Abstract

The study concludes that parliamentary fact-finding committees within the Moroccan constitutional and parliamentary experience have thus far failed to fulfill their fundamental constitutional role—serving as a vital legal mechanism for Parliament to oversee government action and hold the executive branch accountable— despite the reduction in the quorum required for their formation as stipulated in Article 67 of the current Constitution. Parliamentary practice in Morocco has not demonstrated significant activity or a clear capacity to utilize this constitutional tool, in contrast to many comparative constitutional systems—such as those of Britain, France, and Spain—where such committees play a pivotal role in monitoring, tracking, and evaluating the performance of the ruling political authority. —as this experience has seen the formation of only a very limited number of such committees, to the point where their establishment has effectively become a practice that is virtually non-existent in constitutional terms. The primary reason for this lies in a set of normative, legislative, and regulatory constraints governing their operations, alongside political impediments that actively hinder the conduct of parliamentary inquiries by these committees; this has weakened Parliament’s oversight authority and diminished the constitutional standing of the legislative institution. On this basis, it has become essential to review the legal and regulatory framework governing the work of these committees and to act with genuine, serious political will—aiming to strengthen their oversight role, facilitate the performance of their duties vis-à-vis the executive branch and its affiliated bodies, respect the fundamental role of the legislative institution, and uphold the constitutional powers vested in it.

Keywords

Parliamentary Committees; Parliamentary Practice; Normative Constraints; Parliamentary Control.