**Formalities—governing law**

There has been some discussion above of formal requirements for the validity of a contract. In the context of a contract which involves more than one country, the conflicts question will need to be asked; that is, with which country’s laws does the contract have to comply to be formally valid? The question of the governing law relating to formalities is dealt with by Art 9 of the Rome Convention:

**Formal Validity**

1. A contract concluded between persons who are in the same country is formally valid if it satisfies the formal requirements of the law which governs it under this Convention or of the law of the country where it is concluded.
2. A contract concluded between persons who are in different countries is formally valid if it satisfies the formal requirements of the law which governs it under this Convention or of the law of one of those countries.

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208 On the Rome Convention generally, see above, p 270 et seq.
Where a contract is concluded by an agent, the country in which the agent acts is the relevant country for the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2.

An act intended to have legal effect relating to an existing or contemplated contract is formally valid if it satisfies the formal requirements of the law which under this Convention governs or would govern the contract or of the law of the country where the Act was done.

The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall not apply to a contract to which Article 5 applies, concluded in the circumstances described in paragraph 2 of Article 5. The formal validity of such a contract is governed by the law of the country in which the consumer has his habitual residence.

Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 to 4 of this Article, a contract the subject matter of which is a right in immoveable property or a right to use immoveable property shall be subject to the mandatory requirements of form of the law of the country where the property is situated if by that law those requirements are imposed irrespective of the country where the contract is concluded and irrespective of the law governing the contract.

THE DISTANCE SELLING DIRECTIVE (97/7/EC)

There is a mountain of legislation, a considerable amount derived from the EC, which is concerned with consumers. However, by their nature, most transactions taking place electronically will be between parties who have not met and will be concerned with, for example, goods that the purchaser cannot examine before contracting. The Distance Selling Directive is outlined here because e-commerce is likely to be the area in which it is of greatest significance.

The Directive covers contracts between consumers and sellers or suppliers for supply of goods or services concluded at a distance. It only applies to distance contracts made in the context of an organised distances sales or service provision scheme run by the supplier. In a distance contract, the supplier ‘makes exclusive use of one or more means of distance communication’, up to and including the point at which the contract is made; that is, basically, up to and including the point at which the contract is made, the parties are not in each other’s physical presence. Obviously, contracts made by email and over the web provide prime examples and a non-exhaustive, indicative list specifically identifies email as being covered. There are exemptions from the scope of the Directive in whole and in part in Art 3. The Directive does not apply to, for example, ‘contracts relating to financial services’. The body of the Directive is set out below.

209 Article 2(1).
210 Article 2(1).
211 Annex 1 of the Directive, Sched 1 to the Regulations.
212 Annex 2 contains a non-exhaustive list.
Article 1

Object

The object of this Directive is to approximate the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning distance contracts between consumers and suppliers.

Article 2

Definitions

For the purposes of this Directive:

1. ‘distance contract’ means any contract concerning goods or services concluded between a supplier and a consumer under an organized distance sales or service-provision scheme run by the supplier, who, for the purpose of the contract, makes exclusive use of one or more means of distance communication up to and including the moment at which the contract is concluded;

2. ‘consumer’ means any natural person who, in contracts covered by this Directive, is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business or profession;

3. ‘supplier’ means any natural or legal person who, in contracts covered by this Directive, is acting in his commercial or professional capacity;

4. ‘means of distance communication’ means any means which, without the simultaneous physical presence of the supplier and the consumer, may be used for the conclusion of a contract between those parties. An indicative list of the means covered by this Directive is contained in Annex I;

5. ‘operator of a means of communication’ means any public or private natural or legal person whose trade, business or profession involves making one or more means of distance communication available to suppliers.

Article 3

Exemptions

1. This Directive shall not apply to contracts:
   - relating to financial services, a non-exhaustive list of which is given in Annex II,
   - concluded by means of automatic vending machines or automated commercial premises,
   - concluded with telecommunications operators through the use of public payphones,
   - concluded for the construction and sale of immovable property or relating to other immovable property rights, except for rental,
   - concluded at an auction.
2 Articles 4, 5, 6 and 7(1) shall not apply:

- to contracts for the supply of foodstuffs, beverages or other goods intended for everyday consumption supplied to the home of the consumer, to his residence or to his workplace by regular roundsmen,
- to contracts for the provision of accommodation, transport, catering or leisure services, where the supplier undertakes, when the contract is concluded, to provide these services on a specific date or within a specific period; exceptionally, in the case of outdoor leisure events, the supplier can reserve the right not to apply Article 7(2) in specific circumstances.

Article 4

Prior Information

1 In good time prior to the conclusion of any distance contract, the consumer shall be provided with the following information:

   (a) the identity of the supplier and, in the case of contracts requiring payment in advance, his address;
   (b) the main characteristics of the goods or services;
   (c) the price of the goods or services including all taxes;
   (d) delivery costs, where appropriate;
   (e) the arrangements for payment, delivery or performance;
   (f) the existence of a right of withdrawal, except in the cases referred to in Article 6(3);
   (g) the cost of using the means of distance communication, where it is calculated other than at the basic rate;
   (h) the period for which the offer or the price remains valid;
   (i) where appropriate, the minimum duration of the contract in the case of contracts for the supply of products or services to be performed permanently or recurrently.

2 The information referred to in paragraph 1, the commercial purpose of which must be made clear, shall be provided in a clear and comprehensible manner in any way appropriate to the means of distance communication used, with due regard, in particular, to the principles of good faith in commercial transactions, and the principles governing the protection of those who are unable, pursuant to the legislation of the Member States, to give their consent, such as minors.

3 Moreover, in the case of telephone communications, the identity of the supplier and the commercial purpose of the call shall be made explicitly clear at the beginning of any conversation with the consumer.
Article 5

Written Confirmation of Information

1 The consumer must receive written confirmation or confirmation in another durable medium available and accessible to him of the information referred to in Article 4(1)(a) to (f), in good time during the performance of the contract, and at the latest at the time of delivery where goods not for delivery to third parties are concerned, unless the information has already been given to the consumer prior to conclusion of the contract in writing or on another durable medium available and accessible to him. In any event the following must be provided:

- written information on the conditions and procedures for exercising the right of withdrawal, within the meaning of Article 6, including the cases referred to in the first indent of Article 6(3),
- the geographical address of the place of business of the supplier to which the consumer may address any complaints,
- information on after-sales services and guarantees which exist,
- the conclusion for cancelling the contract, where it is of unspecified duration or a duration exceeding one year.

2 Paragraph 1 shall not apply to services which are performed through the use of a means of distance communication, where they are supplied on only one occasion and are invoiced by the operator of the means of distance communication.

Nevertheless, the consumer must in all cases be able to obtain the geographical address of the place of business of the supplier to which he may address any complaints.

Article 6

Right of Withdrawal

1 For any distance contract the consumer shall have a period of at least seven working days in which to withdraw from the contract without penalty and without giving any reason. The only charge that may be made to the consumer because of the exercise of his right of withdrawal is the direct cost of returning the goods.

The period for exercise of this right shall begin:

- in the case of goods, from the day of receipt by the consumer where the obligations laid down in Article 5 have been fulfilled,
- in the case of services, from the day of conclusion of the contract or from the day on which the obligations laid down in Article 5 were fulfilled if they are fulfilled after conclusion of the contract, provided that this period does not exceed the three-month period referred to in the following subparagraph.

If the supplier has failed to fulfil the obligations laid down in Article 5, the period shall be three months. The period shall begin:
in the case of goods, from the day of receipt by the consumer,
in the case of services, from the day of conclusion of the contract.

If the information referred to in Article 5 is supplied within this three-month period, the seven working day period referred to in the first subparagraph shall begin as from that moment.

2 Where the right of withdrawal has been exercised by the consumer pursuant to this Article, the supplier shall be obliged to reimburse the sums paid by the consumer free of charge. The only charge that may be made to the consumer because of the exercise of his right of withdrawal is the direct cost of returning the goods. Such reimbursement must be carried out as soon as possible and in any case within 30 days.

3 Unless the parties have agreed otherwise, the consumer may not exercise the right of withdrawal provided for in paragraph 1 in respect of contracts:

- for the provision of services if performance has begun, with the consumer’s agreement, before the end of the seven working day period referred to in paragraph 1,
- for the supply of goods or services the price of which is dependent on fluctuations in the financial market which cannot be controlled by the supplier,
- for the supply of goods made to the consumer’s specifications or clearly personalized or which, by reason of their nature, cannot be returned or are liable to deteriorate or expire rapidly,
- for the supply of audio or video recordings or computer software which were unsealed by the consumer,
- for the supply of newspapers, periodicals and magazines,
- for gaming and lottery services.

4 The Member States shall make provision in their legislation to ensure that:

- if the price of goods or services is fully or partly covered by credit granted by the supplier, or
- if that price is fully or partly covered by credit granted to the consumer by a third party on the basis of an agreement between the third party and the supplier, the credit agreement shall be cancelled, without any penalty, if the consumer exercises his right to withdraw from the contract in accordance with paragraph 1.

Member States shall determine the detailed rules for cancellation of the credit agreement.

**Article 7**

**Performance**

1 Unless the parties have agreed otherwise, the supplier must execute the order within a maximum of 30 days from the day following that on which the consumer forwarded his order to the supplier.
2 Where a supplier fails to perform his side of the contract on the grounds that the goods or services ordered are unavailable, the consumer must be informed of this situation and must be able to obtain a refund of any sums he has paid as soon as possible and in any case within 30 days.

3 Nevertheless, Member States may lay down that the supplier may provide the consumer with goods or services of equivalent quality and price provided that this possibility was provided for prior to the conclusion of the contract or in the contract. The consumer shall be informed of this possibility in a clear and comprehensible manner. The cost of returning the goods following exercise of the right of withdrawal shall, in this case, be borne by the supplier, and the consumer must be informed of this. In such cases the supply of goods or services may not be deemed to constitute inertia selling within the meaning of Article 9.

Article 8

Payment by Card

Member States shall ensure that appropriate measures exist to allow a consumer:

- to request cancellation of a payment where fraudulent use has been made of his payment card in connection with distance contracts covered by this Directive;
- in the event of fraudulent use, to be recredited with the sums paid or have them returned.

Article 9

Inertia selling

Member States shall take the measures necessary to:

- prohibit the supply of goods or services to a consumer without their being ordered by the consumer beforehand, where such supply involves a demand for payment;
- exempt the consumer from the provision of any consideration in cases of unsolicited supply, the absence of a response not constituting consent.

Article 10

Restrictions on the Use of Certain Means of Distance Communication

1 Use by a supplier of the following means requires the prior consent of the consumer:

- automated calling system without human intervention (automatic calling machine),
- facsimile machine (fax).
Member States shall ensure that means of distance communication, other than those referred to in paragraph 1, which allow individual communications may be used only where there is no clear objection from the consumer.

**Article 11**

**Judicial or Administrative Redress**

1 Member States shall ensure that adequate and effective means exist to ensure compliance with this Directive in the interests of consumers.

2 The means referred to in paragraph 1 shall include provisions whereby one or more of the following bodies, as determined by national law, may take action under national law before the courts or before the competent administrative bodies to ensure that the national provisions for the implementation of this Directive are applied:

(a) public bodies or their representatives;
(b) consumer organizations having a legitimate interest in protecting consumers;
(c) professional organizations having a legitimate interest in acting.

3 (a) Member States may stipulate that the burden of proof concerning the existence of prior information, written confirmation, compliance with time-limits or consumer consent can be placed on the supplier.

(b) Member States shall take the measures needed to ensure that suppliers and operators of means of communication, where they are able to do so, cease practices which do not comply with measures adopted pursuant to this Directive.

4 Member States may provide for voluntary supervision by self-regulatory bodies of compliance with the provisions of this Directive and recourse to such bodies for the settlement of disputes to be added to the means which Member States must provided to ensure compliance with the provisions of this Directive.

**Article 12**

**Binding Nature**

1 The consumer may not waive the rights conferred on him by the transposition of this Directive into national law.

2 Member States shall take the measures needed to ensure that the consumer does not lose the protection granted by this Directive by virtue of the choice of the law of a non-member country as the law applicable to the contract if the latter has close connection with the territory of one or more Member States.
Article 13

Community Rules

1 The provisions of this Directive shall apply insofar as there are no particular provisions in rules of Community Law governing certain types of distance contracts in their entirety.

2 Where specific Community rules contain provisions governing only certain aspects of the supply of goods or provision of services, those provisions, rather than the provisions of this Directive, shall apply to these specific aspects of the distance contracts.

Article 14

Minimal Clause

Member States may introduce or maintain, in the area covered by this Directive, more stringent provisions compatible with the Treaty, to ensure a higher level of consumer protection. Such provisions shall, where appropriate, include a ban, in the general interest, on the marketing of certain goods or services, particularly medicinal products, within their territory by means of distance contracts, with due regard for the Treaty.

Information requirements play a significant role in the Directive. Article 4 requires the consumer to be provided with specified information ‘in good time prior to the conclusion of the contract’ and in a ‘clear and comprehensible manner’. It can be provided ‘in any way appropriate to the means of distance communication used, with due regard, in particular, to the principles of good faith in commercial transactions’. Under the proposed implementing regulations, the contract will be unenforceable against the consumer if there is a failure to comply with these information requirements, and the manner of communication is made more specific in relation to information ‘provided in writing’. Draft reg 5(3) states:

If provided in writing, the information shall be easily legible and, if incorporated in the contract or other document, shall be afforded no less prominence than that given to any other information in the document apart from—

- the heading to the document;
- the names of the parties to the contract;
- the names of the parties to the contract; and any information inserted in handwriting.

In the context of information provided in writing, this would seem to give some concrete form to what is required by ‘good faith’. Although it is by no means clear that an electronic communication is ‘in writing’, it is suggested that, in any event, information which is provided so as to be seen on a computer screen

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213 Article 4(1).
214 Article 4(2).
might be viewed analogously. Provisions such as this attempt to provide consumers with a realistic opportunity of becoming acquainted with the important elements of a transaction, so that their consent to a contract need not be seen as impaired by lack of awareness of those elements. Assistance in determining more broadly when information is provided in a ‘clear and comprehensible manner’ may be provided by the working of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations/Directive, with their emphasis on ‘plain intelligible language’. In addition, those Regulations/Directive also refer to ‘good faith’ in defining fairness—the occasions when the manner in which terms are brought to the attention of the consumer are viewed as relevant to fairness may be helpful in relation to the meaning of ‘good faith’ in this context.

In addition to the ‘clear and comprehensible’ information requirement in Art 4, there are further communication requirements in Art 5. Under the latter Article, the consumer must receive, ‘in good time during the performance of the contract and at the latest at the time of delivery’, confirmation of the information referred to in Art 4(1)(a)–(f), in writing or ‘in another durable medium available and accessible to him’. A requirement for ‘written information’ might cause problems in the e-commerce context but the alternative, that of communication ‘in another durable medium’, would seem largely to prevent such potential difficulties—if the alternative was always available. The DTI takes the view that ‘confirmation by electronic mail would meet the definition of confirmation in “another durable medium available and accessible to [the consumer]”, where the order has been made by means of email’. However, the alternative to the provision of ‘written’ information, of its provision in ‘another durable medium’, would not seem to be available in relation to all the information requirements in Art 5(1), which, in addition to the above requirement, also states:

In any event the following must be provided:

- written information on the conditions and procedures for exercising the right of withdrawal, within the meaning of Article 6, including the cases referred to in the first indent of Article 6(3).

In keeping with the Directive’s attempt to ensure that the contracting consumer makes an informed choice, a ‘cooling off period’ of at least seven days is required by Art 6—giving the consumer the right to withdraw without cost (except the direct cost of returning goods) during that period. A cooling off period gives a consumer a further opportunity to consider the contract. There are some exempted situations, in which, ‘unless the parties have agreed otherwise, the

215 Article 5(1)—unless the consumer has already received the information in one of the required forms.
217 Article 6(1) makes provision for the point at which the cooling off period starts to run.
consumer may not exercise his right of withdrawal’, including contracts ‘for the supply of audio or video recordings or computer software which were unsealed by the consumer’.\textsuperscript{218} Items such as software are very vulnerable to copyright infringement.

The Directive contains certain performance requirements in Art 7—so that the distance purchaser should not be left wondering if goods ordered will ever arrive. Basically, the supplier must perform within 30 days. If he does not do so on the basis that the goods or services are not available, the consumer must be informed and given a refund within 30 days. In addition, some provision is made in the Directive to try to reduce the effects of credit card fraud (Art 8); inertia selling is also dealt with (Art 9), as are restrictions on certain types of communication (for example, spamming) (Art 10).\textsuperscript{219}

\textsuperscript{218} Article 6(3).

\textsuperscript{219} See above, p 293.
Since time immemorial, information has been collected and exchanged about individuals at many levels of society. In the words of Earl Ferrers, ‘The collection of personal data is as old as society itself. It may not be the oldest profession but it is one of the oldest habits’. Such activities range from the collection and storage of personal information by government for a multitude of reasons and purposes to the gossip exchanged at local meeting places. Apart from the fact that increasing computerisation has facilitated the collection and storage of such data, the much used phrase, ‘the global village’, encompasses the notion that exchange of information can now take place on a worldwide scale. This is converted into practical reality by the growth of the internet and world wide web, predicted to have up to 200 million users over the next few years. These users come from diverse backgrounds, encompassing domestic, educational, governmental and commercial sectors. Indeed, the growth of e-commerce has, itself, posed problems in relation to privacy protection which are in urgent need of solution if the projected growth of this section of the economy is to be realised. As has been pointed out:

On the one hand modern society increasingly depends on the collection, storage, processing and exchange of information of all kinds, including personal information. On the other hand it is important to ensure that where information about individuals is used their interests, including their privacy, are properly respected.

This chapter is devoted to a consideration of the way in which the law is able to deal with abuses of the global information infrastructure insofar as this relates to information about individuals, whether true or false. This will involve a study of whether, and in what manner, increasing computerisation can compromise an individual’s privacy or facilitate acts which threaten the individual’s reputation or integrity, together with an analysis of the legal response to these issues.

1 Ferrers, E, Hansard, Col 37, 11 October 1993.
Chapter 7: Information Technology Law

DATA PROTECTION: THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

Prior to the so called information revolution, information and data held on individuals would only be kept in traditional filing cabinets or their equivalent. Not only might these be accessed only relatively infrequently, perhaps, by the holder of the data, but it would be difficult for other users of similar information or information about the same individual to gain access. The ease with which computers can store and manipulate data has caused a dramatic change in this respect and has made it a simple matter for information about particular individuals held in a number of places to be correlated. Indeed, a whole industry has arisen out of the operation referred to as ‘data matching’, whereby a profile of a particular individual is assembled from data held at a number of sources. Such profiles are used extensively for marketing purposes and lists of those with similar profiles form a commodity which is, itself, traded to businesses to enable selective targeting of a particular sector of the market. This process need not, however, be confined to business use, as pointed out succinctly by Browne-Wilkinson VC:

If the information obtained by the police, the Inland Revenue, the social security services, the health service and other agencies were to be gathered together in one file, the freedom of the individual would be greatly at risk. The dossier of private information is the badge of the totalitarian State.3

This not only describes the phenomenon of data matching, but also highlights the dangers to individual rights and liberties and is indicative of some of the fears which surround the storage of personal data on computer systems. These fears have been voiced for some time4 and, even as far back as 1975, a significant amount of information about identifiable individuals was already kept on computer by central government.5 Such anxieties were exacerbated as industry and commerce also began to rely on the use of computers to such an extent that it is today impossible to imagine business being possible without them. In the words of Perri 6, ‘personal information has become the basic fuel on which modern business and government run’.6

The particular features which were likely to be the cause of concern were identified by the Younger Committee on Privacy.

Protecting the Private Individual

Report of the Committee on Privacy\(^7\)
Paragraph 581

We attempted to identify the various aspects of this alleged threat which were raised by computerised personal information stores and seemed to distinguish such stores in the public mind from others kept by traditional methods. We found that the computer’s facility to store, link, manipulate, and provide access to information gave rise to suspicions that complete personal profiles on a great number of people could be compiled; that information could be used for a purpose for which it was not initially collected; that some information could be inaccurate; that it facilitated access to confidential information by many people scattered over a wide area; that its powers of correlation were so superior to traditional methods that it made practicable what had hitherto been impracticable; and that it encouraged the growth on an entirely new scale of information gathering and of organisations to do it. Others feel that there is a danger of information emanating from a computer being thought to be free from human error.

The Committee thus concentrated on three particular areas of concern: the use of computers to compile personal profiles; their capacity to correlate information; and the ease with which unauthorised access to data could be obtained.

The extract above was written in 1972 but, even as rules were being formulated and developed to deal with the issues raised, the nature of the threat was undergoing a subtle change as the technology continued to progress. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the focus was on the development of large, centralised databases held on mainframe computers. Technological advancement then abruptly changed direction and, instead of even larger machines being developed, the advent of the microcomputer resulted in computers rapidly becoming a common tool, both at work and in the home, rather than being confined to large institutions. Further, the creation of computer networks on a global scale\(^8\) moved the emphasis from centralised systems to increasingly decentralised systems, typified by the internet and world wide web. These give rise to qualitatively different problems.

Anonymity on the Internet\(^9\)

Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data
Recommendation 3/97

…it has become apparent that one of the greatest threats to this fundamental right to privacy is the ability for organisations to accumulate large amounts

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\(^7\) Cmnd 5012, 1972, London: HMSO.

\(^8\) Computer networks actually had their genesis in the 1960s with the creation of the ARPANET, but it was not until the mid-1980s that the internet began to be used on a regular, day to day basis outside the research community.

\(^9\) Available at europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/media/dataprot/wpdocs/wp6en.htm.
of information about individuals, in a digital form which lends itself to high speed (and now very low cost) manipulation, alteration and communication to others...

A feature of telecommunications networks and of the Internet in particular is their potential to generate a huge quantity of transactional data (the data generated in order to ensure the correct connections). The possibilities for interactive use of the networks (a defining characteristic of many Internet services) increases the amount of transactional data yet further. When consulting an on-line newspaper, the user ‘interacts’ by choosing the pages he wishes to read. These choices create a ‘clickstream’ of transactional data. By contrast more traditional news and information services are consumed much more passively (television for example), with interactivity being limited to the off-line world of newspaper shops and libraries...

As on-line services develop in terms of their sophistication and their popularity, the problem of transactional data will grow. Everywhere we go on the Internet, we leave a digital trace. As more and more aspects of our daily activities are conducted on-line, more and more of what we do, our choices, our preferences, will be recorded.

But the risks to our personal privacy lie not only in the existence of large amounts of personal data on the Internet, but also in the development of software capable of searching the network and drawing together all the available data about a named person.

A later document from the Art 29 Working Party was to explain the perceived threat in more detail.

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**Anonymity on the Internet**

*Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data*

*Recommendation 1/99*

Presently it is almost impossible to use the Internet without being confronted with privacy-invading features which carry out all kinds of processing operations of personal data in a way that is invisible to the data subject. In other words, the Internet user is not aware of the fact that his/her personal data have been collected and further processed and might be used for purposes that are unknown to him/her. The data subject does not know about the processing and has no freedom to decide on it.

An example of this type of technique is the so called cookie, which can be defined as a computer record of information that is sent from a web server to an user’s computer for the purpose of future identification of that computer on future visits to the same web site.

Browsers are software programs designed to, among other things, graphically display material that is available on the Internet. Browsers communicate between the user’s computer (client) and the remote computer where...

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10 Available at europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/media/dataprot/wpdocs/wp17en.htm.
information is stored (Web server). Browsers often send more information to
the Web server than strictly necessary for establishing the communication.
Classical browsers will automatically send to the Web server visited the type
and language of the browser, the name of other software programmes
installed on the user’s PC and operating system, the referring page, cookies,
etc. Such data can also be transmitted systematically to third parties by the
browser software, in an invisible way.

These techniques allow the creation of clicktrails about the Internet user.
Clicktrails consist of information about an individual’s behaviour, identity,
pathway or choices expressed while visiting a web site. They contain the
links that a user has followed and are logged in the Web server.

... Cookies or browsers can contain or further process data allowing the direct
or indirect identification of the individual internet user.

Thus, the possibility of retaining and collating trace information from successive
web searches may prove very useful for personal profiling purposes, even
though the individual in question may be completely unaware that the data has
been collected. Access/service providers may hold personal details about their
clients, transactional information such as the types of site visited, connection
times, etc, and even, perhaps, the content of private communications such as
email, which can also be used for data matching processes. The problem has
been summed up succinctly by the Data Protection Registrar (now
Commissioner):

Every time you access a service [on the internet] whether it is to make a
contribution to a newsgroup or to make a commercial transaction, you are at
risk of leaving an electronic trace which can be used to develop a profile of your
personal interests and tastes.11

More recently, a report from the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC)
concluded that:

...the current practices of the on-line industry provide little meaningful privacy
protection for consumers... On balance, we think that consumers are more at
risk today than they were in 1997. The profiling is more extensive and the
marketing techniques are more intrusive.12

A US Federal Trade Commission Report presenting results of a survey of
frequently used websites spelt out the threat more explicitly, pointing out that,
‘when the traffic of all sites surveyed is taken into account, there is a 99% chance
that, during a one month period, a consumer surfing the busiest sites on the web
will visit a site that collects personal identifying information’.13

DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY

It will have been apparent that many of the extracts cited in the previous section refer to both privacy and ‘privacy-invading features’ in the context of data protection. Nevertheless, the relationship between the terms ‘data protection’ on the one hand and ‘privacy’ on the other have not always been easy to reconcile. Data protection is often viewed as a technical term relating to specific information management practices, the preferred stance of those who would see data protection primarily as an aspect of business regulation. In contrast, privacy is more likely to be considered as a fundamental human right and accorded specific protection under human rights conventions or constitutions. It is, however, possible to discuss privacy issues in the terminology of risk and risk assessment, concepts which are, perhaps, more familiar in a business environment. Three risk factors can be identified which could be considered to be elements of privacy.14 The first of these is the risk of injustice due to significant inaccuracy in personal data, unjust inference, ‘function creep’ (the gradual use of data for purposes other than those for which it was collected) or reversal of the presumption of innocence, as seen in data matching when correlation of information from disparate sources may produce an impression which is greater than the sum of the parts. The second risk is to one’s personal control over the collection of personal information as a result of excessive and unjustified surveillance (which would presumably include monitoring the use of particular websites) collection of data without the data subject’s consent and also the prohibition or active discouragement of the means to remedy these risks, such as the use of encryption and anonymising software. Finally there is a risk to dignity as a result of exposure or embarrassment due to an absence of transparency in information procedures, physical intrusion into private spaces, unnecessary identification or absence of anonymity, or unnecessary or unjustified disclosure of personal information without consent. Many of these have echoes of data protection issues and, in the technical sense, data protection measures may be considered as risk management devices which need to balance the risk to the individual from unnecessary invasion of privacy with the measures necessary to control that risk.15 It may be that such differences in terminology are not so disparate as they might appear at first sight.

Nonetheless, an agreed definition of privacy remains elusive. Ever since the seminal article of Warren and Brandeis16 at the end of the 19th century, academic

14 See op cit, Perri 6, fn 6, p 40.


writers have been analysing the multi-faceted concept of privacy. Westin suggested that ‘Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups or institutions to determine for themselves when, how and to what extent information about them is communicated to others’, a definition based on the right of self-determination that may be placed at particular risk by the practice of data matching, made so simple by modern information technology.17 This notion was supported by Miller,18 in the specific context of this technology, who considered privacy as ‘the individual’s ability to control the circulation of information relating to him’. Gavison,19 on the other hand, is critical of the ability to control personal information as being a determinant of the definition of privacy precisely because a dependence on subjective choice makes both a realisation of the scope of the concept and the provision of legal protection problematic. In a quest for a more neutral approach, she attempts to deconstruct privacy into three components: secrecy, anonymity and solitude. The definitional difficulties are exacerbated by the fact that whether or not privacy is considered to have been invaded is a very subjective issue, which will depend not only on the view of the person whose privacy is being invaded, but also on who is the invader and what information they are uncovering. Even using the apparently neutral approach of Gavison, the question of whether there has, in fact, been an invasion of privacy is likely to remain a subjective one.

Perri 6 has submitted that the reason why there is no consensus over definition is that ‘as a society we do not and cannot agree on what it is about private life and privacy that we value’,20 while Feldman comments that ‘The problem is that privacy is controversial. The very breadth of the idea and its tendency to merge with the idea of liberty itself produces a lack of definition which weakens its force in moral and political discourse’.21

Whether or not there is an accepted and acceptable definition of privacy, there is undeniably a tension between the rights of all those who would seek to exert control over personal information. It is possible to consider that personal information should be under the control of the person to whom it refers, whereas it may be claimed that, insofar as personal data arises from information which may have been recorded and/or processed in a particular way, the data user should be able to exert right over the use of such data. Thus, competing interests, although often a reflection of the conflict between the individual and the State,

20 Op cit, Perri 6, fn 6, p 21.
may equally well refer to a balancing of the right of individuals to privacy and control over the use of their own information with the right of other individuals or organisations to use that same information, which they may have compiled and processed, to the best commercial effect.

Whilst, in upholding a general right to privacy, civil libertarians might tip this balance in favour of the right of individuals to control data concerning themselves, this may not be an automatic or obvious result.

Data protection between property and liberties
Yves Poullet
in Amongst Friends in Computers and Law
HWK Kaspersen and A Oskamp (eds)

The individual is not the owner of data that concerns him, not even the bearer towards it of a right close to a real right. An individual projects a certain image of himself spontaneously upon society, which image may be precisely captured by another. Coupled with other information, it then takes shape in the eyes of the person who is processing it. There can be no question of a priori denying to another the use of an image of me which I myself have given him. My liberty is opposed to his, which is that of freedom of association within the framework of data systems operated by a union, of religious liberty in the framework of processing undertaken by a religious authority, or more frequently, the liberty to do business in the case of companies. This conflict should resolve itself by the balance of interests method, by which the authority charged with deciding the conflict takes into account the respective legitimate interests expressing the liberty of each party.

...a number of legislative rulings foresee an exception for certain data or certain types of processing. Thus it is easy to justify, that legislation should forbid the processing of philosophical, trade union or religious data, because, a priori, the processing of such data imperils my religious, political or philosophical liberty. With reference to the same data, the same legislations exempt precisely such religious associations, trade unions and the press from this very prohibition, which can be explained as the desire to affirm the freedom of association and the freedom of the press above individual liberties. As we can observe from these limited examples, recording of the same nominative data my be limited, regulated or free, according to the liberties put into question by its being recorded. There is certainly a debate between liberties and the necessity of appreciating, with regard to the interests of society, the weight accorded to each of them.

Particularly in the context of the freedom of the holder of the file to do business, beyond the limits imposed with regard to certain data which characterize, in an immediate way, such recognized constitutional liberties as freedom of opinion, of religion or association, may we admit that legislation, in defining the file holder’s right to information also defines the limit of that right? Should not the principle of the holder of the file’s right to collect data be affirmed as such, even if, a posteriori, certain abuses must be decided in casu by the judge? In other words, should data protection
legislation intervene in the private sector other than by providing for the right of access...should it rule on the contents and limits of private processing?

As mentioned above, Gavison defines three components of privacy as secrecy, anonymity and solitude, while Feldman uses the words ‘secrecy, dignity, autonomy’. In both of these formulations, the word ‘secrecy’ is used to encompass the idea of informational privacy, reflecting the desire of individuals to be able to place checks on what is known about them, not only in the sense of data released, but also in control over subsequent use and reuse. Does this concept of informational privacy equate with data protection or overlap with it? In 1978, the Lindop Committee was established to look exclusively at the issue of data protection in the UK. Although referring to the definitions of both Westin and Miller, quoted above, the Lindop Report, 22 perhaps to reassure those who were concerned about the introduction or what could be regarded as privacy legislation, was at pains to distinguish privacy and data protection.

Report of the Committee on Data Protection
Cmnd 7341, 1998

The concept of data privacy

2.03 There are aspects of privacy which have no immediate connection with the handling of personal data in information systems, such as intrusion into the home, powers of entry and search, and embarrassing publicity in the media. There are also aspects of data protection which have no immediate connection with privacy. For example, the use of inaccurate or incomplete information for taking decisions about people is properly a subject for data protection, but it may not always raise questions of privacy.

2.04 The Younger Committee had to deal with the whole field of privacy. Our task has been to deal with that of data protection. In fact, the two fields overlap, and the area of overlap can be called ‘information privacy’ or, better, ‘data privacy’. It is an important area, and we have a good deal to say about it in this Report. But it is not by itself the whole field of data protection, and we have had to consider some matters which do not directly raise questions of privacy. However, we found it useful to examine the concept of data privacy, and its implications and consequences. For this purpose we have used the term data privacy to mean the individual’s claim to control the circulation of data about himself.

‘Private’ data

2.05 There is wide variation in what data about themselves people regard as ‘private’. Such variations exist between one individual and another, between different sections of society, between societies in different countries, and between different periods of time in the same society.

22 Op cit, fn 5.
2.06 Some people are willing to allow more to be known about themselves than others. Differences of age, personality, temperament, views and beliefs all have a part to play. Variations in social and cultural mores account for variations between different sectors of the same society; variations in institutions, cultures and traditions, and in the style and political characteristics of government, account for variations between different societies. Changes in attitude in the same society are related to many factors such as its economic development, changing educational standards, social conventions, and opportunities for self determination.

2.07 ‘Privateness’ is clearly not an attribute of data themselves, for the same data may be regarded as very private in one context and not so private, or not private at all, in another. Equally, when data are regarded as private, that does not mean that they are, or should be, known only to the individual to whom they refer: rather it means that he wants them to be known only to him and to those others who he agrees should know them. There are many ways in which such agreements are established. In the simplest case the individual gives the data directly to another party; this may be a quite voluntary act or it may be an obligation entered into as part of a commercial contract. At the other extreme, the agreement may be made on his behalf by Parliament enacting legislation which requires him to provide the data to someone. One cannot judge such agreements, however they are reached, without taking a view of the purposes for which the data are to be used, and the conditions under which they are to be applied to those purposes.

Notwithstanding this attempt at semantic differentiation, other sources and commentators have often used the words interchangeably or appear to assume the link between the two. Gellman, for instance, refers to ‘the slice of privacy known as “data protection”’ and goes on to suggest that:

This is a useful European term referring to rules about the collection, use and dissemination of personal information. One major policy objective of data protection is the application of fair information practices, an organized set of values and standards about personal information defining the rights of record subjects and the responsibilities of record keepers. This is an important subset of privacy law.

As acknowledged by Gellman, the term ‘data protection’ originated in Europe, but few would dispute the contention that it has become a globally recognised term. However, it could be argued that the coining of this specific term has, itself, been the root of the problem—suggesting or being indicative of separate strands of meaning where, perhaps, none exist. Although recent initiatives seem more likely to stress the link between data protection and privacy, even in 1980 both the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Council of Europe were in no doubt that data protection was a facet of privacy. In the context of the automatic processing of personal data, the Council

of Europe considered that ‘it is desirable to extend the safeguards for everyone’s rights and fundamental freedoms, and in particular the right to the respect for privacy’,24 while the OECD commented in its Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data25 that ‘privacy protection laws have been introduced…to prevent what are considered to be violations of fundamental human rights such as the unlawful storage of personal data or the abuse or unauthorised disclosure of such data’. The now ubiquitous term ‘data protection’ was reserved for the explanatory memorandum accompanying the Guidelines.

The link between data protection and privacy has increasingly been recognised in the UK as well as internationally. In 1994, the then Data Protection Registrar said in his Final Report that ‘data protection legislation is about the protection of individuals rather than the regulation of industry. It is civil rights legislation rather than technical business legislation’.26 Even though the Data Protection Act 1984 never used the word ‘privacy’, Lord Hoffman in R v Brown remarked that ‘English common law does not know a general right of privacy and Parliament has been reluctant to enact one. But there has been some legislation to deal with particular aspects of the problem. The Data Protection Act 1984…is one such statute’.27 The decision of the Data Protection Tribunal in British Gas Trading Ltd v Data Protection Registrar was more specific, stating that ‘an underlying purpose of the data protection principles is to protect privacy with respect to the processing of personal data’,28 a view which looks both back to the Council of Europe Convention and forward to Directive 95/46/EC.29 Following implementation of this Directive, the Deputy Data Protection Registrar asserted that:30

If the 1998 Act satisfies the Directive, then it serves to protect the rights of individuals to privacy, at least in respect of the processing of personal data. If the 1998 Act fails to protect personal privacy in accordance with the Directive, then the UK is in breach of its Community obligations. I do not assert that data protection legislation is comprehensive privacy legislation protecting every aspect of that right, but I do ask how it can be doubted that, as a matter of law, data protection is a form of privacy protection.

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24 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection on Individuals with regard to the Automatic Processing of Personal Data, available at conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm.
25 Available at www.oecd.org/dsti/sti/it/secure/prod/PRIV-EN.HTM.
29 See below, p 385.
Notwithstanding that such comments and pronouncements originate from a variety of sources, the historic lack of legal protection for privacy *per se* in the UK has meant that there is still resistance, and even suspicion in some quarters, towards any legislation which purports to protect or which could be regarded as protecting privacy. Proponents of such views seek to divorce the concepts of data protection and privacy. This has resulted in warnings against data protection law bringing in privacy law surreptitiously by the ‘back door’. Those who espouse such views concentrate, instead, on the business regulation aspects of data protection and its role in promoting the free flow of personal data. Thus, Viscount Astor stated that:

> ...the Bill which implements the Directive is designed to improve the free movement of personal data throughout the Community...we need to protect the rights of individuals but we do not want a back door privacy law.31

In the same debate, Lord Wakeham was to suggest that the Data Protection Bill (now Data Protection Act 1998, implementing Directive 95/46/EC) was ‘an excellent piece of legislation which avoids all the perils of a privacy law. It is entirely in line with the Government’s stated commitment to self-regulation and their opposition to a privacy law’.

Both sides of this debate have always recognised that the reliance by business on the increased use of computers and computer networks, both internally and externally to the enterprise, creates the tension between business needs and individuals’ right of privacy.

**Report of the Committee on Data Protection**32

2.09 In the use that is made of personal data, the interests of the individual and the interests of society may conflict and need to be resolved in the same way as in the context of individual liberty. With data protection the solution must take the same form: a balance must be found between the interests of the individual and the interests of the rest of society, which include the efficient conduct of industry, commerce and administration. But, as with our liberties, it is not a single point of balance which must be established. There are cases, for example with regard to religious and political beliefs, where the right balance will preserve the individual’s freedom to adhere to his beliefs and will deny to society, and to particular institutions within it such as government departments or commercial enterprises, the opportunity to interfere with that freedom. At the other extreme the maintenance of national security and of law and order in society may require the balance to be struck at a point where the interests of society are given a far higher value than those of the individual. Between these extremes there is a wide spectrum, and the balance for a

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particular use of personal data may be established differently in different cases. It may also be settled differently in different societies, and may shift within the same society with changes, for example, in its political climate or institutional structures.

2.10 The means by which the balances are struck, and the conditions under which the agreements between data subjects and data users are reached, are of great importance. Where the agreement is voluntary, the result will not be fair unless each party fully understands the requirements of the other, and there is a clear understanding of what data are to be provided, and for what purposes they will be used. Fairness requires openness in such dealings and it also requires that no advantage should be taken of any disparities in bargaining power.

2.11 But there are many cases where these conditions for fairness cannot exist. Data users cannot always be expected, or even be able, to appreciate fully the requirements of data subjects. Even less can data subjects be expected to appreciate fully the requirements of data users, let alone the relevant technicalities of information handling. In many cases, especially where the relationship is between the government and the governed, there can be no question of equal bargaining power; in yet others it may turn out that agreement simply cannot be reached. In all such cases, only an independent third party can fairly weigh all the interests involved—those of the data subject, the data user and society at large—and determine the best point of balance.

Whereas it is accepted that civil liberties and human rights cannot be absolute and unfettered, this extract illustrates how difficult it may be to achieve an acceptable balance between the competing rights of those involved. It is the Herculean task of data protection regulation to achieve that balance.

REGULATORY APPROACHES AND INITIATIVES

Identification of these competing needs, together with pressure from a variety of intergovernmental organisations such as the OECD and the Council of Europe, have led to regulation of this area in a number of jurisdictions. However, as yet, there has not been any global consensus on either the most appropriate way of achieving and maintaining the balance between the competing objectives or the provision of a suitable regulatory framework. The discussion above indicates that it is axiomatic that data protection regulation is required to protect privacy of individual data subjects, suggesting that the central issue is merely the problem of reaching agreement on the method of achieving this result. But the counter-argument is that data protection laws impede the free flow of data, stifle rapid innovation and generally restrict the free market. There is also a considerable compliance burden related to the cost of implementation. On this argument, only minimal, external regulation is likely to be tolerated and the advantages of market driven, self-regulatory practices espoused. In other words, strong data protection will, inevitably, hinder commercial activity. Moderating
this view, some legal and economic analyses have apparently demonstrated that the reality may not be so simple and that a strong legal infrastructure may actually encourage commerce. Whichever side of the argument is supported, it does seem to be generally recognised that privacy regulation may be more apt and relevant in relation to business-consumer transactions than for business-business ones.33

If it is taken as a given that some regulation is necessary for the protection of individuals, what is the most suitable method? A clear division in approach is evident between the US on the one hand, which favours a sectoral, self-regulatory system, and Europe, which has a long history of legislative intervention.34 Indeed, as already pointed out, the very concept of data protection appears to be a European creation. In order to be able to appreciate the nature of the debate which has unfolded surrounding the regulation of data protection in different jurisdictions, especially in the US and Europe, it is prudent to examine some of the advantages and disadvantages of these apparently opposing philosophies.

Self-regulation is arguably a much maligned and frequently misunderstood term. It should not be confused with non-regulation, 35 but can reasonably be equated with non-governmental regulation, although a number of self-regulatory regimes do in fact operate within a statutory framework. At its most reduced form, it suggests the propensity of individuals to provide rules for themselves, although these may include, of course, compliance with external, central regulation. Within the business and commercial sector, the term is usually used to denote a much more formal regulatory framework which may be established by the industries, trade and professional associations themselves, in response to the need to be accountable for their members’ activities or in response to a statutory framework, imposed for the control of a particular activity, as noted above. This latter system is sometimes referred to as ‘enforced self-regulation’. Self-regulatory schemes of this nature have become an increasingly familiar aspect of the regulation of commercial activity in many jurisdictions and it is in reference to such schemes that the majority of academic scrutiny and comment has occurred.36

What then are the advantages traditionally claimed for self-regulation over public regulation? First, since self-regulatory agencies (hereafter SRAs) can normally command a greater degree of expertise and technical knowledge of practices and innovatory possibilities within the relevant area than independent agencies, information costs for the formulation and interpretation of standards are lower. Secondly, for the same reasons, monitoring and enforcement costs are also reduced, as are the costs to practitioners of dealing with regulators, given that such interaction is likely to be fostered by mutual trust. Thirdly, to the extent that the processes of, and rules issued by, SRAs are less formalized than those of public regulatory regimes, there are savings on the costs (including those attributable to delay) of amending standards. Fourthly, the administrative costs of the regime are normally internalised in the trade or activity which is subject to regulation; in the case of independent, public agencies, they are typically borne by taxpayers...

Lawyers and economists have been equally scathing in their criticisms of self-regulation. From a legal perspective, it is seen as an example of modern ‘corporatism’, the acquisition of power by groups which are not accountable to the body politic through the conventional constitutional channels. The capacity of an SRA to make rules governing the activities of an association or profession may itself constitute an abuse if it lacks democratic legitimacy in relation to members of the association or profession. The potential for abuse becomes intolerable if, and to the extent that, the rules affect third parties. Further, if—as often occurs—the SRA’s functions cover policy formulation, interpretation of the rules, adjudication and enforcement (including imposition of sanctions) as well as rule-making, there is a fundamental breach of the separation of powers doctrine. Finally, irrespective of theoretical considerations, SRAs are claimed to have a poor record of enforcing their standards against recalcitrant members.

Thus, self-regulation provides a particular type of regulatory regime, whose flexibility and relative informality is often appreciated by the business community. In practice, it may be difficult to assess how well the regime has been implemented or performs its functions, but this is a criticism which can also be directed at some statutory regimes. For the purposes of the present discussion, the major question is whether it can be as effective in protecting individual rights as a statutory scheme.

In Europe, there has been little consideration of the use of self-regulatory regimes as the primary method of regulation. In the UK, the origins of data protection legislation can be traced back to the Younger Committee on Privacy, referred to above. This Committee was established in response to growing concerns during the 1960s about the amount of personal information kept by various organisations, to which the individuals concerned had no right of access. Its terms of reference were:

To consider whether legislation is needed to give further protection to the individual citizen and to commercial and industrial interests against intrusion
into privacy by private persons and organisations or by companies and to make recommendations.

A statutory framework was thus what was in contemplation. Although, at this time, the use of computers was still comparatively novel and was largely confined to big commercial and educational institutions, the potential for the problems identified earlier in the use of computer systems for these purposes had already been identified, and one chapter of the Younger Report\(^\text{37}\) concentrated on this perceived threat to privacy. Although the Report concluded that the threat to privacy from computers was not sufficient at that time to warrant legislation,\(^\text{38}\) nevertheless 10 principles were formulated which were suggested as providing a guide for the use of computers which manipulated personal data.

**Report of the Committee on Privacy**  
**Paragraphs 592–600**

There could be an incentive to cover the cost of acquisition and recording of the information by using it for purposes additional to that for which it was originally collected. For example, a computerised record of subscribers to a trade publication might well prove useful to the manufacturers of certain products advertised therein. The situation could be a clear breach of privacy in so far as it could be held that private information (a name and address) given solely for the purpose of receiving a magazine is passed on without the authority of the originator. Therefore:

1. Information should be regarded as held for a specific purpose and should not be used without appropriate authorisation for other purposes.
2. Access to information should be confined to those authorised to have it for the purpose for which it was supplied.

Furthermore, because it is often cheaper to collect all available information in one operation and because computers have the capacity to store it, there could be a double incentive for the owners of the computers to hoard large amounts of information, some of which, though not essential now, might prove useful at some later date. We believe that:

3. The amount of information collected and held should be the minimum necessary for achievement of a specified purpose.

A great deal of personal information is acquired to provide statistics to assist planning and other research, or is acquired for some other purpose and subsequently adapted to a form suitable for such ends. Planners and researchers, however, rarely need to know identities of individuals. Therefore:

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37 Cmnd 5012, 1972, London: HMSO.
38 But note that, around this time, some of these fears had been identified as a reality in the US—see, eg, *op cit*, Miller, fn 18, Chapter 2.
In computerised systems handling information for statistical purposes, adequate provision should be made in their design and programs for separating identities from the rest of the data.

While we do not think that a printout should automatically be supplied [of the information held about individuals in a computerised record] we think that every system should be so designed that in situations where printout is appropriate an individual can on request be told of the contents of the record.

Therefore:

There should be arrangements whereby the subject could be told about the information held concerning him.

We are not convinced that considerations of privacy are at present sufficiently in the minds of computer users and we think that more regard should be paid to such considerations than is the case now. Therefore:

The level of security to be achieved by a system should be specified in advance by the user and should include precautions against the deliberate abuse or misuse of information.

A security system would be incomplete, however, if it did not include provision for the detection of an irregularity. Therefore:

A monitoring system should be provided to facilitate the detection of any violation of the security system.

There are three further principles of only marginal relevance to privacy which we feel we should put forward for consideration alongside the seven we enumerate above. Computers have the capacity to retain information in effect indefinitely so that it is occasionally stored...with little regard to a time limit. Therefore:

In the design of information systems, periods should be specified beyond which the information should not be retained.

Private sector computer users usually have a commercial interest in ensuring the accuracy an up to dateness of information and protecting it from corruption during processing. There are at present, however, no procedures in general use for dealing quickly with inaccuracies. Therefore:

Data held should be accurate. There should be machinery for the correction of inaccuracy and the updating of information.

The coding of the subjective judgments often entails the loss of shades of meaning and emphasis. For example, a numeral; indicating 'fair' in evaluating an employee's performance is capable of wide interpretation. In such cases it would be preferable to refer the interrogator of the computer to a more detailed report. Therefore:

Care should be taken in coding value judgments.

Similar principles enunciating fair information practices have since formed the backbone of legal instruments for the regulation of data protection, at both the national and international level. The OECD Guidelines of 1980 formulated
principles of good data management, identified by a description of the content, and which covered essentially the same ground. Again, a statutory regime was envisaged, the OECD recommending that these Guidelines be taken into account in the member countries’ domestic legislation on privacy.

Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data
OECD, 1980

Part Two: Basic Principles of National Application

Collection Limitation Principle
7 There should be limits to the collection of personal data and any such data should be obtained by lawful and fair means and, where appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of the data subject.

Data Quality Principle
8 Personal data should be relevant to the purposes for which they are to be used, and, to the extent necessary for those purposes, should be accurate, complete and kept up to date.

Purpose Specification Principle
9 The purposes for which personal data are collected should be specified not later than at the time of data collection and the subsequent use limited to the fulfilment of those purposes or such others as are not incompatible with those purposes and as are specified on each occasion of change of purpose.

Use Limitation Principle
10 Personal data should not be disclosed, made available or otherwise used for purposes other than those specified in accordance with Paragraph 9 except:
   (a) with the consent of the data subject; or
   (b) by the authority of law.

Security Safeguards Principle
11 Personal data should be protected by reasonable security safeguards against such risks as loss or unauthorised access, destruction, use, modification or disclosure of data.

39 Op cit, fn 25.
Openness Principle

12 There should be a general policy of openness about developments, practices and policies with respect to personal data. Means should be readily available of establishing the existence and nature of personal data, and the main purposes of their use, as well as the identity and usual residence of the data controller.

Individual Participation Principle

13 An individual should have the right:

(a) to obtain from a data controller, or otherwise, confirmation of whether or not the data controller has data relating to him;
(b) to have communicated to him, data relating to him
   - within a reasonable time;
   - at a charge, if any, that is not excessive;
   - in a reasonable manner; and
   - in a form that is readily intelligible to him;
(c) to be given reasons if a request made under subparagraphs (a) and (b) is denied, and to be able to challenge such denial; and
(d) to challenge data relating to him and, if the challenge is successful to have the data erased, rectified, completed or amended.

Accountability Principle

14 A data controller should be accountable for complying with measures which give effect to the principles stated above.

Around the same time, the Council of Europe adopted the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, which has its own version of these principles. Article 4(1) of this Convention also seemed to envisage an approach which would be primarily legislative, providing that ‘Each Party shall take the necessary measures in its domestic law to give effect to the basic principles for data protection’.

Council of Europe Convention for the Protection
of Individuals with regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data 1981

Chapter II—Basic principles for data protection

Article 5 Quality of data

Personal data undergoing automatic processing shall be:

(a) obtained and processed fairly and lawfully;

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40 Treaty No 108; full text available at conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm.
(b) stored for specified and legitimate purposes and not used in a way incompatible with those purposes;
(c) adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are stored;
(d) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date;
(e) preserved in a form which permits identification of the data subjects for no longer than is required for the purpose for which those data are stored.

Article 6 Special categories of data

Personal data revealing racial origin, political opinions or religious or other beliefs, as well as personal data concerning health or sexual life, may not be processed automatically unless domestic law provides appropriate safeguards. The same shall apply to personal data relating to criminal convictions.

Article 7 Data security

Appropriate security measures shall be taken for the protection of personal data stored in automated data files against accidental or unauthorised destruction or accidental loss as well as against unauthorised access, alteration or dissemination.

Article 8 Additional safeguards for the data subject

Any person shall be enabled:

(a) to establish the existence of an automated personal data file, its main purposes, as well as the identity and habitual residence or principal place of business of the controller of the file;
(b) to obtain at reasonable intervals and without excessive delay or expense confirmation of whether personal data relating to him are stored in the automated data file as well as communication to him of such data in an intelligible form;
(c) to obtain, as the case may be, rectification or erasure of such data if these have been processed contrary to the provisions of domestic law giving effect to the basic principles set out in Articles 5 and 6 of this Convention;
(d) to have a remedy if a request for confirmation or, as the case may be, communication, rectification or erasure as referred to in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this article is not complied with.

It was international activity of this type which was to lead many of the signatories to these agreements to produce legislation for the regulation of this area—among them the UK, whose first data protection legislation, the Data Protection Act 1984, was enacted as a direct result of the perceived need to ratify the Council of Europe Convention.
William Whitelaw... I draw attention to the European dimension. In January 1981, the Council of Europe Convention on Data Protection was opened for signature. Together with the guidelines on privacy protection of the OECD, the Convention offers an international standard for data protection. This has provided us with a yardstick against which to measure our own proposals. Our intention is to ratify the Council of Europe Convention, and we have kept its provisions firmly in mind in drafting the Bill.

