Abstract

This study examines the constitutional power to appoint senior civil and military officials in Maghreb countries (Mauritania, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia), viewing this power as a logical corollary and inevitable necessity of the regulatory authority vested in the executive branch. It proceeds from the premise that the distribution of this power between the head of state and the government reflects the nature of the prevailing political system and the degree of functional separation between the presidency and the government. Using a comparative analytical method, the study surveys the relevant constitutional, legislative, and regulatory texts across the four countries, addressing two main themes: first, the appointment power granted exclusively to the head of state; and second, the appointment power exercised jointly with the government through the Council of Ministers. The study concludes that appointment authority over strategic and sensitive civil and military positions remains, in essence, an exclusive or near-exclusive prerogative of the head of state, generally non-delegable. By contrast, the government's role in less strategic appointments decided within the Council of Ministers is limited to proposing candidates, with final decision-making authority retained by the head of state. The study also highlights relative variation in the scope of this power among the four states: the expansion of the Head of Government's appointment powers is more pronounced in Morocco than in Algeria, and although both countries' recent constitutional amendments (2011 in Morocco and 2020 in Algeria) relatively broadened the Head of Government's role, it remains limited compared to the central authority retained by the head of state.