With the Convention now widely accepted as setting a necessary standard, we shall find increasingly a division between those countries with data protection, and those without. The latter will be more and more at risk of action from countries determined to prevent the undermining of their own data protection laws by the export of personal data to countries without protection. We must not allow any excuse for sanctions against the United Kingdom. That is what makes it imperative that we legislate without delay. Even if we were not already convinced of the rightness of legislation in this field, we should be compelled by this consideration to bring ourselves into line with European practice.

As well as showing awareness of the propensity for conflict between different regulatory schemes, this extract shows the influence of these international guidelines in leading to legislation in the UK. A similar phenomenon could be observed in other European States. Indeed, Mayer-Schönberger has commented that, in Europe, ‘almost all the national norms enacted after 1981 reflected the spirit if not the text of the OECD Guidelines.’ However the legislative approach has not remained static and Mayer-Schönberger has further traced this development in terms of a succession of generations of data protection legislation. Of these, the first generation represents those laws passed in the early 1970s, the second generation emerged in the late 1970s, the third during the 1990s and the fourth, of which a key example is Directive 95/46/EC, in the 1990s.

Generational development of data protection in Europe
Viktor Mayer-Schönberger

First generation data protection norms

The first data protection laws were enacted in response to the emergence of electronic data processing within government and large corporations. They represent attempts to counter dim visions of an unavoidably approaching Brave New World exemplified by plans discussed in the 1960s and 1970s to centralize all personal data files in gigantic national data banks...

41 Chapter 8 in op cit, Agre and Rotenberg, fn 23.
Most of the first-generation data protection norms do not focus on the direct protection of individual privacy. Instead they concentrate on the function of data processing in society… the first-generation data protection norms take a functional look at the phenomenon of data processing… The first generation statutes avoid using well-known words such as ‘privacy’, ‘information’, and ‘protection of intimate affairs’; instead they employ rather technical jargon: ‘data’, ‘data bank’, ‘data record’, data base’, ‘data file’…

The second generation: warding off more and different offenders

Data protection in the second generation focused on individual privacy rights of the citizen. Well-known sources of privacy, such as the right to be let alone and the right to delimit one’s own intimate space, were brought back into the discussion. Data protection was now explicitly linked to the right of privacy and was seen as the right of the individual to ward off society in personal matters…

…all norms of data protection always included rights of the individual to access and correct his or her personal data. But during the first generation of norms these individual rights were interpreted functionally. They were seen as supporting the accuracy of the personal data stored and processed. Individuals could not decide on whether their data was processed at all; they could merely rectify misleading or inaccurate data about themselves.

In the second generation of data protection rights, individuals obtained a say in the process. Their consent was sometimes a precondition to the data processing; in other instances, individual consent might overwrite a legal presumption that prohibited processing…

This reorientation of data protection from technology regulation to individual liberty and freedom linked it rhetorically with old legal categories of personal privacy. But the noble ideals of negative liberty and individual freedom remained largely political wishful thinking. Their transformation into black-letter law was bound to fail. It is impossible to realize individual informational liberty and privacy without endangering the functioning of the complex European social welfare states. In real life the individual rarely had the chance to decide between taking part and remaining outside society…

The third generation: the right to informational self-determination

These and similar ideas have led to a third major reform of data protection laws. Individual liberty, the right to ward off invasions into personal data, was transformed into a much more participatory right to informational self-determination…

… The individual cannot only, as in second generation data protection norms, once and for all decide in an ‘all-or-nothing’ choice to have his or her personal data processed, but has to be—at least in principle—continuously involved in the data processing…

The revisions and replacement of the technical first generation data protection terms necessitated by the change in technology were part of the second
Protecting the Private Individual

generation. During the third generation of data protection, information technology developed even further away from centralized information-processing models.

...data protection norms of the third generation are characterized by the concentration on—not to call it retreat from—the individual right of informational self-determination and the belief that citizens would exercise this right...

The third generation emphasized informational participation...

But reality turned out to be different again. Even when empowered with new and extended participatory rights, people were not willing to pay the high monetary and social cost they would have to expend when rigorously exercising their right of informational self-determination...

Consequently data protection, despite deliberate attempts to broaden access and streamline enforcement remained largely a privilege of minorities, who could economically and socially afford to exercise their rights...

The fourth generation: holistic and sectoral perspectives

... The legislators realized the generally weak bargaining position of the individual when exercising his or her right. Fourth generation norms and amendments try to rectify this through two rather distinct approaches.

On the one hand, they try to equalize bargaining positions by strengthening the individual’s position vis à vis the generally more powerful informational gathering institutions. In essence, such attempts preserve the belief in the ability of the individual to bring about data protection through individual self-determination if the bargaining balance is reestablished.

On the other hand, legislators take away parts of the participatory freedom given to the individual in second and third generation data protection norms and subject it to mandatory legal protection. Such an approach reflects the understanding that some areas of informational privacy must be absolutely protected and cannot be bargained for individually.

Each of these approaches has found a way into the fourth generation data protection norms...

In addition, under fourth generation developments general data protection norms are supplemented by specific sectoral data protection regulations...

Conclusion

Since 1970, European data protection norms have evolved into a dynamic and changing legal framework. While data protection turned into an accepted concept, its content shifted and adjusted to address technological changes and challenges and to take into account philosophical and ideological transformations. Data protection is no longer seen as a purely functional construct to be used to directly shape and influence the use of information-processing technology. Instead, the focus has shifted to the individual. Citizens’ rights feature prominently in all European data protection systems. The individual rights approach has tended away from simplistic versions of informational privacy as a negative liberty and toward broad participatory
rights of informational self-determination, supported and enhanced by a renaissance of direct regulatory involvement...

Thus, the adoption of a statutory regulatory regime does not, and need not, automatically imply uniformity of provisions, notwithstanding the central influence of the various principles of good data management formulated in the OECD Guidelines and the Council of Europe Convention. There is clearly room for variation in the scope of protection provided and, despite the categorisation into generations, not all jurisdictions within Europe have, as yet, embraced the later generations of norms to the fullest extent.

Reliance on the provision of principles of good data management is not confined to legislation and such principles are also a feature of the primarily self-regulatory regime recommended in the US. Thus, the 1998 Report of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Privacy Online: A Report to Congress, discussed five core principles of privacy protection by reference to the corresponding OECD guidelines, namely: notice/awareness; choice/consent; access/participation; integrity/security; and enforcement/redress. Beyond this apparent similarity, however, the regulatory regimes in Europe and the US diverge markedly. The emphasis on individual rights in Europe appears to have been the prime catalyst to the legislative approach to data protection, whereas business needs have been set much more centre stage in the US. The FTC noted consumer concern about privacy issues in its 1998 Report but nevertheless felt that these concerns could be resolved by the encouragement of self-regulation, even though it recognised that, at that time, there were severe deficiencies in the extent of regulatory protection.

Privacy Online: A Report to Congress
FTC, 1998

Conclusions

... The Commission has encouraged industry to address consumer concerns regarding online privacy through self-regulation. The internet is a rapidly changing marketplace. Effective self-regulation remains desirable because it allows firms to respond quickly to technological changes and employ new technologies to protect consumer privacy. Accordingly, a private-sector response to consumer concerns that incorporates widely-accepted fair information practices and provides for effective enforcement mechanisms could afford consumers adequate privacy protection. To date, however, the Commission has not seen an effective self-regulatory system emerge.

42 Available at www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/toc.htm.
As evidenced by the Commission’s survey results, and despite the Commission’s three-year privacy initiative supporting a self-regulatory response to consumers’ privacy concerns, the vast majority of online businesses have yet to adopt even the most fundamental fair information practice (notice/awareness). Moreover, the trade association guidelines submitted to the Commission do not reflect industry acceptance of the basic fair information practice principles. In addition, the guidelines, with limited exception, contain none of the enforcement mechanisms needed for an effective self-regulatory regime. In light of the lack of notice regarding information practices on the World Wide Web and the lack of current industry guidelines adequate to establish an effective self-regulatory regime, the question is what additional incentives are required in order to encourage effective self-regulatory efforts by industry.

A further Report in July 1999\textsuperscript{43} reiterated the philosophy of the previous Report: that ‘self-regulation is the least intrusive and most efficient means to ensure fair information practice, given the rapidly evolving nature of the internet and computer technology’. It noted that, although there were still observable problems with compliance, there had been significant developments reflecting ‘industry leaders’ substantial effort and commitment to fair information practices’. This fact, together with other initiatives to protect individual privacy, suggested to the FTC that legislation to address online privacy was not appropriate at that time.

These brief details of the contrasting approaches to regulation of data protection in Europe and the US illustrate some of the points of conflict, but it would be misleading to imagine that these apparently opposing mechanisms are entirely mutually exclusive. The view is expressed in the recitals of the OECD’s 1998 Ministerial Declaration on the Protection of Privacy on Global Networks\textsuperscript{44} that, although there are different approaches to privacy in member countries, these methods can, nevertheless, ‘work together to achieve effective privacy protection on global networks’. Although self-regulatory mechanisms are frequently invoked as a substitute for, or an avoidance of, legislation, they may also play a valuable role in both implementing and supplementing framework legislation by providing particular rules for specific sectors and/or purposes. Compare, for instance, how a general framework for maintaining privacy might be put into effect in relation to direct marketing as opposed to the management of health records. In each of these cases, the risks and consequences of inappropriate processing are very different. Codes of Practice (a common form of self-regulation) can be very effective at filling in the necessary detail to enable the framework requirements and guidance to be complied with in specific cases. The disadvantage, of course, is that too great a

reliance on self-regulatory codes may result in divergence between the sectors, which, in turn, can lead to fragmentation at the implementation level.

Despite the possibilities for reconciliation, the two conflicting approaches in the US and Europe appear entrenched within the existing regulatory frameworks and it was apparent that there was likely to be a time when these would clash or would, alternatively, each have to find ways of accommodating the other. This eventually became an imperative with the adoption and implementation of Directive 95/46/EC, which has provisions requiring the adequacy of data protection in third countries to be assessed before transborder data flows will be allowed. In May 2000, the European Union (EU) Member States approved an agreement with the US concerning arrangements to safeguard individual privacy in transborder data flow which, in effect, attempt to reconcile the self-regulatory regime in the US with the legislative approach in the EU (the so called ‘Safe Harbor Agreement’, discussed in more detail below). Surprisingly, perhaps, in view of the content of the previous reports and the sometimes acrimonious nature of the safe harbor discussions, the ETC coincidentally published a further Report, calling for statutory intervention in the US to safeguard individual privacy.

Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic Marketplace
FTC, May 2000

The Commission has long encouraged industry to address consumer concerns regarding online privacy through self-regulation... In its 1998 testimony before Congress, the Commission stated that it was ‘hopeful that self-regulation [would] achieve adequate online privacy protections for consumers’. The Commission, however, also ‘recognize[d] that there [were] considerable barriers to be surmounted for self-regulation to work’. Specifically, the Commission noted that ‘an effective enforcement mechanism is crucial’ to the success of self-regulation, and that ‘it [would] be difficult for self-regulatory programs to govern all or even most commercial Web sites’. Nevertheless, in light of industry efforts at that time, the Commission recommended that Congress refrain from passing legislation. The Commission noted, however, that unless industry could demonstrate that it had developed and implemented broad-based and effective self-regulatory programs, additional government authority in this area might be necessary. In its 1999 Report, a majority of the Commission again determined that legislation was not then appropriate, but noted the ‘substantial challenges’ that industry continued to face in implementing widespread self-regulation.

The Commission recognizes the magnitude of the public policy challenge presented by Internet privacy and applauds the significant accomplishments of the private sector in developing self-regulatory initiatives to date. The

45 See the discussion on Arts 25 and 26 below, p 377.
46 Op cit, Privacy Online, fn 13.
improved statistics regarding the number of Web sites with privacy disclosures and the development of online seal programs are a tribute to industry’s ongoing efforts in this area. The Commission also applauds the industry leaders who have adopted fair information practices. The 2000 Survey data, however, demonstrate that industry efforts alone have not been sufficient. Because self-regulatory initiatives to date fall far short of broad-based implementation of self-regulatory programs, the Commission has concluded that such efforts alone cannot ensure that the online marketplace as a whole will follow the standards adopted by industry leaders...

Ongoing consumer concerns regarding privacy online and the limited success of self-regulatory efforts to date make it time for government to act to protect consumers’ privacy on the Internet. Accordingly, the Commission recommends that Congress enact legislation to ensure adequate protection of consumer privacy online. In doing so, however, the Commission recognizes that industry self-regulation, as well as consumer and business education, should still play important roles in any legislative framework, as they have in other contexts.

Whether or not legislation will now be forthcoming in the US remains to be seen, but, if there is resultant statutory intervention in this area, it will represent a significant step towards global harmonisation of the legal regulation of one aspect of activity on the internet.

THE DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE (95/46/EC)

In view of the Council of Europe Convention on the Processing of Personal Data, it was not surprising that the legislation of those Member States of the EU who regulated this area would be couched in similar terms. It was, nevertheless, perceived that the discrepancies between them were sufficient to warrant further harmonisation between the Member States. Despite the Convention, by the end of the 1980s, some Member States still had no appropriate legislation and a further concern was that any differences in the protection afforded to data in each Member State might lead to restrictions on transborder data flow from those countries with a higher level of protection. This would obviously impede the functioning of the internal market, a crucial factor in the wake of the date of 31 December 1991 set by the Single European Act 1986 for the completion of the Single European Market. Accordingly, in 1990, a proposal for a Directive on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of such Data was published.47

The foregoing might suggest that a primary reason was business efficacy and the facilitation of free movement of data, but the competing interests endemic in this area are strongly represented in the preamble to the original

proposal, which refers not only to transborder data flows, but also to the importance of protecting the right of privacy. In the event, the final version was to be a long time in gestation—one problem was to devise legislation which would both ensure a high level of protection and yet not compromise that already in place in some Member States. In view of the different interpretations put on the various concepts in the different jurisdictions, the Economic and Social Committee were particularly concerned as to whether the proposal actually increased the level of protection or merely accentuated the differences between Member States. An amended proposal was published in 1992 but, although this was debated by the European Parliament and approved subject to amendments, progress then seemed to come to a halt. Action was eventually precipitated by activity in a related area, in the shape of the Recommendations to the European Council from the High Level Group on the Information Society (the Bangemann Report). This Report, initiated by the European Council in December 1993 and produced for the Corfu Summit in 1994, looked at all facets of the Information Society. Chapter 3, ‘Completing the agenda’, contains reference to those provisions which will need to be taken into account if the full benefit of the new era is to be realised without any risk of consequent damage and disadvantage. These include, inter alia, a consideration of privacy issues:

The demand for the protection of privacy will rightly increase as the potential of the new technologies to secure (even across national frontiers) and to manipulate detailed information on individuals from data, voice and image sources is realised. Without the legal security of a Union-wide approach, lack of consumer confidence will certainly undermine rapid development of the information society.

Europe leads the world in the protection of the fundamental rights of the individual with regard to personal data processing. The application of new technologies potentially affects highly sensitive areas such as those dealing with the images of individuals, their communication, their movements and their behaviour. With this in mind, it is quite possible that most Member States will react to these developments by adopting protection, including transfrontier control of new technologies and services.

Disparities in the level of protection of such privacy rules create the risk that national authorities might restrict free circulation of a wide range of new services between Member States in order to protect personal data.

The Group believes that without the legal security of a Union-wide approach, lack of consumer confidence will certainly undermine the rapid development of the information society. Given the importance and sensitivity of the privacy issue, a fast decision from Member States is required on the Commission’s proposed Directive setting out general principles of data protection.

This recommendation, from such an eminent source, proved the necessary boost to revive the proposed Directive. In the period between the original proposal and the Bangemann Report, new legislative procedures had been adopted following the Treaty on European Union and the proposed Directive had become subject to the co-decision procedure under the new Art 189b of the EC Treaty (now Art 251, following the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam 1999). In pursuance of this process, the Council adopted a common position early in 1995\textsuperscript{50} and, following the decision of the Parliament,\textsuperscript{51} the final Directive was published in October 1995.\textsuperscript{52} The adopted Directive is a much amended and augmented version of the original 1990 proposal and contains a total of 72 recitals in the preamble. However, it is an indication of the general agreement between Parliament and the Council on this issue that the final text exhibits only very minor changes to that of the common position.

PROVISIONS OF DIRECTIVE 95/46/EC

Article 1 sets out the objectives of the Directive. First, and fundamentally, this Article refers to the protection of privacy, signalling that, even though limited, data protection is part of the fundamental right of privacy, albeit within a specifically defined area:

**Article 1 Object of the Directive**

1. In accordance with this Directive, Member States shall protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular, their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data.

However, this is immediately followed by an important counterbalancing provision:

2. Member States shall neither restrict nor prohibit the free flow of personal data between Member States for reasons connected with the protection afforded under paragraph 1.

Thus, as far as the Member States of the EU are concerned, the free flow of personal data is envisaged for whatever purpose and this flow cannot be restricted, assuming that there is compliance with the provisions of the Directive. This is, of course, a necessary consequence of the harmonisation of data protection law throughout the EU and the situation is, as we shall see below, rather different for transborder data flow to third countries.

\textsuperscript{50} OJ 1995 C 93/1.
\textsuperscript{51} OJ 1995 C 166/80 and 105.
The scope of the Directive is independent of the mode of storage of the data or information:

**Article 2 Definitions**

...  
(c) ‘personal data filing system’ (‘filing system’) shall mean any structured set of personal data which are accessible according to specific criteria, whether centralized, decentralized or dispersed on a functional or geographic basis...

**Article 3 Scope**

1 This Directive shall apply to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automatic means, and to the processing otherwise than by automatic means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system.

Although the foregoing discussion has concentrated on the technological threat to privacy, this provision makes it clear that so called ‘manual data’ are also included within the ambit of the Directive, albeit that there are clear limits to the application of the Directive to manual data, as can be inferred from the definition above and from recital 27:

...as regards manual processing, this Directive covers only filing systems, not unstructured files; whereas, in particular, the content of a filing system must be structured according to specific criteria relating to individuals, allowing easy access to personal data; whereas, in line with the definition in Art 2(c), the different criteria for determining the constituents of a structured set of personal data, and the different criteria governing access to such a set, may be laid down by each Member State; whereas files or sets of files as well as their cover pages, which are not structured according to specific criteria, shall under no circumstances fall within the scope of this Directive.

The UK expressed some disquiet over the inclusion of manual records in this way and a derogation was negotiated, allowing manual records which predated the Directive a period of 12 years before compliance by Member States was required, subject to the provision that, if they were subjected to further manual processing in the interim, they should be brought into conformity at that time (Art 32(2) and recital 69).

The Directive does not apply to the processing of data outside the scope of Community competence:

**Article 3 Scope**

2 This Directive shall not apply to the processing of personal data:

- in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of Community law, such as those provided for by Titles V and VI of the Treaty on European Union and in any case to processing operations concerning public security, defence, State security (including the economic well being of the State when the processing operation relates to State security matters) and the activities of the State in areas of criminal law...
There has been some debate over what is intended to be encompassed by this requirement. Presumably, it includes all areas of economic and business activity which the Community has competence to regulate, but it will then be for individual Member States to decide whether or not to include other activities within the protection afforded by their legislation. Nonetheless, the Directive refers to the ‘activities of the State’—it is clear that there is not a general prohibition on the processing of records relating to crime, since this is further governed by Art 8(5) referring to sensitive data.53

Definitions of the salient terms are found in Art 2, of which those concerning the meaning of ‘personal data’ and ‘processing’ are expressed in particularly wide terms:

**Article 2 Definitions**

‘personal data’ shall mean any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity;

‘processing of personal data’ (‘processing’) shall mean any operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction...

**The data protection principles**

In common with many other international and national instruments on this topic, the Directive lays down principles of good data management. Article 6 appears to give only five principles, but some matters, such as subject access and security, which are often included in some other versions (compare the OECD Guidelines) are dealt with elsewhere in the Directive:

**Article 6 Principles relating to data quality**

1 Member States shall provide that personal data must be:

(a) processed fairly and accurately;

b) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purpose and not further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes. Further processing of data for historical, statistical or scientific purposes shall not be considered as incompatible provided that Member States provide appropriate safeguards;

c) adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are collected and/or further processed;

d) accurate, and where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step must be taken to ensure that data which are inaccurate or incomplete, having regard to the purposes for which they were collected or for which they are further processed, are erased or rectified;

e) kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the data were collected or for which they are further processed. Member States shall lay down appropriate safeguards for personal data stored for longer periods for historical, statistical or scientific use.

In the definitions set out in Art 2, the Directive distinguishes between the ‘controller’ and the ‘processor’ of data, the latter being merely one who processes data on behalf of the controller. The ‘controller’ is the one (whether alone or jointly with others) who ‘determines the purposes and means of processing personal data’. All controllers of personal data in the areas covered by the Directive will be required to adhere to the principles, even if they are subject to exemption from notification (see below).

Criteria for lawful processing

The general standard for lawful processing of non-sensitive personal data is contained in Art 7:

Article 7 Criteria for making data processing legitimate

Member States shall provide that personal data may be processed only if:

(a) the data subject has unambiguously given his consent; or
(b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; or
(c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; or
(d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject; or

54 See, also, Directive 95/46/EC, recital 51.
(e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller or in a third party to whom the data are disclosed; or

(f) processing is necessary for the legitimate interests pursued by the controller.

Separate provision is made for the processing of so called ‘sensitive’ data in Art 8, which appears to start from the premise that such information should not be processed at all:

**Article 8 The processing of special categories of data**

1 Member States shall prohibit the processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life.

However, subsequent paragraphs provide for certain occasions when such processing will be allowed subject to appropriate safeguards, examples of which are given below:

2 Paragraph 1 shall not apply where:

   (a) the data subject has given his explicit consent to the processing of those data, except where the laws of the Member State provide that the prohibition referred to in paragraph 1 may not be lifted by the data subject’s giving his consent; or
   
   (b) processing is necessary for the purposes of carrying out the obligations and specific rights of the controller in the field of employment law in so far as it is authorized by national law providing for adequate safeguards; or
   
   (c) processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another person where the data subject is physically or legally incapable of giving his consent; or
   
   (d) processing is carried out in the course of its legitimate activities with appropriate guarantees by a foundation, association or any other non-profit-seeking body with a political, philosophical, religious or trade-union aim and on condition that the processing relates solely to the members of the body or to persons who have regular contact with it in connection with its purposes and that the data are not disclosed to a third party without the consent of the data subjects; or
   
   (e) the processing relates to data which are manifestly made public by the data subject or is necessary for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims.

3 Paragraph 1 shall not apply where processing of the data is required for the purposes of preventive medicine, medical diagnosis, the provision of care or treatment or the management of health-care services, and where those data are processed by a health professional subject under national law or rules established by national competent bodies to the obligation of professional secrecy or by another person also subject to an equivalent obligation of secrecy.
Taking the provisions of Arts 7 and 8 together, it is clear that, unless the specific exceptions apply, and assuming that Member States have not outlawed the processing of sensitive personal data entirely, the processing of both sensitive and non-sensitive data can only be legitimised by the consent of the data subject. Such consent is qualified by the adjective *unambiguous* with respect to non-sensitive data and by *explicit* with respect to sensitive data. Consent is defined in Art 2(h) as ‘any freely given specific and informed indication of his wishes by which the data subject signifies his agreement to personal data relating to him being processed’. What is the significance of the different qualifications placed on consent in these two Articles? Clearly, if consent is to be construed as unambiguous, then there must be no room for doubt, but explicit consent suggests a higher standard of proof, in which the consent is distinctly stated and cannot be implied, however unequivocal the implication. Before the adoption of the Directive, it was common to construe consent from the absence of objection, but, even for non-sensitive data, it seems that the Directive may require more positive action to legitimise processing of personal data. The presumption is thus changed from one in which further processing is permitted unless a contrary indication is notified to one in which it is not permitted unless there is definite evidence of consent. At a minimum, it would appear that even the qualification ‘unambiguous’ ‘strengthens the argument that the consent must entail a clear indication of the agreement of the individual’, whereas the use of the qualification ‘explicit’ suggests that the fact that consent has been given must be established beyond doubt.

With respect to non-sensitive data, the alternative criteria in Art 7 are all qualified by the use of the word *necessary*, which imports a strict construction and an objective standard beyond mere convenience and desirability for the data controller. In respect of sensitive data, it can be seen that, by and large, the exceptions are targeted at very specific situations where there are other legitimate objectives to be attained by the processing of the data in question.

**Rights of data subjects**

From the inception of the provisions in Art 1(1), the Directive places individual rights firmly within its ambit. The express reference to the right of privacy in relation to the processing of personal data is amplified by the more detailed rights set out in Sections IV, V and VII. These rights can be divided, loosely, into the right of access, the right to information and the right to object.

These are then reinforced and supplemented by provisions relating to compensation and judicial remedies.

**Information to be given to the data subject**

**Article 10**  Information in cases of collection of data from the data subject

Member States shall provide that the controller or his representative must provide a data subject from whom data relating to himself are collected with at least the following information, except where he already has it:

(a) the identity of the controller and of his representative, if any;
(b) the purposes of the processing for which the data are intended;
(c) any further information, such as:
   - the recipients or categories of recipients of the data,
   - whether replies to the questions are obligatory or voluntary, as well as the possible consequences of failure to reply,
   - the existence of the right of access to and the right to rectify the data concerning him,

in so far as such further information is necessary, having regard to the specific circumstances in which the data are collected, to guarantee fair processing in respect of the data subject.

**Article 11**  Information where the data have not been obtained from the data subject

1 Where the data have not been obtained from the data subject, Member States shall provide that the controller or his representative must at the time of undertaking the recording of personal data or if a disclosure to a third party is envisaged, no later than the time when the data are first disclosed provide the data subject with at least the following information, except where he already has it:

(a) the identity of the controller and of his representative, if any;
(b) the purposes of the processing;
(c) any further information, such as:
   - the categories of data concerned,
   - the recipients or categories of recipients,
   - the existence of the right of access to and the right to rectify the data concerning him,

in so far as such further information is necessary, having regard to the specific circumstances in which the data are processed, to guarantee fair processing in respect of the data subject.

2 Paragraph 1 shall not apply where, in particular for processing for statistical purposes or for the purposes of historical or scientific research, the provision of such information proves impossible or would involve a disproportionate effort or if recording or disclosure is expressly laid down by law. In these cases Member States shall provide appropriate safeguards.
Chapter 7: Information Technology Law

The data subject’s right of access to data

Article 12 Right of access
Member States shall guarantee every data subject the right to obtain from the controller:

(a) without constraint at reasonable intervals and without excessive delay or expense:
   – confirmation as to whether or not data relating to him are being processed and information at least as to the purposes of the processing, the categories of data concerned, and the recipients or categories of recipients to whom the data are disclosed,
   – communication to him in an intelligible form of the data undergoing processing and of any available information as to their source,
   – knowledge of the logic involved in any automatic processing of data concerning him at least in the case of the automated decisions referred to in Article 15 (1);

(b) as appropriate the rectification, erasure or blocking of data the processing of which does not comply with the provisions of this Directive, in particular because of the incomplete or inaccurate nature of the data;

(c) notification to third parties to whom the data have been disclosed of any rectification, erasure or blocking carried out in compliance with (b), unless this proves impossible or involves a disproportionate effort.

The Directive provides no general right to object to processing of personal data, as this would be likely to be disproportionate to the objective of maintaining the free flow of personal data. It does, however, provide a limited right in two particular situations which are perceived as having the potential to severely prejudice individuals.

The data subject’s right to object

Article 14 The data subject’s right to object
Member States shall grant the data subject the right:

(a) at least in the cases referred to in Article 7(e) and (f), to object at any time on compelling legitimate grounds relating to his particular situation to the processing of data relating to him, save where otherwise provided by national legislation. Where there is a justified objection, the processing instigated by the controller may no longer involve those data;

(b) to object, on request and free of charge, to the processing of personal data relating to him which the controller anticipates being processed for the purposes of direct marketing, or to be informed before personal data are disclosed for the first time to third parties or used on their behalf for the purposes of direct marketing, and to be expressly offered the right to object free of charge to such disclosures or uses.
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that data subjects are aware of the existence of the right referred to in the first subparagraph of (b):

**Article 15 Automated individual decisions**

1. Member States shall grant the right to every person not to be subject to a decision which produces legal effects concerning him or significantly affects him and which is based solely on automated processing of data intended to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to him, such as his performance at work, creditworthiness, reliability, conduct, etc.

2. Subject to the other Articles of this Directive, Member States shall provide that a person may be subjected to a decision of the kind referred to in paragraph 1 if that decision:

   (a) is taken in the course of the entering into or performance of a contract, provided the request for the entering into or the performance of the contract, lodged by the data subject, has been satisfied or that there are suitable measures to safeguard his legitimate interests, such as arrangements allowing him to put his point of view; or
   (b) is authorized by a law which also lays down measures to safeguard the data subject’s legitimate interests.

Article 14(a) refers to processing in connection with the exercise of official authority vested in the controller, tasks carried out in the public interest or the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller. In this case, it is possible for this right to be overridden by national legislation. The right to object to the use of personal data for direct marketing contained in Art 14(b) would, arguably, arise from a combination of other provisions, such as the need for unambiguous consent and the principle of fair processing. But, in view of the depth of feeling on this matter, an expressly stated right is welcome.

**Notification**

Some of the first generation data protection statutes were based on a concept of universal registration, but this had been criticised as unnecessarily bureaucratic and cumbersome to administer. The Directive replaces the concept of registration with one of notification:

**Article 18 Obligation to notify the supervisory authority**

1. Member States shall provide that the controller or his representative, if any, must notify the supervisory authority...before carrying out any wholly or partially automatic processing operation or set of such operations intended to serve a single purpose or several related purposes.
Article 19  Contents of notification

1 Member States shall specify the information to be given in the notification. It shall include at least:

(a) the name and address of the controller and of his representative, if any;
(b) the purpose or purposes of processing;
(c) a description of the category or categories of the data subject and of the data or categories of data relating to them;
(d) the recipients or categories of recipient to whom the data might be disclosed;
(e) proposed transfers of data to third countries;
(f) a general description allowing a preliminary assessment to be made of the appropriateness of the measures taken…to ensure security of processing.

It is open to Member States to simplify the notification process, or to exempt from notification in certain circumstances specified in further parts of Art 18, or to extend any aspects of the notification process to non-automatic processing operations (Art 18(5)).

The purpose of the notification and related provisions is to ensure transparency, rather than to create a method of control, but the Directive recognised that there may be situations where further investigation is both relevant and desirable:

Article 20  Prior Checking

1 Member States shall determine the processing operations likely to present specific risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects and shall check that these processing operations are examined prior to the start thereof.

2 Such prior checks shall be carried out by the supervisory authority following receipt of notification from the controller or by the data protection official, who, in cases of doubt, must consult the supervisory authority.

3 Member States may also carry out such checks in the context of preparation either of a measure of the national parliament or of a measure based on such a legislative measure, which define the nature of processing and lay down appropriate safeguards.

Exemptions

As already mentioned, limiting the scope of the Directive to matters within the competence of the Community to legislate (as detailed in Art 3(2)) effectively means that processing for certain purposes will, in any case, fall out with the provisions of the Directive. Further, Art 3(2) also provides that the Directive does not apply to processing of personal data ‘by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity’. However, there are also other areas which may attract exemption from some or all of the provisions. Exemptions for
the purpose of controlling information are a common feature of statutes, be it personal information, as here, or public information, which may also be controlled by freedom of information legislation. Such exemptions arise in recognition of the fact that there may be overriding reasons which will mitigate against disclosing what would otherwise be public information, or allowing access to what would otherwise be protected as personal.

Some of the reasoning behind allowing exemptions was discussed by the UK Data Protection Registrar in Questions to Answer: Paper 9—The Exemptions:

...exemptions should only be permitted in limited circumstances. Broadly, these are the circumstances where achieving the ‘right’ balance of interests requires the data protection rule to be disapplied. What is meant by the ‘right’ balance will vary according to the particular circumstances...it may be that the balance, for example, favours the public interest whereas in others it favours the individual data subject or another individual...the balance may require safeguarding the privacy of third parties at the expense of individuals’ subject access rights by removing information identifying third parties when responding to a subject access request. What is meant by the ‘rule’ will also vary. It may, for example, be withholding information in response to a subject access request where provision of the information would be likely to prejudice the prevention of detection of crime in that particular case: a very narrow exemption applying to only one area of data protection regulation.

The Council of Europe Convention requires that any exemptions from the data protection rules must be:

...a necessary measure in a democratic society in the interests of:

(a) protecting State security, public safety, the monetary interests of the State or the suppression of criminal offences;
(b) protecting the data subject or the rights and freedoms of others.

It appears that the exemptions provided in the Directive are capable of a wider construction than those of the Convention.

Article 13 Exemptions and restrictions

1 Member States may adopt legislative measures to restrict the scope of the obligations and rights provided...when such a restriction constitutes a necessary measure to safeguard:

(a) national security;
(b) defence;
(c) public security;
(d) the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences, or of breaches of ethics for regulated professions;
(e) an important economic or financial interest of a Member States or of the EU, including monetary, budgetary and taxation matters;
(f) a monitoring, inspection or regulatory function connected, even occasionally, with the exercise of official authority in cases referred to in (c), (d) and (e);
(g) the protection of the data subject or of the rights and freedoms of others.

As well as the exemptions expressly referred to in Art 13, there are other limitations on the application of the Directive, such as the permissible derogations from the obligation to notify, referred to above. It also appears, from recital 29 and Art 6(1)(e), that it is expected that there will be exemption provided, in relation to length of time, for storage of personal data used for historical and statistical purposes.

A further exemption is contained in Art 9:

**Article 9  Processing of personal data and freedom of expression**

Member States shall provide for exemptions or derogations...for the processing of personal data carried out solely for journalistic purposes or the purpose of artistic or literary expression only if they are necessary to reconcile the right to privacy with the rules governing the freedom of expression.

Behind the provision of derogations for these so called special purposes is the tacit assumption that the media should be treated differently.

*The Future of Privacy Volume 1: Private Life and Public Policy*  
Perri 6  
1998, London: Demos, p 261

Just what are the exact grounds on which the claim to special protection for the media can be made out—on grounds of special contribution to democracy, duty of scrutiny to ensure clean government and business, on the ground that the media represents a special arm of governance to be protected by the rule of the separation of powers, or general utilitarian grounds, or some special benefit that only the media provide to the wider culture?

Whether or not the media are a special case, it is axiomatic that upholding a right of privacy may at the same time be breaching the right to freedom of expression, and vice versa. Where the protection of one fundamental right may impinge on the enjoyment of another right, the problem of achieving a satisfactory balance is never amenable to easy solution. The Directive leaves it to Member States to achieve an appropriate balance in this context, a process which needs to be viewed within the wider debate of press freedom and privacy but which will, inevitably, be influenced by the distinctive cultures and legal traditions of the individual Member States.

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Protecting the Private Individual

Transborder data flows

In the discussion of individual rights, it must not be forgotten that the Directive, in common with other data protection regulation,\(^{57}\) has the dual objective of both safeguarding privacy in relation to processing of personal data and facilitating transborder data flow (Art 1). The importance of the free flow of such data is further underlined by part of the first sentence of recital 56: ‘...cross-border flows of personal data are necessary for the expansion of international trade...’ Thus, there are no grounds for restricting the free flow of data, provided that the appropriate safeguards are in place. Indeed, it is the very necessity referred to in recital 56 which makes protection of the individual so vital. Given the expected harmonisation of protection created by the Directive, cross-border data flow between individual Member States would not be expected to create an additional threat to the privacy of individuals. The situation could be very different, though, in relation to transfer of data to third countries which may not have data protection to the same extent, or at all. For this reason, Arts 25 and 26 are of extreme importance and their inclusion within the Directive has led many commentators to speculate on the potentially wide reaching effect of the Directive. Thus, Bennett\(^{58}\) has suggested that the ‘Data Protection Directive now constitutes the rules of the road for the increasingly global character of data processing operations’ and Mayer-Schönberger\(^{59}\) predicts that the Directive will assist the drive to homogeneity of approach on a global scale.

Transfer of data to third countries

**Article 25 Principles**

1. The Member States shall provide that the transfer to a third country of personal data which are undergoing processing or are intended for processing after transfer may take place only if, without prejudice to compliance with the national provisions adopted pursuant to the other provisions of this Directive, the third country in question ensures an adequate level of protection.

Should ‘adequate protection’ mean ‘in conformity with the Directive’? Or ‘functional similarity’? Or some lesser standard? How should, or can, this be

\(^{57}\) Compare, eg, the Council of Europe Convention, which attempts, *inter alia*, to reconcile the notion of effective data protection with the ideal of free flow of information, as set out in the European Convention on Human Rights, Art 10. In pursuance of this, Art 12 of the Convention, on automatic processing of data, contains provisions allowing restriction of transborder data flows ‘except where the regulations of the other Party provide an equivalent protection [for the personal data]’.

\(^{58}\) Bennett, C, ‘Convergence revisited’, in *op cit*, Agre and Rotenberg, fn 23, p 111.

\(^{59}\) *Op cit*, Mayer-Schönberger, fn 23, p 223.
The adequacy of the level of protection afforded by a third country shall be assessed in the light of all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer operation or set of data transfer operations; particular consideration shall be given to the nature of the data, the purpose and duration of the proposed processing operation or operations, the country of origin and country of final destination, the rules of law, both general and sectoral, in force in the third country in question and the professional rules and security measures which are complied with in that country.

3 The Member States and the Commission shall inform each other of cases where they consider that a third country does not ensure an adequate level of protection...

4 Where the Commission finds...that a third country does not ensure an adequate level of protection... Member States shall take the measures necessary to prevent any transfer of data of the same type to the third country in question.

These are detailed rules but the derogations provided in Art 26 are not dissimilar to those provided in Arts 7 and 8 and are based primarily on the data subject’s consent, the data subject’s interest or where transfer is from publicly available registers or documents. It should also be noted that Art 25(2) is no help in providing any indication of clear priority amongst the criteria to be applied in assessment of adequacy and does not explicitly create a reference point by which adequacy may, or should, be determined. It was envisaged that there would be practical problems encountered in the assessment of adequacy and a number of possible methodologies were explored. One report prepared for the Commission used the concept of ‘functional similarity’, noting that Europe should not seek the direct transposition of its own principles and systems of protection into other countries. Instead, adequacy might be determined in the presence of any element in the regulation of a third country providing the relevant requirements, even if this was accomplished in a completely different way. Such an approach permits better respect for local legal structures than the requirement for equivalent protection inherent in complete juristic similarity. The particular technique employed was to reduce the elements of data protection to ‘risk factors’, namely, loss of control, reuse, non-proportionality and inaccuracy, and assess the way in which they were protected. A further report referred to the problem of ‘cultural and institutional non-equivalence’, pointing out that judgments of adequacy must appreciate and remain sensitive to important cultural differences. Despite the apparent convergence of data

60 Poullet, Y et al, Preparation of a Methodology for Evaluating the Adequacy of the Level of Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data, 1998, Luxembourg: OOPEC.

61 Raab, C et al, Application of a Methodology Designed to Assess the Adequacy of the Level of Protection of Individuals with regard to Processing Personal Data, 1998, Luxembourg: OOPEC.
protection rules, privacy is still a variable concept and different legal traditions still place different emphasis on protection and apportionment of rights. The report also submitted that ‘assessment of adequacy will be incomplete to the extent that it cannot assess actual practices and the realities of compliance’ and that ‘a more empirical analysis of policies and practices, as well as rules, serves both to advance the debate and to anticipate the specific problems that will be encountered in the implementation of the Directive’.

The Directive provides for two particular groups which, inter alia, have a role to play in relation to determination of adequacy. These are referred to as a ‘Working Party’ and a ‘Committee’:

**Article 29  Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data**

1 A Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data, hereinafter referred to as the ‘Working Party’, is hereby set up.

   It shall have advisory status and act independently.

2 The Working Party shall be composed of a representative of the supervisory authority or authorities designated by each Member State and of a representative of the authority or authorities established for the Community institutions and bodies, and of a representative of the Commission.

**Article 30**

1 The Working Party shall:

   (a) examine any question covering the application of the national measures adopted under this Directive in order to contribute to the uniform application of such measures;
   (b) give the Commission an opinion on the level of protection in the Community and in third countries;
   (c) advise the Commission on any proposed amendment of this Directive, on any additional or specific measures to safeguard the rights and freedoms of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on any other proposed Community measures affecting such rights and freedoms;
   (d) give an opinion on codes of conduct drawn up at Community level.

3 The Working Party may, on its own initiative, make recommendations on all matters relating to the protection of persons with regard to the processing of personal data in the Community.

4 The Working Party’s opinions and recommendation shall be forwarded to the Commission and the committee referred to in Article 31.

**Article 31  The Committee**

1 The Commission shall be assisted by a committee composed of the representatives of the Member States and chaired by the representative of the Commission.
The representative of the Commission shall submit to the committee a draft of the measures to be taken. The committee shall deliver its opinion on the draft… The opinion shall be delivered by the majority laid down in Article 148(2) [now Article 205(2)] of the Treaty… The Commission shall adopt measures which shall apply immediately…

The provisions above illustrate some of the important differences between these two bodies, in terms of both membership and functions. The differing membership is, of itself, suggestive of potential conflicts of interest as a result of different objectives and priorities. The key words in relation to the Working Party are ‘advisory’ and ‘independent’. In this capacity, the Working Party has produced a large number of Opinions and Recommendations, a number of which have been referred to in this text.62 The Art 31 Committee, on the other hand, clearly has a much more formal role in the legislative and oversight process. With specific reference to the assessment of adequacy, the formal outcome is made according to the procedure in Art 31(2) (see Art 25(4)–(6)) and, by virtue of Art 30(1)(b), the Working Party is specifically required to give an Opinion to the Commission on the level of protection in third countries, which is to be forwarded to the Art 31 Committee (Art 30(4)). Although, by Art 30(5), the Commission is under a duty to inform the Working Party of action taken in response to its Opinions and Recommendations, there appears to be no duty, as such, on the Commission to act on, or to take account of, such Opinions or Recommendations.

The following extract explains the view of the Working Party on the issue of adequate protection.

Transfers of personal data to third countries: Applying Arts 25 and 26 of the EU Data Protection Directive
Opinion 12/9863

Chapter One: Assessing Whether Protection Is Adequate

(1) What constitutes ‘adequate protection’?

The purpose of data protection is to afford protection to the individual about whom data are processed. This is typically achieved through a combination of rights for the data subject and obligations on those who process data, or who exercise control over such processing. The obligations and rights set down in directive 95/46/EC build upon those set down in Council of Europe Convention No 108 (1981), which in turn are not dissimilar from those

62 For a full list see europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/media/dataprot/wpdocs/index.htm.
63 Available at europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/media/dataprot/wpdocs/wp12en.htm.
included in the OECD guidelines (1980) or the UN guidelines (1990). It would therefore appear that there is a degree of consensus as to the content of data protection rules which stretches well beyond the fifteen states of the Community.

However, data protection rules only contribute to the protection of individuals if they are followed in practice. It is therefore necessary to consider not only the content of rules applicable to personal data transferred to a third country, but also the system in place to ensure the effectiveness of such rules. In Europe, the tendency historically has been for data protection rules to be embodied in law, which has provided the possibility for non-compliance to be sanctioned and for individuals to be given a right to redress. Furthermore such laws have generally included additional procedural mechanisms, such as the establishment of supervisory authorities with monitoring and complaint investigation functions. These procedural aspects are reflected in directive 95/46/EC, with its provisions on liabilities, sanctions, remedies, supervisory authorities and notification. Outside the Community it is less common to find such procedural means for ensuring compliance with data protection rules. Parties to Convention 108 are required to embody the principles of data protection in law, but there is no requirement for additional mechanisms such as a supervisory authority. The OECD guidelines carry only the requirement that they be ‘taken into account’ in domestic legislation and provide for no procedural means to ensure that the guidelines actually result in effective protection for individuals. The later UN guidelines, on the other hand, do include provisions on supervision and sanctions, which reflects a growing realisation worldwide of the need to see data protection rules properly enforced.

Against this background it is clear that any meaningful analysis of adequate protection must comprise the two basic elements: the content of the rules applicable and the means for ensuring their effective application.

Using directive 95/46/EC as a starting point, and bearing in mind the provisions of other international data protection texts, it should be possible to arrive at a ‘core’ of data protection ‘content’ principles and ‘procedural/enforcement’ requirements, compliance with which could be seen as a minimum requirement for protection to be considered adequate. Such a minimum list should not be set in stone. In some instances there will be a need to add to the list, while for others it may even be possible to reduce the list of requirements. The degree of risk that the transfer poses to the data subject will be an important factor in determining the precise requirements of a particular case. Despite this proviso, the compilation of a basic list of minimum conditions is a useful starting point for any analysis.

The Working Party is thus clearly of the view that, due to the convergence of data protection rules, it is possible to specify a base level of protection which can be defined as adequate and which, because of its origin in a number of international Conventions, ought not to be too contentious for third countries. The Art 31 Committee arguably appears not to be so rigid:
…adequate protection is not, according to our interpretation or the interpretation of the Member States, equivalent protection, so we are not trying to use the precise standards of the Directive for establishing this standard, but nevertheless we do have to make it a relatively tough standard in order to protect the high levels of data processing which have been established in the Community itself.64

Nevertheless, it is clear that these two positions can amount to the same thing, as the Art 31 Committee went on to suggest that:

Our approach is to look at our own Directive, to look at a number of important existing international standards such as the Council of Europe Convention, the OECD guidelines and so on, and try to distil out of that what are the fundamental principles which a decent data protection regime needs to protect. We would not expect that standard to be as high and demanding as that of the Directive or as detailed, but it would contain the core principles… We were not asked to apply equivalent protection or the same protection, but adequate protection.

The interaction of the Working Party and the Art 31 Committee can be observed in a number of the negotiations, which have already taken place or are ongoing, associated with assessment of the adequacy of the data protection in third countries. In the case of Switzerland, for example, the Working Party issued an Opinion on 7 June 199965 which concluded that both federal and cantonal legislation in that jurisdiction was broadly in accordance with the Council of Europe Convention and that Switzerland could be considered to be ensuring an adequate level of protection. On 31 May 2000, the Commission issued a draft Decision66 to that effect, which acknowledges (in recital 13) that this opinion of the Working Party has been taken into account.

In contrast, discussions concerning the adequacy of the primarily self-regulatory regime in the US have not been quite so simple or straightforward. The EU and US have been discussing data protection issues and privacy since before the entry into force of Directive 95/46/EC with a view to trying to create a bridge between the EC legislative approach and the mainly self-regulatory approach in the US. So that the US would not be seen as a ‘data haven’, the adopted approach has been to attempt to define a ‘safe harbor’ for personal data, a set of principles that US companies would sign up to on a voluntary

64 Available at europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/media/dataprot/backinfo/euus.htm.
65 Available at europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/media/dataprot/wpdocs/wp22en.htm.
66 Available at europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/media/dataprot/news/Switzerland.pdf.
basis but to which they would then be bound. As explained by the EC Commission Information Society Directorate General:\(^{67}\) Safe harbor is a mechanism which, through an exchange of documents, enables the EU to certify that participating US companies meet the EU requirement for adequate privacy protection. Participation in the safe harbor is voluntary. Organisations will need to agree to adhere to the privacy requirements laid out in the safe harbor documents for all data received from the EU. The safe harbor is, figuratively, a place where US companies can find shelter from potentially damaging crosswinds caused by different privacy regimes in the US and EU.

The advantage of this approach is that, whilst respecting the different regulatory culture on both sides of the Atlantic, it is able to provide legal certainty for EU data controllers exporting data to ‘safe harbor’ participants, it does not impose a too onerous administrative burden and it provides guidance to US companies and other organisations who wish to meet the ‘adequate protection’ standard specified in the Directive. It is these principles which have been examined for ‘adequacy’ against the Directive’s provisions. The, at times, turbulent history of the ‘safe harbor’ negotiations can be charted by an examination of successive documents of the Working Party\(^ {68} \) which expose the tension between the objectives of the various players involved. Given the commercial power of the US, there are clearly political motivations driving those who are directly participating in the discussions to work towards a negotiated, albeit inevitably compromised, settlement. On the other hand, the Working Party, with its independent yet only advisory status, has shown itself keen to uphold standards, suggesting a potential criticism that it is trying to equate the term ‘adequate’ with the protection afforded under the Directive.

At the inception of the discussions, the Working Party was of the view that ‘the current patchwork of narrowly focused sectoral laws and voluntary self-regulation cannot at present be relied upon to provide adequate protection in all cases for personal data transferred from the EU’. It confirmed its view of the importance of international agreements, specifically the OECD Guidelines, which the US has, ostensibly, adopted:

The Working Party considers that the standard set by the OECD guidelines of 1980 cannot be waived as it constitutes a minimum requirement for the acceptance of an adequate level of protection in any third country

Nevertheless, it appeared to be generally in favour of the ‘safe harbor’ concept, referring to it as an ‘agreed benchmark standard’ and a ‘useful approach’. As the proposed principles have developed through successive drafts, there are


\(^ {68} \) Six separate Opinions and a Working Document have been published since the beginning of 1999. For details see europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/media/dataprot/wpdocs/index.htm.
signs that the consensus which was being worked towards, which has now culminated in an agreement between the Commission and the US, was not completely shared by the Working Party. At the end of 1999, a further Opinion\(^{69}\) deplored the fact that ‘most of the comments made in its previous position papers do not seem to be addressed in the latest version of the US documents’ and confirmed both its general concerns and its view that the OECD Guidelines should represent a minimum requirement. Following the agreement, a further Opinion invited the Art 31 Committee to ‘ensure that the final steps of this important process are taken only in the light of the final opinion of the Working Party’. This final Opinion confirmed the previous opinions and detailed the issues which were, in the view of the Working Party, of continuing cause for concern.

At the time of writing, the agreement which has been reached between the EU and the US has resulted in the publication by the Commission of a draft Decision, which states that it has taken into account (in recital 15) all the opinions of the Working Party. This text has been approved by the Member States but a Report on the draft Decision by the Committee on Citizens’ Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs,\(^{70}\) prepared for the debate on the decision in the European Parliament, takes the view that, as the safe harbour system is not yet in place, ‘the adequacy of the system cannot be confirmed’. In the subsequent debate (on 3 July 2000), the Parliament felt that the Commission had exceeded its powers in reaching its agreement with the US and required the Commission ‘to go back to the negotiating table and change the agreement in such a way that the individual right of appeal to an independent body is recognised where the principles of data protection are alleged to have been violated’.\(^{71}\) The Commission, however, remained of the view that, during the course of the protracted discussions, the best result possible had been obtained. At the time of writing, therefore, the future of the Safe Harbor Agreement looks uncertain; it remains to be seen whether any agreement will, in practice, be overtaken if the calls of the FTC for Congress to legislate\(^{72}\) are heeded.

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\(^{72}\) See discussion above, p 362.
The Data Protection Directive was implemented in the UK by the Data Protection Act 1998,\(^{73}\) which was finally brought into force on 1 March 2000. The structure of this statute follows that of the previous enactment, the Data Protection Act 1984. Both statutes are rather different from most other UK statutes. In relation to the 1984 Act, Stallworthy suggests that this arose because the main provisions follow the Council of Europe Convention and are, therefore, influenced by principles of statutory draftsmanship which are more usually associated with civil law systems.\(^{74}\) The view of Aldhouse is that ‘the Data Protection Act is unprecedented. Even the black letter criminal provisions make use of new concepts’.\(^{75}\) Both statutes are based on the premise of compliance with principles of good data management—the ‘data protection principles’—which are contained in a Schedule appended to the Act. The earlier statute was based on the notion of universal registration but, unfortunately, the manner of drafting meant that these principles could only be enforced against those registered. This created a lacuna whereby the only action which could be taken against those not registered was a prosecution for non-registration, regardless of the degree to which the principles had apparently been flouted. This is no longer the case, as registration has now been superseded by a notification requirement and the principles can be enforced against all users regardless of whether notification has, in fact, taken place. The Data Protection Commissioner is given powers to enforce the principles with the aid of a range of enforcement notices. A number of criminal offences and individual remedies are also created in the body of the statute. Compliance with the terms of the Directive has resulted in some changes of nomenclature and definition. These are summarised in the table below, to assist comparison with the previous statute.

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\(^{75}\) Aldhouse, FGB, ‘UK data protection—where are we in 1991?’ (1991) 5 LCT Yearbook 180, p 184.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Protection Act 1984</th>
<th>Data Protection Act 1998</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Data – information recorded in a form in which it can be processed by equipment operating automatically in response to instructions given for that purpose.</td>
<td>Data – as 1984 Act plus data which forms part of a relevant filing system or part of an accessible record, ie, applies also to manual records.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal data – consisting of information which relates to a living individual who can be identified from that information (includes opinions but excludes intentions).</td>
<td>Personal data – as 1984 Act but includes both opinions and intentions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data User – one who ‘holds’ data, ie, controls its contents and use.</td>
<td>Data controller – one who determines the purposes for which and the manner in which any personal data are, or are to be, processed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer bureau – one who provides other persons with services in respect of data.</td>
<td>Data processor – any person (other than an employee of the data controller) who processes the data on behalf of the data controller.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data subject – an individual who is the subject of personal data.</td>
<td>Data subject – as 1984 Act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processing – amending, augmenting, deleting or re-arranging the data or extracting the information constituting the data and, in the case of personal data, means performing any of those operations by reference to the data subject.</td>
<td>Processing – obtaining, recording or holding the information or data or carrying out any operation or set of operations on the information or data, including: (a) organisation, adaptation or alteration of the information or data; (b) retrieval, consultation or use of the information or data; (c) disclosure of the information or data by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available; or (d) alignment, combination, blocking, erasure or destruction of the information or data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Protection Registrar.</td>
<td>Data Protection Commissioner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registration – all data users and computer bureaux must register and holding of data by unregistered persons is prohibited. Registration is a prerequisite for application of the other provisions of the Act</td>
<td>Notification – all provisions apply independent of notification, but notification of registrable particulars will still be required in the majority of cases.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE DATA PROTECTION PRINCIPLES

The eight data protection principles are listed in Pt I of Sched 1 to the 1998 Act and some guidance on their interpretation in contained in Pt II of that Schedule. A number of the basic requirements contained in the 1998 data protection principles remain unchanged and, thus, there will be case law under the 1984 Act which remains of relevance.

Principle 1

1 Personal data shall be processed fairly and lawfully and, in particular, shall not be processed unless—

(a) at least one of the conditions in Schedule 2 is met, and
(b) in the case of sensitive personal data, at least one of the conditions in Schedule 3 is also met.

Processing is defined in s 1(1) and, as can be seen from the table, has a wide meaning, encompassing the majority of acts which could be applied to data, including the initial obtaining, a process which was treated as distinct from actual processing in the 1984 Act. An interesting question has arisen as to whether the act of anonymising data constitutes processing of that data and is therefore subject to the requirements of the first principle. The problem is well illustrated by the facts of R v Department of Health ex p Source Informatics. Source Informatics provided software to pharmacists to record prescribing patterns of certain drugs by GPs, which could then be used by drug companies for marketing purposes. This was intended to be done with the consent and involvement of the GPs and the information was all anonymised before being collated in this way. However, as a result of advice from the Department of Health that this information was subject to a duty of confidence, notwithstanding the fact of anonymisation, many pharmacists and GPs refused to participate. Source Informatics therefore sought judicial review of the decision of the Department of Health that the use of the data in this way would constitute a breach of confidence.

At first instance, Latham J was of the view both that the information was subject to a duty of confidence, whether or not it had been anonymised before being passed on, and that, absent the consent of the patient, there would be an offence under the 1984 Act for unauthorised use of data. He specifically rejected 76 The 1984 version of the first data protection principle reads: ‘The information to be contained in personal data shall be obtained and the personal data shall be processed, fairly and lawfully.’

the ‘sophistry’ of a two stage test. The precise nature of the relationship between data protection and breach of confidence and, indeed, between personal data and confidential data has still to be fully explored, but a number of relevant points were made by the Court of Appeal which were in conflict with Latham J’s reasoning concerning the potential application of the 1998 Act. They considered the likely impact of the implementation of the 1995 Directive, even though this post-dated the relevant policy information, and, specifically, whether the anonymising of data could be considered processing. If the answer was yes, then all the conditions for lawful processing would apply, which might include the consent of the patients concerned; if the answer was no, then no consent or other conditions would be required. In the following extract, Simon Brown LJ considers the arguments for and against including anonymisation within the definition of processing.

*R v Department of Health ex p Source Informatics Ltd*  
[2000] 1 All ER 786, p 798

**Simon Brown LJ** ...[the] argument put at its simplest is that the proposed anonymisation of the information contained in a prescription form will—under the very wide definition of ‘processing’ set out in Art 2(b)—constitute the processing of data concerning the patient’s health, and that this is impermissible under Art 8.1, such processing not being required for any of the stipulated purposes allowed for by Art 8.3... [The] best answer to this submission [for the GMC and Source] is that the Directive can have no more application to the operation of anonymising data than to the use or disclosure of anonymous data (which, of course, by definition is not ‘personal data’ and to which, therefore, it is conceded that the directive has no application). [Counsel for the GMC] points to the several recitals emphasising the right to privacy as the principal concern underlying this directive, and he places great reliance on recital 26:

Whereas the principles of protection must apply to any information concerning an identified or identifiable person; whereas, to determine whether a person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means likely reasonably to be used either by the controller or by any other person to identify the said person; whereas the principles of protection shall not apply to data rendered anonymous in such a way that the data subject is no longer identifiable; whereas codes of conduct within the meaning of Art 27 may be a useful instrument for providing guidance as to the ways in which data may be rendered anonymous and retained in a form in which identification of the data subject is no longer possible...

Although this is clearly not the appropriate occasion to attempt a definitive ruling on the scope of the Directive—and still less of the impending legislation—I have to say that common sense and justice alike would appear to favour the GMC’s contention. By the same token that the anonymisation

78 [1999] 4 All ER 185, p 192.
of data is in my judgment unobjectionable here under domestic law, so too, I confidently suppose, would it be regarded by other Member States. Of course the processing of health data requires special protection and no doubt the ‘erasure or destruction’ of such data is included in the definition of processing for good reason: on occasion it could impair the patient’s own health requirements. It by no means follows, however, that the process envisaged here should be held to fall within the definition: on the contrary, recital 26 strongly suggests that it does not.

Assuming that there is processing as defined, then, by virtue of the first principle, this must be carried out both fairly and lawfully. ‘Lawful’ is not a term defined in either the 1998 Act or its predecessor.

Ninth Report of the Data Protection Registrar, June 1993

4 Determining the Meaning of the Law: Lawfulness in the First and Second Data Protection Principles

The First Principle not only refers to fairness but also to lawfulness. It requires that personal data shall be processed lawfully. This term also arises in the Second Principle which requires that personal data shall be ‘held only for… lawful purposes’…

No interpretation of the term ‘lawful’ is provided in the Act. Therefore, it has to be interpreted in accordance with the normal rule, which is that a word must be given its ordinary meaning unless the context in which it is used shows another intention. There is nothing in the Data Protection Act to suggest that the term should be given other than its normal meaning. Lawfulness was considered in a House of Lords case in 1991 and in that case ‘unlawful’ was held to mean:

...something which is contrary to some law or enactment or is done without lawful justification or excuse.

This is a broad definition; it applies equally to the public and the private sectors and it applies both to those breaches of the law which can be punished by criminal penalties and those which are dealt with by the civil courts.

The effect of this broad definition is that a data user must comply with all relevant rules of law in relation to the purposes for which he holds personal data, and the ways in which he obtains and processes it. So, for example, it seems to me that information which is obtained by theft or in breach of an enforceable contractual agreement is likely to be unlawfully obtained under the First data protection principle. Data users may only lawfully hold personal data for purposes for which they have adequate powers, otherwise the data will be held for unlawful purposes under the Second data protection principle.

The Registrar also suggested certain areas for concern which might be fertile ground for breaches of the first and second data protection principles:

80 R v R [1991] 3 WLR 767, p 775, per Lord Keith of Kinkel.
(i) Confidentiality

There are circumstances where an obligation of confidence arises between a data user and a data subject. This may flow from a variety of circumstances or in relation to different types of information. Examples might occur in respect of medical information or banking procedures. An obligation of confidence gives the data subject the right not to have his information used for other purposes or disclosed without his permission unless there are other overriding reasons in the public interest for this to happen.

Where an obligation of confidence arises it is unlawful for a data user to use the information for a purpose other than that for which it was provided. Where such a use involves the processing of the personal data, then this may entail unlawful processing within the meaning of the First Principle. This is important for those who hold and process information which may be subject to an obligation of confidence.

The law of confidence applies to government and statutory organisations just as it applies to private persons. Many such bodies obtain confidential information in order to carry out their duties… Public bodies may obtain much of the information they hold under statutory powers. Such powers are given to these data users specifically to carry out their statutory functions. Where a data user obtains information of a confidential quality in pursuance of its statutory functions and that information is then used or disclosed other than in pursuance of those functions, it is my view that a breach of confidence is likely unless there is some other statutory authority or just cause or excuse for the unauthorised uses and disclosures. If such uses or disclosures entail the processing of the personal data then this is likely to be unlawful processing.

(ii) The ultra vires rule

… The ultra vires rule is a rule of law which states that those vested with statutory powers are only able to do those things that Parliament has allowed them to do by statute. This includes doing things that are reasonably necessary to allow them to fulfil their primary functions. It follows, therefore, that a statutory body which obtains, processes or holds personal data for a purpose for which it has no statutory authority will be acting ultra vires and, therefore, unlawfully in holding, obtaining and processing those data.

(iii) Excess of delegated powers

The rules applying to Crown bodies are similar in effect although technically different in law. Where a particular activity is covered by a statutory scheme, for example the payment of benefits, then the Secretary of State and government agency dealing with that area have to follow the rules laid down in the statute in order to act lawfully. If they do not do so they may be acting unlawfully. Even where there is no detailed specific law dealing with an area and it is dealt with under executive powers then those powers will be defined either expressly or implicitly.

A government body which deals with personal data should therefore ensure it is aware of the relevant statutory scheme governing the activity and the extent of the powers given by the scheme. This is particularly important in so far as
there may be specific restrictions on the use or disclosure of data. If the body goes outside the powers to obtain, process or hold personal data it will be doing so unlawfully.

(iv) The concept of legitimate expectations

...there is a continuing, firm, majority belief that government agencies can be trusted to keep and use information in a responsible way. It is within this context of the expectations of individuals that the concepts of legitimate expectation fall to be considered.

In essence this means that in some circumstances an individual who will be adversely affected by a decision of a public body will be entitled to be notified of or consulted about such a decision before it is made. This could apply, for example, if it has been the case that a particular set of information obtained from individuals has not been made public or disclosed and the individual had no reason to think there would be any alteration in this situation. In such circumstances a proposal to disclose this information, where this may have an adverse effect on the individual, may be unacceptable unless the individual has been consulted and given an opportunity to voice his or her position. The individual has a legitimate expectation of consultation which should be respected and complied with. Failure to comply with a legitimate expectation may render unlawful any holding or processing of personal data associated with the proposed alteration in information practices.

It is clear here that the Data Protection Registrar is calling on established legal principles to suggest the likely interpretation of the terms at issue,81 a practice which, as we shall see, may need to be continued in relation to other terms in the Act, such as consent.

The previous first data protection principle separated fair and lawful obtaining from fair and lawful processing. A number of appeals against notices served by the Data Protection Registrar under the 1984 Act relating to the concepts of both fair obtaining and fair processing of data led to the Data Protection Tribunal considering both of these issues. Since the absorption of ‘obtaining’ into the definition of ‘processing’, this distinction appears no longer current but, nonetheless, the guidance on interpretation of the principles given in the second part of Sched 1 refers to these two concepts separately. In the light of both the existing case law and the guidance in the 1998 Act, it is therefore convenient to consider these two aspects individually.

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81 See, also, in this context, Jay, R, ‘Current legal issues in UK data protection’ (1995) 1 CTLR 152.
(a) Information shall be obtained fairly\textsuperscript{82}

Some of the factors to be taken into account in the decision as to whether information has been obtained \textit{fairly} came before the Tribunal as a consequence of a notice served on the mail order company, Innovations Ltd. As well as supplying goods mail order, this firm derived a significant amount of its income by trading in lists of customer names and addresses and making these lists available to other companies for direct marketing purposes (so called ‘list rental’). Direct marketing practices are now, of course, explicitly referred to in the Directive in relation to the right to object to processing. At the time of this incident, the whole area of direct marketing\textsuperscript{83} and trading in customer details was already a concern for those seeking to regulate data management in response to the fact that customer data had become a commodity in its own right. In 1985, a Council of Europe Recommendation\textsuperscript{84} suggested that:

The collection of data from an individual for any reason other than normal customer or contributor relations should be permissible for direct marketing purposes only on condition that this has been expressly stated at the time of collection.

The Recommendation further suggested that the customer should have rights to refuse to allow their data to be included on lists, to have the lists transmitted to third parties and to have data removed from lists. The same view had been taken by the Registrar—that individuals should be notified of the likelihood of their personal details being used for list rental before, or at the time of, obtaining the relevant data if that data were to be deemed to be \textit{fairly} obtained. There was evidence that this had been generally accepted, as it was included in the British Code of Advertising Practice,\textsuperscript{85} which included the stipulation that customers should be given the opportunity to object at the time of data collection and should be advised if the purposes for which the data were to be used changed subsequently. However, in contrast, there had also been a strong lobby from a sector of the industry during the draft stages of the EC Directive on Data Protection against the requirement that the data subject be informed of the purposes of the intended processing.\textsuperscript{86}

\textsuperscript{82} For the statutory guidance on interpretation of fair obtaining see the Data Protection Act 1984, Sched 1 Pt II.

\textsuperscript{83} That this remained a concern is reflected in the introduction of Directive 95/46/EC and, hence, in the 1998 Act of a right to object to processing for the purposes of direct marketing.

\textsuperscript{84} Council of Europe Recommendation No R (85) 20 1985.


\textsuperscript{86} This lobby was not successful and the final Art 10 of Directive 95/46/EC has evolved from a right of the data subject to be informed to a duty on the data user to inform.
It was against this background that a notice was served on Innovations Ltd. The enterprise obtained its custom by orders from their catalogues and in response to advertisements placed in the media. Customers ordering directly from the catalogues were advised of the possibility of their details being made available for other purposes, but those responding to the advertisements did not receive this information until after they had placed an order, that is, after they had supplied their personal details in response to the advertisement. The company argued that it was not practicable to provide notice of this practice in all other media advertisements, because of time and space constraints, and that later notification was more appropriate, as it would allow customers to be given more choice over the potential use of their information. The Registrar, on the other hand, argued that, if the obtaining was to be fair, the customer had to be aware of all the potential uses of personal details at the time that the order was made. The company appealed against the notice.

Innovations (Mail Order) Limited v Data Protection Registrar

Case DA/92 31/49/1

28 Certain interpretation of the data protection principles is provided in part II of the first Schedule of the Data Protection Act 1984. Paragraph 1(1) provides ‘…in determining whether information was obtained fairly regard should be had to the method by which it was obtained, including in particular whether any person from whom it was obtained was deceived or misled as to the purpose or purposes for which it is to be held, used or disclosed’. Our attention was also drawn to para 7, relating to use for historical, statistical or research purposes. We have taken account of this aid to interpretation…

30 We have reached a conclusion that the words ‘fairly obtained’ in the first data protection principle direct attention to the time of obtaining, not to a later time. We do not ignore the facts and circumstances of what happens thereafter. They may provide evidence of the purpose or purposes for which the data was in fact obtained and may provide evidence of the intention of the data user when he has sought, received, collected and obtained the personal information. We conclude in the facts and circumstances of this case that a purpose for which personal information is obtained, namely, list trading, is not obvious, unless clearly stated, before it is obtained. The purpose that is obvious is the supply of goods. We conclude the personal information will not be fairly obtained unless the data subject is so told of the non-obvious purpose before the information is obtained. We have taken into account that many advertisers give notice in ordinary language in their advertisements that they may trade in names and addresses. Many give prospective customers the option to order without having their names and addresses traded. We do not have to decide whether the absence of such a choice may in certain circumstances, for example, with a monopoly supplier, result in unfair obtaining. What

the enforcement notice seeks to achieve is that each advertisement should warn that trading in personal information may result if the name and address is supplied. Many traders are likely to incorporate choice for the customer as to whether to have his name list traded or not in order to avoid loss of trade. It may also assist those to whom the lists are traded since it will remove from the lists those who are unlikely to be interested in such direct mail. The fact that many advertisers currently give, notice in their advertisements where they trade in personal information makes it more likely that the absence of such a warning, where there is nonetheless a general purpose to list trade, increases the risk that members of the public will be misled.

31 We conclude that a later notice may be a commendable way of providing a further warning, but whether it does so or not, we conclude that the law requires in the circumstance we have here that when possible the warning must be before the obtaining. This can best be done by including the warning in the advertisement itself. Where it may not be possible (eg the use of existing names for a new purpose) we consider that the obligation to obtain the data subject’s positive consent for the non-obvious use of their data falls upon the data user.

In order to ensure compliance with the original form of the first data protection principle, the most frequent practice engaged in by companies who participate in list rental was to provide an ‘opt out’ box in their order form or advert to enable customers to indicate if they did not wish their data to be used in this way. The scope of fair obtaining was returned to in the later case of Linguaphone Institute Ltd v Data Protection Registrar, in which the Data Protection Tribunal confirmed the decision in Innovations and drew attention to the fact that it could equally be a violation of the first data protection principle if the opt out box was not clearly positioned and/or was in such minute typeface that it could not be regarded as putting customers on notice of the potential use of their data.

 19 …we are concerned that the opt out box appears in minute print at the bottom of the order form. In the Tribunal’s view the position, size of print and wording of the opt out box does not amount to a sufficient explanation to an enquirer that the company intends or may wish to hold use or disclose that personal data provided at the time of enquiry for the purpose of trading in personal information…

88 Case DA/94 31/49/1.
89 The courts have, of course, taken a similar approach in relation to disclaimers and trade descriptions: ‘To be effective, any such disclaimer must be as bold, precise and compelling as the trade description itself and must be as effectively brought to the notice of any person to whom the goods may be supplied.’ (Norman v Bennett [1974] 1 WLR 1229, p 1232 per Lord Widgery.) Compare, also, cases on incorporation of contractual terms: see, eg, the reasoning advanced in Roe v RA Naylor [1917] 1 KB 712, per Bailhache J.
90 The decisions in Innovations and Linguaphone resulted in the Registrar publishing revised guidelines concerning list and database management in relation to direct marketing. Following the Data Protection Directive, data subjects now have an absolute right to object to use of their data for direct marketing purposes.
It is a moot point whether the arguably more stringent requirements of consent, already discussed in relation to the Directive and expanded upon below in relation to the Act, are met by the use of the opt out box. An opt in box would be capable of providing a more unequivocal indication of the view of the data subject. We shall return to this point during the discussion of fair processing.

(b) Information shall be processed fairly

Any assessment of whether processing is fair will need to take into account the purposes of processing, the type of processing and the consequences to the data subject. Consideration of some of the issues involved in the determination of fair processing arose out of a number of appeals against enforcement notices served against certain credit reference agencies. In each case, the important fact was that the method of processing was too wide—typically by address rather than by name, resulting in persons being judged to be bad credit risks on the basis of another person’s record. This was illustrated, by what was agreed to be a representative complaint, in the case of *CCN Systems Ltd and CCN Credit Systems Ltd v Data Protection Registrar*. J had bought a house from W. Three years later, J applied for a cheque guarantee card but was refused and was told that CCN had provided the credit reference. A copy of his file (obtained under s 158 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974) showed a judgment against W. The only connection between J and W was that they had, at separate times, lived at the same address. This led to a further consideration of the interpretation of fair processing.

*CCN Systems Ltd and CCN Credit Systems Ltd v Data Protection Registrar*

Case DA/90 25/49/9

**Fairness**

48 We now come to the crucial question whether the processing that we have described may be said to be unfair...

... 51 The word ‘fairly’ in the first principle is not defined in the Act, and no guidance is given as to its interpretation. In determining its meaning we must have regard to the purpose of the Data Protection Act. It is quite clear, from the Act as a whole and in particular from the data protection principles set out in Sched 1, that the purpose of the Act is to protect the rights of the individual about whom data is obtained, stored, processed or supplied, rather than those of the data user. The Act was the result of concerns about the use of computer data, concerns voiced in Parliament and in the reports of a number of representative official committees and

widely held throughout Europe (hence the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data opened for signature on January 28 1981 referred to in ss 37 and 41 of the Act).

52 In our view, in deciding whether the processing we have described is fair we must give the first and paramount consideration to the interests of the applicant for credit—the ‘data subject’ in the Act’s terms. We are not ignoring the consequences for the credit industry of a finding of unfairness, and we sympathise with their problems, but we believe that they will accept that they must carry on their activities in accordance with the principles laid down in the Act of Parliament.

53 Having taken due account of the evidence we have heard and the considerations urged upon us we have come to the clear conclusion that it is unfair for a credit reference agency, requested by its customers to supply information by reference to a named individual, so to program the extraction of information as to search for information about all persons associated with a given address or addresses notwithstanding that those persons may have no links with the individual the subject of the enquiry or may have no financial relationship with that individual. We believe this to be so even if the customer has requested address-based information and notwithstanding what is said to be its predictive value. We reject the notion that an organisation like CCN, with its wide specialist knowledge of and experience in credit reference and credit scoring, is a mere ‘conduit pipe.’ We believe the sort of processing carried out in this case is the very sort of activity at which the Act is aimed. We think it right to say that we accept that CCN did not intend to process data unfairly, and did not believe itself to be acting unfairly. But it is necessary to determine the question of fairness objectively, and in our view the case of unfairness has been made out.

Two important points are made here: first, in relation to the purpose of the legislation in protecting the rights of the individual; and, secondly, in relation to the fact that the standard is one of objective fairness—therefore, the matter of whether or not the data user had the motive or intention to breach the data protection principles is irrelevant. A further case, that of Infolink Ltd v Data Protection Registrar, discussed the ‘extraction of information constituting the data’, a rather obscure facet of processing which is no longer a part of the definition. In addition, it clarified the position in relation to balancing the competing interests of the individual and the processor. It was noted that the fact that in CCN the needs of the individual had been referred to as paramount did not mean that the applicant’s interests prevailed over all other interests. It was necessary to weigh the various considerations but, in so doing, the Tribunal was entitled to give more weight to the interests of the individual, in line with the objectives of the legislation. Given the increased emphasis on individual rights in the Directive and the 1998 Act, it is unlikely that this approach will be modified in any material way.
In addition to the general requirement of fair and lawful processing, the first principle further stipulates that personal data shall not be processed unless one of the conditions in Sched 2 are met.

Data Protection Act 1998

SCHEDULE 2

Conditions Relevant for Purposes of the First Principle: Processing of any Personal Data

1. The data subject has given his consent to the processing.

2. The processing is necessary—
   (a) for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is a party, or
   (b) for the taking of steps at the request of the data subject with a view to entering into a contract.

3. The processing is necessary for compliance with any legal obligation to which the data controller is subject, other than an obligation imposed by contract.

4. The processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject.

5. The processing is necessary—
   (a) for the administration of justice,
   (b) for the exercise of any functions conferred on any person by or under any enactment,
   (c) for the exercise of any functions of the Crown, a Minister of the Crown or a government department, or
   (d) for the exercise of any other functions of a public nature exercised in the public interest by any person.

6(1) The processing is necessary for the purposes of legitimate interests pursued by the data controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed, except where the processing is unwarranted in any particular case by reason of prejudice to the rights and freedoms or legitimate interests of the data subject.

In addition, for sensitive personal data, there must be compliance with at least one of the conditions in Sched 3. ‘Sensitive personal data’ is defined by s 2 as:

…personal data consisting of information as to—

(a) the racial or ethnic origin of the data subject,
(b) his political opinions,
(c) his religious beliefs or other beliefs of a similar nature,
(d) whether he is a member of a trade union (within the meaning of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992,
(e) his physical or mental health or condition,
(f) his sexual life,
(g) the commission or alleged commission by him of any offence, or
(h) any proceedings for any offence committed or alleged to have been committed by him, the disposal of such proceedings or the sentence of any court in such proceedings.

**SCHEDULE 3**

**Conditions Relevant for Purposes of the First Principle:**

**Processing of Sensitive Personal Data**

1 The data subject has given his explicit consent to the processing of the personal data.

2(1) The processing is necessary for the purposes of exercising or performing any right or obligation which is conferred or imposed by law on the data controller in connection with employment...

3 The processing is necessary—

   (a) in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or another person, in a case where—

      (i) consent cannot be given by or on behalf of the data subject, or
      (ii) the data controller cannot reasonably be expected to obtain the consent of the data subject, or

   (b) in order to protect the vital interests of another person, in a case where consent by or on behalf of the data subject has been unreasonably withheld.

4 The processing—

   (a) is carried out in the course of its legitimate activities by any body or association which—

      (i) is not established or conducted for profit, and
      (ii) exists for political, philosophical religious or trade-union purposes,

   (b) is carried out with appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of data subjects,

   (c) relates only to individuals who either are members of the body or association or have regular contact with it in connection with its purposes, and

   (d) does not involve disclosure of the personal data to a third party without the consent of the data subject.

5 The information contained in the personal data has been made public as a result of steps deliberately taken by the data subject.

6 The processing—

   (a) is necessary for the purpose of, or in connection with, any legal proceedings (including prospective legal proceedings),
(b) is necessary for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, or
(c) is otherwise necessary for the purposes of establishing, exercising or
defending legal rights.

7(1) The processing is necessary—
(a) for the administration of justice,
(b) for the exercise of any functions conferred on any person by or under
an enactment, or
(c) for the exercise of any functions of the Crown, a Minister of the Crown
or a government department...

8(1) The processing is necessary for medical purposes and is undertaken by—
(a) a health professional, or
(b) a person who in the circumstances owes a duty of confidentiality
which is equivalent to that which would arise if that person were a
health professional.

(2) In this paragraph ‘medical purposes’ includes the purposes of
preventative medicine, medical diagnosis, medical research, the provision
of care and treatment and the management of healthcare services.

9(1) The processing—
(a) is of sensitive personal data consisting of information as to racial or
ethnic origin,
(b) is necessary for the purpose of identifying or keeping under review
the existence or absence of equality of opportunity or treatment
between persons of different racial or ethnic origins, with a view to
enabling such equality to be promoted or maintained, and
(c) is carried out with appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms
of data subjects.

The constraints on processing contained in Scheds 2 and 3 mirror those in Arts 7
and 8 of the Directive (see above) and are based on a requirement of consent,
unless the processing falls within one of the listed categories for which the
process or its purpose is deemed necessary. An interesting difference is that the
qualification ‘unambiguous’ in Art 7 has been omitted, although the presumably
higher standard of explicit consent in Art 8 has been retained. Further the word
‘consent’, although defined in the Directive, has not been given a definition in
the Act, possibly because it is a word which has been much discussed in both
civil and criminal case law. The extent to which the same standard of consent
might be appropriate in different circumstances is debatable, but some
interesting points were made in a case under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954
on the distinction between consent and acquiescence. These seem to be of
particular relevance to the scope of consent, which has erstwhile been implied
from a failure to complete the ‘opt out’ box.
Bell v Alfred Franks & Bartlett Co Ltd
[1980] 1 All ER 356

Shaw LJ If acquiescence is something passive in the face of knowledge, what does ‘consent’ mean? In the context of the contrast implicit in the subsection, the only practical and sensible distinction that can be drawn is that if acquiescence can arise out of passive failure to do anything, consent must involve a positive demonstrative act, something of an affirmative kind. It is not to be implied, because the resort to implication betokens an absence of express affirmation. The only sense in which there can be implied consent is where a consent is demonstrated, not by language but by some positive act other than words which amounts to an affirmation of what is being done and goes beyond mere acquiescence in it. It may lead, in this context, to a false conclusion to speak of ‘implied consent’, which is what the learned judge said was the proper inference to be drawn from the long history of acquiescence. I would prefer for myself to say ‘consent’ involves something which is of a positive affirmative kind…

Waller LJ …but acquiescence is something which has to be contrasted with consent and, in my judgment, consent requires some positive action on the part of the landlord or his predecessor, usually no doubt in words, perhaps in writing, possibly, if gestures were absolutely clear, it could conceivably be by gesture but, in my view, careful proof of such an intention would be required. Normally one would look for some express statement, either in writing or orally…

Thus, a positive ‘opt in’ rather than an ‘opt out’ box might conform to Shaw LJ’s requirement of a ‘positive act’ as a necessary prerequisite of a demonstration of consent. Although consent to process was not an overt feature of the 1984 Act, nonetheless it was discussed in a number of proceedings of the Data Protection Tribunal as a necessary ingredient of fair processing, and so should be not be regarded as an entirely new ingredient as such. In Innovations, the Tribunal pointed out that if there was use of data for a further purpose to that for which it had been provided and which was non-obvious to the data subject, then it was incumbent on the data user (now controller) to obtain the data subject’s positive consent. This issue was discussed further in the later case of British Gas Trading Ltd v Data Protection Registrar.92 British Gas customers were sent circulars allowing them to opt out of processing for other purposes, specifically marketing purposes for products and services which were not, necessarily, related to the supply of gas. Many customers did not return the circular and subsequently brought complaints about the non-obvious further use of their data. The Tribunal considered both the role of consent as a part of fair processing and the view of the Registrar, based on the previous Tribunal decisions, that ‘any intended use must be clear to the data subject at the time at which the information in collected by the data user, unless it can be shown that there has been subsequent consent and that consent cannot be inferred from a

lack of response to a circular offering an opt out’. This led the tribunal to the conclusion that ‘processing, without consent, for wider uses than could reasonably have been expected from a monopoly gas supplier and which are not obvious uses, is unfair’.

The overall situation with regard to consent in English law has been summarised by Jay and Hamilton.\(^93\)

\[\text{Data Protection Law and Practice}\
\text{Rosemary Jay and Angus Hamilton}\

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{a} Consent may be express or inferred from some relevant action (implied consent) but cannot be inferred from silence (\textit{AG v Jonathan Cape} [1975] 3 All ER 484).
  \item \textit{b} No one can consent to something of which he has no knowledge (\textit{Re Caughey ex p Fordee} (1876) 1 Ch D 521).
  \item \textit{c} Consent may be distinguished from acquiescence:
    Consent involves some affirmative acceptance, not merely a standing by and absence of objection. The affirmative acceptance may be in writing which is the clearest obviously; it may be oral; it may conceivably even be by conduct, such as nodding the head in a specific way in response to an express request for consent. But it must be something more than merely standing by and not objecting [\textit{Bell v Alfred Franks & Bartlett Co Ltd} [1980] 1 All ER 356, p 362, \textit{per} Megaw LJ]
  \item \textit{d} A person cannot give a valid consent at common law if he or she is incapable of understanding the action to which he is consenting (\textit{Lang} (1975) 62 Cr App R 50).
  \item \textit{e} A person cannot consent to a contract if he was incapable of understanding the nature of the contract (\textit{Boughton v Knight} (1873) LR 3 PD 64). In contrast, a fundamental mistake as to the basis of a contract will render the purported contract a nullity. In \textit{Galloway v Galloway} (1914) 30 TLR 531, a separation deal between a man and a woman was null because it was based on an erroneous belief in the existence of a marriage between them.
  \item \textit{f} A document may be pleased as not binding a person under the doctrine \textit{non est factum} where he was induced to sign a document containing a contract which was fundamentally different in character from what he contemplated (\textit{Lewis v Clay} (1897) 67 LJQB 224).
  \item \textit{g} The presence of undue influence by another may in some circumstances nullify apparent consent. In \textit{Re T} (1993) it was held that the daughter of a Jehovah’s witness who withheld consent to a blood transfusion was unduly influenced by her mother.
  \item \textit{h} Consent obtained by coercion or duress is not true consent and may be set aside (\textit{The Siboen and the Sibotre} [1976] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 293).
\end{itemize}

\(^{93}\) Citations from footnotes added to text. Reference was also made to Law Commission Consultation Paper No 139, \textit{Consent in the Criminal Law}, 1995, London: HMSO.
Reluctant consent may be valid as long as it is voluntary relevant factors to consider will be whether the person protested, or had an alternative open to him, or was independently advised (Pau On v Lau Yiu Long [1980] AC 614).

An individual reaches majority at 18 years of age and under the Family Law Reform Act 1969 s 1(1) is presumed to have sufficient maturity to consent to any medical treatment or enter into a legal contract for him or herself, unless he or she suffers from mental incapacity. Young persons aged between 16 and 17 can consent to medical treatment to the same extent as someone of full age (section 8(1)) and a person with parental responsibility for a child can give consent to a lawful activity for a child provided it is in the child’s best interests.

An individual may be enabled to exercise choice and consent on behalf of another under…the Enduring Power of attorneys Act 1987.

Principle 2

Personal data shall be obtained only for one or more specified and lawful purposes, and shall not be further processed in any manner incompatible with that purpose or those purposes.

This principle essentially combines the ingredients of both the second and third principles in the 1984 Act. It was seen in relation to the first principle that use beyond the purpose for which the data was collected can be an aspect of fair processing, but this principle puts it beyond doubt that processing must relate only to the original purpose of collection. A case under the 1984 Act provides an illustration. In Macgregor v Procurator Fiscal of Kilmarnock,\(^4\) the neighbour of a police officer was concerned about the man with whom his 18 year old daughter was living and asked the police officer if he could find out any information for him. Certain information about the man in question was obtained from both the Police National Computer and the Scottish Criminal Records Computer and the police officer communicated some of this to the daughter in a telephone call, with the intention of trying to persuade her to return to her father. He was found to have used the information for a purpose other than that for which registration had been made, and appealed on the basis that, as he was seeking to maintain law and order and was concerned for the girl’s welfare, he had used the information for policing purposes. According to the terms of registration under the 1984 Act, ‘policing purposes’ included the protection of life and property, the maintenance of law and order and the rendering of assistance to the public. Whilst the court accepted that the police officer’s motives were undoubtedly humanitarian, the purpose of his action could not be equated with a policing purpose as defined and his appeal was dismissed.

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The only case under the 1984 Act to reach the House of Lords, *R v Brown*,\(^\text{95}\) centred on the meaning of ‘use’ in the context of unauthorised use, a phrase in both the formulation of the previous third principle and also in a corresponding criminal offence in the body of that statute. As this construction no longer features in the 1998 statute, this case is unlikely to remain of direct relevance, although it does contain some useful *obiter dicta* on the relationship between data protection and privacy.\(^\text{96}\)

**Principle 3**

Personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpose or purposes for which they are processed.

This wording is identical to that of the fourth principle in the previous Act, although its application may now need adjustment in the light of the wider definition of ‘processing’. The interpretation of this principle has been discussed in a number of tribunal decisions prior to the 1998 Act. During the existence of the short lived Community Charge, or ‘poll tax’, a number of complaints were received that information required by those administering the tax was in excess of that needed. The task of compiling and maintaining the register of those who were subject to the charge was the duty of the Community Charge Registration Officers (CCROs) in each area. In relation to the fourth data protection principle, the Registrar had already produced guidelines suggesting that data users should establish the minimum amount of information they could hold which was compatible with their intended purposes and, as a result, a number of CCROs modified their requests. A number of officers did not comply and applications to register were refused on this basis, in accordance with the old s 7(2)(b). The CCROs appealed. Three of these appeals were heard together, as they all concerned the gathering of information concerning the type of property inhabited, a factor which was argued to have no relevance to the levying of a *per capita* tax.

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95 [1996] 1 All ER 545.
96 Referred to above, p 347.
Community Charge Registration Officers of Runnymede BC, South Northamptonshire DC and Harrow BC v Data Protection Registrar
Cases DA/90 24/49/3, 4 and 5

Having concluded that property type information was personal data we had to consider whether we were satisfied that the holding of such data infringed the fourth data protection principle that the data should be adequate relevant and not excessive for the purposes for which it was held by the CCRO... We considered the duty to maintain the register could properly include the obtaining and holding of at least some additional information on the computer database... The appellant submitted that we should not take a very restrictive view of the discretion that a particular CCRO might exercise as to the amount of additional information he considered should be held to assist him to carry out his statutory duty. While there may be some force in the argument that what is judged to be excessive should not in some circumstances be too strictly construed we concluded that it could not be decisive where the issue is whether a wide class of data such as property type information should be held without any kind of limitation as to the extent of what was held...

We were referred in the course of the hearing to the Guideline booklet Number 4 issued by the Data Protection Registrar, entitled The Data Protection Principles. Paragraph 4.2 relating to the fourth principle advises that data users should seek to identify the minimum amount of information about each individual which is required in order properly to fulfil their purpose and that they should try to identify the cases where additional information will be required and seek to ensure that such information is only collected and recorded in those cases. We endorse this general guidance for those wishing to have a test to apply to answer the question whether personal data is adequate, relevant and no excessive for the purposes for which it is held. We find that the appellants held on database a substantial quantity of property type information obtained from voluntary answers on the canvass forms or from other sources. It was established that in holding such information, the appellants were holding far more than was in fact necessary for their purposes...

We find and the appellants appear to accept, that it is not relevant and would be excessive to hold wide classes of data merely on the ground that future changes in the law may in remote and uncertain future circumstances require further property types to be added to the existing exceptions identified by the Data Protection Registrar.

A further case considered a similar question, this time in relation to the gathering of information regarding dates of birth. It was accepted by the Registrar that it might, on occasion, be necessary to hold dates of birth in relation to certain categories of person, such as those who were almost 18, students, etc, and, subject to these exceptions, the majority of CCROs removed any reference to date of birth for other individuals. However, the CCRO for Rhondda did not comply and alleged, *inter alia*, that the information required was necessary because holding dates of birth provided a useful method of distinguishing between
people in an area in which many had both surnames and given names in common.

*Community Charge Registration Officer of Rhondda BC v Data Protection Registrar*
*Case DA/90 25/49/2*

There was evidence before us that nationally less than one per cent of households contained persons with the same surname and the same first name. There was no evidence before us as to percentages applying within the area of Rhondda Borough Council, although it was probable that they were greater than the national figure. We approached the question of whether the information was irrelevant and excessive without taking too restrictive a view of the discretion that a particular CCRO might exercise as to the amount of information he considered would assist him to carry out his statutory duties. We found that it was established that the Appellant held and wished to continue holding dates of birth information on as many as possible. The information was to be obtained from answers voluntarily given on canvass forms. We found that the Appellant did not seek to limit the information to be held on his database to those who would shortly attain the age to become charge payers or to identify persons living at the same address with identical names. The information as to dates of birth was personal data and was to cover persons generally at least insofar as the information had been voluntarily provided. We find that the information the Appellant wishes to hold on database concerning individuals exceeds substantially the minimum amount of information which is required in order for him to fulfil the purposes for which he has sought registration namely to fulfil his duty to compile and maintain the Community Charges Register... We are satisfied by the evidence before us that the wide and general extent of the information about dates of birth is irrelevant and excessive.

**Principle 4**

Personal data shall be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date.

Guidance on the interpretation of this principle, which is identical in wording to the previous fifth principle, is contained in Part II of Sched 1:

The fourth principle is not to be regarded as being contravened by reason of any inaccuracy in personal data which accurately record information obtained by the data controller from the data subject or a third party in a case where—

(a) having regard to the purpose or purposes for which the data were obtained and further processed, the data controller has taken reasonable steps to ensure the accuracy of the data, and

(b) if the data subject has notified the data controller of the data subject’s view that the data are inaccurate, the data indicate that fact.

This seems to have been inserted in order to close an apparent loophole relating to accuracy in the 1984 Act. As was pointed out in the parliamentary debates
prior to the 1984 Act, ‘Where a data user records inaccurate information supplied by someone else, the data are accurate. They are an accurate record of what someone else said’. Whilst this is still a pertinent point, it can have unfortunate consequences for a data subject. This guidance and corresponding amendments to the right of rectification (see below) have sought to remedy this problem.

**Principle 5**

Personal data processed for any purpose or purposes shall not be kept for longer than is necessary for that purpose or those purposes.

There appears to be no specific guidance on this principle, which has the same wording as the previous sixth principle, but the purpose of the processing will clearly be a very relevant factor. The objective is clearly to encourage data to be reviewed and destroyed at appropriate intervals, removing the possible temptation to process for further purposes, which might also fall foul of principles 1 and 2.

**Principle 6**

The previous seventh principle to which the new sixth principle is a direct parallel was designed to require those in control of data to take the rights of individual data subjects into account, specifically, the right of access to the data and the right to have the data corrected or erased where appropriate. The reformulated principle is expressed in more general terms:

> Personal data shall be processed in accordance with the rights of data subjects under this Act.

It is clear from the guidance on interpretation in Pt II of the Schedule that this principle will be complied with as long as data controllers comply with ss 7 and 10–12 of the Act itself, which deal with the right of access, the right to prevent processing likely to cause damage or distress, the right to prevent processing for the purposes of direct marketing and rights in relation to automated decision making.

**Principle 7**

The seventh data protection principle is concerned with the security of data, as was the previous eighth principle, but the new version specifically refers to both technical and organisational factors, something which was merely implicit in the former version:
Appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be taken against unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, personal data.

The following guidance on interpretation is given in Pt II of the Schedule:

Having regard to the state of technological development and the cost of implementing any measures, the measures must ensure a level of security appropriate to—

(a) the harm that might result from such unauthorised or unlawful processing or accidental loss, destruction or damage as are mentioned in the seventh principle, and
(b) the nature of the data to be protected.

The data controller must take reasonable steps to ensure the reliability of any employees of his who have access to the personal data.

The specific reference to the state of technological development is an interesting one, as it is unclear to what extent technical solutions to privacy protection, such as the use of encryption, can be specifically required by the law on data protection. Where personal data is particularly sensitive or confidential, it may be that the seventh data protection principle will not be deemed to be complied with without the use of cryptography or other technical mechanism.97

Under the 1984 Act, the security principle was the only one which had to be complied with by the so called ‘data bureaux’. This concept has been replaced in the 1998 Act by the term ‘data processor’, which is defined in s 1(1) as ‘a person (other than an employee of the data controller) who processes the data on behalf of the data controller’. Even in this case there is an overriding duty on the data controller to ensure that there is compliance with the security requirement in the seventh data protection principle, and the relevant obligations are also detailed in the guidance in Pt II of Sched 1:

Where processing of personal data is carried out by a data processor on behalf of a data controller, the data controller must in order to comply with the seventh principle—

(a) choose a data processor providing sufficient guarantees in respect of the technical and organisational security measures governing the processing to be carried out, and
(b) take reasonable steps to ensure compliance with those measures.

For further discussion of the role of cryptography in data protection see, eg, Price, SA, ‘Understanding contemporary cryptography and its wider impact upon the general law’ (1999) 13 Int Rev LC & T 95, p 108 et seq. It should also be noted that the use of cryptography raises a number of other concerns relating to law enforcement and the detection of crime, as well as to rights of access to the keys to the encrypted messages. At the time of writing these issues are under consideration in the debates on the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill (now the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000—see below, p 423). See, eg, HC Deb Vol 6 Col 767 et seq, 6 March 2000; HL Deb Vol 613 Col 881 et seq, 25 May 2000. See, also, Chandrani, R, ‘RIP e-commerce’ (2000) 11 C & L 30.
Where processing of personal data is carried out by a data processor on behalf of a data controller, the data controller is not to be regarded as complying with the seventh principle unless—

(a) the processing is carried out under a contract—

(i) which is made or evidenced in writing, and
(ii) under which the data processor is to act only on instructions from the data controller, and

(b) the contract requires the data processor to comply with obligations equivalent to those imposed on a data controller by the seventh principle.

Principle 8

A new eighth principle deals with transborder data flow:

Personal data shall not be transferred to a country or territory outside the European Economic Area unless that country or territory ensures an adequate level of protection for the rights and freedoms of data subjects in relation to the processing of personal data.

The problems with the interpretation of adequacy have already been discussed in relation to Arts 25 and 26 of the Directive.

Administration, rights and remedies

The rights of the data subject under the 1984 Act were far less extensive than those required by the Directive and were confined to the right of access, together with a limited right of rectification and erasure. These rights were supplemented, subject to certain provisos, by the ability to claim compensation for inaccuracy and loss or unauthorised disclosure.

In line with the Directive, the 1998 Act now includes, in s 7(1), a right of access, which is spelt out more comprehensively than that in s 21 of the 1984 Act.

Data Protection Act 1998

Section 7 Right of access to personal data

(1) Subject to the following provisions of this section and to ss 8 and 9, an individual is entitled—

(a) to be informed by any data controller whether personal data of which that individual is the data subject are being processed by or on behalf of that data controller,
(b) if that is the case, to be given by the data controller a description of—

(i) the personal data of which that individual is the data subject,
(ii) the purposes for which they are being or are to be processed, and
(iii) the recipients or classes of recipients to whom they are or may be disclosed,

(c) to have communicated to him in an intelligible form—

(i) the information constituting any personal data of which that individual is the data subject, and

(ii) any information available to the data controller as to the source of those data, and

(d) where the processing by automatic means of personal data of which that individual is the data subject for the purpose of evaluating matters relating to him such as, for example, his performance at work, his creditworthiness, his reliability or his conduct, has constituted or is likely to constitute the sole basis for any decision significantly affecting him, to be informed by the data controller of the logic involved in that decision-taking.

In line with the Directive, the 1998 Act now includes specific rights to prevent processing likely to cause damage or distress (s 10), to prevent processing for purposes of direct marketing (s 11) and in relation to automated decision making (s 12). These rights may all be exerted by application to court. The ability to claim compensation is no longer restricted merely to cases of inaccuracy, loss or unauthorised disclosure.

Data Protection Act 1998

Section 13 Compensation for failure to comply with certain requirements

(1) An individual who suffers damage by reason of any contravention by a data controller of any of the requirements of this Act is entitled to compensation from the data controller for that damage.

(2) An individual who suffers distress by reason of any contravention by a data controller of any of the requirements of this Act is entitled to compensation from the data controller for that distress if—

(a) the individual also suffers damage by reason of the contravention, or

(b) the contravention relates to the processing of personal data for the special purposes.

(3) In proceedings brought against a person by virtue of this section it is a defence to prove that he had taken such care as in all the circumstances was reasonably required to comply with the requirement concerned.

In cases of inaccuracy, s 14 also gives the court the power to order rectification, blocking, erasure and destruction of the relevant data.

General oversight of the 1984 Act was given to a Data Protection Registrar. This office has been renamed Data Protection Commissioner by the 1998 Act but the duties, powers and functions appear to remain broadly similar in nature.
The Data Protection Registrar and the Register

The Registrar

The Registrar’s functions may be broadly classified as:

(a) administrative, in relation to establishment and maintenance of the register of users of personal data and of computer bureau operators;
(b) supervisory, in relation to compliance with the Act; and
(c) promotional, in relation to the data protection principles, dissemination of information about the operation of the Act and, where appropriate, development of codes of practice for guidance in complying with the principles.

The Registrar’s obligation to promote observance of the data protection principles is an overriding duty applied to the performance of all his functions under the Act, so underlying the quasi-ethical nature of the principles. The Registrar has direct responsibility for promotion of the principles, and the term ‘promotion’, though not defined in the Act, implies something wider than enforcement. Enforcement of the principles, without any direct obligation on data users to observe them, would be an inappropriate term to describe the Registrar’s function, and development of a body of jurisprudence based on the principles through codes of practice, empirical experience and judgment is as important an aspect of the Registrar’s function as is enforcement of the resulting rules.

In order to promote the principles, the Registrar develops, interprets and applies them, both in general terms and in particular circumstances, and where disputes and uncertainty arise, exercises an ombudsman role. This role, and mediating between the conflicting interests of data users and data subjects, may prove to be the most important of the Registrar’s subsidiary functions, although it is not expressly stated in the Act. Appeals from the Registrar’s decisions, including decisions on interpretation and application of the principles, lie to the Data Protection Tribunal and thence, on a point of law, to the courts, but the initial responsibility for developing a practical jurisprudence based on the principles lies with the Registrar. In the introduction to the second issue of his Guideline 4…the Registrar states that ‘Whether there is a contravention of a principle is a question of fact for the Registrar to decide in the first place’. This potentially onerous duty, in combination with his other functions, puts the Registrar into the position of being lawgiver, policeman, judge and jury at the lowest level of enforcement.
There is clear potential for a conflict of interests when so many roles need to be combined, but the Government of the day was quite clear as to the rationale behind it.

Parliamentary Debates (Commons)
11 April 1983

William Whitelaw We have made compliance with these principles enforceable through the medium of the registrar, so establishing a single authority on the subject who can consult, advise and negotiate before taking action. A vital feature of the scheme is his capacity to use his discretionary powers to tailor his response to the circumstances in each case. This flexibility of approach, we believe, is much preferable to any scheme in which, say, a user collecting data unfairly or holding inaccurate data is directly liable to criminal prosecution.

We have gone for a single registrar rather than a multimember authority for positive reasons. We see it as by far and away the most economic use of resources. Since the scheme will be funded by data users themselves, that is of particular importance to them. We believe that an individual registrar will be able to act more rapidly, authoritatively and consistently in this complex and infinitely varied field than could a committee. His interpretation of the principles, and determination of what in particular circumstances constitutes contravention of the principles, will place a premium on consistency and the kind of build-up of understanding and expertise that an individual can best achieve. Because of the variety of cases that will arise, we think that a registrar who is able to look for and accept advice from wherever he sees fit in the special circumstances that he faces will be better equipped than a committee representing an inevitably incomplete range of interests...

In providing for a registrar with a supervisory function of this kind we have had to strike a delicate balance. On the one hand, there is the risk of setting up a cumbersome bureaucracy, continuously at the heels of legitimate business activity and impeding technological developments. On the other hand, we must guard against the registrar being ineffective, lacking the powers and resources to give any teeth to the legislation. The Government do not want some vast new quango that will jeopardise efficiency in every area of national life: thus we have gone for a compact Organisation which will not interfere unnecessarily. The burdens on law-abiding data users will be kept to a minimum. On the other hand, it is nonsense to suggest that the registrar will be ineffective when the need for action arises.

The extent to which the combination of roles is successful is a moot point—although both Data Protection Acts merge these roles into the person of the Registrar, now Commissioner, neither enactment has provided the means to fulfil them all efficiently. Thus, there is a policing function, but this is not supported by any real powers of investigation. This combination of responsibilities at the primary enforcement level is common to a number of other regulatory regimes; however, it is rare to have one individual responsible for such a range of activities. Similarly, some of these other regimes make use of criminal sanctions for some contraventions, causing questions to be raised about the role of the
criminal law in this context. A comparison can be made, for instance, with inspectors appointed under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, who act as both police and prosecutors and have the power to serve notices requiring compliance with the relevant statutory provisions. In comparison, the Data Protection Commissioner has similar powers relating to the service of enforcement notices and, as highlighted in the above extract, is charged also with promoting the observance of the data protection principles—suggesting not only overseeing and enforcement but also education and guidance. In comparison to the area of occupational health and safety, which has been regulated for more than 150 years in the UK, it is still rather early to make any assessment of how the differing roles of the Commissioner and their interdependence might affect the manner and effectiveness of the enforcement. Any assessment of the success with which the roles can be combined is likely to be influenced by the view that is taken of regulatory or ‘white collar’ crime in comparison with other criminal activities.

White collar crime and the enforcement of factory legislation

WG Carson
(1970) 10 Br J Crim 383

… The crucial component in this motivational background is the inspector’s interpretation of his own function, since it is from this that his decisions about how to enforce the law derive their immediate contextual meaning…the inspectors…did not see themselves as members of an individual police force primarily concerned with the apprehension and subsequent punishment of offenders. Rather, they perceived their major function to be that of securing compliance with standards of safety, health and welfare required and thereby achieving the ends at which the legislation is directed… Concerned with securing the offender’s compliance rather than his punishment they tended to choose methods of enforcement as much for their functional efficiency in attaining this objective as for their appropriateness as punitive responses.

Carson went on to suggest that the legal proceedings were themselves used for a rather different purpose than was the case in the rest of the criminal justice system:

[Legal proceedings had] a functional role…in relation to the enforcement process as a whole; whether utilised for their predicted effect upon an individual occupier or upon other employers in their area, they were seen as a means to an end rather than an end in themselves.

Whatever the conflicts between the varying roles of the Commissioner,99 the enforcement function is, arguably, of central importance, with other duties, such as

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99 These roles are likely to be augmented further with the enactment of the Freedom of Information Bill, when the office of Data Protection Commissioner will be subsumed in a newly created office of Information Commissioner, with responsibility for oversight of both statutes.
as dissemination of information, being ancillary to this. This is in contrast with Data Protection Commissioners in some other jurisdictions, whose role can be likened more to that of an Ombudsman.

**UK Data Protection—where are we in 1991?**  
FGB Aldhouse  
*(1991) 5 LCT Yearbook 180*

**Registrar’s Role**

... The United Kingdom Registrar has the power to prosecute and to serve supervisory notices. He has a duty to consider complaints and he has certain limited investigatory powers such as the ability to obtain search warrants. In that respect the Registrar is a classic UK enforcing authority. Although his status of independence and reporting to Parliament is akin to that of the Parliamentary Commissioner, he does not have the decision making role of an ombudsman.

That is distinctly not the case with officials such as the Federal German Data Protection Commissioner of the Canadian Federal Privacy Commissioner. Their jurisdiction is limited to the public sector. They have an audit role and their sanction is principally publicity rather than the use of classic enforcement measures.

This distinction has consequences for the political role of data protection officials. The ombudsman-type commissioners see an important part of their task as promoting political debate about data protection and privacy issues, commenting on those issues and indeed campaigning for a particular viewpoint. On the other hand those officials such as the Irish Commissioner and the United Kingdom Registrar, who are authorities enforcing a legal sanction and are cast much more in the role of policemen, are considerably more circumspect in commenting on these general contentious issues. This is perhaps in part a matter of political culture, but it is undoubtedly in large part a consequence of the distinct role of these officials.

The Commissioner also has powers to bring criminal proceedings in relation to the commission of the offences created by the legislation. Most of these are regulatory offences of strict liability. Thus, s 21 of the 1998 Act makes it an offence not to register particulars with the Commissioner or to fail to notify any changes in these particulars and s 47 creates an offence for failure to comply with a notice. The 1998 Act makes all of these offences subject to a defence of due diligence. Section 55, on the other hand, creates a number of other offences.

**Data Protection Act 1998**

**Section 55 Unlawful obtaining etc of personal data**

(1) A person must not knowingly or recklessly, without the consent of the data controller—

(a) obtain or disclose personal data or the information contained in personal data, or
(b) procure the disclosure to another person of the information contained in personal data.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a person who shows—

(a) that the obtaining, disclosing or procuring—

(i) was necessary for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime, or

(ii) was required or authorised by or under any enactment, by any rule of law or by the order of a court,

(b) that he acted in the reasonable belief that he had in law the right to obtain or disclose the data or information or, as the case may be, to procure the disclosure of the information to the other person,

(c) that he acted in the reasonable belief that he would have had the consent of the data controller if the data controller had known of the obtaining, disclosing or procuring and the circumstances of it, or

(d) that in the particular circumstances the obtaining, disclosing or procuring was justified as being in the public interest.

(3) A person who contravenes subsection (1) is guilty of an offence.

(4) A person who sells personal data is guilty of an offence if he has obtained the data in contravention of subsection (1).

(5) A person who offers to sell personal data is guilty of an offence if—

(a) he has obtained the data in contravention of subsection (1), or

(b) he subsequently obtains the data in contravention of that subsection.

(6) For the purposes of subsection (5), an advertisement indicating that personal data are or may be for sale is an offer to sell the data.

The offences created by this section are all based on obtaining, disclosing or procuring disclosure ‘knowingly or recklessly’, a phrase which also qualified similar offences in s 5(5) of the 1984 Act. It is accepted that recklessness may be used in either a subjective or objective (‘Caldwell’) sense in the criminal law. Subjective recklessness refers to the conscious taking of an unjustified risk, whereas objective recklessness may arise when either no thought has been given as to the existence of an obvious risk or there has been recognition of the risk but it has been ignored. This definition was first expounded in the cases of Caldwell and Lawrence. The use of Caldwell recklessness has largely been restricted to statutory offences containing the word ‘reckless’ or ‘recklessly’ but is not invariably applied to such offences, and it appeared that it was confined to cases under the Criminal Damage Act 1971 (such as Caldwell) and cases of reckless driving (such as Lawrence and, more recently, Reid). In which sense should ‘recklessly’ be used in the Data Protection legislation?

100 See, eg, R v Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396.
102 R v Reid [1992] 3 All ER 673.
In *Data Protection Registrar v Amnesty International (British Section)*, Amnesty was charged under both s 5(2)(b) and (d) of the 1984 Act in relation to two offences of trading in and disclosure of personal information for purposes and to persons not described in the Register. At first instance, Amnesty was acquitted, on the basis that the relevant factor was foreseeability of harm, rather than whether or not the user had been reckless as to the management of the data in a manner incompatible with the registration. Using this test, as the outcome of the action was merely an unsolicited mailing, it was held that Amnesty had not been reckless. On appeal to the Divisional Court by way of case stated, it was held that the seriousness of the consequences of the breach had been confused with the breach itself. In ruling that the appropriate definition of ‘recklessness’ for s 5 was the objective definition found in *Lawrence*, Rose LJ said:

... The particular sensitivity of a person about whom data was released was unlikely to be in the knowledge of the holder of the data and it would be wrong if criminal liability were to be determined by reference to a factor outside the knowledge of the holder or discloser...

...in order for the prosecution to prove the necessary element of recklessness in s 5 it had to show:

1. that there was something in the circumstances that would have drawn the attention of the ordinary prudent individual to the possibility that his act was capable of causing the kind of mischief that s 5(2) and (5) were intended to prevent and that the risk of those mischiefs occurring was not so slight that the ordinary prudent individual would justifiably treat it as negligible; and

2. that before doing the act the defendant either failed to give any thought to the possibility of any such risk or, having recognised the possibility, nevertheless went on to do it.

In other words, the recklessness required is foresight of serious harmful consequences. This decision has been criticised on the basis that the need for such foresight ‘seems entirely inappropriate in the context’ and that to ‘insist on the foreseeability of serious consequences to constitute recklessness would be to make that the more serious form of the offence’, that is, more serious than knowingly disclosing personal data in contravention of the legislation.

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Exemptions

There is a long list of exemptions to some or all of the requirements of the Act. The fact that a topic is apparently covered by an exemption does not necessarily imply that the exemption is from the requirements of the Act in toto and the precise terms of the exemption will need to be studied in each case. The so called ‘primary exemptions’ are to be found in ss 28–36 and include national security; four separate categories of crime; taxation; health; education and social work; regulatory activity; research, history and statistics; special purposes (that is, artistic, literary and journalistic purposes); information made available to the public by law; disclosures required by law or in connection with legal proceedings; and domestic purposes. In addition, Sched 7 contains certain ‘miscellaneous exemptions’. The major difference between the two classifications appears to be that the miscellaneous exemptions are more specific in comparison to the potentially wide ranging primary exemptions. They include provisions relating to preparation of confidential references; armed forces; judicial appointments; Crown employment; management forecasts; negotiations; corporate finance; examination scripts and marks; legal professional privilege; and self-incrimination. It is to be hoped that, given that these all represent derogations from the rights originating in the EC Directive, they will be construed narrowly.

FURTHER ASPECTS OF DATA PROTECTION

With data protection, as with other aspects of computer law, there is continual discussion as to whether the law is sufficiently flexible to keep pace with technological change. Even prior to the 1998 Act, this was reflected in successive Reports of the Data Protection Registrar, which included assessments as to how the existing regime might be applied to technological advances.\textsuperscript{105} The need to keep abreast of developments was also referred to in recital 14 of the preamble to Directive 95/46/EC:

Whereas, given the importance of the developments under way, in the framework of the information society, of the techniques used to capture, transmit, manipulate, record, store or communicate sound and image data relating to natural persons, this Directive should be applicable to processing involving such data.

This reflects the fact that advances in the technology have now made it possible not only for personal data, as such, to be transmitted, manipulated and processed, but also for visual and audio material to be used in such ways. As

discussed at the beginning of this chapter, one major advance which is also capable of including these features is the growth in the size and volume of traffic on the internet—the global network. It will be recalled that the original fears expressed about the potential for the abuse of personal data were based on the existence of separate computer networks, a fraction of the size of the internet. Although quantification of such matters cannot be exact, it is presumed that the magnitude of the risk is likely to increase supralinearly with the size of the network.

Eleventh Report of the Data Protection Registrar
Appendix 6

Data Protection and the Internet

...perhaps the most important thing to understand about the Internet is that its whole purpose is to facilitate the exchange of information. It grew up in an academic and research environment where the ready and open exchange of information is the norm, indeed is the lifeblood. It is an open environment; it exists to publicise information; it encourages browsing.

Today, commercial traffic on the Internet exceeds academic traffic, but the intrinsically insecure nature of the Internet environment has not changed. Protecting information runs counter to the culture. Furthermore, the features which make the Internet so attractive to genuine users and to those whose motive is mere idle curiosity also attract those whose interest is far from innocent. The prospect of being able to roam around the world without leaving your desk, with access to, potentially, a million or more computer systems is an exciting one for any hacker.

Any proposal to use the Internet to provide access to personal data or to communicate personal data from one user to another therefore need to be regarded with caution. Merely connecting a system to the Internet poses a risk for personal data on the system, even if there is no intention to use the Internet to access or communicate those data.

There are risks too for individuals who access services on the Internet. Every time you access a service whether it is to make a contribution to a newsgroup or to make a commercial transaction, you are at risk for personal data on the system, even if there is no intention to use the Internet to access or communicate those data.

The internet and, in particular, the growth of the world wide web, with home pages inviting the browser to ‘sign the visitors’ book’, provides many more opportunities for the capture, retention and subsequent processing of personal data. Photographs may be made available on the web, identifying particular persons; such images can then be viewed or downloaded across the world. That
such data is personal is indisputable, but does it render meaningless the restriction of transborder data flows where there are no guarantees of appropriate safeguards? How can the originator of the material know in which jurisdiction the resultant data might be used? When such information is placed on the web by an organisation or institution, how should that organisation’s registration be framed? If the information is made available on an individual’s home page, does that mean that the processing attracts an exemption on the grounds of personal and domestic use? In short, can legislation on data protection cope with this phenomenon? Even if the capability is there, does enforcement and supervision become such a gargantuan task that it becomes impossible, for all practical purposes, to locate and deal with contraventions?

Increasingly, the internet is being used for commercial transactions. The increasing amount of commercial traffic on the open network (rather than an EDI network developed for and dedicated to business use) is a reflection of the increased access of consumers to the network, resulting in consumer transactions as well as purely business-business contracts, and a consequent increase in the transfer of personal data. The use of computer networks for commercial transactions, that is, e-commerce, is growing fast—recent estimates suggest that the global e-commerce market could be worth $1.4 trillion by 2003, while for Europe the current estimate is $17 billion, projected to reach $340 billion by 2003. It is often suggested that the reason why e-commerce is not growing even faster, particularly for business-consumer transactions, is due to a perceived lack of trust and confidence and, specifically, concern about privacy protection. As pointed out by the Art 29 Working Party: 107

The Internet is not a legal vacuum. Processing of personal data on the Internet has to respect data protection principles just as in the off-line world. This does not constitute a limitation of the uses of the Internet, but is on the contrary part of the essentials aiming at ensuring trust and confidence of users in the functioning of the Internet and the services provided over it. Data protection on the Internet is thus an indispensable condition for the take-up of electronic commerce.

In some ways, the 1995 Directive can be regarded as the current ‘state of the art’ as far as data protection legislation is concerned, but will it be able to provide the privacy protection which is a necessary adjunct to other legal frameworks for e-commerce? 108 The difficult issues are not so much the cases where the data subject is aware that data has been collected and used, or even where this information is made available on the internet, since this is, arguably, the type of

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108 See above, Chapter 6.
activity for which data protection law was designed. Rather, the problems arising as a consequence of the traceability of operations online will be in situations where the potential data subject may not be aware that data is being collected and retained.

How should the Directive and implementing legislation be applied in such cases? Although this collection and retention of data may be an inevitable consequence of the use of the internet for many purposes, the correlation of that data with a specific identifiable individual may not be straightforward. Whether such a correlation can be made may be crucial for the application of the Directive. Although directives are legally binding as to the result to be achieved, they leave the choice of form and method for achieving that result to the individual Member State. Notwithstanding the fact that the Data Protection Directive is intended to harmonise data protection provisions throughout all Member States, there is thus the propensity for a certain divergence of approach. Given that the Directive is not explicit in regard to its application to the internet, the manner in which data protection law has developed in the different jurisdictions may be crucial.

One anomalous area which has already been identified is in the interpretation of what constitutes ‘personal’ or ‘nominative’ data. Many jurisdictions, including the UK, require a close link between the data and the individual for data protection law to apply. However, the definition of ‘nominative data’ has been construed rather wider in France, for example, than most other jurisdictions in the EU.\(^{109}\) This difference in scope may be sufficient to bring, for example, the information gathered by ‘cookies’ within the ambit of data protection law in France, whereas this seems unlikely elsewhere because the connection between the data and an identifiable individual in such a case may be tenuous. Given that the objectives of the Directive include not only the protection of the individual but also the removal of obstacles to the free flow of information and the harmonisation of the relevant national provisions, this is clearly a problem which cannot be ignored.

As already discussed, central to the requirements of the 1995 Directive is the need for the consent of the data subject, except in a restricted number of specific situations. A valid consent needs more than an affirmative response; it necessitates the data subject being made aware, at the time that the consent is given, of the intended purposes of processing, likely use of the data, possible disclosures, etc. Even where the collected data can be correlated with a specific identifiable individual, the invisibility of the collection leaves little opportunity for informed consent.

Whether or not European data protection law is capable of fully protecting privacy rights on global networks is a moot point, but an interesting development is the recommendation of anonymity as a privacy protection measure. It is certainly clear that anonymity would effect such protection during commercial transactions on the open network and, as such, resolve some of the consumer protection issues raised by the increased, and increasing, use of e-commerce. Anonymity is therefore being espoused and promoted by a number of intergovernmental and supranational organisations which are active in this area.

**Anonymity on the Internet**

**Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data**

**Recommendation 3/97**

Transactional data are only a threat to individual privacy if the data relate to an identifiable person. Clearly one way of addressing privacy concerns would therefore be to seek to ensure that wherever feasible the data traces created by using the Internet do not permit the identification of the user. With anonymity guaranteed, individuals would be able to participate in the Internet revolution without fear that their every move was being recorded and information about them accumulated which might be used at a later date for purposes to which they object.

The OECD has recommended that the privacy principles enshrined in the 1980 OECD *Guidelines* on data protection should be taken into account, subject to the 1998 Ministerial Declaration on the protection of privacy on global networks. This Declaration reaffirms the continuing applicability of the 1980 *Guidelines*, which are considered to ‘provide a foundation for privacy protection on global networks’. These guidelines do articulate principles of good data management but the problems that have already been outlined, those of application to invisible data collection, will still apply. In addition, they were formulated before the development of computer networks and Kirby, amongst others, has called for a ‘second generation of information privacy principles in harmony with the development of the Internet’. The 1998 OECD Declaration makes further specific recommendations such as the ‘encouragement of privacy enhancing technologies’. This is presumably in accordance with the statement in the recitals that users should be ‘assisted to maintain their anonymity’. The Declaration notes that further encouragement should be given to the adoption of privacy policies, whether implemented by legal, self-regulatory or other means. There

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have been many suggested solutions based on self-regulatory mechanisms. Thus, the Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P) is based on the idea that measures to deal with privacy and data protection are to be agreed between the ‘client’ and the website collecting the data. The supposition is that clients will only consent to collection of their data if the website has an appropriate privacy policy. Setting aside the fact that many websites either do not have a privacy policy or, apparently, do not adhere to the policy they do have, other dangers inherent on relying on this concept as primary protection rather than a useful addition have been identified.

Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) and the Open Profiling Standard (OPS)

Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data

Opinion 1/98

A technical platform for privacy protection will not in itself be sufficient to protect privacy on the Web. It must be applied within the context of a framework of enforceable data protection rules, which provide a minimum and non-negotiable level of privacy protection for all individuals. Use of P3P and OPS in the absence of such a framework risks shifting the onus primarily onto the individual user to protect himself, a development which would undermine the internationally established principle that it is a ‘data controller’ who is responsible for complying with data protection principles... Such an inversion of responsibility also assumes a level of knowledge about the risks posed by data processing to individual privacy that cannot realistically be expected of most citizens.

The clash between legal regulation and industry self-regulation has already been discussed extensively in the context of transborder data flow and the negotiations on the safe harbour principles. In addition, the contents of the EPIC Report (discussed above) make it clear that, in relation to privacy, there is greater polarisation of views in the US than appears to be the case in Europe. The speculation is that this is due to the familiarity with the effects of legal regulation of data protection which has been present in Europe for some time and has been strengthened by the adoption of the 1995 Directive.

The Council of Europe has also made a Recommendation in this area which states in its preamble that there is ‘a need to develop techniques which permit the anonymity of data subjects...while respecting the rights and freedoms of others and the values of a democratic society’. The Recommendation later comments that ‘anonymous access to and use of services, and anonymous means

of making payments, are the best protection of privacy’ and submits, but does not expand upon this point, that, in some cases, ‘complete anonymity may not be appropriate because of legal constraints’ and suggests pseudonymity in such cases.

The Electronic Commerce Directive, adopted in May 2000 to provide a legal framework for e-commerce in the EU, requires full compliance with the Data Protection Directive, but does suggest in one of the recitals that anonymous use cannot be prevented by invoking the 2000 Directive. Anonymity as such is not a feature or requirement of existing data protection law and it is interesting that it has been promoted in this way, given the downside of fostering anonymous use. It must not be forgotten that measures which foster anonymity in order to protect privacy may, incidentally, facilitate or even encourage antisocial and illicit behaviour. This calls not so much for a balancing of rights, perhaps, as a balancing of the relative risk from different threats. Other interests are also fuelling the discussion. Prior to about 1996, the prevailing commentary seemed to suggest that, on balance, allowing, not to mention favouring, anonymity had the propensity to turn cyberspace into the ungovernable space prophesied in the popular press. The subsequent rapid expansion of e-commerce and, therefore, the increasing presence on the internet of large corporate actors, together with the desire of individual governments to promote this type of activity, has tended to reverse the debate. The general perception seems to be that consumer protection issues, including privacy concerns, relating to commercial transactions over the internet have eclipsed other threats. In the words of the EPIC Report, ‘it appears that commercial activity on the internet is driving the increased collection of personal data’.

The following extract from a Commission Report,115 which considered some case studies on methods of assessing adequacy, provides a final, telling comment:

Compliance with fair information practices for the 6 electronic commerce transfers studied is almost wholly dependent on whether the jurisdiction has a comprehensive data protection law. Where no law applies general fair information practices to electronic commerce activities, e-commerce is virtually unregulated for data protection. Voluntary industry codes exist in the jurisdictions without applicable laws, but the extent to which those codes address all elements of fair information practices let alone meet the standards of the data protection directive, is highly variable.

The discussion thus far has described regulatory activity at national and international level which has the objective of providing a suitable framework within which to safeguard users privacy on the internet. At the time of writing, no discussion of such issues can afford not to mention the potential effect of the

115 Op cit, Raab, fn 61.
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, which received the royal assent on 28 July 2000. Far from protecting privacy, this statute gives the Government wide ranging powers, allowing them to monitor all UK internet traffic in the name of law enforcement and national interest. Internet service providers (ISPs) will be obliged to put in place appropriate technology to intercept email and other communications, subject to Codes of Practice which are yet to be drafted. Time alone will tell how this enactment will be implemented and enforced, but at first sight it appears to be a clumsy tool when considering the delicate and diplomatic task of balancing rights and interests.\textsuperscript{116}

\textbf{DEFAMATION}

It is not only a person’s private information that may be compromised by the escalating use of computer networks. Indeed, many reviews of privacy protection in the UK have cited the action for defamation as a central ingredient of privacy protection\textsuperscript{117} and a number of commentators have concurred with the notion that defamation actions can be viewed as a facet of privacy.\textsuperscript{118} Computer networks provide ample opportunity for propagating scurrilous material about others, which may range from the irritating to that which is potentially defamatory or even a form of harassment. This is especially true of the internet, where such activity, known as ‘flaming’, has been raised almost to an art form, with its own brand of rules and etiquette.\textsuperscript{119} It is the growth of news groups and bulletin boards which have really facilitated this kind of activity. Easy communication across the globe naturally spawned discussion groups of people interested in similar topics, ranging from the serious and scholarly to the frivolous and bizarre. These have been variously organised into newsgroups, electronic bulletin boards and electronic mailing lists, for the exchange of views and experiences and the dissemination of information. Although the way in which they are set up and operated varies, they provide similar scope for the promulgation of defamatory material.\textsuperscript{120}

\textsuperscript{116} See, further, the Foundation for Information Policy Research, available at www.fipr.org/rip/index.html.


\textsuperscript{120} See, eg, Braithwaite, N, ‘The internet and bulletin board defamations’ (1995) 145 NLJ 1216.
Whatever their subject matter, both bulletin boards and newsgroups may be moderated or unmoderated, with a corresponding variation in the integrity of the material available. In particular, those intended for an academic or professional readership are likely to be moderated, so that some editorial control is retained. In contrast, it can be the norm for the language used in some unmoderated groups to be somewhat intemperate. The difference being that the normal readership is so different that the use of excessive language does not provoke an avalanche of claims in defamation. In such an environment, Dooley121 suggests that ‘defamation has been elevated to the status of a spectator sport on the information superhighway, with entire bulletin boards being devoted to flaming’.

However, what may be viewed as acceptable by some protagonists may be experienced as ‘vituperative literary battles’122 by those on the receiving end, for which, if they believe their reputation to have been diminished thereby, they may wish to seek redress in a court of law. This should be distinguished from invasion of privacy—what is at stake here is the individual’s standing in the eyes of his or her peers and the way in which the law can protect it. As in the discussion of privacy, this necessitates balancing the protection of an individual’s reputation against the right of others to pass comment on that person’s words and actions. Even in a country like the UK, which has no written constitution, the law has identified the public interest in the freedom of speech in the defences available to an action for defamation such as fair comment, absolute and qualified privilege, etc.

The Australian case of *Rindos v Hardwick*123 was the first libel action to arise as a consequence of information posted to a newsgroup. Rindos, an anthropologist, had been refused tenure at the University of Western Australia. A comment, in support of his work was placed on ANTHRO-L, an electronic bulletin board subscribed to by anthropologists. In response, the defendant sent a vitriolic missive about Rindos to the newsgroup, sci.anthropology, another forum frequently accessed by academic anthropologists. Since this first case, there have been many other instances of alleged defamation committed, and even facilitated, by this medium of communication which have given rise to litigation in a number of jurisdictions. Some of these will feature in the subsequent discussion as the necessary ingredients for an action for defamation are explored...

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in more detail. *Rindos v Hardwick* established that, in principle, libel could be committed via electronic media, but the case did not really have to address any of the difficult issues which might arise.

**Is it libel or slander?**

It is important to establish whether defamation by electronic means falls within the category of libel or slander, because libel is actionable *per se*, whereas slander requires proof of damage. It is generally accepted that defamation which is written and permanent will be libel but that which is audible and purely transient, such as the spoken word, will constitute slander. However, these represent the most clear cut examples and some examples will fall between the two extremes. Most commentators seem to believe that defamation over the internet should be viewed as libel and the judgment of Ipp J in *Rindos v Hardwick* assumes that the criteria for libel are made out. There has been some discussion, however, as to whether the medium provides sufficient permanence.124 What constitutes permanence? *Monson v Tussauds Ltd*125 concerned an exhibition of waxworks in which an effigy of the plaintiff was placed in the entrance to the Chamber of Horrors. Lopes LJ, discussing the various forms that libel could take, pointed out that, although writing or printing was the most usual medium, any other permanent form could suffice, including ‘a statue, a caricature, an effigy, chalk marks on a wall, signs or pictures’. Clearly, there is no general standard of permanence exhibited in these examples—chalk marks can easily be erased and, in this particular case, it was the positioning of the waxwork, a factor which is clearly not inherently permanent, rather than its content, that gave rise to a finding of libel. To what extent can information made available over computer networks be viewed as permanent? Braithwaite and Carolina explain the answer as follows:126

Electronic messages, although seemingly transitory, can be both stored for future reference and redisseminated far more readily than the printed word. Their transience and ease of alteration can be overstated, while their damaging effects may be much harder to eradicate.

This not only assesses the level of permanence but also suggests a policy reason why electronic communication should give rise to actions in libel rather than slander as a result of the potential for damage.

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125 [1894] 1 QB 671.
126 *Op cit*, Braithwaite and Carolina, fn 122.
In 1975, the Faulks Committee on Defamation recommended that the distinction between libel and slander be abolished.\(^{127}\) This was never acted upon but it may be that there is a need for statutory clarification in respect of electronic communication. If that were to be the case, it would not be the first time that the law had intervened in this way. Section 166(1) of the Broadcasting Act 1990 provides that, for the purposes of libel and slander, ‘the publication of words in the course of any programme included in a programme service shall be treated as publication in permanent form’.\(^{128}\)

Is the offending material defamatory?

Although there is no global harmonisation, as such, of the laws of defamation, most jurisdictions provide a remedy for injury to a person’s reputation or integrity,\(^{129}\) although there are likely to be differences of substance and degree, depending on legal form and tradition. Old authority in the UK says that a defamatory statement is one ‘which is calculated to injure the reputation of another by exposing him to hatred, contempt or ridicule’.\(^{130}\) This is a rather narrow view of the nature of defamation and an alternative test is to consider the effect of the offending statement within the boundaries of the space in which the reputation is enjoyed, whether geographical or social. This has been expressed in the somewhat archaic sounding formulation of Lord Atkin as to whether the statement was one which would tend ‘to lower the [claimant] in the estimation of right thinking members of society generally’.\(^{131}\) Gibbons makes the point that the use of this test ‘reflects the idea that an external assessment has been made of the person’s behaviour and characteristics, and that it represents the views of a group or a community or interests, for example, neighbours, colleagues, clientele, customers or the public at large’.\(^{132}\) The case law on defamation in more traditional media is not particularly helpful in defining the relevant society for these purposes, but this may be a crucial issue in relation to defamation on the internet and world wide web. Despite the global nature of this medium, it would clearly be erroneous to suppose that, in the majority of cases, reputations were, themselves, also global.

There are a number of potential delimitations on the scope of societal boundaries in cyberspace. These may be geographical, or perhaps linguistic: a

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127 Cmnd 5909, 1975, London: HMSO.
128 See, also, the Theatres Act 1968, s 4.
130 Parmiter v Coupland (1840) 6 M & W 105, p 108, per Parke B.
131 Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237, p 1240.
person’s reputation may only subsist in a particular physical location. Thus, even though material published on the internet may be accessible outside this area (see, further, below), there may be no damage arising as a result of the alleged defamation if, in fact, there is no reputation to be impugned. Even within the apparently anarchic, amorphous and disorganised world of cyberspace, individuals will consciously or unconsciously impose their own limits on use and these may serve to delineate the areas in which their reputations are likely to subsist. A range of geographical jurisdictions may be encompassed but this need not, necessarily, imply that all potential users in those jurisdictions are included. Thus, habitual contributors to particular bulletin boards, newsgroups, etc, may enjoy a certain reputation among other users in those groups but not within the jurisdiction at large. As already discussed, there are a vast range of newsgroups, for instance, ranging from the staid and sober to the scurrilous and seditious. In those where the common mode of expression is immoderate or even vituperative, it may be that defamation becomes more difficult to establish, as there may be little evidence that the allegedly offending statement actually damaged the reputation amongst the members of that society. Clearly, the way in which the relevant society is defined and constituted may be crucial and, as yet, there is little guidance from the courts.

Given that defamation is an intrinsically personal wrong providing a remedy for injury to reputation, it is essential that there must be no confusion as to whom the statement refers. Although a definitive test has proved elusive, it does not mean that the statement need be ‘about’ the targeted person as such. In Lunney v Prodigy Services Co,133 which concerned emails to bulletin boards apparently posted by Lunney, the New York State Court of Appeals had to decide whether statements which were not directly about the plaintiff but were ascribed to him could be regarded as defamatory. The first instance court had inclined to the view that in such cases there was no defamation because, although the statements in question purported to have been written by Lunney, they were not ‘of or concerning’ him. Although the majority of the argument in both courts centred on the issue of publication (see below), the view of the Court of Appeals was that Lunney was ‘defamed by being portrayed as the author of the foul material’.

Publication

The purpose of the tort of defamation is to protect reputation rather than injury to feelings caused by insults addressed only to the claimant/plaintiff, for instance. Thus, there will only be a cause of action where there is publication of

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the libel to a third party.\textsuperscript{134} One of the dangers of participation in electronic discussion groups for the unsuspecting defendant is that it can, at times, appear very like a one-to-one interchange; it can be easy to forget that the contents may be mailed to others or available to others who choose to access a particular newsgroup. It is also true that newsgroups and bulletin boards aimed at academics and professional users are increasingly specialised in content and may attract a significant proportion of readers amongst that particular interest group. Thus, the potential for damaging an individual reputation in the eyes of others working in the same field can be high. In the words of Braithwaite and Carolina:\textsuperscript{135}

\begin{quote}
...bulletin boards are often the chosen method of correspondence in certain fields of study. Scurrilous bulletin board messages, even if not widely disseminated by conventional mass media standards, may be nicely targeted to achieve maximum damage to professional or business reputations.
\end{quote}

They also have this to say in relation to the fact of publication itself:

\begin{quote}
When does publication occur? Is information published when data are copied to or stored on individual host computers or is it only when the information is actually communicated to the end user? Principle suggests that the actual communication is necessary, not mere availability, since the gist of defamation is actual or presumed damage to reputation flowing from publication. On the other hand, it would be onerous to expect a plaintiff to prove that stored information had been accessed.
\end{quote}

There is old authority which suggests that actual \textit{communication} to the third party may not be necessary to show publication.

\textbf{R v Burdett}

\textit{(1820) 4 B & Ald 95, p 126}

It is assumed that publication means a manifestation of the contents. I deny that such is the meaning of the word publication. In no part of the law do I find that it is used in that sense. A man publishes an award, but he does not read it. Again, he publishes a will, but he does not manifest its contents to those to whom he makes the publication; he merely desires the witnesses to take notice at the paper to which they affix their different attestations is his will. So in the case of a libel, publication is nothing more than doing the last act for the accomplishment of the mischief intended by it. The moment a man delivers a libel from his hands his control over it is gone; he has shot his arrow, and it does not depend upon him whether it hits the mark or not. There is an end of the \textit{locus pœnitentiæ}, his offence is complete, all that depends upon him is consummated, and from that moment, upon every principle of common sense, he is liable to be called upon to answer for his act. Suppose a man wraps up a newspaper and sends it into another county by a boy; who is the publisher? The boy who perhaps cannot read or is ignorant of its

\textsuperscript{134} But, for offensive and insulting email intended only for the recipient, a charge under the Malicious Communications Act 1988 may be possible.

\textsuperscript{135} \textit{Op cit}, Braithwaite and Carolina, fn 122.
contents, or the man who has put it in the envelope? The boy who carries it is merely an innocent instrument; there can be no other publisher but the person who sent it, and who publishes when he delivers it to the boy. If the sending of a letter by the post be not a publication in the county from whence it is sent, how is a libeller to be punished who sends his libel by the post to some foreign country for circulation?

In contrast, in the light of the current technological environment, the question has arisen as to whether the mere fact that publications via computer networks are accessible globally is equivalent to publication in all jurisdictions simultaneously for the purposes of defamation law. In the Australian case of Macquarie Bank v Berg, Simpson J in the New South Wales Supreme Court denied interlocutory relief on the basis that any effects of the injunction could not be restricted to New South Wales, but would also impact on the rest of the world, since, ‘once published on the internet, material can be received anywhere, and it does not lie within the competence of the publisher to restrict the reach of the publication’.

**Macquarie Bank v Berg**

[1999] NSWSC 526

Supreme Court of New South Wales

13 The consequence is that, if I were to make the order sought (and the defendant were to obey it) he would be restrained from publishing anywhere in the world via the medium of the internet.

The difficulties are obvious. An injunction to restrain defamation in NSW is designed to ensure compliance with the laws of NSW, and to protect the rights of plaintiffs, as those rights are defined by the law of NSW. Such an injunction is not designed to superimpose the law of NSW relating to defamation on every other state, territory and country of the world. Yet that would be the effect of an order restraining publication on the internet. It is not to be assumed that the law of defamation in other countries is coextensive with that of NSW, and indeed, one knows that it is not. It may very well be that, according to the law of the Bahamas, Tazhakstain or Mongolia, the defendant has an unfettered right to publish the material. To make an order interfering with such a right would exceed the proper limits of the use of the injunctive power sought.

This view has been doubted on the basis that it is an oversimplification and arguably misunderstands the technology—the alternative is that the nature and operation of this medium of communication is such that mere accessibility should not automatically be equated with publication in this medium.

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Chapter 7: Information Technology Law

Defamation on the internet—
a duty free zone after all?
Uta Kohl

The tort of defamation occurs where the defamatory imputation is published. This is turn raises the issues as to what amounts to ‘publication’ and how this applies to the medium of the Internet. Does world-wide accessibility equate with world-wide publication and, if not, where is the material put on the Internet actually published? In defamation, the defamatory imputation is published if it is communicated to some person or persons other than the plaintiff himself. With the emphasis being on communication or the making known of the defamatory imputation, it is not enough merely to write defamatory words and it is not even enough to deliver a defamatory statement to another if the other person does not become aware of the defamatory words. Similarly, publication is generally not equivalent to the mere posting of a message, but only becomes complete when the communication reaches the addressee. While it is not necessary for the plaintiff in all cases to prove directly that the defamatory matter was brought to the actual knowledge of anyone, publication is only established if the plaintiff makes it a matter of reasonable inference that such was the case…it must be probable or a matter of reasonable inference that someone actually read the defamatory imputation after it was sent. Therefore, the question in the Internet context is, how probable is it that a particular website is being accessed by someone other than the plaintiff, in the absence of positive evidence of such access? And for those who assume putting a website on the Internet equates with worldwide publication, it must not merely be probable that someone accessed the site but that someone in every jurisdiction accessed it. While this may at first not appear to be difficult to prove, it must be appreciated that there are more than 14.8 million domain names registered world-wide and it can be assumed that the number of individual web pages must be in the 100 millions. Given the sheer number of websites the Internet must be distinguished from television and radio broadcasts. Mere accessibility of these media has been held to equate with publication of their programmes, that is, publication is presumed to occur in all areas to which their waves are transmitted. This is because (given the relatively limited number of radio or TV channels and the great number of viewers and listeners) it is highly probable that someone in each area will actually switch on and view or listen to the particular programme. In contrast, with the Internet it is not at all probable that every website will be accessed in every jurisdiction where it can theoretically be accessed. Some states have clearly a much greater Internet presence than others. This may make it probable that even an obscure site is accessed in a state such as the United States but not necessarily in one which is hardly connected to the Internet. So, if as a matter of reasonable inference, it cannot be assumed that any site put on the Internet and theoretically accessible from anywhere is in fact accessed everywhere, where then can publication be assumed? This is a question of fact which will depend on the circumstances of each particular case.

This analysis suggests that some statistical evaluation of the likelihood of communication in any specified jurisdiction will be required to raise a
presumption that publication has in fact occurred. A presumption that there had been no publication in a particular jurisdiction could, however, be rebutted by evidence of actual access. Support for the view that publication can be equated with actual access can be found in the judgment of Morland J in *Godfrey v Demon Internet*,\(^{137}\) when he remarked that:

> In my judgment, the defendant, whenever it transmits and whenever there is transmitted from the storage of its news server a defamatory posting, publish that posting to any subscriber to its ISP who accesses the newsgroup containing that posting. Thus, every time one of the defendant’s customers accesses ‘soc.culture.thai’ and sees that posting defamatory of the plaintiff, there is a publication to that customer.

Although, arguably, this approach may represent a more realistic evaluation of the fact of publication at first sight, it may appear to be beset by evidential difficulties. In reality, the method might be assisted by two factors. The first is technical: many websites have facilities for recording ‘hits’ and such records may give an indication of the jurisdictions where access has occurred and, *prima facie*, the material has been published. Also, as discussed above, it is not possible to damage a reputation where none exists and the nature of many reputations in this medium is that they may be parochial in either the physical (reputation enjoyed in a particular location) or virtual (reputation confined to those who use a particular newsgroup, etc) sense. The possibility of publication in all jurisdictions will only be of real significance to those who actually have a global reputation to protect.

**Who is liable for the publication?**

It is not only the author of a libel who may be liable, but anyone who participates in the publication of the defamatory matter; this might include the publisher, editor, printer and distributor. It may be that mere distributors have no cause to suspect the existence of a libel in the material in question and, in such a case, they may be able to avail themselves of the defence of innocent dissemination. This was originally established in the case of *Emmens v Pottle*\(^ {138}\) and applies where the defendant had no reason to believe that the publication in question contained a libel and this ignorance did not arise from negligence on the part of the defendant. A particular concern for networked information is the extent of the liability of the bulletin board operator (BBO) or the ISP. Are they akin to distributors, so that the defence of innocent dissemination could be applied, or are they, in reality, more like editors or publishers? Two cases from the US, where a similar defence is available, illustrate the two sides of the coin.

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137 [1999] 4 All ER 342, p 347.
138 (1885) 16 QBD 354.
Chapter 7: Information Technology Law

Cubby Inc v CompuServe Inc\(^{139}\) concerned an online service provider which provided access to a bulletin board, monitored by an independent company which exerted editorial control. A newsletter called Rumorville was available via the bulletin board. The case arose as a consequence of the development by the plaintiff of a news database which would be likely to be in competition with Rumorville. When certain allegedly defamatory remarks were then made about the plaintiff in the newsletter, a libel action was brought against, inter alia, CompuServe, the service provider:

The requirement that a distributor must have knowledge of the contents of a publication before liability can be imposed for distributing that publication is deeply rooted in the First Amendment, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. ‘[T]he constitutional guarantees of the freedom of speech and of the press stand in the way of imposing’ strict liability on distributors for the contents of the reading materials they carry… In [Smith v California (1959)]…the court reasoned that ‘Every bookseller would be placed under an obligation to make himself aware of the contents of every book in his shop, it would be altogether unreasonable to demand so near an approach to omniscience’.

... Technology is rapidly transforming the information industry. A computerised database is the functional equivalent of a more traditional news vendor, and the inconsistent application of a lower standard of liability to an electronic news distributor such as CompuServe than that which is applied to a public library, book store or newsstand would impose an undue burden on the free flow of information. Given the relevant First Amendment considerations, the appropriate standard of liability to be applied to CompuServe is whether it knew or had reason to know of the allegedly defamatory Rumorville statements.

The court went on to find that CompuServe were not liable for the defamation, because they ‘neither knew nor had reason to know of the allegedly defamatory Rumorville statements’. The issue of whether a database operator exercising editorial control over content might be construed as a publisher rather than a distributor and, in consequence, be unable to avail themselves of this ‘distributor’s defence’ was left open.

In contrast, the circumstances in Stratton Oakmont Inc v PRODIGY Services Co\(^{140}\) were to lead to a different result. Derogatory comments and accusations about the plaintiff company were posted on a bulletin board made available by PRODIGY and an action was taken against them for libel:

A distributor, or deliverer of defamatory material, is considered a passive conduit and found liable in the absence of fault… However, a newspaper, for example, is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment and advertising… The choice of material to go into a newspaper and the decisions

\(^{139}\) 776 F Supp 135 (SDNY 1991), available at epic.org/free_speech/cubby_v_compuserve.txt.

made as to the content of the paper constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment...and with this increased control comes increased liability. In short, the critical issue to be determined by this court is whether the... evidence establishes a prima facie case that PRODIGY exercised sufficient editorial control over its computer bulletin boards to render it a publisher with the same responsibilities as a newspaper.

The court found that Prodigy not only held itself out as controlling the contents of its bulletin boards but also that it implemented this control through an automatic software screening program. The court was therefore ‘compelled to conclude that... PRODIGY is a publisher rather than a distributor’ and was therefore liable for the defamatory remarks. The court did, however, point out that they fully agreed with the decision in Cubby and that ‘computer bulletin boards should generally be regarded in the same context as bookstores, libraries and network affiliates’.

Although these two decisions can be reconciled on the basis of the extent of editorial control, concentrating on this aspect alone masks a vigorous debate over the extent to which ISPs should be held liable\(^\text{141}\) for the content of material to which they provide access. This is a debate which, as we shall see, has not been resolved and to which different answers pertain in different jurisdictions.

In the US, cases such as Cubby and Stratton were superseded by statutory intervention in the form of s 230 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.\(^\text{142}\)

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141 See, also, below, p 494.

142 Also referred to as the Communications Decency Act. For discussion of other provisions of this statute see below, p 486.
(3) The Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.

(4) The Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation.

(5) Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a variety of political, educational, cultural, and entertainment services.

(b) Policy—It is the policy of the United States:

(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and other interactive media;

(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation;

(3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control over what information is received by individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer services;

(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online material; and

(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer.

(c) Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ Blocking and Screening of Offensive Material

(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker—No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.

(2) Civil liability—No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of—

(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or

(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1).

(e) Definitions—As used in this section:

(1) Internet—The term ‘Internet’ means the international computer network of both Federal and non-Federal interoperable packet switched data networks.

(2) Interactive computer service—The term ‘interactive computer service’ means any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.
(3) Information content provider—The term ‘information content provider’ means any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.

(4) Access software provider—The term ‘access software provider’ means a provider of software (including client or server software), or enabling tools that do any one or more of the following:

(A) filter, screen, allow, or disallow content;
(B) pick, choose, analyze, or digest content; or
(C) transmit, receive, display, forward, cache, search, subset, organize, reorganize, or translate content.

Section 230(a) and (b) provide the context within which s 230(c)(1) gives ISPs an immunity from suit in relation to material provided by others. The application of this provision in cases of online defamation was first discussed in Zeran v America Online,143 a case arising out of the imputation to Zeran of offensive and tasteless slogans related to the Oklahoma bombings. The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was in little doubt as to the effect of s 230(c)(1):

By its plain language, § 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for information originating with a third party user of the service. Specifically, § 230 precludes courts from entertaining claims that would place a computer service provider in a publisher’s role. Thus, lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content—are barred.

The court considered the context within which the provision was intended to operate. It cited s 230(a)(4) and pointed out that, whilst vigorous enforcement might be necessary against those who introduced illicit material (s 230(b)(5)), Congress had made a policy choice ‘not to deter harmful online speech through the separate route of imposing tort liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for other parties’ potentially injurious messages’. A major reason for this is the immense practical difficulty for ISPs, given the sheer volume of traffic for which they could be held responsible, coupled with the potentially restrictive effects on freedom of speech if ISPs were to take an unduly restrictive approach in order to ensure the avoidance of liability. The court noted also that a further purpose in forbidding the imposition of publisher liability was to encourage self-regulation.

143 Available at www.techlawjournal.com/courts/zeran/71112opn.htm.
Chapter 7: Information Technology Law

The issue in Zeran was whether such immunity extended also to the liability of distributors. Zeran contended that the terms ‘publisher’ and ‘distributor’ were legally distinct and that s 230 left distributor liability intact. On this reasoning, AOL would still be liable if they had actual knowledge of the defamatory statements. The court could not concur with this argument and neither did it believe that its view was necessarily out of line with the decisions reached in Cubby and Stratton.

Zeran v America Online Inc
US Ct App 4th Cir
12 November 1997

The terms ‘publisher’ and ‘distributor’ derive their legal significance from the context of defamation law... Because the publication of a statement is a necessary element in a defamation action, only one who publishes can be subject to this form of tort liability... Publication does not only describe the choice by an author to include certain information. In addition, both the negligent communication of a defamatory statement and the failure to remove such a statement when first communicated by another party...constitute publication... In fact, every repetition of a defamatory statement is considered a publication.

In this case, AOL is legally considered to be a publisher. ‘[E]very one who takes part in the publication is charged with publication.’ Even distributors are considered to be publishers for purposes of defamation law.

Those who are in the business of making their facilities available to disseminate the writings composed, the speeches made, and the information gathered by others may also be regarded as participating to such an extent in making the books, newspapers, magazines, and information available to others as to be regarded as publishers. They are intentionally making the contents available to others, sometimes without knowing all of the contents—including the defamatory content—and sometimes without any opportunity to ascertain, in advance, that any defamatory matter was to be included in the matter published. AOL falls squarely within this traditional definition of a publisher and, therefore, is clearly protected by § 230’s immunity.

Zeran contends that decisions like Stratton Oakmont and Cubby Inc v CompuServe Inc 776 F Supp 135 (SDNY 1991) recognize a legal distinction between publishers and distributors. He misapprehends, however, the significance of that distinction for the legal issue we consider here. It is undoubtedly true that mere conduits, or distributors, are subject to a different standard of liability. As explained above, distributors must at a minimum have knowledge of the existence of a defamatory statement as a prerequisite to liability. But this distinction signifies only that different standards of liability may be applied within the larger publisher category, depending on the specific type of publisher concerned... To the extent that decisions like Stratton and Cubby utilize the terms ‘publisher’ and ‘distributor’ separately, the decisions correctly describe two different standards of liability. Stratton and Cubby do not, however, suggest that
distributors are not also a type of publisher for purposes of defamation law.

Zeran simply attaches too much importance to the presence of the distinct notice element in distributor liability. The simple fact of notice surely cannot transform one from an original publisher to a distributor in the eyes of the law. To the contrary, once a computer service provider receives notice of a potentially defamatory posting, it is thrust into the role of a traditional publisher. The computer service provider must decide whether to publish, edit, or withdraw the posting. In this respect, Zeran seeks to impose liability on AOL for assuming the role for which § 230 specifically proscribes liability—the publisher role...

Zeran next contends that interpreting § 230 to impose liability on service providers with knowledge of defamatory content on their services is consistent with the statutory purposes outlined in Part IIA. Zeran fails, however, to understand the practical implications of notice liability in the interactive computer service context. Liability upon notice would defeat the dual purposes advanced by § 230 of the CDA.

Later cases have largely followed the same line of reasoning, although some notes of concern have been voiced in relation to the issue of notice (Doe v AOL)\textsuperscript{144} and the actual or potential behaviour of ISPs, as shown in the following extract.

**Blumenthal and Blumenthal v Drudge and America Online Inc**

US DC (Colum), 22 April 1998

www.techlawjournal.com/courts/drudge/80423opin.htm

If it were writing on a clean slate, this Court would agree with plaintiffs. AOL has certain editorial rights with respect to the content provided by Drudge and disseminated by AOL, including the right to require changes in content and to remove it; and it has affirmatively promoted Drudge as a new source of unverified instant gossip on AOL. Yet it takes no responsibility for any damage he may cause. AOL is not a passive conduit like the telephone company, a common carrier with no control and therefore no responsibility for what is said over the telephone wires. Because it has the right to exercise editorial control over those with whom it contracts and whose words it disseminates, it would seem only fair to hold AOL to the liability standards applied to a publisher or, at least, like a book store owner or library, to the liability standards applied to a distributor. But Congress has made a different policy choice by providing immunity even where the interactive service provider has an active, even aggressive role in making available content prepared by others. In some sort of tacit *quid pro quo* arrangement with the service provider community, Congress has conferred immunity from tort liability as an incentive to Internet service providers to self-policing the Internet for obscenity and other offensive material, even where the self-policing is

unsuccessful or not even attempted... While it appears to this Court that AOL in this case has taken advantage of all the benefits conferred by Congress in the Communications Decency Act, and then some, without accepting any of the burdens that Congress intended, the statutory language is clear: AOL is immune from suit, and the Court therefore must grant its motion for summary judgment.

Further, in *Lunney v PRODIGY Services*, the lower court found PRODIGY not to be liable by applying common law principles and believed this outcome to be ‘in complete harmony with current Federal statutory law contained in the Communications Decency Act (47 USC § 230 *et seq*’). There was thus no need to decide ‘the essentially academic question of whether this Federal statute would apply to all or part of the allegations’. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit\(^{145}\) dismissed Lunney’s appeal, stating that ‘the public would not be well served by compelling an ISP to examine and screen millions of email communications, on pain of liability for defamation’, but nevertheless declined to come down on either side of the debate set out in *Zeran* in relation to the immunity afforded by 47 USC s 230.

A quite different situation pertains in the UK, although, as yet, only one case has come before the courts. The Defamation Act 1996 includes a statutory version of the innocent dissemination defence.

**Defamation Act 1996**

1 **Responsibility for publication**

   (1) In defamation proceedings a person has a defence if he shows that—

   (a) he was not the author, editor or publisher of the statement complained of;  
   (b) he took reasonable care in relation to its publication; and  
   (c) he did not know, and had no reason to believe, that what he did caused or contributed to the publication of a defamatory statement.

   (2) For this purpose ‘author’, ‘editor’ and ‘publisher’ have the following meanings…

   ‘author’ means the originator of the statement, but does not include a person who did not intend that his statement be published at all;  
   ‘editor’ means a person having editorial or equivalent responsibility for the content of the statement or the decision to publish it; and  
   ‘publisher’ means a commercial publisher, that is, a person whose business is issuing material to the public, or a section of the public, who issues material containing the statement in the course of that business.

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145 See www.law.cornell.edu/ny/ctap/I99_0165.htm; decision affirmed by the Supreme Court, 1 May 2000.
This suggests that ISPs may escape liability if they act purely as distributors and, to an extent, this is clarified in the subsequent subsections.

**Defamation Act 1996**

1 **Responsibility for publication**

(3) A person shall not be considered the author, editor or publisher of a statement if he is only involved...

(c) In processing, making copies of, distributing or selling any electronic medium in or on which the statement is recorded, or in operating or providing any equipment, system or service by means of which the statement is retrieved, copied, distributed or made available in electronic form...

(5) In determining for the purposes of this section whether a person took reasonable care, or had reason to believe that what he did caused or contributed to the publication of the defamatory statement, regard shall be had to—

(a) the extent of his responsibility for the content of the statement or the decision to publish it;

(b) the nature or circumstances of the publication; and

(c) the previous conduct or character of the author, editor or publisher.

The effect of this is clearly quite different from the operation of 47 USC s 230 and its subsequent interpretation. The Defamation Act 1996 causes liability not to fall on those who are not deemed to be publishers, whereas the US statute provides actual immunity from suit for all those who fall within the ambit of the term ‘publisher’. Although pure distributors may escape liability, the situation is much less clear with respect to BBOs and similar activities. Where there is editorial control over the content, then the defence would fall at the first hurdle, in s 1(1)(a). The situation would presumably be similar for a moderated newsgroup. This does not automatically mean that it would be safer to operate an unmoderated bulletin board or newsgroup (in any case, this might be undesirable for other reasons) because a presumption may arise that such a BBO should be aware of the likely traffic on the board to which they provide access and it could be that they would be unable then to satisfy s 1(1)(b) and/or (c). For an unmoderated newsgroup, in particular, it may, in any case, be difficult to identify any appropriate defendant. This might suggest that there could be policy reasons for allowing liability to fall on the service provider in certain cases.

The application of these provisions of in a case of alleged defamation on an internet newsgroup arose in *Godfrey v Demon Internet*. As in *Lunney*, this case concerned a ‘squalid and obscene’ email posting which purported to come from
the claimant. At the interlocutory hearing, there was no argument that this could not constitute defamation and, indeed, the hearing proceeded on the basis that the offending material was defamatory. The discussion centred instead on whether the ISP, Demon, could rely on the defence provided in s 1 of the Defamation Act 1996, given that Godfrey had notified Demon that the posting was a forgery for which he was not responsible and had asked that they remove it from the news server. In Morland J’s opinion, Demon was ‘clearly not the publisher of the posting defamatory of the [claimant] within the meaning of s 1(2) and (3) and incontrovertibly can avail itself of s 1(1)(a)’. Section 1(1)(b) and (c) were to prove more problematic for Demon and the fact that it knew of the defamatory posting but chose not to remove it from its Usenet news servers was deemed to place it ‘in an insuperable difficulty so that it cannot avail itself of the defence provided by s 1’.

The court compared this outcome with that in a much older case, that of *Byrne v Dean*.147 In this case, the person who was in control of the contents of a physical noticeboard in a private club was held to be responsible for the publication of a defamatory notice posted by someone else, on the grounds of her failure to remove the offending notice.

*Byrne v Dean*

[1937] 1 KB 818, p 837

**Greene LJ**...publication, of course, is a question of fact and it must depend on the circumstances in each case whether or not publication has taken place. It is said that as a general proposition where the act of a person alleged to have published a libel has not been any positive act, but has merely been the refraining from doing some act, he cannot be guilty of publication. I am quite unable to accept any such general proposition. It may very well be that in some circumstances a person, by refraining from removing or obliterating the defamatory matter, is not committing any publication at all. In other circumstances he may be doing so. The test it appears to me is this: having regard to all the facts of the case is the proper inference that by not removing the defamatory matter the defendant really made himself responsible for its continued presence in the place where it had been put?

Greene LJ went on to explain that there might be certain cases in which it would be difficult for someone in the position of the defendant to remedy the matter, but:

On the other hand, you have a case such as the present where the removal of this particular notice was a perfectly simple and easy thing to do, involving no trouble whatsoever. The defendants, having the power to remove it, and being able to do it without any difficulty at all, and, knowing that members of the club when they came into the room would see it, I think must be taken

147 [1937] 1 KB 818.
to have elected deliberately to leave it there. The proper inference, therefore, in those circumstances, it seems to me, is that they were consenting parties to its continued presence on the spot where it had been put up. That being so, it seems to me that they must be taken to have consented to its publication to each member who saw it.

Would ISPs be in the first or second of Greene LJ’s categories? How difficult is it for them to remedy such a matter on notice? It is clear that ISPs have the power to remove an offending message, but other factors may nevertheless conspire to make removal a less than simple matter. Compare the view of this issue taken by the court in Zeran.

Zeran v America Online Inc
US Ct App 4th Cir, 12 November 1997

...liability upon notice reinforces service providers’ incentives to restrict speech and abstain from self-regulation. If computer service providers were subject to distributor liability, they would face potential liability each time they receive notice of a potentially defamatory statement from any party, concerning any message. Each notification would require a careful yet rapid investigation of the circumstances surrounding the posted information, a legal judgment concerning the information’s defamatory character, and an on-the-spot editorial decision whether to risk liability by allowing the continued publication of that information. Although this might be feasible for the traditional print publisher, the sheer number of postings on interactive computer services would create an impossible burden in the Internet context... Because service providers would be subject to liability only for the publication of information, and not for its removal, they would have a natural incentive simply to remove messages upon notification, whether the contents were defamatory or not... Thus, like strict liability, liability upon notice has a chilling effect on the freedom of Internet speech.

Similarly, notice-based liability would deter service providers from regulating the dissemination of offensive material over their own services. Any efforts by a service provider to investigate and screen material posted on its service would only lead to notice of potentially defamatory material more frequently and thereby create a stronger basis for liability. Instead of subjecting themselves to further possible lawsuits, service providers would likely eschew any attempts at self-regulation. More generally, notice-based liability for interactive computer service providers would provide third parties with a no-cost means to create the basis for future lawsuits. Whenever one was displeased with the speech of another party conducted over an interactive computer service, the offended party could simply ‘notify’ the relevant service provider, claiming the information to be legally defamatory.
In light of the vast amount of speech communicated through interactive computer services, these notices could produce an impossible burden for service providers, who would be faced with ceaseless choices of suppressing controversial speech or sustaining prohibitive liability.

Advances such as the internet and the world wide web have made electronic publishing a very accessible operation, often without the need for any participation by a publishing company, as such. It is entirely possible that the situation could arise where, unlike traditional forms of publishing, only the original author could be liable if the circumstances were such that the service provider could avail themselves of this defence. This could be an undesirable outcome, not least because it may make it difficult to bring an action against the author, if he or she happens to be in a different jurisdiction (see below). Compare the rather stricter view of the liability of distributors in the context of contempt of court, especially where this has arisen in another jurisdiction; this difference appears to emanate from policy considerations.

_R v Griffiths and Others ex p AG_
_[1957] 2 All ER 379_, p 383

**Lord Goddard CJ**…we are holding that to those who in the way of their trade are responsible for putting the offending matter into circulation the defence of innocent dissemination is not available in cases of contempt… We accept unreservedly that neither of these respondents…knew of these scandalous paragraphs and we recognise that they immediately took every step in their power to stop the circulation as soon as their attention was directed to the matter. It is regrettable that in holding them guilty of a contempt we cannot also deal with those who are far more responsible but are out of the jurisdiction. We shall impose a fine…and we do so to emphasis the risk which is run by dealing in foreign publications imported here but which have no responsible editor or manager in this country. The distributors are the only persons who can in these circumstances be made amenable in the courts of this country. Now that the risk and responsibility have been exposed by this case, should offences occur in the future similar leniency may not be extended. It was argued that, if these two respondents are liable, so every small newsagent or street seller who sells the paper would equally be liable. Logically this may be so, but the court would not regard with favour applications against such persons to whom no real blame would attach. This jurisdiction is discretionary and the court can be trusted not to exercise it except against those who can fairly be said to bear some real responsibility for the publication.

Clearly, there are certain important differences between the policy considerations which pertain in cases of libel on the one hand, and contempt of court on the other. It remains to be seen in what manner the statutory defence will be applied if the electronic equivalent of the situation described above occurs in relation to either libel or contempt.
In *R v Griffiths*, the distributors of a contempt of court were found liable on the basis that they were ‘the only persons who can...be made amenable in the courts of this country’. What is the situation in respect of cross-border libel? Where can the claimant bring an action? The decision as to whether the English courts will have jurisdiction depends on matters of some complexity, but one factor may be the existence of agreements between the countries in question. Following *Shevill and Others v Presse Alliance SA*, the situation has been clarified, so far as those countries which are signatories to the Brussels and Lugano Conventions are concerned. The case concerned a French newspaper, *France Soir*, published by Presse Alliance, that had its major circulation in France but also had a small circulation in England. An article in this newspaper suggested that Ms Shevill, who had worked temporarily at a bureau de change in Paris, together with her employers and others, was implicated in the laundering of the proceeds of drug trafficking. As the plaintiff was English and domiciled in England, an action was brought in England, claiming damages for the publication of the libel there.

Article 5(3) of the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 1968 (the Brussels Convention) allows a claimant/plaintiff to bring an action in ‘the place where the harmful event occurred’. The defendants, Presse Alliance, argued that the court had no jurisdiction to hear the case as the harmful event had taken place in France and no damage had actually been shown in England. The English law of libel presumes damage once publication has been demonstrated. The Court of Appeal held that the matter of the damage being presumed was not an issue of jurisdiction as such and that ‘the place where the harmful event occurred’ could be construed as referring to both the place where the tortious act occurred and the place where the damage was suffered. Thus, where an act was done in one State which caused damage in another, the plaintiff could choose to bring an action in either State.

On appeal, the House of Lords referred several questions to the European Court of Justice (ECJ).

*Shevill and Others v Presse Alliance SA*  
[1995] All ER (EC) 289

1 In a case of libel by a newspaper article, do the words ‘the place where the harmful event occurred’ in Article 5(3) of the Convention mean: (a) the place where the newspaper was printed and put into circulation; or (b) the place or places where the newspaper was read by particular

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149 Incorporated into domestic law by the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Acts 1982 and 1991. See, also, above, p 256.  
150 [1992] 1 All ER 409.
individuals; or (c) the place or places where the plaintiff has a significant reputation?

2 If and in so far as the answer to the first question is (b), is ‘the harmful event’ dependent upon there being a reader or readers who knew (or knew of) the plaintiff and understood those words to refer to him?

3 If and in so far as harm is suffered in more than one country (because copies of the newspaper were distributed in at least Member State other than the Member State where it was printed and put into circulation), does a separate harmful event or harmful events take place in each Member State where the newspaper was distributed, in respect of which such Member State has separate jurisdiction under Article 5(3), and if so, how harmful must the event be, or what proportion of the total harm must it represent?

4 Does the phrase ‘harmful event’ include an event actionable under national law without proof of damage, where there is no evidence of actual damage or harm?

5 In deciding under Article 5(3) whether (or where) a ‘harmful event’ has occurred is the local court expected to answer the question otherwise than by reference to its own rules and, if so, by reference to which other rules or substantive law, procedure or evidence?

6 If, in a defamation case, the local court concludes that there has been an actionable publication (or communication) of material, as a result of which at least some damage to reputation would be presumed, is it relevant to the acceptance of jurisdiction that other Member States might come to a different conclusion in respect of similar material published within their respective jurisdictions?

7 In deciding whether it has jurisdiction under Article 5(3) of the Convention, what standard of proof should a court require of the plaintiff that the conditions of Article 5(3) are satisfied: (a) generally; and (b) in relation to matters which (if the court takes jurisdiction) will not be re-examined at the trial of the action?

These questions would clearly have relevance in cases where the libel had been perpetrated by electronic means, provided that the relevant ingredients, such as publication in a particular Member State, had been established. The ECJ divided the questions into two, according to whether they concerned questions of jurisdiction or assessment of damage.

*Shevill and Others v Presse Alliance SA*

[1995] All ER (EC) 289, p 317

33 …the answer to the first, second, third and sixth questions referred by the House of Lords must be that, on a proper construction of the expression ‘place where the harmful event occurred’ in Article 5(3) of the Convention, the victim of a libel by a newspaper article distributed in several Contracting States may bring an action for damages against the publisher either before the courts of the Contracting State where the publisher of the defamatory publication is established, which have jurisdiction to
award damages for all the harm caused by the defamation, or before the courts of each Contracting State in which the publication was distributed and where the victim claims to have suffered injury to his reputation, which have jurisdiction to rule solely in respect of the harm caused in the State of the court seised.

In respect of the remaining questions, referring to the assessment of damage, the court felt that the matter was one that should be decided by the rules pertaining in the particular Member State in which the action was brought, assuming that the provisions of the Convention were not compromised.

Application of the principles expounded above in relation to newspaper publishing to electronic fora presumes that there has been identification of those responsible for propagating the libel. This may be no easy task in relation to media such as the world wide web, even where the individuals are named on the page. The computer hosting the pages may not readily be discerned and may be in a completely different jurisdiction from the person producing the web pages. Where a defendant can be isolated and is in a convenient jurisdiction, to what extent are they deemed to be accountable for all the information which can be accessed from their pages? A particular feature of ‘hypertext mark-up language’ (HTML), which is used for preparing information to be made available on the world wide web, is that embedded links can be incorporated which will provide access to other related sites when the user ‘points and clicks’. Suppose that the home site is not itself defamatory but provides links to other sites which contain libellous material. Is the host of the home page liable for the publication of this material?

*Hird v Wood*\(^{151}\) concerned an individual who pointed continually at a placard so that all who passed by were made aware of the writing on it. The person who had written the placard or placed it in position was unknown. It was held that the act of pointing to the contents was enough to constitute evidence of publication. This seems to provide a remarkably good analogy for the situation occurring when readers of a home page are directed to a page hosted by a third party which may provide further information of interest. The matter is not quite so simple as that, however, because, of course, the process does not stop there and there may then be further links to other pages creating the ‘web’. It seems unlikely that any court would find liability for defamatory material hosted on a site which could not be reached directly from the defendant’s home pages. The situation is further complicated by the fact that, unlike traditionally produced works, the information on web pages (or other networked information) is not static but is continually being refined and updated. If a direct link is provided from one page to another provided by a third party, then

\(^{151}\) (1894) 38 SJ 235.
whether or not there is liability for material will undoubtedly depend on the particular circumstances of the case. Nonetheless, proprietors of home pages might be prudent to check their embedded links at intervals, not only to ensure they are still operative, but also to ensure that they would continue to be happy to point their readers in that direction.
CHAPTER 8

POLICING ‘CYBERSPACE’

INTRODUCTION

It has been reported that, since 1993, attacks on the computer systems of banks and other financial institutions, made possible by the use of the latest generation of military weapons which target communications systems, have resulted in losses in excess of £500 million as the organisations involved pay ‘ransom’ money. In the last few years, there have been prosecutions for the possession and publication of child pornography both in the UK and the US, this being material that was available either on computer networks or on other electronic media. Such examples serve to illustrate how the computer can be used to assist the perpetration of crime. Neither is this a new phenomenon. During the 1980s, a number of cases came to court in a number of jurisdictions that could, perhaps, be regarded purely as examples of antisocial behaviour, but caused problems for the law in trying to locate the behaviour within existing legal provisions. A number of these were cases of computer hacking and the outcomes were often inconsistent, even in relation to ostensibly similar facts. In some cases, there might be an acquittal because the charge chosen was deemed to be inappropriate or, alternatively, because the law was interpreted in novel ways in order to found a conviction. Although computer hacking is often what comes to mind when computer misuse and abuse is referred to, there is a whole spectrum of activity that may be referred to as computer crime or computer-related crime that began to become apparent as the so called computer or information revolution progressed.

2 See below, p 479.
3 Compare, eg, R v Gold and Schifreen and R v Whiteley, discussed below, pp 456, 459.
4 The use of this term has itself led to some controversy. Tapper, in ‘Computer crime: Scotch mist?’ [1987] Crim LR 4, describes the phrase as ‘ungrammatical and inelegant’, although other writers are rather more dismissive of any perceived semantic difficulties: ‘Clearly it is easy to argue over a definition of computer crime. Such an argument seems fruitless, and will not be engaged in here.’ (Encyclopedia of Information Technology Law, London: Sweet & Maxwell, vol II, para 12.03.) This writer is clearly of a much more pragmatic persuasion: ‘The notion of computer crime is retained here merely because it serves as a useful umbrella under which to address a range of quite new and difficult criminal law problems...’
5 For an anecdotal account of some of the more high profile cases and examples see Clough, B and Mungo, P, Approaching Zero: Data Crime and the Computer Underworld, 1993, London: Faber & Faber.
Thus, August Bequai, writing in the preface to an early Council of Europe Recommendation on Computer-Related Crime,\(^6\) suggests that, ‘In the information society, power and wealth are increasingly becoming synonymous with control over our data banks… The computer revolution has provided tools with which to steal with impunity, control and manipulate the thoughts and movements of millions, and hold an entire society hostage’. The dangers have been spelt out more recently by Sieber.\(^7\)

**Legal aspects of computer-related crime in the information society**

**Ulrich Sieber**

**January 1998**

The *vulnerability of today’s information society* in view of computer crime is still not sufficiently realised: Businesses, administrations and society depend to a high degree on the efficiency and security of modern information technology. In the business community, for example, most of the monetary transactions are administered by computers in form of deposit money. Electronic commerce depends on safe systems for money transactions in computer networks. A company’s entire production frequently depends on the functioning of its data-processing system. Many businesses store their most valuable company secrets electronically. Marine, air, and space control systems, as well as medical supervision rely to a great extent on modern computer systems. Computers and the Internet also play an increasing role in the education and leisure of minors. International computer networks are the nerves of the economy, the public sector and society. The security of these computer and communication systems and their protection against computer crime is therefore of essential importance.

In the course of this development *computer crime* has developed into a major threat of today’s information society. The spreading of computer technology into almost all areas of life as well as the interconnection of computers by international computer networks has made computer crime more diverse, more dangerous, and internationally present.

This clearly underlines the potential for a particular type of abuse of computer systems, and to this may be added a number of ‘traditional’ crimes that may be facilitated by the use of computer systems such as offences of theft, deception and fraud; offences related to obscenity and indecency; criminal breaches of copyright arising from intentional distribution and commercial exploitation of copyright works; and criminal damage aimed at the computer system itself. That these are different in kind, both from each other and from the ‘new’ offences related to or relying on computer hacking, goes without saying, but together they make up a body that has come to be referred to,


however inaccurately, as computer crime and, in varying degrees, has caused problems for the interpretation and development of the law in this area. It is not the purpose of this chapter to examine the accuracy of the phrase ‘computer crime’: whatever the shortcomings of this term, it has become accepted terminology for a particular species of activity that has the common ingredient of computer use.

A coherent response to these problems is difficult, however, because of an absence of homogeneity in the subject matter, demonstrated by a lack of consensus both in the definition of and in the severity of the offences, and also in identifying the jurisdiction in which the offence occurred. Discrepancies in the type of regulation because of the former, together with the confusion raised by the latter, may inevitably lead to the likelihood of ‘forum shopping’ in the hope of a favourable hearing in situations where an offence can be deemed to have taken place in one of a number of jurisdictions. An explanation for the apparent increase in computer crime is difficult, although the suspicion is that, like the advent of the motor car, the advent of the computer created more opportunities for crime. This difficulty has been identified by Wasik:8

…the sheer diversity of behaviour within the context of computer misuse, where the computer may figure at one moment as the instrument of crime, and at the next as the target for crime, and given the importance of non-economic motives in some forms of computer misuse, such as the unauthorised access of computer systems purely for intellectual challenge and some cases of computer sabotage, makes any monolithic explanation of this phenomenon quite implausible.

Whatever the explanation for the behaviour, it is clear that the law has had to respond to these activities, and it has done so with varying degrees of consistency and success. This chapter will consider the response of the law and will draw conclusions as to the consistency of approach.

COMPUTER FRAUD

Many considerations of the phenomenon of computer crime begin with a study of computer fraud, defined by the Audit Commission9 as ‘Any fraudulent behaviour connected with computerisation by which someone intends to gain financial advantage’. Fraudulent schemes are usually devised to create some pecuniary benefit or to relieve the perpetrator of a financial burden. Most studies in this area, in common with the Audit Commission, have identified three species of computer fraud, namely, input fraud, output fraud and program fraud, of which the latter is less common, as it requires considerably

more knowledge and expertise. Thus, input fraud might include the misuse of cash cards or the creation of accounts for ‘ghost employees’, whereas theft of pre-signed cheques is an example of an output fraud. Program frauds are necessarily rather more elaborate and include the so-called salami type, in which a program is written which automatically ‘slices off’ small amounts from a number of accounts and transfers them to another account created for the purpose. A small deficit may not be noticed or reported on one account, but, if the process is repeated on a vast number of accounts, a considerable sum can be accrued in the illicit account. Salami and other program frauds can also be activated at a later date, creating consequent problems in detection of both the fraud and the perpetrator.

How has the law responded to the issue of computer fraud? The Law Commission concluded that, in general, the existing criminal law was adequate to deal with cases of computer fraud. The exception to this was identified as those offences that have proof of deception as an element, since this raised the vexed question of whether it is possible to deceive a machine or whether this is an act that can only be performed on humans. A further complication may be that, although an appropriate offence can be identified, the nature of computer technology may make it more difficult to identify both when and where the offence occurred, both of which factors may have important ramifications for the final outcome of the case.

The potential difficulties that may arise in such situations are illustrated by the facts of Thompson. Thompson was a computer programmer, employed by a bank in Kuwait. He identified five accounts that were both substantial and dormant, that is, no transactions had been made into or out of them for a long time. He then opened five accounts in his name at various branches of the bank and transferred money into these accounts from the dormant accounts.

To cover his tracks, the program did not execute until he had left the bank’s employment and was returning to the UK. The intention was that the program would erase itself and all records of the transfers after executing. Once in the UK, Thompson opened accounts in UK banks and wrote to the Kuwaiti bank manager, asking him to transfer the money now in the five accounts held in his own name. This led to him being found out and he was charged and convicted of obtaining property by deception, contrary to s 15 of the Theft Act 1968, which states:

(1) A person who by any deception dishonestly obtains property belonging to another, with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it, shall on conviction on indictment be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years.

11 [1984] 1 WLR 962.
For the purposes of this section a person is to be treated as obtaining property if he obtains ownership, possession or control of it, and ‘obtain’ includes obtaining for another or enabling another to obtain or to retain it.

Section 4(1) of the same Act provides:

‘Property’ includes money and all other property, real or personal, including things in action and other intangible property.

The issue in the case itself was not so much a question of whether or not this offence had been committed, but, rather, when and where and, in consequence, whether or not the English courts had jurisdiction to hear the case. Section 15(2) of the Theft Act 1968 defines ‘obtaining property’ for the purposes of the offence of obtaining by deception in s 15(1) as obtaining ownership, possession or control.

The argument for the Crown was that the offence had occurred in England when the credit balance in the fraudulently created accounts was transferred to the accounts in England, as this was the moment at which Thompson obtained ownership, possession or control. The defence argued that, on the contrary, control was obtained in Kuwait, at the time when the manipulation of the balances in the respective accounts was made. The Court of Appeal, although recognising the points raised, was anxious not to treat the fraud in any different manner to a similar case of fraud perpetrated by more traditional means.

\[R v Thompson\]
\[1984\] 1 WLR 962, p 967

May LJ We think, however, that one may legitimately ask: of what property did this appellant in that way obtain control in Kuwait? What was the nature of that property? Mr Caplan’s reply, as we understand it, was that the appellant obtained the control of those credit balances on his savings accounts, which were effectively choses in action, and were such until the bank discovered his fraud. With all respect to Mr Caplan’s persuasive argument, we think that when it is examined it is untenable. We do not think that one can describe as a chose in action a liability which has been brought about by fraud, one where the action to enforce that liability is capable of immediate defeasance as soon as the fraud is pleaded. It is neither here nor there, we think, that the person defrauded, in this case the bank, may not have been aware that one of its employees had been fraudulent in this way until a later time. The ignorance of the bank in no way, in our view, breathes life into what is otherwise a defunct situation brought about entirely by fraud. One has only to take a simple example. Discard for the moment the modern sophistication of computers and programmes and consider the old days when bank books were kept in manuscript in large ledgers. In effect all that was done by the appellant through the modern computer in the present case was to take a pen and debit each of the five accounts in the ledger with the relevant sums and then credit each of his own five savings accounts in the ledger with corresponding amounts. On the face of it his savings accounts would then have appeared to have in them substantially more than in truth they did have as the result of his forgeries; but we do not think that by those
forgeries any bank clerk in the days before computers would in law have thus brought into being a chose in action capable either of being stolen or of being obtained by deception contrary to section 15 of the Theft Act 1968.

Insofar as the customers whose accounts had been fraudulently debited and who had to be reimbursed by the bank, as Mr Caplan submitted, are concerned, we prefer the approach of Mr Walsh. He submitted that properly considered it was not a question of reimbursement: it was merely a question of correcting forged documents, forged records, to the condition in which they ought to have been but for the fraud.

In those circumstances and for those reasons we agree with the judge in the court below that the only realistic view of the undisputed facts in this case is that the six instances of obtaining charged in the indictment each occurred when the relevant sums of money were received by the appellant’s banks in England. Further it seems to us quite clear...that those sums of money were obtained as the result of the letters which the appellant wrote to the bank in Kuwait. The only proper construction to be put upon those letters is that they contain the representations pleaded in the particulars of offences in the indictment.

Thus, in this case, the decision was arrived at by applying exactly the same principles as would be applied in a more conventional case and, although the use of the computer clearly facilitated the fraud, the existing law was still capable of application. This does not automatically mean that all cases of computer fraud present no problems. The prosecution in Thompson was able to identify a human mind which had been deceived by the acts of the accused, namely, the bank manager in Kuwait, at the time of receiving the letter of instruction from Thompson. Would the result have been the same if no such person could have been identified? The Scottish Law Commission\(^{12}\) suggested that there was, in this respect, a distinction in relation to offences involving fraudulent activity between the law in Scotland and that in England and Wales:

...in Scotland such activities, even where they involved computers, would be adequately dealt with by the common law crimes of fraud, or in some cases, theft. Referring to the classic definition of fraud given by Macdonald,*, we did question whether it could be said that there had been a false pretence if no other human being was involved and the pretence was made solely to a computer. However, we concluded that the concept of ‘false pretence’ is probably sufficiently flexible to cope even with that sort of case. In this respect, we noted, Scots law may have an advantage over English law, which, in the Theft Act 1968 and elsewhere, uses the concept of ‘deception’ which, it has been held, requires a human mind to be deceived. Under both systems of law, of course, there will be many cases involving computers where it will nonetheless be perfectly possible to say that a false pretence has been made to a person, or that a person has been deceived.

* Criminal Law of Scotland, 5th edn, p 52: fraud ‘involves a false pretence made dishonestly in order to bring about some definite practical result’.

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This difference highlights the fact that the applicability of existing legislative provisions to otherwise ‘traditional’ offences committed with the aid of computers may depend on the vagaries of language and the capability of that language of being interpreted in such a way as to take into account any special features of computer crime. The nuances of the relevant language were spelled out by Buckley J in *Re London and Globe Finance Corp Ltd.*\(^{13}\)

To deceive is, I apprehend, to induce a man to believe that a thing is true which is false, and which the person practising the deceit knows or believes to be false. To defraud is to deprive by deceit: it is by deceit to induce a man to act to his injury. More tersely it may be put, that to deceive is by falsehood to induce a state of mind; to defraud is by deceit to induce a course of action.

Thus, use of the concepts of false pretence and fraud may result in there being no need to wrestle with the thorny question of whether a machine (that is, a computer) can be deceived on occasions where there has been no communication or intervention by humans.

One recent cause for concern has been the phenomenon of so called phantom withdrawals from automatic teller machines at banks. A relatively recent example was the case of *R v Munden,*\(^{14}\) involving a policeman who alleged that money had been extracted from his account even though he had made no withdrawals. He was prosecuted for attempted fraud and eventually acquitted. However, for computer law, this is arguably more correctly described as an issue of evidence than one of fraud.

Although the whole area of so called computer crime was reviewed by the Law Commissions for both Scotland and England and Wales, it was generally concluded that most cases of computer fraud could be dealt with adequately by the existing provisions, except on those rare occasions on which the case might rest on the ‘deception’ of a machine. In recognition of this, the Law Society made the suggestion that the definition in the Theft Act 1968 should be extended by introduction of the wording ‘inducing a machine to respond to false representations which the person making them knows to be false as if they were true’.

This proposal was not acted upon and it remains the position that ‘the prevailing opinion is that it is not possible in law to deceive a machine’,\(^{15}\) It is suggested in the next extract, however, that, as technology develops, this situation need not necessarily remain the same, although the use of the concept of ‘false representations’ is still preferred.

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\(^{13}\) [1903] 1 Ch 728, p 732.

\(^{14}\) (1996) unreported; see comp.risks 18.25, available at catless.ncl.ac.uk/risks/18.25.html#subj5.1.

Non-human minds

Whatever the precise nature of the state of mind which must be induced, it cannot exist unless there is a mind for it to exist in...

A more difficult question is whether it is possible to deceive a machine… The question is likely to be one of increasing importance in the context of computer fraud. If a person enters false data into a computer, or gains access to confidential files by using someone else’s password, is he deceiving the computer?… One would hardly say, other than metaphorically, that the computer believes the input to be accurate. On the other hand it might be argued that here again the notion of belief may be misleading, since it is not expressly used in the legislation. The question is not whether computers can have beliefs, but whether they can be deceived; and the more ‘intelligent’ they become, the more arguable it must be that they can. But this may be a rare case where the change from the terminology of false pretences to that of deception assists the defence, since it might be easier to establish that the defendant made a false representation to a computer than that the computer was thereby deceived.

In some situations, cases might now be enabled to proceed by virtue of certain changes introduced by s 1(1) of the Theft (Amendment) Act 1996.

Theft Act 1968 (as amended)

15A Obtaining a money transfer by deception

(1) A person is guilty of an offence if by any deception he dishonestly obtains a money transfer for himself or another.

24A Dishonestly obtaining a wrongful credit

(1) A person is guilty of an offence if—

(a) a wrongful credit has been made to an account kept by him or in respect of which he has any right or interest;
(b) he knows or believes that the credit is wrongful; and
(c) he dishonestly fails to take such steps as are reasonable in the circumstances to secure that the credit is cancelled…

(3) … A credit to an account is wrongful if it is the credit side of a money transfer obtained contrary to s 15A…

Section 15A does not refer to electronic transfer, other than to say in sub-s (4) that ‘it is immaterial whether the money transfer is effected on presentment of a cheque or by another’. Crucially, though, the need for deception, which unsurprisingly retains the same meaning (s 15B(2)), has not been eliminated from the provision. This is due to the amendments being introduced to rectify
the situation following the House of Lords’ decision in *R v Preddy*. This case arose as a result of false statements made to obtain mortgage advances and which were credited electronically, leading to a charge of obtaining property by deception. As the building society representatives could be identified as the target of this deception, the salient issue in the particular case was whether any property as such had been transferred. The House of Lords was of the view that the creation of a new chose in action could not be equated with obtaining property, precipitating swift action by the Law Commission and Parliament to resolve the situation. In the consequent haste, the opportunity for a more comprehensive overhaul of the legislation, which could have taken into account the difficulties with the concept of deception and computerised accounting methods, was missed. A case which depends solely on the ‘deception’ of a machine may lead to a similar ‘knee jerk’ reaction unless, as suggested by Arlidge and Parry, above, the computer has become sufficiently advanced to be deemed deceivable. Otherwise, it appears likely that there will be a range of conduct which could result in an acquittal on a charge based on deception and which might not fit comfortably into any of the other offences in the Theft Act 1968. In the words of Chapman:

> If it is essential that criminal offences attach liability to the wrong conduct itself, rather than to some peripheral activity associated with the same, then it is equally important to identify accurately the conduct that attracts moral obloquy.

Aside from the potential problems with deception, the existing law seemed sufficiently adaptable to deal with instances of computer fraud; but, as far as other types of activity were concerned, the application of the criminal law was by no means so certain. This was particularly true in relation to the increasing phenomenon of ‘computer hacking’, which produced some particular headaches for the courts prior to the passing of the Computer Misuse Act 1990. Attempts were made to use a number of pre-existing statutes. One of the most celebrated cases was that of *R v Gold and Schifreen*.

Gold and Schifreen hacked for a hobby and had managed to obtain the password for the Prestel System operated by BT, which provided subscribers with both email facilities and access to a number of database services. The password they obtained was in fact that issued to BT engineers, so not only did it not charge them for use, but it also gave widespread access to all parts of the system (note, however, that it was not a particularly complex password: 22222222

followed by the user ID 1234). By this means, they were even able to leave messages in the email box of the Duke of Edinburgh! Their activities eventually aroused suspicion and they were tracked down by monitoring their telephone usage. The question then arose as to what could be an appropriate charge. A prosecution was brought under s 1 of the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981, which provides that: ‘A person is guilty of forgery if he makes a false instrument with the intention that he or another shall use it to induce somebody to accept it as genuine and by reason of so accepting it do or not do some act to his own or any other person’s prejudice.’ For offences under this section, the problems identified in relation to the deception of a machine are overcome by express provision in the Act.

Gold and Schifreen were convicted, but appealed on the basis that no false instrument had been made. ‘Instrument’ is defined in s 8 of the Act and includes disks, tapes, etc, on which the material is stored by electronic means. The prosecution argument relied on the assertion that the dishonestly obtained password could constitute such an instrument, as it generated and was transmitted in the form of electrical impulses.

This contention was rejected for two reasons. First, it was felt that any instrument for the purposes of this Act had to be *ejusdem generis* with the other examples in the statutory definition, which were all physical objects, and, as the electrical impulses in question were only transient, this did not correspond well with the idea of the creation of an instrument. In addition to the difficulties with the definition of the instrument, the inapplicability of the charge was also held to be due to the nature of the offence of forgery. In this case, the password was not false—it was genuine—there was just no entitlement to use it. Both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords were of the view that the use of this statute was inappropriate, as it was not intended to apply to this type of case. Lord Brandon of Oakbrook, giving judgment in the House of Lords, referred with approval to the speech of Lord Lane in the Court of Appeal, which is given below.

R v Gold and Schifreen
[1987] QB 1116, p 1124

**Lord Lane CJ** In our judgment the user segment in the instant case does not carry the necessary two types of message to bring it within the ambit of forgery at all. Moreover, neither the report nor the Act, so it seems to us, seeks to deal with information that is held for a moment whilst automatic checking takes place and is then expunged. That process is not one to which the words ‘recorded or stored’ can properly be applied, suggesting as they do a degree of continuance.

There is a further difficulty. The prosecution had to prove that the appellants intended that someone should accept as genuine the false instrument which they had made. The suggestion here is that it was a machine (under section 10(3)) which the appellants intended to induce to respond to the false
instrument. But the machine (ie, the user segment) which was intended, so it was said, to be induced seems to be the very thing which was said to be the false instrument (ie, the user segment) which was inducing the belief. If that is a correct analysis, the prosecution case is reduced to an absurdity.

We have accordingly come to the conclusion that the language of the Act was not intended to apply to the situation which was shown to exist in this case. The submissions at the close of the prosecution case should have succeeded. It is a conclusion which we reach without regret. The Procrustean attempt to force these facts into the language of an Act not designed to fit them produced grave difficulties for both judge and jury which we would not wish to see repeated. The appellants’ conduct amounted in essence, as already stated, to dishonestly gaining access to the relevant Prestel data bank by a trick. That is not a criminal offence. If it is thought desirable to make it so, that is a matter for the legislature rather than the courts.

The wholehearted and unanimous endorsement of this passage by the House of Lords shows the disdain with which the attempt to squeeze the activity of computer hacking into the framework of an inappropriate statute was treated. The clear message was that, although it might be appropriate in some areas of the law to expand and develop the interpretation of existing legal provisions to take account of advances in technology, such provision had to be consonant with the alleged ‘offence’, in order not to stretch the law beyond its breaking point.20

In an attempt to bring a number of antisocial computer users to book, various persons were charged with offences under the Criminal Damage Act 1971. Was there any greater likelihood of success in these cases, or were they to be treated with the same contempt as the charges made under the Forgery Act?

The question for the court in *Cox v Riley*21 was whether the deliberate erasure, by a disgruntled employee, of a computer program from a plastic card controlling a computerised saw, so as to render the saw inoperable, could be construed as criminal damage for the purposes of s 1(1) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971. It was agreed by all parties that the card was ‘property’ within the meaning of s 10(1), but had it been damaged? At first instance, damage was found in the fact that the card could no longer be used to operate and control the saw. On appeal, the opposing argument was again placed that, in reality, it was not the card that had been damaged but the program; the physical state of the card was unchanged. As the program was intangible, it was argued that it could not, of itself, be construed as ‘property’ within the meaning of s 10(1).

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20 This should, however, be distinguished from the situation in *R v Governor of Brixton Prison ex p Levin* [1997] 1 Cr App R 355, where it was held that the word ‘disk’ was within the definition of ‘instrument’ in the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981, s 8(1)(d) and embraced the information stored, as well as the medium on which it was stored. By entering false instructions on the disk, it was, in the court’s opinion, falsified, and the applicant had thereby created a false instrument.

21 (1986) 83 Cr App R 54.
Stephen Brown LJ found, however, that the card was indeed damaged, in that it had been deprived of its usefulness and it would take both time and money to remedy this situation. In arriving at this conclusion, he relied on *dicta* of Cantley J in the case of *Henderson and Battley*, 22 which took the definition of ‘damage’ from the *Concise Oxford Dictionary* as ‘injury impairing value or usefulness’. Both Stephen Brown LJ and Cantley J relied also on the much earlier precedent of *Fisher*, 23 concerning a discontented employee who put a steam engine out of action in such a way as not to damage the engine as such, but to ensure that considerable time and effort was needed to make it operative again. The use of this reasoning to reach the decision in *Cox v Riley* was later criticised by the Law Commission on the basis that it was decided under the provisions of the Malicious Damage Act 1861, 24 an Act which contained a different concept of damage. However, notwithstanding the applicability of this case to the situation in *Cox v Riley*, the inherent pragmatism in this approach and its application to rather more modern technology can be seen in the concluding remarks: 25

It has to be said that we are living in the age of computers; not only computers but other magnetised operations. One thinks of articles such as the ordinary bank card which is used to withdraw money from certain machines. There are many methods of operating machinery by stimulating or activating electrical circuits or magnetised contacts, all these are matters which are part of the modern industrial and social scene.

It seems to me quite untenable to argue that what this defendant did on this occasion did not amount to causing damage to property...

As will be appreciated, this does not really attack the crux of the opposing argument, which is directed at where the damage lies, 26 and is perhaps more informed by the fact that it was well established that the defendant had the requisite *mens rea* rather than confirmation that the necessary *actus reus* had been proved.

A rather different approach was to be taken to the application of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 in computer-related cases in *R v Whiteley*, 27 but, on any assessment, this was a radically different type of case. In brief, 28 Whiteley’s hobby was hacking into computer networks and a particular target of his was JANET, the Joint Academic Network. Whilst engaged in such activities, he assumed the identity of Alan Dolby, the ‘Mad Hacker’, and deleted and changed data and ‘locked out’ authorised users by effecting changes of passwords, etc. He was

22  (1984) unreported, ICA.
23  (1865) LR 1 CCR 7.
24  See below, p 470.
25  (1986) 83 Cr App R 54, p 58, *per* Stephen Brown LJ.
26  For discussion of these rules in a different context see above, p 176.
28  For a more detailed account of events see *op cit*, Clough and Mungo, fn 5, p 42 *et seq.*
eventually traced, following monitoring of the system at Queen Mary College, one of his prime targets, and charged with criminal damage.

Again, the argument was put that the damage was not to the tangible parts of the computer system but, rather, to the information contained on the disk. The manner in which such disks store information is in the arrangement of magnetic particles on the surface—if the information is changed (maliciously or otherwise), then this pattern will be altered. The court found that such a change could be sufficient to found a charge of criminal damage.

*R v Whiteley*  
*(1991) 93 Cr App R 25, p 27*

...the disks are so constructed as to contain upon them thousands, if not millions, of magnetic particles. By issuing commands to the computer, impulses are produced which magnetise or demagnetise those particles in a particular way. By that means it is possible to write data or information on the disks and to program them to fulfil a variety of functions. By the same method it is possible to delete or alter data, information or instructions which have previously been written on to the disk. The argument advanced on behalf of the appellant, when reduced to its essence, seems to us to be this. That since the state of the magnetic particles on the disk is not perceptible by the unaided human senses, for instance of sight or touch, therefore the appellant’s admitted activities only affected the ‘intangible information’ contained on the disk itself. Even if the absence of such a change is not fatal to the prosecution, goes on the submission, interference with the particles cannot amount to damage in law.

It seems to us that that contention contains a basic fallacy. What the Act requires to be proved is that tangible property has been damaged, not necessarily that the damage itself should be tangible. There can be no doubt that the magnetic particles upon the metal disks were a part of the disks and if the appellant was proved to have intentionally and without lawful excuse altered the particles in such a way as to cause an impairment of the value or usefulness of the disk to the owner, there would be damage within the meaning of section 1. The fact that the alteration could only be perceived by operating the computer did not make the alterations any the less within the ambit of the Act.

... Any alteration to the physical nature of the property concerned may amount to damage within the meaning of the section. Whether it does so or not will depend upon the effect that the alteration has had upon the legitimate operator (who for convenience may be referred to as the owner). If the hacker’s actions do not go beyond, for example, mere tinkering with an otherwise ‘empty’ disk, no damage would be established. Where, on the other hand, the interference with the disk amounts to an impairment of the value or usefulness of the disk to the owner, then the necessary damage is established.

This reasoning might have provided a suitable avenue for the use of existing legal provisions to deal with cases of computer hacking—particularly of the more antisocial variety which involve rather more than mere browsing in the contents
of files. However, by the time this decision had been reached, the Law Commission’s recommendations for reform of the law in this area had resulted in the passing of the Computer Misuse Act 1990, which effectively removed such cases from the ambit of the Criminal Damage Act 1971.

The Law Commission reviewed the application of the existing criminal law and considered the desirability of criminalising activities such as hacking by the creation of specific offences. In so doing, they took into account the findings of the Scottish Law Commission, which had already reported on this topic. They also had to come to terms with both the notion of computer crime and whether it was either necessary or desirable to create new criminal offences in this area, especially with regard to the activities of hackers. The Scottish Law Commission had recommended in their Report that the problem could be tackled by the creation of an unauthorised access offence, although this received a mixed reception in some quarters.

‘Computer crime’: Scotch mist
Colin Tapper
[1987] Crim LR 4, p 8

Possible responses

There seem to be three main possibilities. The first is for the legislature to do nothing, but instead to rely upon the judiciary to interpret the existing rules in such a way as to embrace computer-related crimes. The second is for the legislature to assist the task of the judiciary by modifying the definitions and conditions for liability of existing offences, but without enacting new ones. The third is to enact new offences specifically aimed at computer-related crime. This third alternative should perhaps be further subdivided between new offences which are intended to supplant existing offences in the computer-related area, and those which are intended to supplement them. Choice between these various alternatives must largely be determined by some perception of the particular uses or abuses of computers which fall outside the ambit of existing offences. Some general considerations are, however, apposite here.

The principal argument for the first alternative is that it is in many ways the most flexible. Development can proceed by minute steps, and those steps can often be retraced if a new perspective shows them to have started out in the wrong direction. It is also likely to be the method most congenial to the judiciary and so most likely to be accorded a sympathetic reception by them. It is much rarer to find determined opposition and destructive interpretation offered to a new common law development than to a new and unwelcome statute. It has the further advantage that the pace of development automatically reflects the incidence of the relevant situation. If no cases come to court for decision, the law stands still; but if many cases come, then some

29 Op cit, Scottish Law Commission, fn 12.
development, or at least crystallisation, is inevitable. This method is also least likely to foster anomalies, either between different applications of the same offence, or between different offences.

The disadvantages are in some ways the converse of the advantages. Just because the law proceeds in a flexible, and reversible, manner, it may lose some of its deterrent effect. It can be argued that in order to influence conduct, potential actors must have some clear idea of when the law is likely to intervene, and that this will be denied if each new situation gives rise to a new decision. Such an argument can be overstated however. Criminal law is concerned with morally reprehensible conduct, and the effect of uncertainty may be to restrain potential actors from doing anything remotely reprehensible in the area. Nevertheless, there remains a constraint upon the judges in this respect. They will be reluctant to depart very far from established rules. In general it is not the province of the judges to create new criminal offences, and this general policy is embodied in rules requiring all doubts to be resolved in favour of the accused, a maxim just as applicable to the establishment of rules as to the finding of facts. It may also be thought that the process of litigation is unlikely to lead to the development of the best-informed rules, rules of relevance confine lawyers to the proof of facts clearly and closely applicable to the particular facts before the court, and neither counsel nor judiciary may be thought sufficiently computerate to be trusted to understand the subject well enough to develop the best rules.

The third alternative lies at the opposite extreme. New legislation can be moulded to fit the precise delineation of the perceived need. It can come replete with exact definitions and explicit exceptions. The range of procedures, forms of proof and level of penalty are all capable of being adapted to the special problems of the situation. It may also be argued that it is just as, if not more, flexible than common law development, since legislation can always be amended, or, if necessary, repealed and replaced. However true this may be in theory, it is, given the pressure on parliamentary time, less than practically possible.

The principal disadvantages are those of creating anomalies and, by so doing, injustice. It is unlikely to be acceptable if criminality, or even sentence or procedure, depends upon whether a computer happens to have been involved... Nor is it clear that legislators and draftsmen are so much more conversant with the technology of computing than counsel and judges, though they do have more opportunity to seek expert advice. Even so, the encapsulation of the burgeoning technology within the strait-jacket of the ordinary language and comprehensible structure ideally characterising Acts of Parliament, constitutes a formidable task. It is made more formidable still by the hinterland of presumptions, policies and principles customarily bestowed upon the construction of Acts of Parliament establishing new criminal offences, especially if recourse to anything beyond the words themselves is artificially restricted.

The middle course of tailoring definitions and conditions mitigates both advantages and disadvantages of the two extremes. It is likely to reduce anomalies when compared to the creation of wholly new offences, but it can often achieve this only at the expense of some distortion of the pattern of existing offences. The principal point of engagement in the legislative process
is also perhaps the most hazardous in terms of drafting, namely in the casting of definitions.

It can be seen from this account that in the abstract there is no clear choice to be made between these different approaches. All must depend upon the array of conduct which is sought to be suppressed, and the aptitude of application of such crimes as already exist.

It had often been suggested that there was no need for further criminal offences, because the reality was that this would create anomalies by criminalising behaviour which would not attract this stigma if the outcome of that behaviour was achieved by more conventional means. However, the following comment provides an interesting slant on the view that computer crime is nothing more than a way of committing different offences.

**Computer crime in the new Spanish Criminal Code**

*MB Bidasolo*  
(1997) 2 Comm L 19

Much more autonomy is given to computer crime by a different concept of computer criminality. According to this, the creation of a computer crime protects a legal interest related to its own particular nature, namely, the ‘trust in the correct working of computer systems’ as a macro-social interest, which is an essential condition for the ordinary development of our contemporary relationships.

To set this discussion in context, the Law Commission for England and Wales pointed out the differences between computers and other information storage and retrieval systems.

**Reforming the Present Law—Hacking**  
Law Commission Working Paper No 110, Pt VI

6.3 The possible criminalisation of conduct which is not at present directly covered by the criminal law must involve a consideration of whether it is in the public interest that such conduct should be regarded as criminal. This in turn may involve consideration of whether it can be adequately controlled in some other way, in particular by the civil law...

**B Should the obtaining of unauthorised access to a computer by hacking be a criminal offence?**

6.7 …there are some special features concerning computers and their accessibility to which we think attention must be drawn at this stage:

(i) Computers are capable of storing and processing vast amounts of information. Information which twenty or thirty years ago might have been stored in large rooms full of filing cabinets can now be kept on a single disk smaller than a pocket sized notebook. The computer is a relatively recent invention which we must now accept as a feature of late 20th century life. In general, the benefits which this new technology has brought to members of society are not in doubt.
(ii) Much of the information stored in computers is information of a nature which those who disclose it to the computer owner would not want disclosed to third parties. For example, information relating to individuals of a personal kind, bank accounts, credit ratings, medical records and trade secrets.

(iii) For large computer systems to be effective, and to be of maximum use to legitimate users, including those who supply information to computer owners, they must be readily accessible from ‘remote’ computer terminals. This necessarily gives rise to problems of security which are of an entirely different kind from those which arise in connection with the safeguarding of manual records...it is difficult if not impossible to create a totally secure computer system.

(iv) It may be possible for a person to obtain unauthorised access to information stored in the computer without the need for any physical presence other than at a terminal which is connected to the computer system by means of a telecommunication system. Without this physical presence, a person who seeks to obtain unauthorised access will not be exposed to the risk of prosecution for offences such as burglary or criminal damage which might be applicable if physical access were required.

(v) In deciding whether obtaining unauthorised access to information held on a computer should be a crime, analogies with other forms of conduct may be helpful but can be misleading. It is probably better, therefore, to consider the computer for what it is...

1 The arguments for an offence

6.8 One argument in favour of an offence...acknowledges the importance of computers for society as a whole and suggests that those who use and rely on computers may be inhibited from making full use of them, if they fear that others might obtain unauthorised access to information held on them. For this reason, it is in the public interest that society must try to deter hacking generally, or at the very least in respect of computers holding certain kinds of information.

6.12 ...further argument in favour of an unauthorised access offence...rests on the possible consequences of hacking to a computer system. Where the computer system is especially important, or the information stored on it especially valuable, these consequences will be more serious, but hacking could lead to an inadvertent damaging of any computer system. An offence of obtaining unauthorised access to a computer would signal society’s disapproval of those who deliberately set out to breach security measures, and amount to a rejection of the claim that hacking is a harmless intellectual pastime. This rejection would have beneficial consequences beyond the number of successful prosecutions likely to be brought...

6.13 Another positive side-effect of a hacking offence would be that its prohibition may serve to deter conduct which is made possible by the obtaining of unauthorised access to a computer, such as computer assisted fraud or theft, or the corruption of data or programs. An offence which may reduce the number of opportunities for subsequent (illegal) activities is worthy of further consideration.
The arguments against an offence

6.15 The main argument against the introduction, in any form, of a criminal offence of obtaining unauthorised access to a computer is that, although such conduct may constitute an invasion of privacy, it is not a matter in which the criminal law should interfere. No general right of privacy exists in English law even in the law of tort, and while obtaining unauthorised access to a computer may appear to be akin to the tort of trespass, such behaviour is generally not subject to criminal sanction without some further aggravating feature. Information is not property in English law...and it is no offence, as such, to read someone else's correspondence or files...

6.16 A further argument against the creation of a hacking offence is that the offence may be very difficult to enforce. We understand that it is possible for a hacker to obtain access to data on a computer and to ensure that the fact that he has obtained access remains undetected, or at least can be discovered only after a very time-consuming search... Sometimes conduct may be so serious and so socially damaging that it clearly merits a criminal sanction whatever the problems of enforcement. In other cases where the harm caused by the relevant conduct is not so great, the case for providing a criminal sanction will be weakened by problems of enforcement. It is arguable that mere hacking falls into the latter category.

Further discussion and debate, together with further evidence received following the publication of the Working Paper, led to the conclusion that, taking all the circumstances into account, the creation of further criminal offences was in fact necessary.30

Computer Misuse31
Law Commission

1.37 ...the main argument in favour of a hacking offence does not turn on the protection of information, but rather springs from the need to protect the integrity and security of computer systems from attacks from unauthorised persons seeking to enter those systems, whatever may be their intention or motive. It is for that reason that we propose, as a deterrent counter to hacking, two offences: the first, a broad offence that seeks to deter the general practice of hacking by imposing penalties of a moderate nature on all types of unauthorised access; and the second a narrower but more serious offence, that imposes much heavier penalties on those persons who hack with intent to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, serious crime.

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30 Whether this outcome is desirable continues to be questioned. See, eg, Wasik, M, ‘Misuse of information technology: what should the role of the criminal law be?’ (1991) 5 LC & T Yearbook 158.
31 Cm 819, 1989, London: HMSO.
Thus, the Law Commission came to the conclusion that the existing criminal remedies were inadequate to deal with many instances of computer crime and misuse, although it conceded that a number of charges under the Theft Act might be appropriate in cases of computer fraud. However, despite the completion of the Law Commission Report, the Government seemed to have no plan to introduce legislation, and the Computer Misuse Act eventually saw the light of day as a consequence of a Private Members’ Bill introduced by Michael Colvin. This Bill followed fairly closely the Law Commission’s proposals—in particular, it took the two tier approach that is common in such legislation in other jurisdictions, namely, the creation of a basic hacking offence plus an ulterior intent offence to cover situations where there is some intent to commit a further crime.

**Computer Misuse Act 1990**

1 **Unauthorised access to computer material**

(1) A person is guilty of an offence if—

(a) he causes a computer to perform any function with intent to secure access to any program or data held in any computer;
(b) the access he intends to secure is unauthorised; and
(c) he knows at the time when he causes the computer to perform the function that that is the case.

(2) The intent a person has to have to commit an offence under this section need not be directed at—

(a) any particular program or data;
(b) a program or data of any particular kind; or
(c) a program or data held in any particular computer.

2 **Unauthorised access with intent to commit or facilitate commission of further offences**

(1) A person is guilty of an offence under this section if he commits an offence under section 1 above (‘the unauthorised access offence’) with intent—

(a) to commit an offence to which this section applies; or
(b) to facilitate the commission of such an offence (whether by himself or by any other person)…

(2) This section applies to offences—

(a) for which the sentence is fixed by law; or
(b) for which a person…may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of five years…

(3) It is immaterial for the purposes of this section whether the further offence is to be committed on the same occasion as the unauthorised access offence or on any future occasion.
(4) A person may be guilty of an offence under this section even though the facts are such that the commission of the further offence is impossible.

These sections demonstrate the structure of the offences created. Sections 1 and 2 are hierarchical and, when charges are brought under s 2, it is still possible to convict under s 1, even where the necessary intent for a s 2 offence is not proved. Note, however, that certain activities do not fall within the ambit of the statute, in particular, reading of the contents of files non-interactively, for example, unauthorised reading after printing out in cases where the print operation had been performed by an authorised user, or mere reading of information on a computer screen. Depending on the nature of the material, such acts could fall within the scope of the Data Protection Act 1998.32 A potentially more serious omission as the technology becomes ever more sophisticated is computer eavesdropping, and it may be that, in the future, action may be needed to remedy this lacuna.33 In common with statutes in other jurisdictions, the Act does not define the word ‘computer’,34 but a lengthy interpretation section demonstrates the wide reaching scope of some of the other crucial concepts in the Act:

17 Interpretation

(2) A person secures access to any program or data held in a computer if by causing a computer to perform any function he—

(a) alters or erases the program or data;
(b) copies or moves it to any storage medium other than that in which it is held or to a different location in the storage medium in which it is held;
(c) uses it; or
(d) has it output from the computer in which it is held (whether by having it displayed or in any other manner),

and references to access to a program or data (and to an intent to secure such access) shall be read accordingly.

(3) For the purposes of subsection (2)(c) above a person uses a program if the function he causes the computer to perform—

(a) causes the program to be executed; or
(b) is itself a function of the program.

(4) For the purposes of subsection (2)(d) above—

(a) a program is output if the instructions of which it consists are output; and

32 See above, Chapter 7.
(b) the form in which any such instructions or any other data is output (and in particular whether or not it represents a form in which, in the case of instructions, they are capable of being executed or, in the case of data, it is capable of being processed by a computer) is immaterial.

(5) Access of any kind by any person to any program or data held in the computer is unauthorised if—

(a) he is not himself entitled to control access of the kind in question to the program or data; and
(b) he does not have consent to access by him of the kind in question to the program or data from any person who is so entitled.

(6) References to any program or data held in a computer include references to any program or data held in a removable storage medium which is for the time being in the computer; and a computer is to be regarded as containing any program or data held in any such medium.

(7) A modification of the contents of any computer takes place if, by the operation of any function of the computer concerned or any other computer—

(a) any program or data held in the computer concerned is altered or erased; or
(b) any program or data is added to its contents; and any act which contributes towards causing such a modification shall be regarded as causing it.

(8) Such a modification is unauthorised if—

(a) the person whose act causes it is not himself entitled to determine whether the modification should be made; and
(b) he does not consent to the modification from any person who is so entitled.

Thus, as far as access is required, it appears that any sort of activity will suffice other than merely reading a screen and that the Act extends to access to, or modification of, the contents of floppy disks if this occurs while they are in any computer. The issue of authorisation is unlikely to be controversial in relation to a remote hacker, but where, as is frequently the case, the alleged unauthorised access occurs in employment, the Law Commission considered that:

…an employer should only have the support of the hacking offence if he has clearly defined the limits of authorisation applicable to each employee, and if he is able to prove that the employee had knowingly and recklessly exceeded that level of authority35

However, it went on to say that misuse which was on a par with misuse of the office photocopier, etc, should not be caught by the legislation. The question of the scope of authorisation was raised in DPP v Bignell,\(^{36}\) where no criminal liability was found on the basis of lack of authorisation even though the consequent access was then exploited in an unauthorised manner. In the absence of s 2 ulterior intent, the Act only criminalises the fact of unauthorised access and what is then done with the information/data is immaterial for the purposes of the Computer Misuse Act, although it may incur a breach of another statute such as the Data Protection Act 1998,\(^{37}\) depending on the nature of the data. The interpretation of ‘unauthorised’ in s 17 thus allows for the existence of different levels of authority: one being to access the data or program in question and the other, in relation to s 3, being to actually modify and change the data or program.

This parallels the practice on computer networks of issuing different types of identifiers or passwords for those people who are permitted access on a read only basis vis à vis those who have more extensive authorisation to make changes to the computer contents.

The very first case under the Computer Misuse Act 1990, that of R v Cropp,\(^{38}\) raised questions about the scope of the Act. Cropp was charged with an offence under s 2(1) (which requires the establishment of an offence under s 1(1)) following an incident which occurred when he visited the premises of his ex-employer, a wholesaler, with his new employer. Cropp showed interest in an item, picked up a machine and a salesperson began to enter the details on the storeroom computer. The salesperson was called away during this operation and Cropp, being well acquainted with the operation of the system, took the opportunity to input a discount of 70%. His new employer subsequently paid an invoice for £204.60 plus VAT, instead of the correct sum of £710.96 plus VAT. Was this a case of unauthorised access to a computer?

A submission of no case to answer was made, on the grounds that, in order to contravene s 1(1) (and, therefore, s 2(1)), it had to be established that the accused had used one computer with intent to secure unauthorised access into another computer. This represents the usual definition of ‘hacking’, which was popularly supposed to be the activity that was proscribed by this new legislation. The judge upheld this submission, saying that:

> It seems to me, doing the best that I can in elucidating the meaning of s 1(1)(a), that a second computer must be involved. It seems to me to be straining language to say that only one computer is necessary when one looks to see the actual wording of the subsection: ‘Causing a computer to perform any function with intent to secure access to any program or data held in any computer.’

37 See above, Chapter 7.
The Attorney General sought clarification from the Court of Appeal on the basis that the Act had been drafted so as to deal not only with the situation in which indirect access to a computer system is gained by using another computer, but also with the situation where a person misuses a computer to which he or she has direct (but unauthorised) access. The following point of law was at issue:

In order for a person to commit an offence under section 1(1) of the Computer Misuse Act 1990, does the computer which the person causes to perform any function with the required intent have to be a different computer from the one into which he intends to secure unauthorised access to any program or data held therein?

The argument on behalf of the Attorney General was that the vital phrase was ‘any computer’ at the end of s 1(1)(a). Whilst conceding that the major mischief which had led to the enactment of the Act was that in which persons used one computer to hack into another computer, it was submitted that the scope of this section was not confined purely to that activity.

Lord Taylor of Gosforth CJ The ordinary canons of construction require this court to look at the words of the section and to give them their plain and natural meaning. Doing that, we look again at the relevant words. They are, ‘he causes a computer to perform any function with intent to secure access to any program or data held in any computer’.

Mr Lassman argued successfully before the judge, and sought to argue before this court, that that final phrase, ‘held in any computer’, should really be read as ‘held in any other computer’, or alternatively should be read as ‘held in any computer except the computer which has performed the function’.

To read those words in that way, in our judgment, would be to give them a meaning quite different from their plain and natural meaning. It is a trite observation, when considering the construction of statutes, that one does not imply or introduce words which are not there when the plain and natural meaning is clear. In our judgment there are no grounds whatsoever for implying, or importing the word ‘other’ between ‘any’ and ‘computer’, or excepting the computer which is actually used by the offender from the phrase ‘any computer’ at the end of the subsection (1)(a).

If the court had not arrived at such an interpretation, the potential usefulness of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 could have been severely curtailed, resulting in what has been described as ‘total emasculation’. The dramatic effect that this might have had is particularly apparent with hindsight, as the majority of

prosecutions that have been brought since then have far more in common with
the situation in Cropp than with hacking.\textsuperscript{41}

In its Report, the Law Commission had also recommended an offence of
unauthorised alteration or destruction of data, having come to the conclusion
that the interpretation of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 as seen in Cox v Riley\textsuperscript{42}
(which they had appeared to endorse in the Working Paper\textsuperscript{43}—‘Our provisional
view is that this reasoning is correct and in accordance with the wide meaning
which damage was intended to bear’) was in need of clarification. It should be
noted that this was written before the decision in R v Whiteley.\textsuperscript{44}

\textit{Computer Misuse}\textsuperscript{45}
Law Commission

2.27 Our provisional view was that the wide meaning attributed by the
courts to the word ‘damage’, including as it did any injury impairing
the value or usefulness of the property, had had the effect of extending
the law of criminal damage to cover the tangible property…on which
programs or data were stored. On this reasoning any unlawful
interference with the data or program would amount to damage to
the tangible storage medium, providing that its value was thereby
diminished.

2.28 It does not seem to have been seriously questioned that the
unauthorised destruction of data and the reprogramming of
operational computers ought to be criminal… Alteration or erasure
of data without authority has, in the absence of specific
justifications provided by law, no social value; it involves deliberate
interference with the property of others, and not merely trespassing
on their premises or looking at their information; …it can cause
substantial loss and, in the case of operational systems, physical
danger. While it is clear therefore that these activities ought to be
outlawed, it is more controversial whether the present law of
criminal damage is an adequate response in the way that we
 provisionally suggested. Our conclusion on further consideration,
which was supported by the weight of opinion on consultation, is
that clarification of the law is required. The main reasons for that
conclusion are as follows.

2.29 ‘Property’ means, for the purposes of the Criminal Damage Act 1971,
property of a tangible nature. In Cox v Riley, the deleted computer
program had been stored on a plastic circuit card, which latter could
be and was identified as the tangible property which had been
damaged. Several consultees have made the point that there may be
more difficulty in other cases in pointing to a physical medium on

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnote{41 See, further, below, p 474.}
\footnote{42 (1986) 83 Cr App R 54; see, also, above, p 458.}
\footnote{43 Law Commission Working Paper No 110, 1988, para 3.38.}
\footnote{44 (1991) 93 Cr App R 25; see, also, above, p 459.}
\footnote{45 Cm 819, 1989, London: HMSO.}
\end{footnotesize}
which the altered or erased data has been held; indeed it has been suggested to us that in some cases data is stored by means of electrical impulses that are only very notionally attached to any tangible property. For the commission of a criminal offence to depend on whether it can be proved that data was damaged or destroyed while it was held on identifiable tangible property not only is unduly technical, but also creates an undesirable degree of uncertainty in the operation of the law.

2.30 The Divisional Court in Cox v Riley in effect held, following the unreported case in the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) of Henderson and Battley, that the circuit card had been damaged because to reprogram it would require more than a minimal amount of time and effort. That analysis looked back to Fisher, a case decided on section 15 of the Malicious Damage Act 1861, which unlike the 1971 Act referred to ‘damage with intent to destroy or to render useless’ (emphasis added). While the reasoning in Fisher is somewhat ambiguous, it is possible that the court regarded ‘rendering useless’ as forming a separate head of ‘damage’. It is therefore not entirely clear that the view that damage can occur where there has been no physical impairment of the tangible object has survived the repeal by the 1971 Act of the specific offence discussed in Fisher. The problem is that neither Cox v Riley nor Henderson and Battley squarely address the point that the dictionary definition of ‘to damage’ requires some injury to a thing; the decisions concentrate on the second limb of that definition, that the injury must lessen or destroy its value. In our view, therefore, those authorities cannot be relied on with sufficient confidence as stating the present law on the meaning of damage.

This recommendation was given effect in s 3 of the Act.

**Computer Misuse Act 1990**

**Section 3 Unauthorised modification of computer material**

(1) A person is guilty of an offence if—

(a) he does any act which causes an unauthorised modification of the contents of any computer; and

(b) at the time when he does the act he has the requisite intent and the requisite knowledge.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b) above the requisite intent is an intent to cause a modification of the contents of any computer and by so doing—

(a) to impair the operation of any computer;

(b) to prevent or hinder access to any program or data held in any computer; or

(c) to impair the operation of any such program or the reliability of any such data.
(3) The intent need not be directed at—
   (a) any particular computer;
   (b) any particular program or data or a program or data of any particular kind; or
   (c) any particular modification or a modification of any particular kind.

(4) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b) above the requisite knowledge is knowledge that any modification he intends to cause is unauthorised.

(5) It is immaterial for the purposes of this section whether an unauthorised modification or any intended effect of it of a kind mentioned in subsection (2) above is, or is intended to be, permanent or merely temporary.

(6) For the purposes of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 a modification of the contents of a computer shall not be regarded as damaging any computer or computer storage medium unless its effect on that computer or computer storage medium impairs its physical condition.

The concepts contained in this section are further amplified in s 17(7) and (8). Section 3 creates an offence of doing any act which causes unauthorised modification of the contents of any computer with the requisite intent and knowledge as defined by the section. Interestingly enough, the new Act does not actually amend the Criminal Damage Act 1971 as originally suggested by the Law Commission, but in s 3(6) contains a proviso as to the application of that Act to modification of computer material. It therefore appears that if another case like Cox v Riley were to occur, it would have to be taken under this section, notwithstanding the successful prosecution argument in the later case of Whiteley.

Section 3 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 appears to be capable of catching a wide variety of types of activity. It would be expected to embrace the type of modification and erasure seen in Cox v Riley but should also be capable of covering the intentional introduction of viruses, worms, Trojan horses and other programs of a potentially destructive nature. Since the intent need not be directed at any particular computer, the liability of the person who originates the virus or worm should be unaffected if, in the event, a virus is introduced to a system by means of an infected disk innocently acquired by a third party. On the other

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46 See above, p 467.
47 (1986) 83 Cr App R 54; see, also, above, p 458.
48 (1991) 93 Cr App R 25; see, also, above, p 459.
49 These, and similar terms, are sometimes used interchangeably in non-technical parlance. A virus is a self-replicating program which may not be immediately apparent on examination of a system but copies itself into the computer memory and, from there, to any disks which are subsequently loaded and/or in the memory of other computers attached to the same network as data is exchanged. The type of program commonly referred to as a ‘worm’ is an example of a program that was developed for exploring the capabilities of computer systems and networks and may adversely affect systems on which it is unwanted by consuming resources. A ‘Trojan horse’ is a program which appears as a program performing an innocuous function but hides the fact that it also has another, usually more sinister, function.
hand, it would appear that anyone knowingly introducing an infected disk has a clear intent to modify the contents of a computer.

Not long before the Computer Misuse Act 1990 was passed, the strange case of Dr Lewis Popp hit the headlines. A large number of people associated with computer use received disks through the post, purporting to contain important information about the AIDS virus. If, in fact, the disks were used, although they did reveal information on that subject, they also contained a Trojan horse which was programmed to activate after the computer had been used about 100 times.\(^{50}\)

Although the contents of the hard disk would have been destroyed, there would have been little action which could have been taken as a result of this particular activity, unless the courts would have been happy to use the reasoning in \(\text{Whiteley}\).\(^{51}\) This incident was referred to in the Parliamentary debates on the Bill and it is also evident that, at this stage, it was intended that the new legislation would cover such activities: ‘…circulation of an infected disk, such as this is not an offence. However, the Bill will make it one.’\(^{52}\) Despite this, there was some discussion after the statute was enacted as to whether it was suitable for apprehending those who introduced viruses into computer systems for whatever reason.\(^{53}\) Some of this raised problems of detection and enforcement (see below) but the fact that s 3 could, in principle, be used in this way was put beyond doubt in the case of \(\text{R v Pile}\).\(^{54}\) Pile, who referred to himself as the ‘Black Baron’, developed two particular viruses, Queeg and Pathogen, and also Smeg, a guide to writing viruses. He placed these on bulletin boards with the message, ‘That’s all there is to it. Have fun. The Black Baron’. Although there is an element of the comic in this, the viruses themselves were extremely sophisticated and capable of masquerading as other, innocent programs. He was even successful in incorporating a virus into an anti-virus scan program. This was the first time that a person had appeared in court as a result of intentionally introducing computer viruses to a system and the court had no problems in finding a breach of s 3.

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51 In fact, Dr Popp was eventually arrested in Ohio and charged with extorting money with menaces, as those affected were also directed to transfer sums of money to a bank account in Panama. In the event, there was evidence that Popp’s mental condition had deteriorated to such an extent that he was pronounced unfit to plead.
52 Michael Colvin, \(\text{Hansard}\), Vol 166 Col 1139, 1990.
54 (1995) unreported. For further details see, eg, Jones, ‘Computer terrorist or mad boffin?’ (1996) 146 NLJ 46; ibid, Akdeniz.
However, it still remains uncertain to what extent the Computer Misuse Act could be applicable where persons write and distribute information detailing computer virus codes but are not themselves responsible for introducing a virus into a system. A possibility might be to charge them with an inchoate offence such as incitement or conspiracy, or perhaps, in appropriate circumstances, with aiding and abetting an offence under the Act.\(^{55}\) Pile was in fact charged with, *inter alia*, incitement to breach s 3, but, as his was a guilty plea, the likely success of such charges in other cases remains undetermined.

**THE OPERATION OF THE ACT**

On first examination, it does not appear that the new Act has had any more conspicuous success at deterring or apprehending computer misuse than the hotch potch of offences in use prior to its enactment.

Wasik\(^{56}\) suggested in 1995 that, in reviewing the operation of the law in this area, attention should be focused on two key issues:

What is the proper role of the criminal law in this area? Should the continuing trend towards criminalisation of computer misuse be society’s main response to that behaviour? What should be the priority between that approach and, say, the development of ethical codes and regulatory structures, which would impinge upon manufacturers and others to ensure compliance with higher levels of security in IT products? Might civil liability and/or regulatory arrangements offer a more subtle, and perhaps more effective approach, than further criminalisation? Do we need more law, or less?

To the extent that criminalisation is appropriate in this area (and few would deny that it does offer an important element within a range of responses) we should be concerned to predict, to identify and to remedy the various shortcomings of the law. Will the criminal law as currently drafted cover, for example, the malicious dissemination of computer viruses? This requires us to look, not just at the substantive criminal law but also at the rules of admissibility of evidence in court and the provisions relating to enforcement, search and seizure of evidential material. We should also be concerned to identify new criminal trends associated with widespread computerisation, such as the organised theft of computer hardware and the spread of pornographic material through IT networks.

The Law Commission Reports dealt with some of the reasons for the introduction of criminal offences and their activity was paralleled in a number of other jurisdictions, which, on the whole, came to similar conclusions. However, this is not to say that there is no place for other regulatory activity

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and this subject will be returned to later. But what of the shortcomings in the present law? Findings in other jurisdictions that criminal offences had a necessary part to play in combating computer misuse were, inevitably, followed by observations that the introduction of such offences did not provide a complete solution.57

In the UK, statistics show58 that the total number of cases under this legislation is small and, of these, only a small minority are actually hacking cases—the activity which, arguably, precipitated legislative activity. This observation also correlates with the Audit Commission’s findings that the instances of computer misuse can more often be associated with the employment relationship. Whilst, as identified by the Law Commission, hacking could not be penalised without the Computer Misuse Act 1990, a number of other legal sanctions might be appropriate in the situations identified by the Audit Commission. These could include dismissal,59 in addition to a range of theft offences where the abuse occurs in order to obtain a pecuniary advantage, or they could be construed as blackmail.

Despite the lack of court cases, popular belief, coupled with anecdotal evidence, suggests that hacking is a widespread activity but that, even though this might indicate a breach of s 1, action would be unlikely to be instigated until or unless the activity rose above the nuisance level or became in some way damaging. Part of this is due to the problems inherent in detecting and identifying the hacker—something that was not really addressed by the Law Commission Report. Clearly, the collection of evidence in such cases is not the same process as for more conventional crimes. However, despite criticisms that the expertise of the police is unable to keep pace with that of the hackers,60 there have been some conspicuous successes, notably the prosecution of Pile, referred to above. Commentators have noted a parallel situation in other jurisdictions with similar legislation: ‘…in many Western countries where there are computer crime laws, there have been only a handful of computer crime prosecutions.’61 Conley and Bryan have identified specific enforcement problems in the US but their words seem eminently capable of describing the situation elsewhere.

59 See, also, Denco v Joinson [1992] 1 All ER 463.
61 Brunnstein, K and Fischer-Huebner, S, ‘How far can the criminal law help to control IT misuse?’ (1995) 9 LC & T Yearbook 111.
Computer crime legislation in the US
JM Conley and RM Bryan
(1999) 8 ICTL 35

The weakness in the entire effort has been and is likely to remain at the enforcement end. Legislatures have been more diligent in defining offenses than in planning and funding the specialized enforcement programs that computer crime laws require. At the same time, the victim community, especially its corporate members, seems to be less than enthusiastic about supporting rigorous enforcement. Until these conditions change, it will be fair to conclude that the US is much better protected against computer crime in theory than in practice.

It is not only the detection and apprehension of offenders that has given rise to problems, but also the attitude of the courts. This was made particularly apparent in the case of Bedworth. Bedworth was a teenager whose hacking activities started when he was given a computer for his 14th birthday in 1987. By the time he was arrested in 1991, together with fellow hackers who had all communicated under pseudonyms via an electronic bulletin board, he had hacked into an impressively long list of computer systems including the Financial Times, a cancer research institute in Brussels, the EC offices in Luxembourg and many others, resulting in significant financial losses being incurred by the institutions involved. At his trial, he made no attempt to deny that he had done the acts of which he was accused. His defence was that he was obsessed; he was subject to compulsive behaviour, so that, although he knew that what he was doing was unlawful, his obsession denied him the freedom to stop—in other words, he was addicted to hacking. To the surprise of the prosecution, the jury acquitted him, a verdict which was widely referred to at the time as if it drove the proverbial 'coach and horses' through the enforcement of the Computer Misuse Act 1990.

Accepting that it can never be known on what basis the jury came to their conclusion, there seem to be three main possibilities. The first of these was that they were intending to signal their disapproval of the Computer Misuse Act in much the same way as the surprise acquittal of Ponting had discredited parts of the Official Secrets Act 1911. This seems unlikely; although there were certain aspects of the investigation of this case (discussed below) which had perhaps aroused the concern of the jury, the case had not been preceded by the history of


criticism and bad publicity surrounding the statute in question which had set
the scene prior to Ponting.

The second possibility is that the jury were persuaded by the defence of
addiction to computers, notwithstanding the judge’s summing up. For addiction
to be a sufficient defence to a criminal charge, the individual should be affected
to such an extent that the affliction may be viewed as a ‘disease of the mind’,
sufficient to prevent the formation of the requisite mens rea. This would then
effectively equate with a defence of insanity. Whether or not there is clinical
evidence to support any finding of addiction to computer hacking is not a subject
which can be debated here, although supporting evidence had been produced
during the trial. It is certainly the case that, at the trial, Bedworth gave repeated
assertions, not only that he had committed the acts at issue, but also that he was
aware that these acts were wrong and would not be repeated. If he were truly
addicted, would he be able to make this latter promise? Charlesworth,64 citing
the case of Lawrence,65 points out that courts are unlikely even to take addiction
to account in mitigation. Lawrence was, of course, a case in which the offence (of
burglary) was committed to feed the addiction rather than being directly related
to that addiction. Whilst it can be problematic to draw analogies between such
cases and those, such as Bedworth, in which the addiction is to the criminal
behaviour itself, nonetheless there is confirmation for the absence of a general
defence of addiction in Kopsch66—‘The defence of uncontrollable impulse is
unknown in English law’.

Finally, it is entirely possible that what acquitted Bedworth was the ‘sympathy
vote’. There was evidence at the trial that the police had utilised tactics such as
‘dawn raids’ on his home in their apprehension of Bedworth and it may be that
the jury thought that he was only a young, fresh faced boy and that, in the
particular circumstances of the case, the police had overreacted.

Whilst we can never be sure of the precise reasoning on which this acquittal
was based, it is clear that no such sympathy was extended to his co-defendants,
Strickland and Woods, who, having pleaded guilty, were sentenced to six
months’ imprisonment—a recognition, perhaps, of the fact that the behaviour
in question resulted in significant financial loss, can cause serious damage to the
systems affected and should be viewed seriously.

Similarly, in the more recent case of Pile (above), the judge clearly took the
matter very seriously and, in the face of the likely losses to affected users,
allowed a defence application to seek an expert opinion on the amount of damage caused by Pile’s activities in advance of deciding on sentence. This led to a sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment when the case returned to Exeter Crown Court in November 1995. Neither has there has been much leniency for the latest case involving a schoolboy hacker, *R v Pryce.* Pryce was fined a total of £1,200 for 12 counts of hacking into computer systems, including that of the Pentagon, whose network was said to be much easier to penetrate than that of a UK university!

Even taking into account the provisions provided in the Computer Misuse Act, a further problem which could have surfaced in the case of both Bedworth and Pryce is that of jurisdictional problems; some of the computer systems into which they hacked were in other countries. The reverse situation is obviously equally likely: hackers in other countries can hack into computers and networks in the UK. How is this problem to be addressed? What of the virus which originates in the former USSR or Eastern Europe? The evidence is that this is being dealt with by co-operation between police forces, at least in Europe, and European police forces have agreed with Interpol that hackers or originators of viruses can be prosecuted in their country of residence, even if the hack or the virus has wreaked havoc in another jurisdiction. This improved co-operation has now been extended into Eastern Europe and has been finding ways of dealing with organised gangs—particularly in Russia and the Balkans. Indeed, the evidence that many viruses originate in Eastern European countries with little regulation of such activities has been used as evidence of the efficacy of computer crime legislation:

…the thesis that lack of computer crime legislation tends to mean different ethical standards amongst citizens is, apparently, borne out by what is reported from Bulgaria. Bulgaria had the highest rate of computer virus production *per capita* of any country in the world. In Bulgaria, there is no computer crime legislation and there are no copyright laws.

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68 The Computer Misuse Act 1990, s 4 makes it immaterial (subject to certain conditions detailed in subsequent sections and subsections) (a) whether any act or proof of which is required for conviction of the offence occurred in the home country concerned; or (b) whether the accused was in the home country concerned at the time of such an act or event. See, also, Kelleher, D, ‘International computer crime’ (1997) 147 NLJ 445.

REGULATION OF CONTENT ON COMPUTER NETWORKS

Thus far, two particular types of activity have been the focus of the discussion in this chapter—the use of computers to obtain pecuniary advantage, which may lead to a number of offences under theft and related legislation; and unauthorised access, including hacking into computer systems. The Computer Misuse Act 1990 and similar statutes in other jurisdictions are a particular example of the law’s response to unauthorised access to computer systems and, despite the differences between the jurisdictions, shows, in many respects, a remarkable consistency of philosophy and approach. This is especially apparent in relation to the almost universal choice of criminal sanctions as appropriate to penalise such actions.

However, these are not the only activities facilitated by the burgeoning use of computers that have caused discussion and concern. The increase in both the size and the capability of computer networks and, in particular, the development of the internet and the world wide web, have raised a certain amount of disquiet as to the extent to which these media can be used for the propagation of undesirable material. In order to appreciate some of these problems, it is useful to have a rudimentary understanding of the way in which such systems function. The manner of operation of the Internet was set out in *ACLU v Reno I.*70

*ACLU v Reno I*
US DC Penn (1996)

**Findings of fact**

The Internet is not a physical or tangible entity, but rather a giant network which interconnects numerable smaller groups of linked computer networks. It is thus a network of networks. This is best understood if one considers what a linked group of computers—referred to here as a ‘network’—is, and what it does... Some networks are ‘closed’ networks, not linked to other computers or networks. Many networks, however, are connected to other networks, which are in turn connected to other networks in a manner which permits each computer in any network to communicate with computers on any other network in the system. This global Web of linked networks and computers is referred to as the Internet.

The nature of the Internet is such that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to determine its size at a given moment. It is indisputable, however, that the Internet has experienced extraordinary growth in recent years. In 1981, fewer than 300 computers were linked to the Internet, and by 1989, the number stood at fewer than 90,000 computers. By 1993, over 1,000,000

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70 Full text available at www.epic.org/CDA; see below, p 488. See, also, Communication to the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, *Illegal and Harmful Content on the Internet 2: How does the Internet Work?* COM (1996) 487.
computers were linked. Today, over 9,400,000 host computers worldwide, of which approximately 60 per cent are located within the United States, are estimated to be linked to the Internet. This count does not include the personal computers people use to access the Internet using modems. In all, reasonable estimates are that as many as 40 million people around the world can and do access the enormously flexible communication Internet medium. That figure is expected to grow to 200 million Internet users by the year 1999.

... The resulting whole is a decentralised, global medium of communications— or 'cyberspace'—that links people, institutions, corporations, and governments around the world. The Internet is an international system. This communications medium allows any of the literally tens of millions of people with access to the Internet to exchange information. These communications can occur almost instantaneously, and can be directed either to specific individuals, to a broader group of people interested in a particular subject, or to the world as a whole...

Messages between computers on the Internet do not necessarily travel entirely along the same path. The Internet uses ‘packet switching’ communication protocols that allow individual messages to be subdivided into smaller ‘packets’ that are then sent independently to the destination, and are then automatically reassembled by the receiving computer. While all packets of a given message often travel along the same path to the destination, if computers along the route become overloaded, then packets can be rerouted to less loaded computers...

No single entity—academic, corporate, governmental, or non-profit—administers the Internet. It exists and functions as a result of the fact that hundreds of thousands of separate operators of computers and computer networks independently decided to use common data transfer protocols to exchange communications and information with other computers (which in turn exchange communications and information with still other computers). There is no centralised storage location, control point, or communications channel for the Internet, and it would not be technically feasible for a single entity to control all of the information conveyed on the Internet.

The findings of fact in this case then went on to discuss the different routes by which people might gain access to the internet and the different methods by which they might communicate or retrieve information. These include email, newsgroups, real time interactions, use of distributed databases and remote information retrieval. The most advanced example of this last category is the world wide web, which was described as follows:

**The World Wide Web**

A third approach, and fast becoming the most well known on the Internet, is the ‘World Wide Web’. The Web utilises a ‘hypertext’ formatting language called hypertext markup language (HTML), and programs that ‘browse’ the Web can display HTML documents containing text, images, sound, animation
and moving video. Any HTML document can include links to other types of information or resources, so that while viewing an HTML document that, for example, describes resources available on the Internet, one can ‘click’ using a computer mouse on the description of the resource and be immediately connected to the resource itself. Such ‘hyperlinks’ allow information to be accessed and organised in very flexible ways, and allow people to locate and efficiently view related information even if the information is stored on numerous computers all around the world.

Purpose. The World Wide Web (W3C) was created to serve as the platform for a global, on-line store of knowledge, containing information from a diversity of sources and accessible to Internet users around the world. Though information on the Web is contained in individual computers, the fact that each of these computers is connected to the Internet through W3C protocols allows all of the information to become part of a single body of knowledge. It is currently the most advanced information system developed on the Internet, and embraces within its data model most information in previous networked information systems...

... The Web links together disparate information on an ever-growing number of Internet-linked computers by setting common information storage formats (HTML) and a common language for the exchange of Web documents (HTTP). Although the information itself may be in many different formats, and stored on computers which are not otherwise compatible, the basic Web standards provide a basic set of standards which allow communication and exchange of information. Despite the fact that many types of computers are used on the Web, and the fact that many of these machines are otherwise incompatible, those who ‘publish’ information on the Web are able to communicate with those who seek to access information with little difficulty because of these basic technical standards.

... Running on tens of thousands of individual computers on the Internet, the Web is what is known as a distributed system. The Web was designed so that organisations with computers containing information can become part of the Web simply by attaching their computers to the Internet and running appropriate World Wide Web software. No single organisation controls any membership in the Web, nor is there any single centralised point from which individual Web sites or services can be blocked from the Web. From a user’s perspective, it may appear to be a single, integrated system, but in reality it has no centralised control point.

Computer networks thus facilitate communications between both individuals and groups, as well as providing the means to access and retrieve extensive information from a variety of sources across the globe. Not surprisingly, this does not only include educational and informative material, but also includes information that might be undesirable or antisocial. Such material might be defamatory;71 obscene or pornographic, racist, malicious, threatening or abusive, or may constitute undesirable religious or political propaganda. The following

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71 See discussion above, Chapter 7.
list of areas which might give rise to concern in this respect and are likely to be covered by different national and international legal regimes was provided by the European Commission:72

- national security (instructions on bomb making, illegal drug production, terrorist activities);
- protection of minors (abusive forms of marketing, violence, pornography);
- protection of human dignity (incitement to racial hatred or racial discrimination);
- economic security (fraud, instructions on pirating credit cards);
- information security (malicious hacking);
- protection of privacy (unauthorised communication of personal data, electronic harassment);
- protection of reputation (libel, unlawful comparative advertising);
- intellectual property (unauthorised distribution of copyrighted works, for example, software or music);

It was suggested that these were ‘pressing issues of public, political, commercial and legal interest’ which could not be ignored, even while recognising that ‘the benefits of the Internet far outweigh its negative aspects’. Such comments have fuelled speculation about the extent to which the law might be able to intervene and regulate the actual content of information that is available on the internet and the world wide web.

It may be that the existing law is not tailored appropriately for application to computer networks but, whatever the law may be in a particular jurisdiction, it is clear that there is unlikely to be consensus between jurisdictions over acceptable standards. Certain governments may be sensitive about the expression of some political or religious views and it is evident that acceptable standards and definitions of obscene or pornographic material will vary from place to place. The practical effect of such divergence was noted by McGuire, in a consideration of the relevant regulatory regimes in Germany and the US, both of which provide a constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression but do not exhibit any agreement over what content should be regulated on the internet.73 Delacourt concurred in this view, noting that ‘Germany and the US are at least on the same page with regard to pornography but…their treatment of divisive political propaganda differs dramatically’.74 Given the ease of accessing information which originates in another jurisdiction, is it possible to control the propagation of such material or to enforce national laws on a medium which does not recognise national boundaries?

72 Op cit, Communication to the European Parliament, fn 70.
There are also a number of divergent views about the nature of these media that colour the debate surrounding the basis on which the law might intervene. At one extreme is the view that this global network of computers is a fundamentally anarchic medium which is not, nor should it be, subject to any type of control or regulation. This has even found expression in such comments as ‘no law applies to the internet’. Notwithstanding the sentiments of those who espouse this view of the internet, the fallacy behind such a statement should be obvious. Far from there being no law that applies, it is clear that there are a multitude of laws which apply in numerous jurisdictions. However, the application and enforcement of those laws in this area may be so fraught with difficulties as to give the outward appearance that no law applies. Even for those who do not see the internet as completely anarchic, there is a problem in assessing the appropriate analogy to draw with other fora for the access and exchange of information. Is an encounter in cyberspace the equivalent to exchanging gossip at the village meeting place or to participating in a high level conference? Should the same standards be applied as are applied to publishing of hard copy, or to television and radio broadcasts? The fundamental difference between the internet or world wide web and these other forms of communication is that the global network is capable of fulfilling all of these functions simultaneously; thus, in some circumstances, it may be appropriate to utilise similar rules as are used for traditional publication, but at other times such an attempt may be felt to be a violation of the right to free speech, or even the right to privacy.

A centrally important question is, therefore, whether to regulate the internet at all, and if so, in what manner. There is an increasing amount of academic discussion concerning this issue from both a theoretical and practical point of view. Although it is beyond the scope of this book to explore the debate in depth, a brief review of the arguments will serve to place the ensuing discussion of the substantive law in context.

It has become common to speak of the ‘online community’ and it might be expected that any putative regulation would take this into account. Indeed, the concept of community is a vital one in US jurisprudence for defining the legal meaning of ‘obscenity’. The court in *US v Thomas* rejected the notion of a community defined by the linkage of its members in cyberspace and retained the traditional connection between a community and its geographical location.
although some commentators take the concept of such a community for granted, if not its identification—‘Due to the very nature of the internet, defining a community by which to judge potentially offensive material is impossible’.79 Indeed, the very difficulty of connecting activity in cyberspace with a specific physical jurisdiction has led some commentators to suggest that the rules which pertain to cyberspace should evolve in relation to that medium, rather than out of an artificial connection to some geographical location.80

For those who think that regulation by law is either infeasible, over-restrictive or simply not appropriate, the alternative is non-regulation or some form of self-regulation.81 A number of commentators have espoused a variety of self-regulatory regimes with regard to content regulation but, as yet, these have not received any universal acceptance.82 One possibility is not to regulate at all. Delacourt, whilst acknowledging that this way forward might leave some important concerns unresolved, can nevertheless see some virtues in such an approach.

77 See below, p 490.
78 Gobla, KA, ‘The infeasibility of Federal internet regulation’ (1997) 102 Dickinson L Rev 93, p 129; see, also, discussion below of ACLU v Reno I and ACLU v Reno II.
80 See, also, above, p 349, on self-regulatory regimes in the context of privacy regulation.
82 ACLU v Reno; full text available at www.epic.org/CDA.
The most obvious, and most controversial, alternative to this cumbersome web of national and local regimes is to leave the Internet completely unregulated…

While far from imaginary…the dangers of objectionable on-line expression have been overstated. Although some would argue that any amount of obscenity or hate speech is cause for concern, the amount of such expression as a proportion of the enormous total volume of on-line expression does not warrant the amount of attention it has received. The argument that novel features of the new technology magnify the social impact of such expression is similarly one-sided, for there are an equal number of features which minimize such impact. The interactive nature of the Internet will often provide the user with the opportunity to respond instantaneously to the hate speech espoused in a usegroup or Web site, making such postings far less effective than the traditional leaflet. Additionally, the scope and relative complexity of navigating the Internet will often prevent users from finding what they are looking for, much less what they are trying to avoid. Someone who comes across obscenity was probably looking for obscenity and is no more likely to stumble across it than to stumble across song lyrics, techno-babble, or an infinite variety of other things. The relative chaos of the Internet demonstrates another point: the system is in its infancy. As it matures, several developments will take place to limit the amount of objectionable on-line expression…the demographics of Internet users will diversify. In response to diversification, service providers will vary their offerings, with the elimination of objectionable material as a major selling point…

An argument for regulation of the Internet to stem the flow of objectionable material also privileges the chaff at the expense of the wheat.

Despite this view, Delacourt nevertheless acknowledges the practical reality that, ‘although the arguments for complete non-regulation are compelling, the fact remains that the political pressures which spurred the creation of the national regulatory regimes are not likely to disappear’. Notwithstanding some of the perceived problems inherent with application of legal rules to the internet, not all commentators favour a complete abandonment of legal regulation. The following extract, written in the context of privacy regulation but applicable to regulation of other activities, shows elements of both pragmatism and idealism

Transborder data flow: is there a solution in sight?
Peter Blume
(2000) 8 Int JLIT 65, p 82

There are many areas where legal rules are not fully efficient and where it is well known that they are not always enforced. Actually there probably does not exist any legal rule that is always respected in practice. This implies that
although it must be recognised that the Internet is impossible to regulate completely this does not mean there should be no rules. It should be added that legal rules are complied with for many reasons and that fear of sanctions is only one of these. In many situations rules are respected on the basis of a general respect for the law.

As will be seen below, there have been a variety of ways, all exhibiting varying degrees of success, in which legal regimes have been utilised for the regulation of the internet, including application of pre-existing law, amendment of existing provisions and the creation of new law.

Arguably, it is the use of the internet as a medium for the circulation of various types of pornography that has caused the greatest concern and controversy amongst both politicians and the public, and a study of the response to these concerns raises a number of the fundamental issues surrounding regulation of the internet as a whole. In the US, the challenge to the Communications Decency Act of 1996 as being unconstitutional on its face highlighted some of these tensions. This Act included provisions aimed at preventing young people from accessing indecent material over computer networks. It made it a criminal offence to engage in communication on computer networks that is either ‘indecent’ or ‘patently offensive’ if the contents of that communication can be viewed by a minor. Neglecting the not inconsiderable difficulty of ascertaining the age of those accessing the material, this was regarded by many as an unacceptable intrusion into the right to free speech, which is protected by the First Amendment to the US Constitution. Accordingly, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed a legal challenge to the statute and the case was heard in June 1996.83

Having discussed both the mode of operation of the internet and the world wide web and the way in which they were used,84 the court went on to make some observations that related to the way in which analogies might be drawn between the internet and other methods of obtaining and exchanging information.

**ACLU v Reno I**  
US DC Penn (1996)

Because of the technology underlying the Internet, the statutory term ‘content provider’,85 which is equivalent to the traditional ‘speaker’, may actually be a
hybrid of speakers. Through the use of HTML, for example, Critical Path and Stop Prisoner Rape link their Web sites to several related databases, and a user can immediately jump from the home pages of these organizations to the related databases simply by clicking on a link...

Because of the different forms of Internet communication, a user of the Internet may speak or listen interchangeably, blurring the distinction between ‘speakers’ and ‘listeners’ on the Internet. Chat rooms, email and newsgroups are interactive forms of communication, providing the user with the opportunity both to speak and to listen.

It follows that unlike traditional media, the barriers to entry as a speaker on the Internet do not differ significantly from the barriers to entry as a listener. Once one has entered cyberspace, one may engage in the dialogue that occurs there. In the argot of the medium, the receiver can and does become the content provider, and vice versa.

The Internet is therefore a unique and wholly new medium of worldwide human communication...

Once a provider posts content on the Internet, it is available to all other Internet users worldwide. Similarly, once a user posts a message to a newsgroup or bulletin board, that message becomes available to all subscribers to that newsgroup or bulletin board...

Once a provider posts its content on the Internet, it cannot prevent that content from entering any community. Unlike the newspaper, broadcast station, or cable system, Internet technology necessarily gives a speaker a potential worldwide audience. Because the Internet is a network of networks...any network connected to the Internet has the capacity to send and receive information to any other network...

...it takes several steps to enter cyberspace. At the most fundamental level, a user must have access to a computer with the ability to reach the Internet (typically by way of a modem). A user must then direct the computer to connect with the access provider, enter a password, and enter the appropriate commands to find particular data. On the World Wide Web, a user must normally use a search engine or enter an appropriate address. Similarly, accessing newsgroups, bulletin boards and chat rooms requires several steps.

Communications over the Internet do not ‘invade’ an individual’s home or appear on one’s computer screen unbiden. Users seldom encounter content ‘by accident’. A document’s title or a description of the document will usually appear before the document itself takes the step needed to view it, and in many cases the user will receive detailed information about a site’s content before he or she need take the step to access the document. Almost all sexually explicit images are preceded by warnings as to the content...

Evidence adduced at the hearing showed significant differences between Internet communications and communications received by radio or television. Although content on the Internet is just a few clicks of a mouse away from the user, the receipt of information on the Internet requires a series of affirmative steps more deliberate and directed than merely turning a dial.
The court then moved on to an analysis of the legal issues in the case. Notwithstanding the guarantee of free speech provided by the First Amendment, it is well established that this guarantee will be forfeited in the case of obscenity and child pornography, and there is Federal law which proscribes such activities.\(^86\) The court observed that the existing law was capable of application to whatever medium was used for the dissemination of this type of material and, therefore, could equally be applied to propagation via the internet.\(^87\) Commercial distributors of pornography were unlikely to be caught by the provisions of the Communications Decency Act 1996, as their usual practice was to require credit card validation, thus reducing the likelihood of the material being accessed by minors; in addition, the target of the Act was not obscene material but that which was ‘indecent’ or ‘patently offensive’. Although ‘obscene’ had a recognised meaning,\(^88\) this was not the case with regard to ‘indecent’ and neither was it defined in the statute. Given the criminal penalties attached to breach of the Act and the difficulties in ascertaining what material would be covered and the range of defendants, the court was unanimously of the opinion that the statute was unconstitutional for reasons of vagueness. In arriving at this conclusion, the judges found evidence that the internet had more in common with telephone conversation than with broadcasting, for instance, and that, based on this reasoning, the Government had little valid pretext for regulating the content.

**ACLU v Reno I US DC Penn (1996)**

**District Judge Dalzell**...The Internet is a new medium of mass communication. As such, the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence compels us to consider the special qualities of this new medium in determining whether the CDA is a constitutional exercise of governmental power. Relying on these special qualities, which we have described at length in our findings of fact above, I conclude that the CDA is unconstitutional and that the First Amendment denies Congress the power to regulate protected speech on the Internet...

\(^86\) See, eg, *US v Thomas* 74 F 3d 701 (6th Cir 1995), affirmed by US Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit (29 January 1996). *Thomas* concerned obscene material made available on a bulletin board held on a computer in California. The case came to court in Memphis, Tennessee, where the bulletin board was accessed, on the basis that, in cases involving transportation of obscene material between States, the proper standard to apply is that of the community of the geographic area where the materials are sent. It had been suggested that the ‘community standard’ test for obscenity set out in *Miller v California* 413 US 15 (1973) should be modified in the light of the creation of ‘cyber communities’ but this was considered irrelevant on the facts of this particular case, as membership was required before the bulletin board was accessed, which, in practice, meant that some control could be exerted over the likely destination of the files in question.

\(^87\) See above, fn 86.

\(^88\) Full text of the oral arguments presented to the Supreme Court on 19 March 1997 is available at www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/trial/sctran.html; also via www.epic.org/CDA.
Four related characteristics of Internet communication have a transcendent importance to our shared holding that the CDA is unconstitutional on its face... First, the Internet presents very low barriers to entry. Second, these barriers to entry are identical for both speakers and listeners. Third, as a result of these low barriers, astoundingly diverse content is available on the Internet. Fourth, the Internet provides significant access to all who wish to speak in the medium, and even creates a relative parity among speakers...

The CDA will, without doubt, undermine the substantive, speech-enhancing benefits that have flowed from the Internet... The diversity of the content will necessarily diminish as a result. The economic costs associated with compliance with the Act will drive from the Internet speakers whose content falls within the zone of possible prosecution. Many Web sites, newsgroups, and chat rooms will shut down, since users cannot discern the age of other participants. In this respect, the Internet would ultimately come to mirror broadcasting and print, with messages tailored to a mainstream society from speakers who could be sure that their message was likely decent in every community in the country...

The CDA’s wholesale disruption on the Internet will necessarily affect adult participation in the medium. As some speakers leave or refuse to enter the medium, and others bowdlerise their speech or erect the barriers that the Act envisions, and still others remove bulletin boards, Web sites and newsgroups, adults will face a shrinking ability to participate in the medium. Since much of the communication on the Internet is participatory, i.e., is a form of dialogue, a decrease in the number of speakers, speech fora, and permissible topics will diminish the worldwide dialogue that is the strength and signal achievement of the medium...

... It is no exaggeration to conclude that the Internet has achieved, and continues to achieve, the most participatory marketplace of mass speech that this country—and indeed the world—has yet seen. The plaintiffs in these actions correctly describe the ‘democratising’ effects of Internet communication: individual citizens of limited means can speak to a worldwide audience on issues of concern to them. Federalists and Anti-Federalists may debate the structure of their government nightly, but these debates occur in newsgroups or chat rooms rather than in pamphlets. Modern day Luthers still post their theses, but to electronic bulletin boards rather than the door of the Wittenberg Schlosskirche. More mundane (but, from a constitutional perspective, equally important) dialogue occurs between aspiring artists, or French cooks, or dog lovers, or fly fishermen.

Indeed, the Government’s asserted ‘failure’ of the Internet rests on the implicit premise that too much speech occurs in that medium, and that speech there is too available to the participants. This is exactly the benefit of Internet communication, however. The Government, therefore, implicitly asks this court to limit both the amount of speech on the Internet and the availability of that speech. This argument is profoundly repugnant to First Amendment principles...
The Internet is a far more speech-enhancing medium than print, the village green, or the mails. Because it would necessarily affect the Internet itself, the CDA would necessarily reduce the speech available for adults on the medium. This is a constitutionally intolerable result.

Some of the dialogue on the Internet surely tests the limits of conventional discourse. Speech on the Internet can be unfiltered, unpolished and unconventional, even emotionally charged, sexually explicit and vulgar—in a word, ‘indecent’ in many communities. But we should expect such speech to occur in a medium in which citizens from all walks of life have a voice. We should also protect the autonomy that such a medium confers to ordinary people as well as media magnates...

Cutting through the acronyms and argot that littered the hearing testimony, the Internet may fairly be regarded as a never-ending worldwide conversation. The Government may not, through the CDA, interrupt that conversation. As the most participatory form of mass speech yet developed, the Internet deserves the highest protection from governmental intrusion.

True it is that many find some of the speech on the Internet to be offensive, and amid the din of cyberspace many hear discordant voices that they regard as indecent. The absence of governmental regulation of Internet content has unquestionably produced a kind of chaos, but as one of the plaintiffs’ experts put it with such resonance at the hearing: what achieved success was the very chaos that the Internet is. The strength of the Internet is that chaos.

Just as the strength of the Internet is chaos, so the strength of our liberty depends upon the chaos and cacophony of the unfettered speech the First Amendment protects.

This decision of the Pennsylvania Court was appealed by the US Government and the Supreme Court upheld the judgment in June 1997,\(^\text{89}\) noting that the ‘community standards’ criterion as applied to the internet means that any communication available to a nationwide audience will be judged by the standards of the community most likely to be offended by the message.

Still considering that the appropriate way forward was by means of legislation to address the perceived problems, in 1998, Congress produced another enactment, the Child On-line Protection Act (COPA), intending to rectify the specific concerns raised in the CDA litigation. The provisions of COPA made it a Federal crime to propagate material online that was ‘harmful to minors’ for ‘commercial purposes’ (47 USC s 231(1)). By virtue of 47 USC s 231(e)(2)(A), it would only be inferred that the communication was for commercial purposes if the person was ‘engaged in the business of making such communication’. The meaning of this phrase was itself expanded upon in 47 USC s 231(e)(2)(B) in the following terms:

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89 136 L Ed 2d 436 (1997). Full text of the oral arguments presented to the Supreme Court on 19 March 1997 is also available at www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/trial/sctran.html and via www.epic.org/CDA.
A person will be deemed to be ‘engaged in the business’ if the person who makes a communication, or offers to make a communication, by means of the World Wide Web, that includes any material that is harmful to minors, devotes time, attention, or labor to such activities, as a regular course of such person’s trade or business, with the objective of earning a profit as a result of such activities (although it is not necessary that the person make a profit or that the making or offering to make such communications be the person’s sole or principal business or source of income). A person may be considered to be engaged in the business of making, by means of the World Wide Web, communications for commercial purposes that include material that is harmful to minors, only if the person knowingly causes the material that is harmful to minors to be posted on the World Wide Web or knowingly solicits such material to be posted on the World Wide Web.

The term ‘contemporary community standards’ was referred to in 47 USC s 231(e)(6), which defined ‘harmful to minors’ as:

...any communication, picture, image, graphic image file, article, recording, writing, or other matter of any kind that is obscene or that—

(A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find, taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is designed to pander to, the prurient interest;
(B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive with respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent female breast; and
(C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.

Defences were available where it could be shown that attempts had been made, in good faith, to restrict access to minors by requiring, for example, credit card verification or identity number, or age verification by digital certificate or other appropriate technological means.

This statute was again the subject of an immediate challenge by the ACLU and others,90 on the basis that it was:

(a) invalid on its face and as applied to them under the First Amendment for burdening speech that is constitutionally protected for adults;
(b) invalid on its face for violating the First Amendment rights of minors; and
(c) unconstitutionally vague under the First and Fifth Amendments.

Reno was of the view that the provisions challenged were aimed at commercial pornographers and that the interpretation of the statute could be restricted in this way, an argument which was given short shrift by the court:

There is nothing in the text of the COPA, however, that limits its applicability to so-called commercial pornographers only; indeed, the text of COPA imposes liability on a speaker who knowingly makes any communication for commercial purposes ‘that includes any material that is harmful to minors’, and defines a speaker that is engaged in the business as one who makes a communication ‘that includes any material that is harmful to minors…as a regular course of such person’s trade or business (although it is not necessary that the person make a profit or that the making or offering to make such communications be the person’s sole or principal business or source of income)’. Because COPA applies to communications which include, but are not necessarily wholly comprised of material that is harmful to minors, it logically follows that it would apply to any Web site that contains only some harmful to minors material.

Like its predecessor, the CDA, the court was of the view that COPA infringed the right of adults to freedom of speech and expression, concluding, albeit somewhat reluctantly, that ‘the protection of children from access to harmful to minors materials on the web, the compelling interest sought to be furthered by Congress in COPA, particularly resonates with the court’ and that its decision to allow an injunction against enforcement would ‘delay once again the careful protection of our children’. However, the court was ‘acutely cognizant of its charge under the law of this country not to protect the majoritarian will at the expense of stifling the rights embodied in the Constitution’.

In June 2000, the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 91 upheld the granting of an injunction on the basis of likely unconstitutionality but, interestingly, for the purposes of the academic debate on community in cyberspace, Circuit Judge Garth focused on the impossibility of determining ‘contemporary community standards’.

ACLU v Reno II
US Ct App (3rd Cir 2000)

Because material posted on the Web is accessible by all Internet users worldwide, and because current technology does not permit a Web publisher to restrict access to its site based on the geographic locale of each particular Internet user, COPA essentially requires that every Web publisher subject to the statute abide by the most restrictive and conservative state’s community standards in order to avoid criminal liability. Thus, because the standard by which COPA gauges whether material is ‘harmful to minors’ is based on identifying ‘contemporary community standards’ the inability of Web publishers to restrict access to their Web sites based on the geographic locale of the site visitor, in and of itself, imposes an impermissible burden on constitutionally protected First Amendment speech…

91 Available at vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d//Jun2000/991324.txt.
We base our particular determination of COPA’s likely unconstitutionality, however, on COPA’s reliance on ‘contemporary community standards’ in the context of the electronic medium of the Web to identify material that is harmful to minors. The overbreadth of COPA’s definition of ‘harmful to minors’ applying a ‘contemporary community standards’ clause—although virtually ignored by the parties and the amicus in their respective briefs but raised by us at oral argument—so concerns us that we are persuaded that this aspect of COPA, without reference to its other provisions, must lead inexorably to a holding of a likelihood of unconstitutionality of the entire COPA statute.

As a result, we do not find it necessary to address the District Court’s analysis of the definition of ‘commercial purposes’; whether the breadth of the forms of content covered by COPA could have been more narrowly tailored; whether the affirmative defenses impose too great a burden on Web publishers or whether those affirmative defenses should have been included as elements of the crime itself; whether COPA’s inclusion of criminal as well as civil penalties was excessive; whether COPA is designed to include communications made in chat rooms, discussion groups and links to other Web sites; whether the Government is entitled to so restrict communications when children will continue to be able to access foreign Web sites and other sources of material that is harmful to them; what taken ‘as a whole’ should mean in the context of the Web and the Internet; or whether the statute’s failure to distinguish between material that is harmful to a six year old versus a 16 year old is problematic.

Clearly, these latter questions all represent problems which will have to be addressed if Congress eventually manages to draft legislation which satisfies the other points.

Other jurisdictions have also introduced legislation purporting to regulate the content and use of information on the internet that, although not without some adverse comments being made, have not resulted in such a dramatic reaction as in the US, although it is difficult to assess how effective some of these statutes have been in practice. A number of States in Australia, for example, introduced legislation aimed both at restricting access to certain material on the Internet and controlling content, but with little opportunity for public debate on the issue.92 In Singapore, the preferred method has been to introduce ‘a licensing scheme that aims to safeguard public morals, political stability and religious harmony’.93 Both ISPs and internet content providers (ICPs) are required to register under the scheme. Both will need to follow certain guidelines—for ISPs, this might include blocking objectionable sites as instructed, whilst ICPs will have to submit information about prospective readers and the names of those with responsibility for publication.

93 ‘Internet regulation to start on Monday’ (1996) Straits Times, 13 July.
Administration of the system (and presumably those making decisions on what is or is not objectionable) will be by a National Internet Advisory Committee under the auspices of the Ministry of Information and the Arts. In China, the approach is to try to restrict access only to sites which will assist in the economic development of the country, whereas compliance with Islamic law is mandated for connection the the internet in Iran. On the other hand, recent reports suggest that France has resiled from plans to regulate content on the internet and will, instead, encourage voluntary compliance with an (as yet unwritten) international code of conduct for service providers.

Reference has already been made to the difference in approach between Germany and the US. At the end of 1995, a situation arose in Bavaria which was subsequently to receive worldwide attention. In November, a police search on a court order showed that customers of the ISP, CompuServe Germany, could access certain pornographic sites. As a result of this search, the police produced a list of unacceptable newsgroups containing representations of violent, child or animal pornography and, after communication with the parent company, CompuServe USA, access to these sites was blocked from 22 December 1995 until 13 February 1996. During this, albeit short, period, no customers of CompuServe worldwide could access the sites in question, showing the potential for the actions of a small jurisdiction to have a global effect. In February, access was restored but customers in Germany were offered free blocking software.

Despite the provision of this software, the offending sites could still be accessed by German customers and, eventually, the local manager of CompuServe Germany, Felix Somm, was charged with assisting in the dissemination of pornographic writings contrary to s 184 of the German Penal Code. Section 5 of the German Telecommunications Service Law, which came into force on 1 August 1997, provides exemption from liability for ‘access providers’ and in other cases restricts liability to those situations where the ISP is aware of the content and does not take reasonable steps to deal with the situation. At the trial in May 1998, neither of these provisions assisted Somm. CompuServe Germany was held not to be an access provider, as it did not connect customers to computer networks as such, but merely to its parent company. On the issue of the requisite knowledge, an interesting debate occurred due to the evidence of an expert witness, who pointed out that Somm could not

94 Op cit, Delacourt, fn 74.
96 Available in English at www.iid.de/rahmen/inkdgebt.html.
97 Cf the Defamation Act 1996, discussed above, p 438.
98 For a transcription in English see www.cyber-rights.org/isps/somm-dec.htm.
have been expected to be aware of the actual content of the material, which was placed on the server in the US.\footnote{99}{See www.eim.de/sep-98–3.htm.} As a result of this testimony, even the State prosecutor argued against a finding of guilt. The court did not agree and Somm was given a two year suspended sentence. This led to both prosecution and defence appealing and he was eventually acquitted at the appeal before the Landgericht München in November 1999. The defence for Somm commented that the case showed that, for effective regulation of the internet, ‘there are no alternatives to international legal harmonisation and international co-operation’.

In the UK, the debate has centred on the extent to which existing laws are adequate to deal with the distribution of pornography on the internet,\footnote{100}{Available at www.apic.net/mailing-lists/apple/9911/msg00010.html; see, also, Palfrey, T, ‘Policing the transmission of pornographic material’ (1996) 5 ICTL 197, who suggests international co-operation to combat those who disseminate illegal and harmful material via the internet, along the same model as is currently in use for policing of money laundering activities.} and also the extent to which they are capable of dealing with instances in which children are exposed to material intended only for an adult audience, as well as instances when the internet is used to propagate child pornography. Parliament recognised the widespread concern surrounding the perceived proliferation of ‘indecent’ material available via the internet and convened a Home Affairs Committee to investigate the matter.\footnote{101}{See, eg, Manchester, C, ‘Computer pornography’ [1995] Crim LR 546; Gibbons, T, ‘Computer generated pornography’ (1995) 9 LC & T Yearbook 83.} The Committee defined pornography as ‘obscene and indecent images and sounds which are stored, transmitted or viewed using computer technology’. They were given a wide brief to examine and assess the extent of the problems caused by the use of information technology to disseminate such material, and the likelihood of additional problems arising as a result of the development of the relevant technologies, and, in particular, to ascertain whether any changes in legislation were required to deal with existing and potential concerns relating to computer pornography. In the event, although the possibility of dedicated legislation at some future date was not ruled out, the Committee decided that it was possible to deal with the matter by amending the existing legislation to make it clear that it applied equally to the dissemination of material via computer networks. Their recommendations were given effect in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, which amended certain sections of the Obscene Publications Act 1959 and the Protection of Children Act 1978.
Section 1(1) of the Obscene Publications Act 1959 makes it a criminal offence to publish any obscene article. ‘Article’ is defined as ‘any description containing or embodying matter to be read or looked at or both, any sound record, any film etc’. Unlike the standard in the US, which allows for different standards in different communities, such matter will be obscene if, taken as a whole, it is such as to ‘tend to deprave and corrupt persons likely to read, see or hear matter contained or embodied in it’. To avoid any possibility that ‘article’ could be construed as not including information on computer, this section was amended by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 to include the transmission of electronically stored data which, on resolution into user-viewable form, is obscene. As the definition of ‘publication’ includes distribution, circulation, etc, this could have the effect of making a network provider liable for obscene material, as well as the originator of that information.

There may be more specific offences applicable to particular types of material, for example, offences under the Children and Young Persons (Harmful Publications) Act 1955, which applies to any book, magazine or other like work which is of a kind likely to fall into the hands of children and young persons. Such publications have to be pictorial in the main to attract the provisions of this Act and include stories portraying ‘the commission of crimes, acts of violence or cruelty or incidents of a repulsive or horrible nature in such a way that the work as a whole would tend to corrupt a child or young person’. In the absence of specific amendments, the application of this statute will rest on whether an interpretation of ‘other like work’ includes material available on computer.

Provisions that criminalise paedophilia are also likely to be of relevance, especially as this is a type of behaviour of which there appears to be universal condemnation and whose adherents have made full use of the facilities for dissemination of material offered by the internet. The Protection of Children Act 1978 creates offences relating to the display and distribution of indecent photographs of children, which includes advertisements suggesting that the advertiser makes such material available (s 1(1)(a)–(d)). These provisions have also been amended by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 to include both photographs and pseudo-photographs, the latter referring to computer generated or partially computer generated images of children. Data stored on a computer disk or other electronic means that is capable of conversion into a photograph or ‘pseudo-photograph’ is also included. The interpretation of these sections has been discussed in R v Fellows and Arnold, in which the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal against convictions for possessing indecent material.

103 For a review of cases relating to child pornography on the internet see, eg, op cit, Akdeniz, fn 81.

photographs of a child, having an obscene article for publication and distributing indecent photographs, the material in question being available over a computer network. The defendants had contended that such computer data did not constitute a photograph for the purposes of s 1 of the 1978 Act and that the data were not, in any event distributed or shown merely by reason of being made available for downloading. Evans LJ decided that:

...although the computer disk was not a photograph it was a copy of an indecent photograph. The disk contained data not visible to the eye, which could be converted by appropriate technical means into a print which exactly reproduced the original photograph from which it was derived. It was a form of copy which made the original photograph, or a copy of it, available for viewing by a person with access to the disk.105

Notwithstanding the applicability of the offences described above to material made available over the network, a problem may arise where the source of the material is outside the UK jurisdiction. Where the offence is one in which mere possession of the offending material is sufficient, there may be still a defendant who can be apprehended in the UK courts. This may not be the case where the offence is one of ‘publication’. In such a case, the relevant issue may be whether the offending material can be construed as an ‘article’ for the purposes of s 46 of the Customs Consolidation Act 1876, which prohibits the importation into the UK of ‘indecent or obscene prints, paintings, books, cards, lithographic or other engravings, or any other indecent or obscene articles’. HM Customs and Excise believe that this section would not apply where the offending material was made available in the UK via telephone lines, although it would be expected to apply to pornographic material which entered the country on disk.106 Manchester, mindful of the wide construction of certain concepts that the courts have used in other cases involving pornography, suggests a possible avenue for judicial creativity in this area which is remarkably reminiscent of arguments voiced in other areas of law, discussed elsewhere in this work.107

Computer pornography
Colin Manchester
[1995] Crim LR 546, p 553

...it is not inconceivable for the terms ‘articles’ and ‘goods’, as defined [in s 46 of the Customs Consolidation Act 1876], to be used to describe intangible matter such as information held on computer disks. Both terms make reference to ‘property’ and the concept of intangible property is well recognised in law, eg, copyright in published works. If the reference to ‘property’ is widely interpreted, this could encompass intangible information

106 Op cit, Manchester, fn 101, p 552.
107 See, eg, the discussion above, p 457 of the decision in Cox v Riley, and discussion of software as goods, above, p 171.
held on computer disk and this could certainly be ‘movable property’, thereby falling within the definition of ‘goods’, since it can be moved (electronically) from a computer in one place to a computer in another place. Similarly, the term ‘item’ in the definition of ‘article’ might be employed to describe an ‘item of information’, even though the information is not in tangible form. Further, if particular information is held on computer disk along with other information, the particular information might constitute a ‘separate element, member or part of anything’ viz part of the information held on the disk. If this article on ‘Computer pornography’ had been written abroad on a word processor, saved on computer disk and transmitted electronically to the Criminal Law Review, would it really be straining language too far to say that there had been an importation of an article into the country?

EUROPEAN INITIATIVES

The so called information society is an important phenomenon for the European Union (EU), representing as it does a whole new market in services and products. The institutions of the EU have, therefore, not been slow to realise the importance of a suitable legal framework within which the new technology can operate. The major thrust of such initiatives is facilitatory—to enable enterprises within the EU to gain full advantage of new technologies and to ensure that any barriers to the provision of services or threats to competitiveness are removed or minimised.

This does not mean that any negative aspects of the market in information and services available via computer networks have been ignored, and there has been significant activity which demonstrates this fact. In 1996, a Green Paper on the Protection of Minors and Human Dignity in Audiovisual and Information Services was published,108 which was followed by the Commission’s communication, Illegal and Harmful Content on the Internet.109 As there is no competence, as such, to legislate on criminal matters, it is for the Member States to respond as appropriate, although competence will be retained where the regulation of the activity in question might threaten the operation of the internal market:

As regards the distribution of illegal content on the Internet, it is clearly the responsibility of Member States to ensure the application of existing laws. What is illegal off-line remains illegal on-line, and it is up to Member States to enforce these laws... At another level, the presence of illegal and harmful content on the Internet has direct repercussions on the workings of the internal market. In particular, the adoption by Member States of regulations of new Internet services intended to protect the public interest may also create risks of distortions of

Policing ‘Cyberspace’

competition (for example, through widely divergent responses to the question of potential liability of Internet service providers), hamper the free circulation of these services, and lead to a re-fragmentation of the internal market. If unsolved, such problems may justify Community intervention.

The communication goes on to advocate a combination of self-regulation supplemented by technical solutions to deal with ‘illegal content’ on the internet, but encounters problems when considering ‘harmful content’, due to the potential conflicts with the right to freedom of expression and also with the legal framework of the internal market, the competition rules and the principle of the free provision of services. This discussion also implicitly presumes that there is no overlap between what is actually illegal and what might be considered merely harmful either in individual Member States or between Member States, and that there will be some consensus about what is included in these terms. In respect of the free movement of goods, the European Court of Justice has already been able to extend a wide margin of appreciation to Member States to enable them to define acceptable standards for their own territory, even where this might restrict the free movement of goods.110 The basic position is set out in the case of R v Henn and Darby.111

R v Henn and Darby
[1979] ECR 3795, p 3813
European Court of Justice

Under the terms of Article 36 of the Treaty the provisions relating to the free movement of goods within the Community are not to preclude prohibitions on imports which are justified inter alia ‘on grounds of public morality’. In principle, it is for each Member State to determine in accordance with its own scale of values and in the form selected by it the requirements of public morality in its territory... Each Member State is entitled to impose prohibitions on imports justified on the grounds of public morality for the whole of its territory...whatever the structure of its constitution may be and however the powers of legislating in regard to the subject in question may be distributed.

This general statement is subject to the proviso that such measures should not constitute arbitrary discrimination, as explained in the later case of Conegate v HM Customs and Excise.112

110 See the EC Treaty, Arts 30, 36.
...although Community law leaves Member States free to make their own assessments of the indecent or obscene character of certain articles, it must be pointed out that the fact that goods cause offence cannot be regarded as sufficiently serious to justify restrictions on the free movement of goods where the Member State concerned does not adopt, with respect to the same goods manufactured or marketed within its territory, penal measures or other serious and effective measures intended to prevent the distribution of such goods in its territory. It follows that a Member State may not rely on grounds of public morality in order to prohibit the importation of goods from other Member States when its legislation contains no prohibition as to manufacture or marketing of the same goods on its territory.

This approach has effectively been reiterated by the Commission in relation to the provision of information services:

What is considered to be harmful depends on cultural differences. Each country may reach its own conclusion in defining the borderline between what is permissible and not permissible. It is therefore indispensable that international initiatives take into account different ethical standards in different countries in order to explore appropriate rules to protect people against offensive material whilst ensuring freedom of expression.

However, in the event of substantial differences in attitude between different Member States, it is more difficult to see how this might be accommodated in practice, in relation to information services, without compromising the free market in those services.

These early initiatives have been developed further and, interestingly in the light of the approach taken in some other jurisdictions, more recent documents, in particular, have stressed the value and role of self-regulatory mechanisms, both within and without a more formal regulatory framework. This is particularly evident in Decision 276/1999 of the European Parliament and Council, which puts forward a four year plan to combat illegal and harmful content on global networks.

**Adopting a Multiannual Community Action**

**Plan on Promoting Safer Use of the Internet by Combating Illegal and Harmful Content on Global Networks**


**Article 2**

The action plan has the objective of promoting safer use of the Internet and of encouraging, at European level, an environment favourable to the development of the Internet industry.
Article 3

In order to attain the objective referred to in Article 2, the following actions supporting and promoting measures to be taken in the Member States shall be undertaken under the guidance of the Commission...

– promotion of industry self-regulation and content-monitoring schemes…;
– encouraging industry to provide filtering tools and rating systems, which allow parents or teachers to select content appropriate for children in their care while allowing adults to decide what legal content they wish to access …;
– increasing awareness of services provided by industry among users…;
– support actions such as assessment of legal implications;
– activities fostering international cooperation in the areas enumerated above;
– other actions furthering the objective set out in Article 2.

Further, in Annex 1 to the Decision, it is pointed out (in para 1.1) that ‘co-operation from the industry and a fully functioning system of self-regulation are essential elements in limiting the flow of illegal content on the internet’. Later in 1999, the Council further concluded,\textsuperscript{113} \textit{inter alia}, that ‘self-regulation systems, in accordance with national cultural and legal traditions and practices, may…make a contribution to safeguarding public interests’ and that ‘self-regulation could usefully complement regulation in the context of the future development of new media services’.\textsuperscript{114}

If this seems to be a rather different approach than might have been noted from other jurisdictions, it is perhaps important at this juncture to consider the problem in perspective. Although the issues surrounding the dissemination and propagation of illegal and/or harmful material via the internet are deserving of resolution, in comparison with the total of all information available on global networks, the proportion that would be likely to fall into these categories is very small. As with access to similar information available on more traditional media, the answer may be based more in a reassessment of society and community values, perhaps backed up by technological methods, than in the drafting of unenforceable legislation.

The current state of play thus seems to be somewhat confusing and there is an inherent tension emerging between the implementation of self-regulation and the desire of governments to impose external regulation on the internet.

\textsuperscript{113} Document 399 Y 1006 (02), \textit{Council Conclusions of 27 September 1999 on the Role of Self-Regulation in the Light of the Development of New Media Services} OJ 1999 L 283/3.

\textsuperscript{114} See, also, above, p 349 \textit{et seq} on self-regulation in the context of privacy protection.
CHAPTER 9

ASPECTS OF THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS ON THE INTERNET

INTRODUCTION

The questions arising out of the application of existing intellectual property rights to the development of computer software and databases were explored above, Chapter 2. This chapter considers some of the challenges for the protection of intellectual property rights created by global networks. Just as computer networks created new ways of committing traditional crime, so they provide new ways of infringing intellectual property rights. A number of the issues raised are those which are generally common to the regulation of the internet and have been referred to in connection with the application of legal principles to other activities on the internet and world wide web. Examples are the problems of jurisdiction, detection and enforcement and the liability of service providers.¹ Other problems are specific to the realm of intellectual property and will be illustrated by two contrasting examples: copyright infringement and the application of established principles to a new medium; and domain name disputes in which there have been attempts to protect the rights in a new property, the domain name, into existing legal frameworks.

COPYRIGHT

Copying of material from the vast information source that is the internet is a trivial matter, but application of traditional copyright principles has not always proved to be straightforward.

Copy of And The Internet
Hector L MacQueen
in Law And The Internet
Lilian Edwards And Charlotte Waelde (eds)

The issues are manifold. Is the ease of perfect reproduction and manipulation of material in the digital form used by our communication systems the

¹ See above, Chapter 6, on jurisdiction, Chapters 7 and 8 on liability of service providers and Chapter 8 on detection and enforcement. For a consideration of conflict of laws in relation to intellectual property and the internet see Dutson, S, ‘The Internet, the conflict of laws, international litigation and intellectual property: the implications of the international scope of the Internet on intellectual property infringements’ [1997] JBL 495.
death-knell of the whole basis of copyright? Are we going to have to reconsider such fundamentals of copyright law as what constitutes publication, reproduction and public performance, or the old distinctions between categories of work such as literary, artistic, sound recording and film? Are we going to see the emergence of a genuine market place in which producer and user bargain about the price of individual transfers of material, rather than requiring intermediaries such as publishers? Given the ready flow of material across national frontiers, does the international harmonisation of copyright laws need intensification, and should the classic rules of private international law on jurisdiction and choice of law be adapted to enable a party confronted with infringements in another country to sue effectively in his own country and have judgments recognised abroad?

This extract demonstrates the multiplicity of issues. Has copyright, which was developed in a very different era to the present, outlived its usefulness? Some would say yes. On the other hand, Mackaay, in likening traditional copyrights and other legal rights to fences which separate those with entitlement from those without, answers the question thus:

Does the Internet spell the end of property rights? The old fences may not work so well any more. Yet information, while apparently abundant once in existence, still needs to be created and the creator needs be encouraged.

This suggests a belief that the concept of copyright is not dead, as such, but that the ‘fencing techniques’ may need modification or repair. Schønning points out that the internet is unlikely to lead to a mass breakdown in the copyright system any more than has happened when it had to deal with other forms of piracy and illicit copying of easy-to-copy media, such as videos, audiotapes, computer software, etc, and simply concludes thus: ‘...surely copyright will survive even this legal and technological challenge.’

How should the principles already enshrined in national laws be applied and how is the lack of global harmonisation to be dealt with when the medium, itself, is a global one? Although the existence of certain international treaties such as the Berne Convention might suggest the existence of a modicum more consensus than in some other areas, a number of commentators have remarked

on the general need for a further erosion of national differences in interpretation of established principles.

Intellectual Property
WR Cornish

Since the Internet is an incorrigibly global phenomenon, such differences affect the search for liability and the securing of jurisdiction over defendants who can actually be made responsible for copyright infringements. This is the first reason for seeking international accords which will reduce the urge to seek out the best forum. It also explains why rightowners press for liability to be imposed on all those involved in placing and delivering material on the Internet.

Millé also calls for global solutions, suggesting that copyright law needs to find answers to the questions posed by the presence of new modes of intellectual creation, of distribution to the public and of use and enjoyment of the works; that there is a need to make the treatment given to intangible property uniform at world level; and that administration by an international organisation appears essential.

However, some other commentators, having considered the various arguments, have sounded a note of caution about the consequences of being in too much haste to introduce new or amended legislative rules. This is illustrated by the following extract, written in response to the EC initiatives on copyright in the information society (see below).

Copyright and the information society in Europe: a matter of timing as well as content
Lionel Bently and Robert Burrell
(1997) 34 CMLR 1197, p 1208

…it would be sensible to delay any reform of copyright law until we have a good idea of exactly what impact the new forms of creation, distribution and consumption will have on authors, right holders, distributors and consumers. Some predict the ‘death of copyright’, that it is a concept that emerged in an era of print and is built upon print-informed notions of a fixed text. For such commentators copyright is a medium which is intrinsically incapable of accommodating impending/ongoing changes in the ways intellectual creation is conceived and the challenge for the future lies in devising new ways of providing incentives to creators of information. At the opposite extreme are those who argue that copyright has shown itself flexible enough to adapt to repeated technological changes since 1710 (both in expanding the scope of protected works and extending the rights given to new modes of distribution), and that it can, with a few minor modifications, adapt to the new digital environment.

However, even if we assume that copyright can be adapted to the new
technologies, it is not clear as yet whether such adaptation requires a
strengthening or weakening of the rights at present afforded to content
holders. While...most of the calls for action have been from content holders
concerned that their rights will be undermined by digitization, other
commentators have predicted that one of the effects of electronic distribution
will be to strengthen the economic position of copyright owners. This is
because digitization may give rise to more effective ways of administering
rights. One of the advantages of the developments in information processing
may be that the transaction costs of obtaining licences will be reduced. While
the cost of tracking down and obtaining many licenses is prohibitive when
traditional methods are employed, the reduction in transaction costs
presented by electronic licensing may open new valuable streams of revenue
to content holders. At present it is difficult to predict which of these prognoses
is more accurate and consequently, it would seem unwise to act until
we have a better understanding of what the information society will
look like...

It is also unwise to act hastily when many people are working towards a
technological solution to the problems that digital technologies are alleged
to present. One such solution being developed involves the encryption of
works that are currently protected by copyright. It is envisaged that users
would then pay for access codes either for the works or group of works to
which they wish to have access. A technological response, it is argued, would
have the positive consequence of allowing for the evolution of mechanisms
of supervision best suited to the new environment. Some commentators have
even predicted that technological solutions could replace copyright
altogether. Critics of those who hope to find a technological solution to the
problem of unauthorised copying over electronic networks would
undoubtedly argue that anti-copy systems can be overcome. If successful,
however, a technological response could confine the need for legislative
intervention to the laying down of certain standards, together with providing
support through, for example, criminalizing the use and sale of devices
designed to circumvent copy-protection...

Finally, and more abstractly, we do not know how the information society
will affect many of the concepts we currently take for granted as
underpinning our copyright laws or, as importantly, what new social
constructs will gain conventional acceptance. Notions of authorship, of the
work, of public and private may well be transformed in the ‘electronic
environment’.

Whilst at one level it might be sensible to delay legislating until the nature of the
beast is better understood, technology is advancing all the time, and not always
in the direction expected, such that there could always be a reason for legal
inaction which could be confused with legal impotence. At a practical level,
legislative change is frequently a long time in gestation and, as discussed below,
there has still not been agreement on the terms of the draft Copyright Directive,
which prompted the above response.

In the absence of global harmonisation, there is little option for those seeking
a remedy but to rely on the vagaries of national law and its interpretation. This
can create complications and difficulties for the courts, as is evident in the
comment from the US District Court for the Central District of California that it was ‘mindful of the difficulty of applying well established doctrines to what can only be described as an amorphous situs of information, anonymous messenger of communication, and seemingly endless stream of commerce’. As with other copyright infringements, there may be problems of mass piracy and easy commercial exploitation. At the other end of the scale, it is a trivial matter for the individual user to download copies of material from the internet and worldwide web. For material which is already in digital form on the internet, copying may occur initially when the material is uploaded by the provider. In this case, any potential illegality would fall to be judged in accordance with legislation in the jurisdiction of the provider’s server. There will then be further copying when the material is downloaded by the user. In this case, whether or not the activity is lawful would be determined by the law in the geographical location of the user’s computer. An awareness of the vagaries of national interpretation of copyright principles may thus be crucial. In between these two processes, transmission may be effected by means of a communication carrier, creating a further term in the equation.

A major concern for the imposition of liability is the extent of the permitted reproduction. In the UK, the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 creates a high standard with respect to copying and, according to s 17(6), ‘copying in relation to any description of work includes the making of copies which are transient or are incidental to some other use of the work’. During the gestation of the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty, a proposed new Art 7 would have made the definition of ‘reproduction’ include both direct and indirect reproduction, whether permanent or temporary, and in any manner or form. This did not make it into the final version of the Treaty but resulted in a spirited account of how such a definition would inhibit the functioning of information networks.

The new WIPO Copyright Treaty: a happy result in Geneva
Thomas C Vinje
[1997] EIPR 230

The common denominator underlying objections to Article 7 were concerns that Article 7 would inappropriately tilt the balance in copyright law and hinder the growth of the information infrastructure...most importantly, many...feared that, unless properly circumscribed, Article 7 would threaten the legality of browsing and deprive infrastructure providers (such as Internet access and backbone providers) of legal security by threatening them with the risk that they would engage in copyright infringement by unknowingly making ephemeral copies...of infringing works put on their systems by users.

7 See op cit, Schønning, fn 4.
... It is far preferable to the hasty adoption of an unbalanced provision that, rather than encouraging the creation and dissemination of works in the digital environment threatened to stifle the Information Infrastructure...

The digital revolution by its very nature will inexorably lead to the making of vast numbers of ephemeral copies... But should every one of those ephemeral copies constitute an infringing reproduction? Are not many, perhaps most, ephemeral copies different in their fundamental nature from permanent reproductions, and should not the law reflect that difference? Will every, or even most, of those ephemeral copies have economic significance justifying their characterisation as an infringing act? What would be the social, technological and economic consequences of deeming the vast numbers of essential ephemeral copies to fall within the copyright holder's exclusive right of reproduction. Assuming the conclusion is reached that certain temporary copies should be excluded in the reproductive right, how should that result be achieved? Would it not be preferable to follow an approach whereby most temporary copies fall outside the reproductive right, and those that are covered be treated as the exception rather than the rule?...

If all these questions are debated broadly and soberly it should be possible to reach a wise and balanced legislative solution to this difficult and complex dilemma...

In addition to difficulties over the scope of the definition of reproduction, there are also some very different approaches to the question of the extent of internet service providers' (ISPs') and communication carriers' liability for copyright infringement. Communications carriers, providing the means of transmission between provider and user, can be treated as distinct from ISPs and there is a very strong case for complete exemption for communication carriers 'from any type of copyright liability in respect of the provision of Internet infrastructure'.8 ISPs, on the other hand, who may have some input and control over at least some of the material to which they provide access, have been exempted from liability by statute in some jurisdictions, such as the US and Germany, while France and Italy, for instance, have declined to provide such exemption.9

In Europe, some solutions to some of these issues are currently being sought, following from the Green Paper, Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society,10 after which a proposal for a Directive on the Harmonisation of Certain

9 In the US, under the Telecommunications Act 1996, see above, Chapter 7 and the discussion of Lunney v Prodigy; in Germany, under the Information and Communication Services Act, see above, Chapter 8 and the discussion of the Somm case. See, also, Köhler, C and Burmeister, K, ‘Copyright liability on the Internet today in Europe (Germany, France, Italy and the EU)’ [1999] EIPR 485. For the French perspective see, also, Passa, J, ‘The protection of copyright on the Internet under French law’, in Pollaud-Dulian, F (ed), The Internet and Author’s right: Perspectives on Intellectual Property, 1999, London: Sweet & Maxwell, Vol 5, Chapter
Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society was published.\textsuperscript{11} This has been amended during its course through the legislative process and the latest version was published on 21 May 1999.\textsuperscript{12}

The preamble refers to a number of reasons for the proposed Directive, including reference to the WIPO 1996 Copyright Treaty (recital 10), which ‘update[s] the international protection for copyright and related rights significantly, not least with regard to the so called “digital agenda” and improve[s] the means to fight piracy worldwide’, as well as the need for encouragement for compatibility and interoperability of different systems and the development of global systems (recital 32). Recital 16 also refers to the fact that harmonised protection at Community level will overcome ‘the legal uncertainty regarding the nature and the level of protection of acts of on-demand transmission of copyright works and subject matter protected by related rights over networks’. Arguably, some of the overriding reasons for the proposal are contained in recital 5.


5 Whereas, without harmonisation at Community level, legislative activities at national level which have already been initiated in a number of Member States in order to respond to the technological challenges might result in significant differences in protection and thereby restrictions on the free movement of services and products incorporating, or based on, intellectual property, leading to a refragmentation of the internal market and legislative inconsistency; whereas the impact of such legislative differences and uncertainties will become more significant with the further development of the Information Society, which has already greatly increased transborder exploitation of intellectual property; whereas this development will and should further increase; whereas significant legal differences and uncertainties in protection may hinder economies of scale for new products and services containing copyright and related rights.

The basic reproduction right is contained in the proposed Art 2:

\textbf{Article 2 Reproduction right}

Member States shall provide for the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit direct or indirect, temporary or permanent reproduction by any means and in any form, in whole or in part:

(a) for authors, of their works;

\textsuperscript{12} COM (1999) 250 final.
(b) for performers, of fixations of their performances;
(c) for phonogram producers, of their phonograms;
(d) for the producers of the first fixations of films, in respect of the original and copies of their films;
(e) for broadcasting organisations, of fixations of their broadcasts, whether those broadcasts are transmitted by wire or over the air, including by cable or satellite.

In Art 3(1), authors are given the ‘exclusive right to authorise or prohibit any communication to the public of originals and copies of their works by wire or wireless means’, but the proposed Art 3(4) suggests that it is envisaged that, in general, communications carriers will not be expected to be liable for copyright infringement of the material to which they provide access. Presumably, the same will be true of ISPs in the absence of knowledge or control of infringing material. It is perhaps an omission, given the emergence of different approaches to ISP liability, not to have included more explicit provision for ISPs:

**Article 3**

4 The mere provision of physical facilities for enabling or making a communication does not in itself amount to an act of communication to the public within the meaning of this Article.

The problem of temporary reproduction outlined above is then dealt with in the proposed Art 5(1):

**Article 5**

1 Temporary acts of reproduction referred to in Article 2, such as transient and incidental acts of reproduction which are an integral and essential part of a technological process, including those which facilitate effective functioning of transmission systems, whose sole purpose is to enable use to be made of a work or other subject matter, and which have no independent economic significance, shall be exempted from the right set out in Article 2.

However, at present, this is the only mandatory exception to the restricted acts and the other permissible derogations contained in the proposed Art 5(2) and (3) are left to the Member States’ discretion as to whether they are included in their domestic law. Such an approach was criticised as being inconsistent with a policy of harmonisation in relation to an earlier draft of the Directive but remains unchanged in the present proposal.

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**The proposed Directive for copyright in the information society: nice rights, shame about the exceptions**

Michael Hart

[1998] EIPR 169

If the twin aim of the proposed Directive is harmonisation and the digital agenda, this lack of harmonisation of exceptions actually matters. In an age of
digital and network technology and an ever-increasing global communication environment, for copyright laws to be effective, global legal and technical solutions are increasingly going to be needed. If it is lawful to do something important in one country but not in another, technologies which enable a work which is uploaded in one country to be available worldwide are going to expose this and result in abuse. Although an EU directive cannot provide a global solution, it nevertheless is a very important step in the right direction... Harmonising the most important exceptions would not only achieve far greater harmonisation. The increased clarity in terms of what is and is not legal would help technology industries in developing technical copy protection systems which reflect this position, as it is difficult to introduce technical measures which block uses which are perfectly lawful in some countries but not in others.

ISSUES RAISED BY LINKING ON THE WORLD WIDE WEB

A further feature of the relevant technology which has created challenges for traditional legal principles is the web link. The phenomenon of linking, which allows the user to move from site to site, is now so familiar as to have lost all remaining vestiges of novelty, but is indisputably crucial to the existence and operation of the world wide web. A site which is not linked is less likely to be found by other users and its worth will be diminished to the user if he or she cannot travel from that site to another. Conversely, many people will bookmark sites which contain a collection of links to sites relevant to their interests.

Controlling world wide web links: property rights, access rights and unfair competition
Chris Reed
(1998) 6 Indiana J Global LS

In order to analyse how the law might be applied to web links, it is necessary to understand the way in which a link works. Each link is part of a web page whose display is created on the viewer’s computer by his browser software. The web page is built up using the instructions contained in the HTML file produced by the creator of the page, which is transmitted to the viewer’s browser when he enters that page’s URL. The HTML file contains text to be displayed as part of the page, the URLs for any images or other binary files (eg, sound files) that are to be incorporated automatically into the page, and instructions for laying out the page on the viewer’s screen.

14 For an example of such a site in the present context see the Link controversy page at www.jura.uni-tuebingen.de/~s-bes1/lcp.html.
15 Available at www.law.indiana.edu/glsj/vol6/no1/reed.html.
Chapter 9: Information Technology Law

The HTML file may also contain code for a link. That code highlights some element of the page, normally either a piece of text or an image, which is selectable by the viewer with his mouse. The HTML file associates a URL with the page element. When the viewer selects that page element, the browser software sends a request to the associated URL for a file and, upon receipt, performs the appropriate action for that type of file. The simplest kind of link is to another web page; its selection by the viewer results in his browser receiving the new HTML file and, by following the instructions in its code, building a fresh page for display.

It is important to note that the creator of the web page containing the link does not transmit the linked-to page to the viewer. He merely provides the address from which the linked-to page can be obtained. It is the viewer, through the browser software, who requests the page, receives a copy of its code, and displays the resulting work; while it is the proprietor of the linked-to page who transmits the HTML code to the viewer via a web server.

Can links to material on other sites violate the intellectual property rights of the creator of the material or the proprietor of the site? One of the first cases to raise this issue was that of *Shetland Times v Wills*,\(^{16}\) which, despite being only an interlocutory hearing, has received substantial debate and comment.\(^{17}\)

The *Shetland Times* is an old established newspaper, serving the Shetland Islands. Wills, an ex-employee of the *Shetland Times*, started an electronic newspaper, the *Shetland News*. When its site was accessed, the reader would see a selection of headlines, on which he or she could click to read the full story. Some of these headlines were reproduced verbatim from the *Shetland Times* website and, when these particular hypertext links were followed, the reader would be taken directly to the story on the *Shetland Times* site, bypassing the *Shetland Times* home page. Although there was no suggestion that the actual stories had been copied from one site to the other (a process made rather

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18 This can be compared with the US case of *Ticketmaster Corp v Microsoft Corp* (1997) (www.jmls.edu.cyber.cases.ticket1.html), in which a website containing a city guide to seattle linked directly to Ticketmaster pages providing details of events and tickets, bypassing the home page. Ticketmaster alleged that this link constituted trademark dilution and unfair competition but the case was settled by means of an agreement whereby any links would only be made directly to the homepage. In *Playboy Enterprises v Universal Tel-a-Talk Inc* US Dist Lexis 8231 (1998) (www.bna.com/elaw/cases/play tele.html), the court found that the use of the word ‘playboy’ in a hypertext link from the defendant’s to PEI’s site did not constitute trademark infringement.
superfluous by the technology), the _Shetland Times_ alleged infringement of its copyright.\(^{18}\)

**Shetland Times v Wills**  
1997 SLT 669, p 670  
Outer House

**Lord Hamilton** The grounds of action are twofold. The pursuers maintain that the headlines made available by them on their web site are cable programmes within the meaning of s 7 of the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988, ... that the facility made available by the defenders on their web site is a cable programme within the meaning of s 7, and that the inclusion of those items on that service constitute an infringement of copyright under s 20 of the Act. The pursuers also maintain that the headlines are literary works owned by them and that the defenders’ activities constituted infringement by copying under s 17 of the Act, that copying being in the form of storing the works by electronic means...

No detailed technical information was put before me in relation to the electronic mechanism involved. It was simply submitted [by the defenders] that there was not ‘sending’ in an ordinary sense and that a contrast could be made with cable television where there was sending by transmission from the provider to the customer. On the internet a caller electronically accessed information which was provided entirely passively.

In my view the pursuers’ contention that the service provided by them involves the sending of information is prima facie well founded. Although in a sense the information, it seems, passively awaits access being had to it by callers, that does not, at least _prima facie_ preclude the notion that the information, on such access being taken, is conveyed to and received by the caller. If that is so, the process may arguably be said to involve the sending of that information...

... On the information that was available or on the basis of the arguments presented, the pursuers have, in my opinion, a prima facie case that the incorporation by the defenders in their web site of the headlines provided at the pursuers’ web site constitutes an infringement of s 20 of the Act by inclusion in a cable programme service of protected cable programmes...

... While literary merit is not a necessary element of a literary work, there may be a question of whether headlines, which are essentially brief indications of the subject matter of the items to which they relate, are protected by copyright. However, in light of the concession that a headline could be a literary work and since the headlines at issue (or at least some of them) involve eight or so words designedly put together for the purpose of imparting information, it appears to me arguable that there was an infringement, at least in some instances, of s 17.

The _Shetland Times_ case concerned a direct link, but the problem is made a little more complex when the links and references to other sites are made via the techniques of inline linking, in which images can appear as part of the viewed web page even though they originate elsewhere, or framing, where the viewed web page will appear divided into multiple, independently scrollable windows,
some of which may come from other sites although appearing within the frame of the first site.

**Link law: the emerging law of internet hyperlinks**

Mark Sableman

(1999) 4 Comm L & P 557

Framing technology and inline linking technologies raise particular copyright concerns. Each of these technologies permit a web publisher, to some extent, to display images or other content from another site, as if that content were maintained on the publisher’s own site… Inlined links… allow one to essentially import a graphic from another website, and incorporate it in one’s own website. The viewer will not know that the graphic comes from another site; rather to the viewer, the inlined graphic appears to be a seamless part of the web page he is viewing. It is a little bit like painting a picture of a gallery at the Louvre, simply by importing onto your canvas the Louvre’s own digital reproductions of those drawings, at the very least, it seems sneaky… As browsing technology develops, and as users get faster web access, other web page display and browsing technologies (particularly involving audio, music and other multimedia outputs) are likely to raise copyright infringement claims. Whatever the resolution of these issues, use of framing and inline linking technologies to create composite web pages is likely to raise more difficult copyright infringement issues than simple direct hyperlinks like those involved in the *Shetland News* case.

Sableman (above) refers to the case of *Washington Post Company v Total News Inc*, in which a number of publishers objected to the way in which Total News used framing technology to set a news story from another site within the overall Total News frame, in particular by blocking banner advertisements and other distinguishing features. The objection here was not to the link *per se*, but to the way in which the link was accomplished and presented. In common with many linking cases, the issue was settled by agreement between the parties, originating the notion of the ‘linking licence’ whereby Total News agreed to link to other sites only in certain specified ways.

Aside from the potential loss of advertising, etc, the question in the *Total News* case was essentially whether framing led to the creation of derivative works. This same issue also arose in *Futuredontics Inc v Applied Anagramics Inc.* Applied Anagramics linked to the Futuredontics website in such a way that Futuredontics material appeared within frames on the Anagramics site. Futuredontics claimed that this was a copyright infringement and sought an injunction to restrain the link. The district court found insufficient reasons for granting an injunction, as Futuredontics had not demonstrated conclusively that the ‘balance of hardships

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19 See *op cit*, fn 17.
tips sharply in its favor’ and no real evidence of significant injury had been presented. The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed this denial of injunctive relief, agreeing with the lower court on the application of the ‘balance of hardships’ test. Because of these factors, the question of whether the material on the Anagramics site constituted a derivative work was not considered in any detail, but the district court suggested that the ‘cases cited by the parties do not conclusively determine whether the defendant’s frame page constitutes a derivative work’; and so, this assertion remains to be explored more fully by the courts at a later date.

There have been many cases filed in the US on matters associated with linking and framing, and the majority appear to have reached a settlement based on an agreement related to the manner of framing. The extent to which copyright, in particular, provides an appropriate legal mechanism for dealing with such disputes remains largely unresolved. The final way in which intellectual property rights may be infringed by links is via embedded links or metatags. Arguably, this is more an issue for the law relating to trademarks than copyright, but it is convenient to discuss it here along with the other aspects of linking. Metatags are the key words which are used by search engines. They can be written into the code for a website but will remain invisible to the user unless he or she examines the underlying code for that particular web page. This does not create a problem as long as the site uses ordinary, descriptive words or its own trademark, but some commercial sites also incorporate trademarks of their competitors. This means that, when a user employs a search engine to find a competitor’s website, the results of the search will list both sites, even though there is apparently no overt mention of the search term on the face of the retrieved page. Further, when a search engine finds a correlation between a search term and a metatag, it is likely to place that site high in the order of relevance, a fact which will also be of importance to a commercial site.

Cases on metatags have been proliferating in the US and a representative idea of the issues which have been raised and the attitude and approach of the courts can be gained from a consideration of the *Playboy* litigation. Playboy Enterprises Inc (PEI) own the registered trademarks ‘Playboy’ and ‘Playmate’ and, in a number of actions in the US courts have alleged trademark infringement by others who have used these trademarks either as metatags or other labels to attract users to their sites. In *Playboy Enterprises Inc v AsiaFocus International Inc*, the court found that the defendants had engaged in ‘deceptive tactics’ which warranted severe sanctions.

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Chapter 9: Information Technology Law

*Playboy Enterprises Inc v AsiaFocus International Inc*

No Civ A 97–734-A (US DC Va)

10 April 1998

The Defendants specifically chose to copy famous trademarks for a well known source of ‘adult’ entertainment for use in their own ‘adult’ service. In doing so, they reaped the benefit of the public’s established association of the trademarks PLAYMATE and PLAYBOY with adult entertainment. No other purpose appears for choosing PLAYMATE and PLAYBOY but to create that false association in the mind of the consuming public. The defendants’ willfulness is further established by their purposeful tactic of embedding the trademarks PLAYMATE and PLAYBOY in the hidden computer source code. This strategy epitomizes the ‘blurring’ of PEI’s trademarks. When a search engine led a consumer to the asian-playmates Web site in response to a search of PEI’s trademarks, the consumer would probably believe that the defendants’ Web site was affiliated with PEI.

Using a trademark as a metatag may both divert a user to another site and also lead to confusion over the ownership and relationship between the site and the legitimate trademark owner. This point was returned to in a later decision.

*Playboy Enterprises Inc v Calvin Designer Label*\(^23\)

985 Supp 1220 (US DC Cal)

12 May 1999

28 Metatags create confusion as to source despite an infringer’s success in its unlawful venture. Infringement can be based upon confusion which creates initial customer interest, even though no actual sale is finally completed as a result of the confusion. That is, the web user is lured to a web site she is not looking for as a result of confusion and deception intentionally caused by the defendant who knows the limitation of the searching device used by the potential visitor.

The case law showed that the absence of evidence of actual confusion\(^24\) did not automatically create an inference that there was no likelihood of confusion, and this was of particular relevance in internet cases, since:

[The] nature of the internet makes proof of actual confusion difficult to obtain because browsing on the internet is a private matter that may not involve any actual sales. The internet is different from a retail shopping environment, where evidence of actual confusion is easier to obtain through mall intercept surveys [para 39].

\(^{23}\) See www.bna.com/e-law/cases/playcalv.html; preliminary hearing available at www.jmls.edu/cyber/cases/calvin.html.

\(^{24}\) A point which had already been made in *Playboy Enterprises Inc v Frena* 839 F Supp 1552 (US DC Flo 1993) (www.loundy.com/CASES/Playboy_v_Frena.html), in which the issue concerned the use of ‘playboy’ and ‘playmate’ as file descriptors for photographs, breaching PEI’s copyright, available on the defendant’s bulletin board.
Note, however, the following extract from a UK case, involving domain names rather than metatags\(^{25}\) but perhaps even more relevant in this context, and compare it with the notion of ‘initial interest confusion’, discussed in the extract from *Playboy Enterprises v Netscape and Excite*, below.

**Avnet Inc v Isoact Ltd**  
[1998] FSR 16  
High Court

Jacobs J...it is a general problem of the internet that it works on words and not words in relation to goods and services. So whenever anyone searches for that word, even if the searcher is looking for the word in one context, he will, or may find web pages or data in a wholly different context... Of course, users of the internet also know that is a feature of the internet and their search may produce an altogether wrong web page or the like. This may be an important matter for the courts to take into account in considering trademark and like problems.

Returning to *Playboy v Calvin*, the court held that the intent of the defendant in selecting the allegedly infringing marks was a key factor in determining the likelihood of confusion and, in this case, the defendants had actually admitted that they used ‘Playboy’ as a metatag. The court also derived further evidence of the defendant’s intent from the fact that, as well as using the trademark in metatags, it had also been used as a background which contained multiple uses of the trademark in black text on a black background so that, although it was not visible to the user it was easily detectable by search engine. The court therefore issued a permanent injunction preventing the defendant from using PEI’s trademarks in this way.

PEI was unsuccessful in a later case, in which they tried to obtain an injunction against some of the organisations which provide search engines and attempt to maximise the revenue gained from advertising by ‘keying’ banner advertisements to the search terms employed by the user.

**Playboy Enterprises Inc v Netscape Communications Corp**\(^ {26}\)  
*Playboy Enterprises Inc v Excite Inc*  
55 F Supp 2d 1070 (US DC Cal 1999)

Defendants operate search engines on the internet. When a person searches for a particular topic in either search engine, the search engine compiles a list of sites matching or related to the user’s search terms, and then posts the list of sites, known as ‘search results’.

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\(^{25}\) See, also, Hurdle, H, ‘Domain names—the scope of a trademark proprietor’s monopoly’ [1998] EIPR 74.

\(^{26}\) Available at www.bna.com/e-law/cases/planetsc.html.
Defendants sell advertising space on the search result pages. Known as ‘banner ads’, the advertisements are commonly found at the top of the screen. The ads themselves are often animated and whimsical, and designed to entice the internet user to ‘click here’. If the user does click on the ad, she is transported to the web site of the advertiser.

As with other media, advertisers seek to maximize the efficacy of their ads by targeting consumers matching a certain demographic profile. Savvy web site operators accommodate the advertisers by ‘keying’ ads to search terms entered by users.

That is, instead of posting ads in a random rotation, defendants program their servers to link a pre-selected set of banner ads to certain ‘key’ search terms. Defendants market this context-sensitive advertising ability as a value-added service and charge a premium.

Defendants key various adult entertainment ads to a group of over 450 terms related to adult entertainment, including the terms ‘playboy’ and ‘playmate.’ Plaintiff contends that inclusion of those terms violates plaintiff’s trademarks rights in those words.

PEI was asserting both trademark infringement and dilution and, in order to be awarded an injunction, it needed to show both likelihood of confusion and likelihood of resultant harm:

Assuming *arguendo* that defendants’ use of ‘playboy’ and ‘playmate’ is use of plaintiff’s marks, plaintiff must still show that confusion is likely to result from that use. Plaintiff has not so shown.

Rather, plaintiff relies on the recent case from the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, *Brookfield Communications, Inc v West Coast Entertainment Corp* for the proposition that defendants cause ‘initial interest confusion’ by the use of the words ‘playboy’ and ‘playmate.’ Initial interest confusion, as coined by the Ninth Circuit, is a brand of confusion particularly applicable to the internet. Generally speaking, initial interest confusion may result when a user conducts a search using a trademark term and the results of the search include web sites not sponsored by the holder of the trademark search term, but rather of competitors. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the user may be diverted to an un-sponsored site, and only realize that she has been diverted upon arriving at the competitor’s site. Once there, however, even though the user knows she is not in the site initially sought, she may stay. In that way, the competitor has captured the trademark holder’s potential visitors or customers.

*Brookfield* is distinguishable from this case, and where applicable, supportive of defendants’ position....

As English words, ‘playboy’ and ‘playmate’ cannot be said to suggest sponsorship or endorsement of either the websites that appear as search results (as in *Brookfield*) or the banner ads that adorn the search results page.

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27 174 F3d 1036 (9th Cir 1999) (laws.findlaw.com/9th/9856918.html), noting the point that words routinely used in English such as ‘movie buff’ could legitimately be used in metatags, but not if they were confusingly similar to a trademark—in this case, MovieBuff.
Although the trademark terms and the English language words are undisputedly identical, which, presumably, leads plaintiff to believe that the use of the English words is akin to use of the trademarks, the holder of a trademark may not remove a word from the English language merely by acquiring trademark rights in it.\textsuperscript{28} ...the analogy is quite unlike that of a devious placement of a road sign bearing false information. This case presents a scenario more akin to a driver pulling off the freeway in response to a sign that reads ‘Fast Food Burgers’ to find a well known fast food burger restaurant, next to which stands a billboard that reads: ‘Better Burgers: 1 Block Further.’ The driver, previously enticed by the prospect of a burger from the well known restaurant, now decides she wants to explore other burger options. Assuming that the same entity owns the land on which both the burger restaurant and the competitor’s billboard stand, should that entity be liable to the burger restaurant for diverting the driver? That is the rule PEI contends the court should adopt.

So, the court found that, not only was there no likelihood of confusion, there was not even ‘use’ of the trademarks by the defendant. It was similarly dismissive of the arguments on dilution and tarnishment. The point was made that, even if the defendants could be said to ‘use’ the trademark, PEI would still have to show that that use caused harm, which it had not done, and, if such contentions were allowed, there was a danger of giving PEI near-monopoly control of placing their marks and associated goods and services on the internet. This would clearly be an undesirable outcome.

There are a number of other situations where it is entirely possible to use the trademark of another as a metatag. In \textit{Playboy Enterprises Inc v Welles},\textsuperscript{29} PEI again tried to prevent the defendant from using its trademarks as metatags on her website. However, Terri Welles had, in the past, been a model for Playboy and had also been awarded the title ‘Playmate of the Year’ by the \textit{Playboy} magazine. She therefore had a legitimate purpose in making use of these trademarks on her site and there was no likelihood of confusion with the PEI site, especially as her site contained a disclaimer which made it clear that there was no link with or official endorsement by PEI. This illustrates that the use of metatags relating

\textsuperscript{28} There are, however, some conflicting decisions as to whether the term ‘playboy’ could be construed as a word which has meaning independent of its association with PEI. In \textit{Playboy Enterprises v Chuckleberry Publishing} 939 F Supp 1032 (SDNY 1996) (www.bna.com/e-law/cases/playmen.html), the defendant had originally published a magazine in Italy entitled \textit{Playmen} and this case was concerned with whether rulings made about the publication of the US version were violated by an internet site subsequently established by the defendant. However, the court noted that the ‘Italian courts ruled that, “lexically”, PLAYBOY was a weak mark and not entitled to protection in that country’. In contrast, in \textit{Playboy Enterprises v Giannattasio} (1999), it was argued that those assessing the site in question would not automatically assume any connection with PEI, as the term ‘playboy’ had become a generic term. However, this was rejected by the court in Naples, which granted an injunction against the offending site. Summary available at www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/guidelines/precedents.html.

\textsuperscript{29} 7 F Supp 2d 1098 (SD Ca 1998), available at www.loundy.com/CASES/Playboy_v_Wells.html.
to others trademarks or names may be done for valid reasons, and these can include activities such as comparative advertising, or even sites which are critical of the original site. One rationale for this is that the metatag is an important device to assist the users in searching the web and, when conducting a web search, they may be just as interested in finding information about, or criticism of, the name searched for as information prepared by the owner of that name. In the commercial setting, this situation is replicated in more traditional markets and is considered as one of the outcomes of normal competition; so, no different standard would be expected to pertain in cyberspace in the absence of evidence of deception or unfair competition.

**DOMAIN NAMES**

A domain name can be likened to an address on the global computer network which both identifies and gives other information about a specific internet site. The term ‘top level domain’ (TLD) refers to either the generic descriptors ‘.com’; ‘.net’; ‘.org’, etc, or an indication of the country in which the domain name has been registered, for example, ‘.uk’; ‘.de’; ‘.to’, etc. Second level domain names then give further information which may be the name of the site in the case of the generic TLD, for example, ‘cavendishpublishing.com’, or further information about the type of site in the case of country TLDs, for example, ‘.co.uk’; ‘.ac.uk’, etc. In these latter cases, a further domain name will then identify the actual site, for example, ‘aber.ac.uk’. Each domain name can identify only one site and so is unique to that site, so that two companies which might trade under the same name quite successfully in the ‘real world’ cannot have exactly the same domain name in cyberspace.

Thus, although there are a number of different companies and products which use the name ‘polo’, only one can have the domain name ‘polo.com’, although other variants might be possible to distinguish the different users, for example, ‘volkswagenpolo’. Conversely, it is common for the same company to register in more than one TLD; for example, butterworths.com and butterworths.co.uk are both owned by the same legal publisher. Osborne notes the following:

> …in practice, few companies will be prepared to register their names in all registries around the world...and indeed may not be eligible under local rules. However, because the Internet is truly international, it may be possible for well known domain names to be registered by third parties in unusual countries.

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30 The courts have provided agreed explanations of the operation of domain names in, eg, *Pitman Training Ltd v Nominet UK* [1997] FSR 797 and *Panavision International LP v Toeppen* (1998) (laws.findlaw.com/9th/9755467.html). The substance of both of these cases is discussed below, pp 523, 529.
where the well known company does not have a registration, and then use it worldwide; for example, ‘wellknowntradename.is’ could be registered in Iceland but used everywhere. This could be particularly troublesome if the same goods and services were sold by the newcomer or if the trademark was so distinctive (for example, Kodak) that a perceived connection with the trade owner is likely, whatever the newcomer’s business.31

As more and more commercial enterprises trade or advertise their presence on the web, domain names have become more and more valuable and the potential for dispute is high. Whereas a large number of trademarks containing the same name can comfortably co-exist because they are associated with different products, belong to business in different jurisdictions etc, the distinctive nature of the domain name providing global exclusivity is much sought after.32 The fact that many consumers searching for a particular site are likely, in the first place, to try and guess its domain name has further enhanced this value. For instance, the law firm Clifford Chance could be identified not only by ‘cliffordchance.com’, but also by ‘clifford-chance.com’. This has led to disputes between those who wish to claim the entitlement to the use of a particular domain name, and also to the emergence of ‘cybersquatting’, in which domain names incorporating famous names are registered by those with no interest in using the domain name other than to transfer it to the ‘rightful owner’ for an appropriately large sum.33 If businesses do not wish to be at the mercy of cybersquatters, they need to ensure registration of all names which could conceivably be used to identify their website. Both well known commercial enterprises, such as Harrods, and famous personalities, such as Jeanette Winterson, the author, and Julia Roberts, the actress, have been victims of such activity.34

As disputes over the registration and use of domain names began to proliferate, litigants and potential litigants looked to the law for a suitable remedy. Many disputes in the commercial sector arose from the use of trademarks and trade names, and so answers were sought in the law relating to trademarks,35 unfair competition and passing off.

31 Osborne, D, ‘Domain names, registration and dispute resolution and recent UK cases’ [1997] EIPR 644.
32 See, eg, Griffin, TM, ‘Internet domain names and trademarks: strategies for protecting brand names in cyberspace’ (1998) 32 Suffolk UL Rev 47, commenting on the fact that there are apparently 100,000 trademarks in the world which use the word ‘Prince’, but only one of these can have the domain name ‘prince.com’.
33 For further discussion of the way in which such disputes arise see, eg, Waelde, C, Trademarks and domain names: what’s in a name?’, in Edwards, L and Waelde, C (eds), Law and the Internet: Regulating Cyberspace, 1997, Oxford: Hart, p 48; ibid, Osborne.
34 See below, p 524.
Domain names and trademarks: what’s in a name?
Charlotte Waelde
in Law and the Internet
Lilian Edwards and Charlotte Waelde (eds)
1997, Oxford: Hart, p 63

The fundamental issues to be resolved

There is no doubt that there is currently a great deal of confusion surrounding the issue of trademarks and domain names. In this confusion there are a number of fundamental issues that have to be resolved concerning the interaction between the two.

At a very basic level, it is not clear why trademarks and domain names are necessarily seen as synonymous. A domain name is an address. We all have addresses, and there has never been an argument that a postal address should be seen as synonymous with a trademark, no matter how similar the name is to a registered mark. However, it is true that on the Internet, a company’s ‘address’ (ie, its URL) may raise a level of expectation as to the quality and origin of the goods that may be offered, or the information that may be offered in connection with that address. For example, the name ‘next.clothes.com’ may lead us to think that what we would be buying would be clothes and other goods from the store Next. Because these domain names may suggest quality, origin and identity, they may function as trademarks. However, careful consideration must be given to the separation of the domain name from the trademark and the underlying goods and services, which should not automatically be seen as synonymous.

A further problem is over the use of the trademark. Trademark law is such that it permits multiple registrations of the same trademark in different geographical locations, and for different goods and services where there is unlikely to be confusion. However, only one person can hold a particular domain name, and that is for world wide use. This question of competing international trademarks and domain names…must be rationally analysed to create an internationally workable policy.

The cases which have come before the courts can basically be divided into two types: those in which both parties have some legitimate interest in the name; and the more common ‘cybersquatting’ cases. The latter category includes both those cases where the defendant merely shelved the acquired domain names in order to block use by the ‘rightful owner’ and extract a high price for the transfer and also those where the defendant used the name to maximise visits to their own sites or to cause damage to the victim as a result of the confusion created.36

36 The issue of confusion has also been discussed in actions for trademark infringement in relation to the unauthorised use of trademarks as metatags (see above). For a consideration of the difference in the relevant factors suggesting confusion in metatag and domain name cases see, eg, Brookfield Communications Inc v West Coast Entertainment Corp 174 F 3d 1036 (9th Cir 1999), available at laws.findlaw.com/9th/9856918.html.
Aspects of the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights on the Internet

In *Pitman Training Ltd v Nominet UK Ltd*, the High Court was asked to consider whether the use of a domain name could constitute passing off. The case concerned Pitman Training and Pitman Publishing. The name ‘Pitman’ had been associated with publishing since 1849, which business originally had a training business, which was sold in 1985 to Pitman Training Ltd. Pitman Publishing became one of the divisions of Pearson Professional Ltd, a wholly owned subsidiary of Pearson plc. By virtue of an agreement made at the time that the businesses were divided, both Pitman Training and Pitman Publishing were allowed to use the name ‘Pitman’ in connection with their respective businesses, as long as Pitman Training used it only in connection with training and correspondence courses and agreed not to publish books or engage in any other trade under that name.

The facts which led to the dispute were as follows. Pitman Publishing applied to Nominet, which administers registrations for the ‘.uk’ domain, for use of the domain name ‘pitman.co.uk’, which was allocated to them on the usual ‘first come, first served’ basis in February 1996. It was intended that a website would be designed and constructed but would not be ready for launch until December 1996. The domain name was not used in the interim except for advertising in connection with promotions.

In March 1996, Pitman Training was told that ‘pitman.co.uk’ was still unallocated; its ISP therefore procured the name and began to use the email address ‘enquiries@pitman.co.uk’. As noted by the court, the question of how this could have occurred was not resolved:

> No one—neither of the two experts who have given evidence in this case nor anyone else—has come up with any clear explanation beyond mere speculation as to how this could have happened. It should not have been possible but it did happen.38

Pitman Publishing became aware of the situation in December 1996 and requested immediate restoration of the domain name from Nominet, which acceded. Pitman Training commenced proceedings. Scott VC was not impressed by the argument that the actions of Pitman Publishing could constitute passing off:

> This strikes me as a strange proposition given that Pitman Publishing has traded under the style Pitman for nearly 150 years... The evidence does not even begin to support the contention that the public associates the domain name pitman.co.uk with PTC... That there may be some confusion by some members of the public is undoubtedly so. But that confusion results from the use by both companies...of the style ‘Pitman’ for their respective trading purposes.

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38 Ibid, p 804.
Chapter 9: Information Technology Law

So, although the court appeared to accept that inappropriate use of a domain name might sometimes constitute passing off, that was not the case in these particular circumstances; any confusion which might have arisen had its origin in another source, namely, the agreement voluntarily entered into by both parties concerned.

Another case where, as in Pitman, the dispute had arisen because both parties felt that they had a legitimate entitlement to the use of the domain name in question was Prince plc v Prince Sportswear Group Inc.\(^{40}\) When the US firm, Prince Sports Group Inc, tried to register the domain name ‘prince.com’, it found that it had already been registered by Prince plc, a UK computer services firm which had also registered the domain name ‘prince.co.uk’. Prince Sports Group was the owner of the trademark ‘Prince’ and, although the registration of the ‘.com’ domain is done on a first come, first served basis, if another party is able to show that it has a Federal registered trademark, then the first party will lose its registration. The dispute led to proceedings being filed in both the US and the UK. In the UK, Prince plc sought a ruling that the allegations of Prince Sports Groups that its registration of the domain name had resulted in trademark dilution were unfounded and constituted groundless threats in relation to s 21 of the Trademarks Act 1994. The High Court found for Prince plc and issued an injunction preventing Prince Sports from continuing with the threats, but there was no discussion of whether the UK trademarks held by Prince Sports were being infringed. The parties subsequently agreed a settlement in which Prince plc retained the domain name, and so the legal arguments were not developed any further.

The first cybersquatting case in the UK was that of Harrods plc v UK Network Services Ltd.\(^{41}\) The domain name ‘harrods.com’ was registered but not used by unrelated third parties, with the intention of selling the name to Harrods at an inflated price. Harrods sued for trademark infringement, passing off and conspiracy. In agreeing to issue an injunction, the legal arguments were not aired extensively but Lightman J accepted the principle that the law relating to trademarks and passing off can be applied to domain names. He referred, by analogy, to the case of Glaxo plc v Glaxowellcome Ltd,\(^{42}\) in which a company called ‘Glaxowellcome’ was registered in anticipation of the merger of Glaxo and Wellcome and a sum of £100,000 was demanded for transfer of the name. Even though the company had not traded, the court in that case was not prepared to tolerate a price being demanded for a name in which another party had goodwill. In both cases, the court appeared to be heavily influenced by the perceived

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dishonest intentions of the defendants. In the Harrods case itself, the defendant had accumulated a range of domain names corresponding to famous names and a number of commentators have noted that the court had little sympathy with the defendants. In cybersquatting cases, policy issues may loom large, since ‘most would agree that some remedy should exist against a domain name pirate seeking to extract payment from the “rightful owner” in return for a domain name which the pirate possesses’.43

The issues were aired more extensively in the One in a Million cases. One in a Million had registered domain names associated with a number of famous enterprises, including Marks & Spencer, Ladbrokes, Sainsbury, Virgin Enterprises and British Telecommunications, for the apparent purpose of extracting a high price for transferring them. Actions were brought on behalf of the all the companies concerned, on the basis of passing off. If the only action of such cybersquatters is to shelve the domain names and not to make use of them for trading purposes, it appears that it could be difficult to establish the classic ingredients of passing off, namely, misrepresentation in the course of trade, damage to goodwill and consumer confusion.44 In the High Court,45 Sumption J appeared at first to be taking this line of argument:

The mere creation of an ‘instrument of deception’ without either using it for deception or putting it into the hands of someone else to do so is not passing off...it follows that the mere registration of a deceptive company name or a deceptive internet domain name is not passing off.

However, he then went on to grant an injunction on the basis that ‘there is only one possible reason why anyone who was not part of the Marks & Spencer plc group should wish to use such a domain address, and that is to pass himself off as part of that group or his products as theirs’. Note that the alleged action has changed from that of registering to that of use, even though there was no evidence as such that there had been any trading, or even any other activity on websites associated with these domain names. Nonetheless, the potential for passing off rather than the genuine threat seemed to be sufficient to allow the injunction to be granted. Again, as in the Harrods case, there was clearly little sympathy for this practice:

The history of the defendants’ activities shows a deliberate practice followed over a substantial period of time of registering domain names which are chosen to resemble the names and marks of other people and are primarily intended to deceive.

44 Ibid.
45 Marks & Spencer plc v One in a Million Ltd [1998] FSR 265.
In the Court of Appeal, Aldous LJ reviewed the history of both trademark legislation and the action for passing off, leading to the five familiar characteristics itemised by Lord Diplock in Erven Warnink BV v J Townend and Sons (Hull) Ltd. Having done so, he went on to say:

It follows that a court will intervene by way of injunction in passing off cases in three types of case. First, where there is passing off established or it is threatened. Secondly, where the defendant is a joint tortfeasor with another in passing off either actual or threatened. Thirdly, where the defendant has equipped himself with or intends to equip another with an instrument of fraud.

British Telecommunications plc and Another v One In A Million Ltd and Others [1998] 4 All ER 476, CA, p 497

Aldous LJ It is accepted that the name ‘Marks & Spencer’ denotes Marks & Spencer plc and nobody else. Thus anybody seeing or hearing the name realises that what is being referred to is the business of Marks & Spencer plc. It follows that registration by the appellants of a domain name including the name ‘Marks & Spencer’ makes a false representation that they are associated or connected with Marks & Spencer plc. This can be demonstrated by considering the reaction of a person who taps into his computer the domain name marksandspencer.co.uk and presses a button to execute a ‘whois’ search. He will be told that the registrant is One In A Million Ltd. A substantial number of persons will conclude that One In A Million Ltd must be connected or associated with Marks & Spencer plc. That amounts to a false representation which constitutes passing off.

Mr Wilson submitted that mere registration did not amount to passing off. Further, Marks & Spencer plc had not established any damage or likelihood of damage. I cannot accept those submissions. The placing on a register of a distinctive name such as marksandspencer makes a representation to persons who consult the register that the registrant is connected or associated with the name registered and thus the owner of the goodwill in the name. Such persons would not know of One In A Million Ltd and would believe that they were connected or associated with the owner of the goodwill in the domain name they had registered. Further, registration of the domain name including the words ‘Marks & Spencer’ is an erosion of the exclusive goodwill in the name which damages or is likely to damage Marks & Spencer plc.

Mr Wilson also submitted that it was not right to conclude that there was any threat by the appellants to use or dispose of any domain name including the words Marks & Spencer. He submitted that the appellants, Mr Conway and Mr Nicholson, were two rather silly young men who hoped to make money

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46 [1998] 4 All ER 476.
47 [1979] 2 All ER 927, p 932.
from the likes of the respondents by selling domain names to them for as much as they could get. They may be silly, but their letters and activities make it clear that they intended to do more than just retain the names. Their purpose was to threaten use and disposal sometimes explicitly and on other occasions implicitly. The judge was right to grant quia timet relief to prevent the threat becoming reality.

I also believe that domain names comprising the name ‘Marks & Spencer’ are instruments of fraud. Any realistic use of them as domain names would result in passing off and there was ample evidence to justify the injunctive relief granted by the judge to prevent them being used for a fraudulent purpose and to prevent them being transferred to others.

Ignoring the question of whether there is any likelihood that a consumer looking for the Marks & Spencer website would actually type the ‘whois’ command, a person might well guess the domain name as ‘marksandspencer.com’. Nevertheless, despite the belief of the Court of Appeal that misrepresentation and confusion could be found, this decision seems rather out of line with other passing off cases. It has, however, been suggested that the One in a Million decisions may lead to a refinement of the tort of passing off on the basis that ‘the essence of passing off is to provide a remedy against a party which is perceived as unjustly reaping where it has not sown’.49

Whether or not this occurs remains to be seen, but there is no doubt that, where the domain pirate has done more than merely shelve the domain name, identifying the constituents of passing off is less controversial, as can be seen from two cases decided by the courts in New Zealand. In Oggi Advertising Ltd v McKenzie,50 Oggi sought to restrain the use of the domain name ‘ottie.co.nz’ by the defendant, registered allegedly on behalf of a Mr Elliott Oggi from Canada, whom the plaintiffs believed to be bogus. The court found that the defendant’s association with the name ‘Oggi’ and also with a home page referring to a similar business was sufficient to constitute a misrepresentation. It was made to prospective customers in the course of trade, was calculated to injure goodwill, caused actual damage and the elements of passing off were thus made out.

Oggi was referred to in the later case of NZ Post v Leng.51 The domain name ‘nzpost.com’ was registered by Leng, an New Zealand citizen, with InterNic, which administers the ‘.com’ domain name. In this case, a website was created which corresponded to the domain name which hosted a range of material, some of which was similar to that provided by the New Zealand Postal Service, NZ Post, on its website at ‘nzpost.co.nz’. NZ Post alleged passing off and breaches of the New Zealand Fair Trading Act 1986. The evidence was accepted that, if

49 Op cit, Meyer-Rochow, fn 43.
looking for the website of NZ Post, a New Zealand resident might guess ‘nzpost.co.nz’, but that others were very likely to try ‘nzpost.com’. Having considered the elements of passing off and the conduct necessary for deceptive conduct under the statute, the High Court in Auckland had little difficulty in concluding that the continued existence of ‘nzpost.com’ would lead to confusion. The court concluded that the requirements for passing off were made out, or that, at a minimum, there was an arguable case, and so felt that it was obliged to issue an injunction.

As Leng’s website was hosted on a server in California, the court also considered issues of jurisdiction and enforceability. It noted that, in the US case of Panavision International v Toeppen and Network Solutions Inc, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth circuit had rejected Toeppen’s assertions that the damage had occurred in cyberspace. The One in a Million cases were also considered and the court concluded that not only did it have jurisdiction to issue an injunction, but it was obliged to do so. Leng had registered a domain name containing NZ Post’s mark and showed no inclination to change it. A very real chance of confusion existed and there was no suggestion that Leng had a legitimate personal interest in the ‘NZ Post’ name. The domain name was an instrument of deception and was appropriating NZ Post’s goodwill, at least in New Zealand. The issues of enforcement outside of the jurisdiction did not arise, as Leng resided in New Zealand and there was therefore no need to discuss what might have happened if that had not been the case.

In the courts in the US, domain name piracy has been discussed in terms of infringement of trademarks. Again, in Panavision International LP v Toeppen, Toeppen had done more than merely register the disputed domain name; he had a website with the address ‘panavision.com’, on which there were photos of the town of Pana in Illinois. Panavision said that this was an infringement of their trademark and required him to transfer the domain name. He refused to do so unless paid $13,000. When Panavision would not co-operate, Toeppen registered another domain name using their other trademark, panaflex.com—the website for this address just said ‘hello’. As with many other cybersquatters and domain name pirates, Toeppen had a history of registering names corresponding to well known enterprises, some of which he had tried to sell to the ‘rightful owner’.

The Federal Trademark Dilution Act (15 USC) provides in s 1125(c) that:
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled…to an injunction against another person’s commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark…

The corresponding California statute is couched in similar terms. It prohibits dilution of ‘the distinctive quality’ of a mark, regardless of competition or the likelihood of confusion. The protection extends only to strong and well recognised marks.

Toeppen’s argument was that the domain name was merely an address and he referred the court to a number of cases which were authority for the fact that neither the registration of a domain name nor the acceptance for registration constituted a ‘commercial use’ within the meaning of the Trademark Dilution Act. The court, however, was of the view that Toeppen’s use was not ‘as benign as he suggests’.

Panavision International LP v Toeppen and Network Solutions Inc
141 F 3d 1316 (9th Cir 1998)

24 In order to prove a violation of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, a plaintiff must show that (1) the mark is famous; (2) the defendant is making a commercial use of the mark in commerce; (3) the defendant’s use began after the mark became famous; and (4) the defendant’s use of the mark dilutes the quality of the mark by diminishing the capacity of the mark to identify and distinguish goods and services…

…Toeppen traded on the value of Panavision’s marks. So long as he held the internet registrations, he curtailed Panavision’s exploitation of the value of its trademarks on the internet…and that it did not matter that his use had not been attached to a product…

Trademark dilution on the internet was a matter of Congressional concern. Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt) stated:

…it is my hope that this anti-dilution statute can help stem the use of deceptive internet addresses taken by those who are choosing marks that are associated with the products and reputations of others.

We reject Toeppen’s premise that a domain name is nothing more than an address. A significant purpose of a domain name is to identify the entity that owns the web site. ‘A customer who is unsure about a company’s domain name will often guess that the domain name is also the company’s name.’ (Cardservice International v McGee 950 F Supp 737, 741 (ED Va 1997).) ‘[A] domain name mirroring a corporate name may be a valuable corporate asset, as it facilitates communication with a customer base.’ (MTV Networks Inc v Curry 867 F Supp 202, 203–204 n 2 (SDNY 1994).)…
31 Using a company’s name or trademark as a domain name is also the easiest way to locate that company’s web site. Use of a ‘search engine’ can turn up hundreds of web sites, and there is nothing equivalent to a phone book or directory assistance for the internet. See Cardservice, 950 F Supp at 741.

32 Moreover, potential customers of Panavision will be discouraged if they cannot find its web page by typing in ‘Panavision.com’, but instead are forced to wade through hundreds of web sites. This dilutes the value of Panavision’s trademark...

33 Toeppen’s use of ‘Panavision.com’ also puts Panavision’s name and reputation at his mercy.

While the justice of the result may not be in doubt, as with the UK passing off cases, it would appear that the court had no sympathy for the defendant and so was willing to put a broad construction on the meaning of ‘commercial use’.

Electronic commerce and trademarks in the US: domain names, trademarks and the ‘use in commerce requirement’ on the Internet
Giorgio Nicolò Vergani
[1999] EIPR 450

...the courts have stretched the ‘use in commerce’ requirement to the ‘vanishing point’. One reason for this interpretation may be (and probably is) the tendency towards a conception of trademarks as property granting the trademark owner broader protection than under traditional trademark doctrine. One possible justification of such a construction is that the courts addressed the Internet explosion in a very short period of time while facing usurpers, religious and political extremists and various exploiters with the only instrument arguably available, the trademark law.

Commentators and others have made many suggestions for improving the situation with regard to domain names, including the creation of new TLDs, placing more emphasis on the development of technological solutions—graphical icons for linking, sophisticated browsing technology, etc—and the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. This latter process is now much more the norm under the auspices of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which was created in October 1998 and now coordinates the assignment of internet domain names. The various organisations which register domain names are accredited to ICANN. All registrars of the

55 For further discussion of this case and other US domain name cases see, eg, op cit, Tucker, fn 20.
57 See op cit, Morton, fn 41.
58 See, eg, Kelleher, D, ‘Generic domain names on the Internet’ [1998] EIPR 62; op cit, Osborne, fn 31; op cit, Stoodley, fn 35.
generic top level domains must follow the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy. This can involve court action but also allows a complaint to be submitted to an approved dispute resolution service provider such as the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, and such providers have now adjudicated in many hundreds of such disputes.\textsuperscript{59}

It is not only commercial enterprises which suffer from the activities of domain name pirates. In March 2000, Mark Hogarth, a Cambridge academic, registered a number of domain names corresponding to the names of famous writers, including ‘jeanettewinterson.com’, ‘jeanettewinterson.org’ and ‘jeanettewinterson.net’. He alleged that he intended to create unofficial sites devoted to providing extracts of the writings of the author, other details, etc, but he also wrote to a number of them, asking if they wished to purchase the domain name associated with their name. Winterson filed a complaint against Hogarth on the basis that she had a common law right to her name. The WIPO Arbitration Panel\textsuperscript{60} considered the situation in the UK and referred to a number of cases, including those involving One in a Million, discussed above:

6.9 …the issue is not whether the Respondent has committed passing off by registering the three domain names at issue, it is merely whether under English common law unauthorized use of a mark can be restrained other than by a action for infringement of a trademark. The mere fact that the right to sue for infringement of an unregistered trademark is not available under English law does not affect a person’s right of action against another for passing off...applying English law the Complainant clearly would have a cause of action to prevent unauthorized use of the mark JEANETTE WINTERTON in passing off.

In addition to the rights of the complainant in her name, the panel found that the domain name had been both used and registered in bad faith and that the respondent had no legitimate rights of interests in the name, and accordingly ordered that all three domain names be transferred.

A similar result occurred in a hearing involving the actress Julia Roberts.\textsuperscript{61} As this related to the situation in the US, it was argued on the basis of the existence of a common law trademark. In this case, the respondent alleged that the fact of registration and use of the domain name ‘juliaroberts.com’ was of itself sufficient to give him rights and a legitimate interest in the name. The panel referred to the Winterson case and decided that ‘registration of her name as a registered trademark or service mark was not necessary and that the name “Julia Roberts” has sufficient secondary association with the complainant that common law

\textsuperscript{59} For details of proceedings see www.icann.org/udrp/udrp.htm.
trademark rights do exist under US trademark law’. Further, the respondent had ‘failed to show: (a) use of the domain name in connection with the offering of any goods or services; (b) common knowledge that he is known by the domain name; (c) legitimate, non-commercial or fair use of the domain name; or (d) any other basis upon which he can assert rights or a legitimate interest’ and the court further found that both use and registration had been in bad faith. Thus, as might be expected, a similar result was obtained to that in the Winterson case, but by considering relevant law and precedent in the jurisdiction of origin.

SUMMARY

This chapter has considered the current legal response to some of the problems of intellectual property law associated with digitisation and the developing information society. The legal reaction to these technological changes is seen, generally, to be one of pragmatism. While the appropriateness of a copyright regime has been debated, the practical response to some of the fundamental copyright issues has been to develop legislative proposals, with the further possibility of supplementing the legal framework with technical requirements. Nevertheless, the situation with regard to ISP liability remains far from clear.

Attitudes to linking vary, from the proponents of the view that the raison d’être of the world wide web is indicative of the creation of a ‘right to link’, to those who take a rather more circumspect view of the way in which their work might be disseminated to a wider audience. This has resulted in a flurry of litigation, which has usually resulted in an agreement on the manner of linking, leading to the emergence of the so called ‘licence to link’.

Finally, with respect to domain names, the use of mediation and alternative dispute resolution has removed the imminent threat of the courts being bombarded with disputes over domain name registration and use. However, as is revealed by a browse through the list of hearings on the ICANN website, this has not stemmed the tide of disputes but has merely transferred them to other fora. A fundamental problem is the need for new TLDs, which may be addressed by current proposals.

62 See above, fn 58.
63 See above, fn 55.
As the information society progresses, the law will have to continue to be flexible and adaptable in the face of continuous technological evolution. The prospect of a complete review of the framework and rationale of intellectual property law in the face of such changes seems remote at present, if, indeed, it is even desirable.
prorogation of 261–62
special 258–59, 263
place of
performance 263–63
residence
scope of 257
subject matter 262
substantial
connection
with UK 268
updating of 256–57
websites 264–65
writing 263
Bulk goods,
See Unascertained
goods
Bulletin boards 423–24, 428, 431–33
Caching 289
Care and skill 239–10
Cash machines 453–54
Celebrities 521, 531–32
Child pornography 490–92, 495–99
China,
See People’s
Republic
of China
Choice of law 271, 275
Click wrap 123
Codes of practice
data protection 361–62, 423
self-regulation 361–62
Commissioned works 116
Comparison
abstraction-filtration-
comparison test 37–41, 44, 47–50
software 37–41, 44, 47–50
Compensation 409
Competition 9
Compilation,
See, also,
Decomposition 18–19, 23, 46–47
Computer fraud 449–74
alteration of data 470–73
ATMs, phantom
withdrawals from 453–54
authorisation 468–69
bank transfers 450–51
construction 466–70
criminal damage 457–60
defection 453–55
definition 449–50
destruction of data 470–73
electronic transfers 454–55
forgery 456–57
hacking 455–74
input 450
‘instruments’ 456
jurisdiction 450
Law Commission 450, 453, 458–72
phantom
withdrawals 453–65
program 450
response to 450
Scottish Law
Commission 452–53, 460
theft 454–55
Trojan horse 473
viruses 472–74
Computer misuse,
See, also, Computer
fraud 447–49, 474–78
compulsive
behaviour 476–78
criminal offences 475–78
employment 475
hacking 475–78
Law Commission 474–75
review of
provisions on 474
unfair contract terms 176–77
United States 476
viruses 478
Confidentiality,
See Breach of confidence
Consideration 108–11
Construction
computer fraud 466–67
ccontra proferentem rule 133–34
exemption clauses 133–54
unfair contract terms 133–54
Contra proferentem rule 133–34
Contracts,
See, also, Exemption clauses; Software contracts; Terms;
Unfair contract terms
acceptance 124–25, 127, 300–07
acquisition 124–26
automated 295–96
Brussels Convention 1968 259–60
consumer 259–60, 264–65, 272–73, 278–81
defective software 171–218
electronic
commerce 287, 293, 294–308
formalities 308
formation of 296–308
governing law 270–80
hardware 93
invitation to treat 296–99
offer 124–25, 127, 296–99
signatures 320, 323–24
turnkeys 190–99
UNCITRAL Model
Law on Electronic Commerce 296
writing 319
Cooling off period 335–36
Copyright
back-ups 15
Berne Convention 10, 59
breakdown
of system 504
databases 56–58, 61
decomposition 56–58, 61
defective software 178–79
downloading 507
EC law 506, 508–11
harmonisation 504–07, 509–11
internet 503–11
service providers 508, 510
Japan 11–13
liability 508
literary works 15–16, 22–28, 36–37, 46
object codes 22, 27, 28
permitted
reproduction,
extent of 507
piracy 11–12
reproduction right 509–10
software 8–9, 10–16, 21–36, 40–48, 52–54, 83
contracts 115–17, 119
source codes 22, 27, 28
substantial part 28, 54–55
substantial
similarity 28, 47
WIPO 507–08
world wide web 515
Information Technology Law

Council of Europe 355–57, 360, 375–76, 385, 421–22
Credit cards 332
Criminal offences
  computer misuse 475–78
  fraud 449–74
  growth in
    computer crime 447
    hacking 176, 447
Cryptography
  data protection 342
  registration of 324
  signatures 320–21
  writing 318
Cybersquatting 521, 522, 524–25
Damage
  computer fraud 457, 460
  criminal 457, 460
  defamation 427–28
  product liability 219, 221
  unfair contract terms 176
Damages 130–31
Data protection 338–423
  administration 408–15
  accuracy of 405, 409
  adequate, relevant and not excessive data 403–04
  advertisements 392–95
  Bangemann Report 364–65
  Codes of Practice 361–62, 423
  compensation 409
  confidentiality 387–88, 390
  consent 399–402, 419
  Council of Europe 355–57, 360, 375–76, 385, 421–22
  criminal offences 387–88,
  402–03, 411–15
  data controllers 368
  data matching 338, 341
  data processors 368, 407–08
  Data Protection
    Commissioner 411–13
    data protection principles 367–68, 3387–416
  Data Protection Register 410–12
  Data Protection Registrar 410–12, 3416–17
  data subjects’ rights 370–73, 406, 408–15
  access 372, 408–09
  information to be given to 371–72
  objections 372–73
  direct marketing 392
  electronic commerce 418–20
  Electronic Privacy Information Center 341
  email 341
  encryption 342
  errors 405, 409
  exemptions 374–76, 416
  freedom of expression 376
  guidelines 354–55
  harmonisation 365, 377, 419
  information 392–97
  internet 417–18, 420, 422–23
  anonymity on 339–41
lawful processing,
criteria for 368–70, 387–402
lawful purposes,
   processing for 402–03
length of time for
   keeping data 406
legitimate
   expectations 391
Lindop Committee 345–46, 348–49
manual records 366
meaning 346
notification 373–74
OECD 346–47, 354–55, 357, 360, 420–21
opting out box 399–400
‘personal data’,
   meaning of 367
prior checks 374
‘processing of
   personal data’,
   meaning of 367
recklessness 414–15
regulation 349–63, 382–83, 421–23
remedies 408–15
risk assessment 342
safe harbor
   concept 383–84
security 406–08
self-regulation 350–52, 361–62, 421
sensitive data 370, 397–99
supervisory
   authorities, obligation
to notify 373–74
terminology 386

transborder
data flow 363–64, 377–84, 408, 418
UK, in 385–416
ultra vires rule 390
United States 341, 350, 360–63, 382–84
websites 341, 421
Working Party 379–83
Younger Committee 338–39, 351–53

Database rights 84–92
copyright 84–89
Directive on 86–92
EC law 86–92
extraction 90
harmonisation 91
novelty 85
originality 84–86
re-utilisation 90
sui generis rights 87–88
‘sweat of the brow’ test 85, 88
two tier system 88–89

Deceit 101

Decompiation
Australia 58–59
copyright 56–58, 61
definition 65
EC law 56, 59–61
fair use 56–58
interoperability 55–59
research 58–59
software 55–59, 61, 65
United States 56–58
WIPO 92

Defamation 423–46
Australia 424–25, 429
Brussels Convention 1968 443–45
bulletin boards 423–24, 428, 431–33
communication 428–31
damage 427–28, 443
definition 426
distributors 436–37, 442–43
Faulks Committee 426
flaming 423–24
harassment 423
hypertext 445
immunity 436
innocent dissemination 431–32
internet 423–31, 439–40
service providers 431–446
liability 431–36
libel 425–26
newsgroups 423–24, 427–28, 431, 439–40
permanence 425
publication 427–48
publishers 436–39
reputation 427–28
slander 425–26
United States 433–39
websites 431, 442, 445–46
Defective software
bespoke contracts 190–91
computer misuse 176–77
contracts 171–218
copyright 178–79
damage 176
description 192–202
errors 174
fitness for purpose 181–82, 186, 211–17
functional aspects 177–78
goods, software as 174–85
hacking 176
hardware 181–86
implied terms 171, 174, 181, 186–88, 191
information 174–78
intellectual property 178–80
product liability 219–47
quality 181, 186–88, 202–11
sale of goods 171–74, 180–218
satisfactory quality 186–88, 202–11
services 186–91
standard software 144, 191
supply 190–91
turnkey contracts 190–91
United States 180, 184
Delivery 104
Description
defective software 192–202
identity test 199–202
meaning 195–202
reliance 194–95
sale, by 192–202
unascertained goods 193, 199
Development
contracts 102–07
Development
risks defence 231–36
Direct marketing 392
Disclaimers 153–54
Distance selling
card payments 332
cooling off 335–36
directive on 327–36
EC law 327–36
electronic commerce 294, 327–36
e-mail 327
good faith 334–35
inertia selling 332
information 334–35
Index

performance 331–32
remedies 333
withdrawal right 330–31
writing 334–35
Documents 310–19
Domain names 520–32
bad faith 531–32
celebrities 521, 531–32
confusion 527, 529
conspiracy 524–25
country indications 520
cybersquatting 521, 522, 524–25
distinctiveness 521, 529
electronic commerce 530–32
famous names 521, 525, 529, 531–32
generic descriptors 520
ICANN 530–31, 532
injunctions 524–25, 528
misrepresentation 527
passing off 523–28, 530
service marks 531–32
top level 520–21
trade marks 521, 522, 524, 526–32
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy 531
United States 528–32
WIPO 531–32
Domicile 262–68
Downloading 507
Duress 111–14

EC law
Brussels Convention 1968 256–68, 443–45
copyright 506, 508–11
data protection 339–41, 347–48, 357–59, 362–85,

392, 418–22
databases 86–92
decomposition 56, 59–61
distance selling 327–36
electronic commerce 252–53, 256–68, 281–95, 300
free movement of goods 499
freedom of establishment 292
harmonisation 91, 365, 377, 419, 509–11
home country approach 291–92
internet, regulation of content on 498–501
Lugano Convention 256–68
product liability 220–21, 224–28, 231–35
shrink wrap licences 127–28
signatures 319–20, 322, 325–26
software 54, 59–66
contracts 117–23
sui generis rights 66
unfair contract terms 160–69, 277–78
writing 318–19
Economic loss 219
EFTA 256
Electronic commerce,
See, also, UNCITRAL
Model Law on Electronic Commerce 251–336
acceptance 300–07
basic information 292–93
Brussels Convention 1968 256–68
caching 289
communication,
effective 293–94
contracts 287, 293,
294–308
co-ordinated field 290–91
data protection 418–22
definition 251–52
Directive on 252–53,
281–95, 300
dispute resolution 294–95
distance selling 294, 327–36
domain names 530–32
EC law 252–53, 256–68,
281–95, 300
electronic data
interchange 254–55
facilitative
approach 292–93
freedom of
establishment 292
global nature of 252–53
goods 252
governing law 256, 270–80
home country
approach 291–92, 294
hosting 289–90
implied terms 253
intermediate service providers,
liability of 288–91, 294
jurisdiction 256–69
information society
services 281, 290–94
invitation to treat 296–99
Lugano
Convention 1988 256–68
offer 296–99
regulated professions 286–87
regulation 253–54,
286–87
Rome Convention
1980 271–80
scope 251–52
service providers 288–91, 294
services 252, 281,
290–4
signatures 308–09, 39–27
spamming 293–94
supply 291
unsolicited
communications 286, 293–94
writing 308–19
Electronic data
interchange 254–55
Electronic transfers 454–55
Email
acceptance 304–06
data protection 341
distance selling 327
Employment 475
Encryption,
See Cryptography
Errors
data protection 405, 409
defective software 174
product liability 223–24,
230, 234
software contracts 120–23
source codes 120, 122–23
European Free
Trade Association 256
European Patent
Convention 8, 67–68, 72–78
European Union,
See EC law
Examination 206–07
Exemption clauses
defective software 132–69
construction 132–54
contra proferentem rule 133–34
negligence 133–34
software contracts 106, 117
unfair contract
terms 106, 117,
132–69
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expert systems 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraction 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>decompilation 56–58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States 56–58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Famous names 521, 525, 529, 531–32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faulks Committee 426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filtration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abstraction-filtration-comparison test 37–41, 44, 47–50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>software 37–41, 44, 47–50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fitness for purpose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>defective software 181–82, 186, 211–17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>implied terms 171, 174, 181, 186–88, 191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘particular purpose’ 212–17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reasonableness 212, 216–17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reliance 216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>satisfactory quality 203, 210–12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sale of goods 171, 174, 181, 186–88, 191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flaming 423–24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forgery 456–57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Forum non conveniens</em> 268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framing 514–15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France, content on internet and 494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>See Computer fraud</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free movement of goods 499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>establishment 291–92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of expression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>data protection 376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>internet, regulation of content on 482–83, 488, 492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, internet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>content and 494–95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>defective software 174–85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>electronic commerce 252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>free movement of 499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>software, as 174–85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>software contracts 94–95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unascertained 193, 199, 215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governing law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contracts 270–80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>electronic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>commerce 256, 270–80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rome Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 270–80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>signatures 326–27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vienna Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guarantees 136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guiliano-Lagarde Report 270, 275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hacking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>compulsive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>behaviour 476–78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>computer fraud 455–74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>computer misuse 476–78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>defective software 176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>definition 468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardware 93, 181–83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harmonisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>copyright 504–07, 509–11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>data protection 365, 377, 419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>databases 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC law 91, 365, 377, 419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>509–11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harassment 423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and safety 227, 236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hire purchase 136–37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>approach 291–92, 294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hosting 289–90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyperlinks 511–20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypertext 445, 480–81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICANN 530–31, 532</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ideas
expressions, distinguishing from 31–35, 40, 43, 52–54
software 31–35, 40, 43, 52–54
United States 31–35, 40, 43

Implied terms,
See, also,
Fitness for purpose; Satisfactory quality
defective software 171, 174, 181, 186–88, 191
electronic commerce 253
merchantability 202–04, 206–09
samples, sale by 217–18
software contracts 102, 107

Indemnities 135–36

Individual, protecting the private 337–446
data protection 338–49, 363–423
defamation 423–46
regulatory approaches and initiatives 349–63

Information
basic 292–93
co-ordinated field 290–91
data protection 371, 392–97
defective software 174–78
distance selling 334–35
electronic commerce 281, 290–94
facilitative 292–93

Information society
services 281, 290–94
software, as 222

Inertia selling 332

Injunctions
domain names 530–31
unfair contract terms 157–58
world wide web 514–15

Inline linking 513
Innovation 245
Instructions 222
Insurance 153

Intellectual property
rights, See, also,
Copyright;
Patents; WIPO
internet 503–33
passing off 523–28, 530
software 5–92
defective 178–80
trademarks 521, 522, 524, 526–32
TRIPS Agreement 76–77
world wide web 511–20

Intermediaries
electronic commerce 288–91, 294
liability 288–91, 294

Internet, See, also,
Domain names;
Electronic commerce;
Websites;
World wide web
Australia 493
child pornography 490–92, 495–99

Community
Action Plan 500–01
copyright 503–11
content, regulation of 479–501
data protection 339–41, 417–18,
Index

420, 422–23
defamation 423–31, 439–40
divergence 482–83
downloading 507
EC law 498–501
France 494
free movement of goods 499
freedom of expression 482–83, 488, 492
Germany 494–95
intellectual property 503–33
Iran 494
obscenity 484, 496–97
paedophilia 496–97
People’s Republic of China 494
pornography 486, 488–99
imports of 497–98
privacy 339–41
pseudo-photographs 496–97
regulation of content on 479–501
self-regulation 484, 499–501
service providers content and 493–94
copyright 508, 510
defamation and 431–46
Singapore 493
United States 479–80, 484, 486–95
Interoperability
decompilation 55–59
object code 56
software 55–59
source code 56
Interpretation,
See Construction
Invitation to treat
electronic commerce 296–99
offer 296–99
website advertisements 299
Iran, internet content and 494
Japan
copyright 11–13
software 11–13
Jurisdiction
Brussels Convention 1968 256–68
common law 268–69
computer fraud 450
consumer contracts 259–60, 264–65
electronic commerce 256–69
exclusive 260–63
forum non conveniens 268
Lugano Convention 256–68
presence 268–69
proper law 308
prorogation 261–62
service out of the 269
special 258–59, 263
submission to 269
Keys 320–21
Knowledge 247
Languages
assembler 16–18, 24–25
software 16–18, 24–25
Legitimate expectations 391
Libel 425–26
Licences,
See also Shrink
wrap licences
licensing 101–02
software contracts 94, 101–02, 115–17, 120
terms 116–17
Lindop Committee 345–46, 348–49
Linking 511–20, 532
Literary works
adaptations 27
copyright 10, 15–16, 22–28, 36–37, 46
meaning 28
object codes 22, 27
software 10, 15–16, 22–28, 36–37, 45
source codes 25
translations 27
United States 36–37
Look and feel 30–31
Lugano Convention
1988
EC law 256–68
electronic commerce 256–68
jurisdiction 256–68
Merchantability 202–04, 206–09
Metatags 515, 517, 519–20
Misrepresentation
domain names 527
pre-contractual statements 99–101
software contracts 99–101
Mistakes,
See Errors
Models 13–14
Negligence,
See, also, Negligent misstatements
product liability 219, 227, 236–38
unfair contract terms 135–36, 143
Negligent misstatements
product liability 237
software contracts 101
Networks,
See Internet
Newsgroups 423–24, 427–28, 431, 439–40
Notices 310–19
Novelty 85
Object codes
copyright 22, 27, 28
interoperability 56
literary works 22, 27
software 19–23, 27–28
Obscenity 484, 496–97
Offer
advertisements 297–99
electronic commerce 296–99
invitations to treat 297–99
shrink wrap licences 124–25, 127
websites 297–99
Online systems 107, 121
Originality 84–86
Paedophilia 496–97
Passing of property 104
Passing off 523–28, 530
Patents
European Patent Convention 8, 67–68, 72–78
expert systems 79
petty 13–14
shell systems 79
software 8, 10, 13–14, 67–83
TRIPS 76–77
United States 68–69
WIPO 8
People’s Republic of China
internet, regulation of content on 494
software 54
Personal computers, growth in use of 5
Phantom withdrawals 453–54
Piracy 11–12
Pornography and the internet 486, 488–99
Postal rule 300–07
Pre-contractual statements 95–101
Privacy
definition 342–43
internet 339–41
Lindop Committee 345–46, 348–49
Younger Committee 338–39, 351–53
Product liability
ambulance services 219, 240–43
bespoke software 237–40
care and skill 239–40
causation 228–30, 241
customer expectations test 228
damage 219, 221
defective software 219–47
defects, whether 226–28
development risks defence 231–36
duty of care 241–43
EC law 220–21, 224–28, 231–35
economic loss 219
errors 223–24, 230, 234
health and safety 227, 236
innovation 245
instructions 222
knowledge 247
negligence 219, 227, 236–38
negligent misstatements 237
‘product’ 220–26
software engineering 238–39, 243
standard of care 241–46
strict liability 223, 227, 232, 235–36
warnings 222
Programs, See Software
Proper law 308
Quality,
See, also, Satisfactory quality
defective software 181, 186–88, 202–11
pre-contractual statements 95–101
software contracts 95–101
Receipt acceptance 300–07
Rome Convention
1980 279
Regulation
Codes of Practice 361–62
data protection 249–63, 349–63,
382–83, 421–23
electronic
commerce 253–54, 286–87
individuals,
protection
of private 349–63
internet,
content on 479–501
regulated
professions 286–87
self-regulation 350–52,
361–62, 421
United States 382–84
Remedies
compensation 409
damages 130–01
data protection 408–15
distance selling 333
injunctions 157–58, 514–15,
530–31
shrink wrap
licences 130–31
Reproduction rights 509–10
Research 58–59
Residence 268
Re-utilisation 90
Reverse engineering,
See Decompilation
Rome Convention
1980
advertisements 279–80
applicable law 271–75, 280
choice of law 271, 275, 278
closest connection,
country of 275–76
consumer contracts 272–73,
278–81
electronic commerce 270–80
exclusions 270
freedom of choice 271
governing law 270–80
Guiliano-Lagarde
Report 270, 275
mandatory rules 276–78
place of business 275–76
receipt 279
signatures 326–27
supply 270
unfair contract
terms 276–78
websites 280
Safety
ambulance services 219 240–43
health and 227, 236
product liability 219, 240–43
Sale of goods
defective software 171–74,
180–218
description 192–202
fitness for
purpose 171, 174, 181,
186–88, 191
merchantability 202–04,
206–09
satisfactory
quality 171, 174,
181, 186–88
samples, sale by 191, 208–12
Samples, sale by 217–18
Satisfactory quality
back-up copies 210
business, sale in
course of 204–05
defective software 186–89,
202–11
examination 206–07
exceptions 206–08
fitness for purpose 203, 210–12
implied terms 204–11
meaning 208–11
merchantability 202–04,
Index

206–09
reasonableness 209
sale of goods 171, 174, 181, 186–88, 191, 208–12
Search engines 517–18
Security 406–08
Self-regulation 350–52, 421, 484, 499–501
Service marks 531–32
Service out
of jurisdiction 269
Service providers
content 493–94
copyright 508, 510
defamation 431–34
electronic
commerce 288–91
intermediate 288–91
internet 431–34,
493–94,
508, 510
liability 288–91
Services,
See, also, Service
providers
electronic commerce 252, 281, 290–94
software
contracts 94–95
defective 186–91
Shrink wrap licences
acceptance 124–25, 127
acquisition contracts 124–26
click wrap 123
damages 130–31
defective software 123–32
EC law 127–28
effectiveness of 129–30
envelope,
opening the 127–29
incorporation
by notice 125–26
lawful acquirers 127
lawful use 127
offer 124–25, 127
software contracts 94, 123–32
terms 124–26
websites,
downloading
from 123–24
Signatures
advanced
electronic 326
authenticity 323–24
contracts 320, 323–24
cryptography 320–21, 324
Directive on 325
EC law 319–20, 322, 325–26
electronic
commerce 308–09,
319–25
equal treatment 309–10
hierarchy of 324–26
integrity 323–24
keys 320–21
meaning 321–22,
325–26
secure-signature-
creation device 326
UNCITRAL Draft
Uniform Rules 324–25
UNCITRAL Model
Law on Electronic
Commerce 309
Singapore, internet
content and 493
Slander 425–26
Software,
See, also,
Bespoke software;
Defective software;
Software contracts
abstraction-filtration-
comparison test 37–41, 44,
interoperability 55–59
investment in 6
Japan 11–13
literary works 10, 15–16, 22–28, 336–37, 45
look and feel 30–31
object codes 19–23, 27–28
patents 8, 10, 11, 367–83
Directive on 83
petty 13–14
People’s Republic of China 54
personal computers, growth in use of 5–6
piracy 11–12
programming 19–20
protecting 5–92
restricted acts 60–61
scope of protection 28–55
shell systems 79
source codes 21–22, 24–26, 28, 46
standard 191
substantial part 28, 54–55
substantial similarity 28, 47
sui generis rights 10, 66
technical contributions 83
trade, protection as a basis for 7
trade secrets 9
translations 25–27, 65
TRIPS Agreement 54, 76–77
unfair competition 9
utility models 13–14
United States 11–14, 20–22, 28, 30–45, 62–63, 68–69
WIPO Model Provisions 5–10
**Index**

Software contracts 9, 61, 93–169
- acceptance tests 105–06
- back-ups 119–20
- bespoke software 93, 95, 102, 107–08
- commissioned
  - works 116
- consideration 108–11
- copyright 115–17, 119
- deceit 101
- delivery 104–05
- development
  - contracts 102–07
- Directive on 117–21
- duress 111–14
- EC law 117–23
- error correction 120–23
- exemption clauses 106, 117, 132–69
- further work 104–05
- goods, software as 94–95
- implied terms 102, 107
- lawful acquirer 118
- lawful user 118–19
- licences 94, 101, 115–17, 120
  - shrink wrap 123–32
- misrepresentation 99–101
- modification of
  - contractual
  - obligations 106–14
- negligent
  - misstatements 101
- online systems 107, 121
- passing of property 104
- pre-contractual
  - statements 95–101
  - terms, as 96–101
- quality 95–101
- services, software as 94–95
- source code 120–23
- standard software 93, 95, 107–08
- suitability 95–101
- terms 101–02
  - pre-contractual
    - statements, as 96–101
- unfair 106, 117, 132–69
  - types of 93
  - unfair contract
    - terms 106, 117, 132–69
- Software engineering 238–39, 243
- Source codes
  - adaptations 24–25
  - copyright 22, 26, 28
  - errors 120, 122–23
  - interoperability 56
  - literary works 25
  - software 21–22, 24–26, 28, 46
  - United States 22
- Spamming 293–94
- Standard contract
  - terms
  - satisfactory quality 191
  - unfair contract
    - terms 144
- Standard of care 241–46
- Standard software 93, 95, 102, 107–08, 191
- Sui generis protection
  - databases 87–88
  - EC law 66
  - software 10, 66
- Supply
  - defective software 190–96
  - electronic
    - commerce 291
    - Rome Convention 1980 270
- System shells 79
- Telex 300–07
- Terms,
See, also,
Implied terms;
Unfair contract terms
incorporation,
notice by 125–26
licensing 101, 116–17
pre-contractual statements 96–101
shrink wrap licences 124–26
software contracts 96–102, 107
standard contract terms 144
Theft 454–55
Trade
secrets 9
software 7, 9
Trademark
infringement 515–22, 524,
526–32
Transborder data flow 363–64, 377–84
Translations
definition 65
literary works 27
software 25–27, 65
TRIPS Agreement
patents 76–77
software 54, 76–77
Trojan horse 473
Turnkey contracts 190–99

Ultra vires 390
Unascertained goods
description,
sale by 193, 199
samples, sale by 218
UNCITRAL Draft
Law on Electronic Signatures 324–25
UNCITRAL Model
Law on Electronic Commerce 306–07
acceptance 306
contracts 296
signatures 309
writing 309, 314,
316–18
Unfair contract terms
black lists 145
construction 133–54
consumer,
dealing as 138, 144–49,
168
core terms 168
disclaimers 153–54
EC law 160–69,
277–78
exemption clauses 106, 117,
132–69
fairness test 168
hire purchase 136–37
indemnities 135
injunctions 157–58
insurance 153–54
negligence 135, 143
reasonableness 138, 140–41,
144, 159–54
Regulations on 154–69
Rome Convention 1980 276–78
software contracts 106, 117
standard
contract terms 144
Unfair competition 9
Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution
Policy 531
United States
breach of confidence 45
computer misuse 476
copyright 11–14, 20–22,
28, 30, 32–45,
62–63, 68–69,
506–07
Index

data protection 341, 350, 382–84
decompilation 56–58
defamation 433–38
defective software 180, 184
domain names 528–32
fair use 56–58
ideas distinguished from expressions 31–35, 40, 43
internet, regulation of content on 479–80, 484, 486–95
literary works 36–37
metatags 515
obscenity 484
patents 68–69
regulation 382–84
safe harbor concept 383–84
software 11–13, 20–22, 28, 30–44, 63
source programs 22
world wide web 514–15
Unsolicited communications 286, 293–94
Utilisation databases 90
re-utilisation 90
Utility models 13–14

Vienna Convention 1980 270
Viruses 472–74, 478

Warnings 222
Websites,
See, also, World
wide web
acceptance 304–07
advertisements 297–99
Brussels Convention 1968 264–65
data protection 341, 421
defamation 431, 442, 445–46

invitation to treat 299
offer 297–99
Rome Convention 1980 280
shrink wrap licences 123–24

WIPO
copyright 507–09
databases 92
domain names 531–32
Model Provisions 6–10
patents 8
software 5–10

World Intellectual Property Organisation,
See WIPO

World wide web,
See, also, Internet
advertisements 514, 517–19
confusion, evidence of 516–20
copyright 515
dilution 518–19
direct links 513
framing 514–15
hyperlinks 511–20
hypertext 445, 480–81
injunctions 514–15
inline linking 513
intellectual property 511–20
linking 511–20, 532
metatags 515, 517, 519–20
newspaper headlines 512–13
search engines 517–18
trademark infringement 515–20
United States 514–15

Writing
Brussels Convention 1968 263
contracts 319
cryptography 318
distance selling 334–35
documents 310–17
EC law 318–19
electronic
commerce 307–19
equal treatment 309

notices 310–17
UNCITRAL Model
Law on Electronic
Commerce 309, 314,
316–18
Younger Committee 338–39, 351–53